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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation investigates the role that eros in general, and philosophical eros in 
particular, plays in the search for the eidos of the beautiful in Plato’s Hippias Major. It defends 
the claim that noesis of the eidos of the beautiful can only be accomplished within the life of 
philosophical eros, that is, within the life of eros which is directed toward the good. As such this 
dissertation aims both to provide an interpretive key to the Hippias Major, allowing us to read 
the dialogue in a rich and novel way, and also to make the claim that the Hippias Major presents 
us with a picture of the interrelation between eros, philosophy, and beauty, and about how these 
three elements manifest themselves in human life. As such, some continuities and parallels can 
be found between it and the other two dialogues which deal most explicitly with beauty and eros, 
the Phaedrus and Symposium. 
The first five chapters interpret a particular section of the Hippias Major according to 
role the eros plays within it, attempting to show that eros, both in general and in its unique 
manifestation as philosophical eros, is a crucial mediating term for any comprehensive 
understanding of any section of the dialogue, and therefore of the dialogue as a whole. In each of 
these five chapters, I will articulate the role that eros plays within the search for obtaining a 
noetic glance at the eidos of the beautiful. The first chapter demonstrates how Socrates’s 
philosophical eros gives birth to the question about the beautiful itself within the context of a 
discussion about sophistry and money. The second chapter shows how Socrates’s philosophical 
engagement with Hippias’s definitions of the eidos of the beautiful generates a dialectic of 
ascent, allowing Hippias to expand his understanding of what counts as beautiful in a trajectory 
that mirrors Diotima’s ascent in the Symposium. The third chapter articulates the erotic 
significance of Socrates’s claim that the eidos of the beautiful inheres in being and not 
appearances. The fourth chapter gauges the erotic significance of Socrates’s and Hippias’s claim 
that the beautiful is good, and the good beautiful. The fifth chapter interprets the comic and 
tragic aspects of the dialogue in terms of philosophical eros, its rejection and fulfillment. 
The sixth chapter will take stock of the overall interpretation of the Hippias Major 
developed in the first five chapters, and will present the overarching view about the relationship 
between the contemplation of beauty, on the one hand, and desire for possession of beauty and 
moral concern, on the other, which one can glean from the character and action of Socrates in 
Hippias Major.  It will bring this view into a conversation with the notion of “liking devoid of 
interest” which is found in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. The conclusion of this dissertation will 
underscore the principle claim, that the philosophical search for the eidos of the beautiful can 
neither be separated from the eros which beauty inspires in a human being, nor can it be 
accomplished without one’s eros being directed toward the good, and that this philosophical 
search is marked by suffering and possible tragedy. 
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Introduction 
 
This dissertation will examine the principal function that eros has for making an adequate 
interpretation of the Hippias Major, in particular with respect to the goal that the dialogue sets 
out to accomplish. In arguing this, I am making a two-sided claim: first, that the concept of eros 
is a key to unlocking much of the meaning of the dialogue, and second, that the dialogue depicts 
something essential about the relationship between beauty, eros, and philosophy. In the Hippias 
Major, Socrates sets out to define “the beautiful itself,” which is identified as an eidos, or form, 
which causes a thing to be beautiful, “when added” (ἐπειδὰν προσγένηται, 289d). While in the 
Phaedrus, Charmides, and the Symposium, beauty is primarily spoken of as the object of eros, in 
the Hippias Major, it is an object of both eros (because beauty is portrayed as desirable and 
attractive), as well as noesis (given that the attempt to define the beautiful itself is also an attempt 
to know it). I will pursue the question of the role that the eros for the beautiful plays in the search 
for the eidos of the beautiful in the Hippias Major.  
Ultimately, my argument is that the Hippias Major is a dramatic presentation of the idea 
that there cannot be noesis of the beautiful without eros for the good (i.e., philosophical eros). 
The dialogue shows us that while beautiful beings are often the object of eros, the intelligible 
form (eidos) of beautiful beings is only disclosed to the one who loves the good (i.e., the 
philosopher). By doing so, the Hippias Major follows the same path of the Symposium and the 
Phaedrus in depicting the beautiful is an ally to the noetic aspirations of philosophical discourse. 
In a sense, the Hippias Major begins near the top of Diotima’s ladder and works backwards. 
Diotima says that the penultimate rung on the Ladder of Love is the place where the lover of the 
Good “gives birth to many gloriously beautiful ideas and theories, in unstinting love of wisdom 
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[ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ]” (210d, emphasis mine), a rung through which the lover must pass in 
order to reach the beautiful “itself by itself with itself” (ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ 
μονοειδὲς, 211b). In contrast, the Hippias Major begins its investigation of beauty by having 
Socrates posit that the beautiful itself “is something” (287c), i.e., an intelligible form distinct 
from its particular instantiations, and then proceeds to show (through dialectic and dramatic 
characterization) why only a particular kind of soul, one whose eros desires the good above all 
things, will be able to adequately approach that form, and be able to make any noetic insights 
into its nature.1 In both dialogues, beautiful beings shine forth most radiantly—that is, in a way 
that most clearly communicates their eidetic nature—to someone who seeks to know the good, 
i.e., to the philosopher. More so than in Diotima’s discourse in the Symposium, the Hippias 
Major illustrates the corresponding practical and political claims that are required of the would-
be knower of the beautiful itself. But the Hippias Major goes about presenting all of this in a 
way that is quite different from the mythological visions of Diotima’s discourse in the 
Symposium, or those expressed by Socrates in his second speech in the Phaedrus. Instead of 
grand visions, the Hippias Major gives us a meticulous dialectical inquiry into the different ways 
we use the word, “beautiful,” and concerns the multivalent dimensions of beauty as it manifests 
itself in human life. Most importantly, while on the one hand, Diotima’s ascent culminates in the 
“sudden” (ἐξαίφνης, 210e) encounter with the beautiful itself, an encounter which suggests that 
the tension between appearance and being has somehow been overcome, on the other, the 
Hippias Major depicts an erotic ascent toward the beautiful itself as it would take play out on 
this finite plane of human life, in which the encounter with the beautiful itself must always be 
mediated by appearance, and is therefore always partial, incomplete and, as I will suggest, 
marked by tragic suffering. 
                                                          
1 Both quotations come from Alexander Nehamas’s translation of the Symposium. 
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Beyond pointing out these expository and genre differences between the Hippias Major 
and the Symposium and Phaedrus, however, it is also a goal of this dissertation to point to the 
deep philosophical kinship between the Hippias Major and these two more famous dialogues.2 In 
an effort to bring this kinship to light, I will cite passages from both the Phaedrus and the 
Symposium which contain arguments or situations that mirror and perhaps illuminate those which 
occur in the Hippias Major. I also hope to bring the Hippias Major into dialogue with 
contemporary aesthetics, by considering whether Plato’s treatment of beauty, knowledge, and 
desire in the Hippias Major can give us a new perspective from which to resolve the tension in 
modern aesthetics between pleasure and moral concern, on the one hand, and the Kantian notion 
of the “disinterestedness” of aesthetic contemplation, on the other. It is in conversation with the 
Kantian theory that the philosophical importance of the Hippias Major becomes most clear. 
In what follows, I will lay out the necessary propaedeutic elements to my interpretation 
of the Hippias Major. First, I will make an examination of the status quaestionis with regard to 
the Hippias Major and the theme of eros. Second, I will outline the method I will apply in my 
own study of the topic. Third, I will sketch out provisional definitions of the key terms in my 
study. This will require a short treatment of eros, philosophical eros, and noesis, as well as a 
                                                          
2 An argument has already been made about the dramatic connection between these three dialogues, one which 
suggests that a deeper, philosophical kinship also exists. Drew Hyland writes: “Cleary [the Hippias Major] takes 
place in Athens, where Hippias is on state business, and since he could not have traveled safely from Elis (near 
Sparta) during the active periods of the Peloponnesian War, most scholars put the dramatic date of the dialogue as 
between 421 and 416 BC, that is, during the famous ‘peace of Nicias.’ This is especially noteworthy when we 
compare it with the dramatic dates of the Symposium and Phaedrus. Especially if we push the date of Hippias’s visit 
(and so this dialogue) toward its later range – that is, near to 416 – it means that Plato has Socrates engage in three 
dialogues during this approximate period, each of which deals thematically with the question of to kalon. For the 
Symposium can be dramatically dated with some precision to February, 416 BC (the occasion of the festival where 
Agathon won his first prize for tragedy); and the Phaedrus with less precision, as occurring between 418 and 416 
BC. The Platonic Socrates, it seems, was at this point in his life (in his middle fifties) very concerned with the 
question of beauty.” See Drew A. Hyland, Plato and the Question of Beauty (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2008), 10. 
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longer excursus on the word to kalon, the central concern of the Hippias Major. Finally, I will 
make a brief outline of the six chapters which comprise my study.  
Status Quaestionis 
 Before entering into the actual question of my dissertation, a brief note should be made 
about authenticity. The Hippias Major is one of a group of Platonic dialogues whose authenticity 
has been doubted in the last two centuries. Doubts about its authorship were raised by Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, mainly due to his judgment that the Socrates’s vituperation of Hippias in the 
dialogue “indisputably appears here under a far coarser form” than Socrates’s attacks of his 
opponents in other dialogues. Yet while Schleiermacher says that such vulgarity “may perhaps 
excite a suspicion in the minds of many as to the genuineness of the dialogue,” he does not in the 
end exclude it from the Platonic canon.3 Rather, he chalks up the moments of Socratic harshness 
to stylistic inconsistency precipitated by Plato’s use of the strange “unnamed friend” device in 
the dialogue. However, Schleiermacher’s followers went one further and did question the 
authenticity of the dialogue, thus inaugurating several decades of academic dispute about the 
issue. This dispute is nicely summarized by Paul Woodruff in his 1982 study of the Hippias 
Major, which accompanies his translation of it.4 Woodruff also makes an argument in support of 
Platonic authorship, an argument which seems to have convinced most scholars who have 
studied and written about the dialogue in his wake. With few exceptions, most scholars writing 
after Woodruff have operated under the assumption that the Hippias Major was written by 
Plato.5 I also follow this assumption. Moreover, the text is as rich in philosophical content as any 
                                                          
3 Friedrich Schleiermarcher, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato. William Dobson, trans. (Cambridge, MA: Arno 
Press, 1973), 344. 
4 Paul Woodruff, Plato: Hippias Major (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), 94-103.  
5
 Perhaps the most notable exception is Charles Kahn, who has taken to criticize Woodruff’s book on just this point. 
See Charles Kahn, “The Beautiful and the Genuine: A discussion of Paul Woodruff, Plato, Hippias Major. 
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Platonic dialogue and (as I will attempt to show) it can be brought into useful dialogue with other 
Platonic works. 
 Perhaps because that the dialogue’s authenticity was doubted for so long, in the twentieth 
century only a few scholars have attempted to make a comprehensive interpretation of the 
dialogue: Dorothy Tarrant,6 Paul Woodruff,7 Ivor Ludlam,8 Seth Benardete,9 Christopher 
Bruell,10 Maria Teresa Liminita,11 and David Sweet.12 None of these interpretations make an 
explicit investigation of the theme of eros, and indeed the topic is only mentioned briefly in 
Benardete’s and Sweet’s work. Indeed, no scholar has made an extensive treatment of the theme 
of eros in the Hippias Major. This is no doubt largely due to the fact that, as Seth Benardete 
points out, “Neither [Socrates nor Hippias] mentions the charm or attractiveness of the beautiful. 
The beautiful is not lovely. The word for sexual intercourse occurs, but not eros nor any of its 
cognates.”13 Notice, however, that Benardete seemingly presents us with an argument where the 
conclusion does not follow from the premise. It is indeed a fact that the word “eros” does not 
appear in the Hippias Major. But it does not necessarily follow that given this fact, the dialogue 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Translated with Commentary and Essay, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3 (1985): 261-287. In his own, book-
length study of the Hippias Major (the only book-length study to come out after Woodruff’s), Ivor Ludlam chooses 
to take an agnostic stance on the question, though he does also supply arguments in favor of authenticity. See Ivor 
Ludlam, Hippias Major: An Interpretation (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991). In one of the most recently-
published pieces of scholarship about the Hippias Major, Drew Hyland does not rehearse the arguments in favor of 
authenticity, considering the matter to be either settled or moot (because of the high philosophical quality of the 
dialogue). See Hyland, Plato and the Question of Beauty, 6. 
6 Dorothy Tarrant. The Hippias Major, attributed to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928). 
7 Woodruff, Hippias Major, 94-103. 
8 See Ivor Ludlam, Hippias Major: An Interpretation (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991). 
9 In the Introduction to Seth Benardete, The Being of the Beautiful: Plato’s Theatetus, Sophist, and Statesman 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984). 
10 Bruell, Christopher. On the Socratic Education: An Introduction to the Shorter Platonic Dialogues. New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. (See chapter, “Greater Hippias”). 
11 Maria Teresa Liminita, II problema della bellezza-Autenticita e significato dell’Ippia Maggiore di Platone (Milan: 
CELUC, 1974). 
12 Sweet, David R. “Introduction to the Greater Hippias.” In The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten 
Platonic Dialogues, edited by Thomas L. Pangle (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 340-355. 
13 Seth Benardete, The Being of the Beautiful: Plato’s Theatetus, Sophist, and Statesman (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1984), xx.  
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tells us that “the beautiful is not lovely.” Instead, this is an assumption, and a dubious one. In the 
common sense of the ancient Greek word, kallos and to kalon carry a connotation of 
attractiveness and, therefore, of desirability.14 Even in English, it would be odd to have a 
discussion about beauty which was not also, in some implicit way at least, about desire. Since the 
Hippias Major is a drama, it would behoove a scholar to search for signs of eros in the characters 
and action, and not only in the words used. Moreover, in Plato an absence is often as significant 
as a presence. Hyland points out that the absence of any reference to beauty in the Aristophanic 
discourse in the Symposium sets up a contrast with Diotima’s speech which does mention the 
term; the upshot of this discrepancy is, according to Hyland, to highlight the essential importance 
of beauty for the fulfillment of eros.15 I will argue that a similar thing occurs in the Hippias 
Major: eros is not absent, but merely not mentioned. It is present insofar as it is enacted by both 
Hippias and Socrates, that is, insofar as it informs their actions and thinking depicted in the 
dialogue, and as a concept which underlies most of the definitions of the beautiful presented in 
the dialogue.  
 In searching for the erotic dimension of a dialogue which does not make an explicit 
theme of eros (in the way that the Symposium, Phaedrus, Alcibiades I, Lysis, and at times the 
Republic do), nor mention the word altogether (as many other Platonic dialogues do), I am aided 
by the growing scholarship which seeks to trace the erotic thread that runs through all of Plato’s 
works. Foremost among these is the work of Jill Gordon, who in Plato’s Erotic World argues 
                                                          
14 See Dover’s discussion of the word in K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), 69-73. See also the chapter, “Beauty in Greek,” in David Konstan, Beauty: The 
Fortunes of an Ancient Greek Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
15
 “It comes as a stunning recognition that Aristophanes’ is the only speech in the entire Symposium that does not so 
much as mention to kallos. The word or any of its cognates is missing entirely from his speech and his speech 
alone.” Drew Hyland, “The Whole Comedy and Tragedy of Philosophy; On Aristophanes’ Speech in Plato’s 
Symposium.” Norsk filosofik tidsskrift 48 (2013): 17. 
7 
 
that eros permeates all Platonic dialogues.16 Gordon describes eros as forming part of a 
cosmology, in which eros is “a journey from the origin of the cosmos and human origins, 
through various types of human self-cultivation, concluding with human destiny as a return to 
our origins.”17 But eros also manifests itself in the motivation that humans possess, to do the 
work of self-cultivation and to pursue the quest for their origins: “Eros shapes what we pursue 
and how we pursue it,” and “It directs the activities of the psuche to philosophy and its divine 
origins.”18 As a shaping and directing force, eros manifests itself as questioning, courage, 
matchmaking (or finding a lover), self-knowledge, and memory.19 Gordon also builds upon the 
fact that Socrates claims to have erotic expertise.20 Closer to our theme of the relationship 
between eros and noesis, Drew Hyland, David Roochnik, and David Schindler have all written 
extensively about the erotic structure of philosophical discourse and questioning, each in their 
own way showing how Plato’s dramatic depiction of philosophy is thoroughly erotic. Drew 
Hyland has written about the “interrogative stance” which is proper to Socratic discourse, a 
stance which is a manifestation of the erotic nature of human being.21 Roochnik has pointed out 
that philosophical discourse in Plato must be understood as having as its object not only “being 
as being,” but “being as being as desired.”22 He has also done work in distinguishing techne from 
                                                          
16 “Symposium, Phaedrus, Charmides, Lysis, Alcibiades I, and perhaps Republic are considered Plato’s ‘erotic 
dialogues’ because interlocutors discuss eros, and erotic relations among the interlocutors are dramatically 
portrayed. These dialogues, of course, shape scholars’ investigations of erotic desire in Plato’s work. But they also 
circumscribe those investigations. In actuality, Plato’s entire world is permeated with eros.” Gordon, Plato’s Erotic 
World, 1. 
17 Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World, 2. 
18 Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World, 2. 
19 Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World, 7-11. 
20 Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World, 1. 
21 See Drew Hyland, The Virtue of Philosophy: Interpretation of Plato’s “Charmides” (Cleveland: Ohio University 
Press, 1982). Further discussion on the theme of eros and philosophical discourse are found in Drew Hyland, 
Finitude and Transcendence in the Platonic Dialogues (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), as well as Plato and the 
Question of Beauty. 
22 David Roochnik, “The Erotics of Philosophical Discourse.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987): 127. 
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philosophical discourse, and grounds this distinction in part on the erotic nature of the latter.23 
David Schindler’s recent work has developed a theory of Platonic philosophy as being “ecstatic” 
and “bonocentric,” meaning that it has an erotic structure and accepts that the standard for truth 
is not a correct, exhaustive, discursive account made by the philosopher, but an ever-distant 
ideal, the Good, which is the principle of the intelligibility of reality but which cannot be fully 
grasped by human consciousness.24 The work of all of the above-mentioned scholars will furnish 
the required hermeneutical tools which I will use to uncover the presence of eros in the Hippias 
Major. In other words, their work provides a way to see the work of eros in a text where the 
word is not explicitly mentioned, but where its characters are driven by it. 
Method and Terms 
 About the method employed in this dissertation, the first things to point out is that the 
method takes into account not only the philosophical content of the dialogue (the arguments, 
elenchi, definitions, etc.) but also its dramatic content (characters, action, setting, allusions, etc.). 
The two dimensions of the text are, as far as the purposes of my interpretation goes, deeply 
interrelated.25 While attention will be paid to the exclusively philosophical content of the 
dialogue, by evaluating the arguments the Socrates and Hippias make in favor of a definition or a 
                                                          
23 See David Roochnik, Of Art and Wisdom: Plato’s Understanding of Techne (University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State Press, 1996). Also David Roochnik, The Tragedy of Logos. 
24 See Schindler, D.C. Plato’s Critique of Impure Reason: On Goodness and Truth in the Republic (Washington, 
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008). Also: Schindler, D.C. “Plato and the Problem of Love.” Apeiron: 
A Journal of Ancient Philosophy and Science 40 (2007). 
25
 In his critical treatment of Woodruff’s commentary of the Hippias Major, Ronald Polansky recommends looking 
for philosophical significance in the dramatic aspects of this dialogue. This method is required, Polansky argues, 
because the philosophical content of a Platonic dialogue can never be completely extricated from the dialogue form: 
“When, however, he [Woodruff] turns to assessing the interaction of the characters in the dialogue, he tends toward 
less minute inquiry. But the dialogue must be mined as strenuously for the evidence of an interpretation of the 
character of its participants as for the presuppositions of its arguments.” See Ronald Polansky, “Reading Plato: Paul 
Woodruff and the Hippias Major,” in Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings. Ed. Charles Griswold (New York: 
Routledge, 1988), 209. While we agree with Polansky on both his claim about the inextricability of the dialogue 
form from the philosophical content, as well as with his critique of Woodruff’s treatment of character, we will go 
further and analyze other dramatic aspects as well, especially action. 
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modification of a definition of the beautiful, as much or more attention will be paid to the way, 
and direction toward which, the dialogue develops, of the allusions which are summoned by the 
examples, and of the dramatic character (either comic or tragic) of the dialogue as a whole. The 
full philosophical meaning of the dialogue cannot be approached without taking into account 
these dramatic elements.  
To explain more clearly what I mean by this, I appeal here to the distinction made by 
Rosemary Desjardins between external and internal examples (paradeigmata) in Platonic 
discourse.26 The external examples are those explicitly cited by Socrates or an interlocutor. In the 
Hippias Major, these examples will range from tools to animals to gods. These examples serve a 
function in the philosophical argument being made at that particular moment in the dialogue. But 
there are also internal examples, those “self-referential examples that are truly pivotal for this 
question of interpretation—that is to say, those examples Plato provides within the fabric of a 
concurrent discussion of the same topic.” There are three types of internal examples: 
(1) Reference to action outside the dialogue. 
(2) Clever introduction and clever juxtaposition of characters: “The actions and attitudes 
of each reflect, and are reflected in, their rather different ways of understanding the logoi that are 
here being discussed—and it is left to the reader to see (in light of their different behavior) in 
what sense their respective interpretations are to be rejected, in what sense maintained.”27 
(3) Erga (deeds) which help to interpret logoi (words): “Our understanding of love or the 
art of logoi in the Phaedrus, of division in the Sophist, of limit and the unlimited in the Philebus, 
                                                          
26 See Rosemary Desjardins, “Why Dialogues? Plato’s Serious Play.” In Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings. Ed. 
Charles L. Griswold, Jr. (New York: Routledge, 1988) 110-125. 
27 Desjardins, “Why Dialogues? Plato’s Serious Play,” 120. 
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of hypothesis in the Phaedo, of episteme epistemes in the Charmides, of discrimination and 
weaving in the Cratylus, of dialectic in the Republic, of logos in the Theatetus will all to a large 
extent depend on our awareness of the practical demonstration or paradeigma that Plato has 
taken care to provide within the dramatic action that constitutes the context of the discussion. It 
is awareness of this constant need for interpretation that drives Plato to adopt a special kind of 
vehicle for his philosophy—that of dramatic dialogue that will not be forced to rely exclusively 
on its vulnerable discursive content.”28   
All three types of internal examples are dramatic elements which exist to open up 
avenues of interpretation of the philosophical content of the dialogue. To give an example from 
the Hippias Major, well-clad Hippias’s physical beauty juxtaposed against Socrates’s ugliness 
form an internal paradeigma which conditions the interpretation of the relationship between 
beauty, knowledge, and appearances. If we did not take into account Socrates’s and Hippias’s 
looks, something would have been missed about Socrates’s statement that the beautiful itself 
causes a being to be, and not merely appear, beautiful (294a). By taking into account the detail 
about Hippias’s well-clad appearance, we can see that Socrates is not only making a point about 
the nature of the beautiful, but is also indirectly attacking Hippias’s claims to knowledge about 
beauty truly is. Thus the interpretation I advance in this dissertation will take into account not 
only the logical coherence of the definitions and arguments advanced by Hippias and Socrates, 
but also the wealth of external and internal examples which form the complex of meaning that is 
the dialogue. I believe that by looking at these examples, the presence of eros can be discerned in 
the dialogue as a necessary concept in the investigation of the eidos of the beautiful.  
                                                          
28 Desjardins, “Why Dialogues? Plato’s Serious Play,” 120-121. 
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 Having remarked about the method to be employed in this study, I would like to make a 
few comments about four principal terms which I will use throughout the study. This is by no 
means at attempt to define these terms exhaustively –they each will gain new layers of meaning 
in the course of the dissertation. Instead, I would like to sketch out what I take to be the general 
idea behind these terms, a general idea which will serve as a starting point for this dissertation. 
The terms are: eros, philosophical eros, noesis, and to kalon. 
Eros carries many meanings throughout the Platonic corpus. The simple meaning of the 
word is, of course, “love” or “desire,” but the word carries much philosophical significance for 
Plato. The entirety of the Symposium and half of the Phaedrus are devoted to uncovering this 
significance. To elaborate on what is stated above, Gordon’s work on eros offers one 
comprehensive view of the meaning of eros in Plato’s thought. More importantly, Gordon 
endeavors to show that eros is present in many Platonic dialogues which do not explicitly 
mention it by name.29 This presence can be discerned once one adopts the broad meaning of eros 
which Gordon sketches out in the introduction of her book: “a journey from the origin of the 
cosmos and human origins, through various types of human self-cultivation, concluding with 
human destiny as a return to our origins.”30 Eros is a force which compels a human being to 
pursue goods both human and divine, and it also manifests itself in how this pursuit is enacted in 
a human life: “Eros shapes what we pursue and how we pursue it,” and “It directs the activities 
of the psuche to philosophy and its divine origins.”31 Eros manifests itself as questioning, 
courage, matchmaking (or finding a lover), self-knowledge, and memory: in other words, all of 
                                                          
29 “Symposium, Phaedrus, Charmides, Lysis, Alcibiades I, and perhaps Republic are considered Plato’s ‘erotic 
dialogues’ because interlocutors discuss eros, and erotic relations among the interlocutors are dramatically 
portrayed. These dialogues, of course, shape scholars’ investigations of erotic desire in Plato’s work. But they also 
circumscribe those investigations. In actuality, Plato’s entire world is permeated with eros.” Gordon, Plato’s Erotic 
World, 1. 
30 Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World, 2. 
31 Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World, 2. 
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these human experiences are a sign of eros’s presence.32 Insofar as we see these experiences in it, 
we can discern the activity of eros in the Hippias Major.  
Beyond the rich collection of nuances and meanings in Gordon’s account of eros, one 
particular manifestation of eros plays a pivotal role in the Hippias Major. It is a manifestation, or 
rather meaning, of eros which is found in the Hippias Major and which runs parallel with 
Diotima’s account of the same in the Symposium. In other words, a similar meaning of eros is at 
play in both dialogues. (Throughout my study, I will appeal to this parallel for gaining 
illumination about the Hippias Major.) In the Symposium, Diotima states that eros ultimately 
desires to possess the good, forever, but also that before that, it desires to possess everything 
from beautiful bodies, to beautiful souls, to laws, sciences, and the beautiful itself. What 
“possession” means, of course, differs according to the nature of each object: To desire a soul is 
to desire to have a soul as a companion; to desire to possess a science is to desire to know it.  
A distinction exists between eros simpliciter, which can be for a beautiful body or a 
beautiful soul or any type of beauty, and philosophical eros, by which I mean eros which desires 
the good above all things, and which has subordinated all other desires to this overarching desire 
for the good. Moreover, the person with a truly philosophical eros recognizes that the good is 
something which exists in itself, and is not defined primarily by what is in his or her interest. It 
is, rather, something that one aspires to know as it is in itself. In other words, the philosopher is 
self-aware about her desire for the good as good. In the Hippias Major, Socrates exemplifies 
philosophical eros, because his overarching and abiding concern is for the good, and because he 
has eros for the beautiful because the beautiful is good. On the other hand, Hippias’s eros is not 
directed toward the good, but ultimately toward power and self-affirmation. Another aspect to 
                                                          
32 Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World, 7-11. 
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specifically philosophical eros is its questioning and interrogative nature, with respect to the 
causes (aitia) and forms (eide) of things. As we shall see (in Chapter One), Socrates’s approach 
to the beautiful is marked by this questioning nature. The significant differences between Hippias 
and Socrates, which we will examine throughout the course of this dissertation, will further 
elucidate the distinct nature of philosophical eros.33 
The preferred term for the type of knowledge that Socrates wants about the beautiful is 
noesis. My preference is based on the fact that this word best captures the type of knowledge that 
Socrates sees himself as ultimately pursuing by the end of the dialogue, after the dialectic has 
refined and adumbrated the elusive definition of the beautiful which Socrates has failed (but not 
failed completely) to establish. However, as we will see, Socrates is never very precise about the 
nature of the knowledge that he is after. At first, the assumption seems to be that the eidos of the 
beautiful can be captured by discourse. But by the end of the dialogue, Socrates accepts his 
failure to define the beautiful itself, although this admission comes with a stated willingness to 
continue to search for it. It seems then that the stated question of the dialogue asks for a 
comprehensive, discursive account of the beautiful itself, but that the dialogue itself fails to 
deliver such a definition. In this dissertation we will see that, even though the dialogue fails in 
this particular way, and even though it ends in aporia, nevertheless the dialogue does yield 
                                                          
33 My use of the term “philosophical eros” as eros for the good comes from Hyland, who uses the term in Plato and 
the Question of Beauty, particularly in his chapter on the Symposium, where he argues that “acts of virtue” are the 
ultimate telos of the ascent toward the beautiful itself (59). Allan Bloom also distinguishes philosophical eros from 
eros more generally: “If Eros, put most generally, is longing, then the philosopher who pursues the knowledge he 
does not have could be considered erotic. He longs for knowledge. If the need to know is what is most 
characteristically human, then such philosophical Eros would be the privileged form of eros.” See Allan Bloom, 
Love and Friendship (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 432. 
I am also aware of other philosophical approaches to Platonic eros which attempt to interpret the concept 
without direct recourse to the concept of the good. See, for example, Alfred Geier, Plato’s Erotic Thought: The Tree 
of the Unknown (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2002).  To a certain extent, Nussbaum also attempts 
such an interpretation, when she refers to the “self-cancelling” nature of eros, in Nussbaum, The Fragility of 
Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
176. 
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partial knowledge about the eidos of the beautiful. The term I use to denote this partial 
knowledge is noesis: a “flash” of knowledge concerning the formal intelligibility of phenomena. 
This concept of noesis comes closest to capturing the type of knowledge Socrates both claims to 
have and to lack at the end of the dialogue: he claims to know some things about the beautiful—
some noetic flashes of its formal intelligibility—but he does not claim to possess a 
comprehensive definition of it—that is, episteme. Socrates never actually gives us a technical 
term for knowledge, beyond the common, οἶδα (286c), and sophia, used to denote Hippias’s 
sophistical wisdom (281a, 281b) and political wisdom (296a). But noesis does seem to best 
capture the type of knowledge he still aims to pursue at the end of the dialogue. The word 
appears in a negative sense, when Socrates and Hippias argue that some beautiful beings are 
“unknown” ἀγνοεῖσθαι (294d). The issue of knowledge will be taken up in greater depth in 
Chapter One and Chapter Three.34 
My interpretation of the Hippias Major rests on a particular translation of the key term, 
τὸ καλόν. Among scholars of Greek philosophy, there is a longstanding debate over the accurate 
translation of this word, which has such great importance for philosophy. Depending on the 
dialogue or treatise in question, τὸ καλόν has been translated into “the fine,” “the noble,” “the 
admirable,” and, of course, “the beautiful.”35 Because this controversy is relevant to the Hippias 
Major, I will make a critical appreciation of the controversy as I understand it, and will outline 
my reasons for supporting the translation of τὸ καλόν as “beautiful.” 
                                                          
34 The distinctions I make between noesis and episteme in Plato in this section are grounded in the work of Hyland. 
See especially the essay, “But What about the Ideas?” in Finitude and Transcendence. 
35 An interesting summary and discussion of the different ways τὸ καλόν has been treated by translators of Plato 
appears in Aryeh Kosman, “Beauty and the Good: Situating the Kalon.” Classical Philology (105) 2010:341-357. 
See also the response by Gabriel Richardson Lear in the same volume, which contains a rich symposium on τὸ 
καλόν: Gabriel Richardson Lear, “Response to Kosman.” Classical Philology (105) 2010: 357-362. In the first two 
chapters of this book I will make use of both contributions to the symposium, as well as their respective responses. 
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 The first thing to note is that the English word “beautiful” does not enjoy a unanimously-
accepted definition among philosophers today. For some philosophers, the term is defined at 
least in part by the idea of the “aesthetic,” which implies that beauty is always tied to what the 
senses perceive (αἴσθησις). But if beauty is always aesthetic, then it would not make sense to 
speak of the beauty of wisdom, which is not perceived by the senses (this, in fact, is one reason 
why τὸ καλόν is not always translated as “the beautiful”: we should speak instead, some argue, 
of the nobility of wisdom36). There are other philosophers who have argued that the beautiful can 
refer to spiritual and ideal realities as well as to physical ones, and that the problem lies in the 
modern notion of the aesthetic, which has limited the idea of the beautiful to those things which 
are first perceived by the senses.37 
This ambiguity over the English meaning of “beautiful” has sometimes had a confusing 
effect on the study of the Hippias Major. Scholars who have translated or commented on the 
Hippias Major have translated τὸ καλόν in different ways, and the way they translate it has 
affected their overall interpretation of the dialogue. For the most part, those who have translated 
τὸ καλόν as “fine” have usually defined beauty as aesthetic. These interpreters usually take the 
Hippias Major to be about something other than beauty. Woodruff writes that the dialogue is 
“not a treatise in aesthetics, and beauty is not its subject. The dialogue is concerned with 
commendation itself, and the logic of commendation.”38 Raymond, citing this same passage from 
Woodruff, adds that the Hippias Major “is bound to leave the student of aesthetics quite cold,” 
                                                          
36 Kosman argues that wisdom cannot be beautiful because “wisdom simply doesn’t look like anything.” Kosman, 
“Beauty and the Good,” 350. 
37 Nehamas writes: “Although the word continued to be used, beauty itself was replaced by the aesthetic, which, 
completely isolated as it is with the rest of the world, promises nothing that is not already in it, is incapable of 
deception, and provokes no desire,” (Nehamas, Only a Promise of Happiness, 10). The aesthetic, according to 
Nehamas, differs from the beautiful in that it refers only to high art and certain sublime experiences, and sunders the 
experience of the beautiful from Platonic eros, and replaces the latter with the Kantian idea of “disinterested liking.” 
38 Woodruff, Hippias Major, 110. 
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and believes that it would be more accurate to say that “Socrates wants to know what it is, in the 
most general way imaginable, for a thing to be an object of value. Beauty is only a species of 
value.”39 Both Woodruff and Raymond base their opinions on definitions of τὸ καλόν which are 
not “the beautiful.” In his own translation of the dialogue, Woodruff prefers “the fine” (though, 
as we will see below, he does not do this in his translation of the Symposium), and Raymond 
argues that “fine” or “admirable” are accurate renderings.  
Other scholars have taken various other paths. One is to define τὸ καλόν as beautiful, but 
then to subsequently claim that “beautiful” is a term with various equivocal meanings. To give 
one example, Sider argues that the Hippias Major is indeed a treatise on beauty. But he also 
points out that τὸ καλόν has three meanings in Ancient Greece: it may refer to use, aesthetic 
beauty, or moral beauty. Sider, in his own study, chooses to focus on aesthetic beauty, and 
argues that the Hippias Major gives us the beginnings of a philosophical theory, but one that 
deals only with this restricted sense of beauty as aesthetic.40 Some scholars have chosen to 
preserve a simple, univocal sense of τὸ καλόν, usually (but not always) rendering it as 
“beautiful.” Seth Benardete, in The Being of the Beautiful, is (apparently) undisturbed by the 
philosophical and linguistic controversy over the subject matter of the Hippias Major, and offers 
an interpretation based on a rendering of “τὸ καλόν” as “the beautiful,” while treating the 
dialogue as if it were investigating the same “beauty” that is discussed by Socrates in the 
                                                          
39 Christopher C. Raymond, “The Hippias Major and Aesthetics,” Literature & Aesthetics 19 (2009): 32. 
40 Sider argues that the Hippias Major is one of the only dialogues with the “what is x?” format where the x is only 
partially ethical, and that “This alone should make us suspicious of any attempt to extract from the dialogue a theory 
of aesthetics which ignores ethics and morality. Nevertheless, this is what I intend to do.” David Sider, “Plato’s 
Early Aesthetics: The Hippias Major,” 75-76. Robert George Hoerber shares Sider’s view: “In brief, to kalon 
involves the concept of beauty on three standards: 1) the utilitarian; 2) the aesthetic; and 3) the moral.” See Robert 
George Hoerber, “Plato’s Hippias Major,” The Classical Journal 50 (1955): 184. Ivor Ludlam also adopts a view 
that distinguishes “aesthetic” from “moral” beauty, grounding this distinction in the difference between τὸ καλόν 
and the noun τὸ κάλλος, but he sees the Hippias Major as an attempt to show how the two words “should be 
synonymous” (113-116). Moreover, Ludlam himself seems to believe that they should be synonymous, too: 
“Beauty, whatever else one might say about it, pertains to perception, both sensory and intellectual” (113). See Ivor 
Ludlam, Hippias Major: An Interpretation. 
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Diotima section of the Symposium.41 In his own translation of the dialogue, David Sweet renders 
τὸ καλόν as “beautiful” and treats the dialogue as dealing with “beauty” as such, also drawing 
parallels with the Symposium.42 Joe Sachs’s translation also translates the term as “beautiful.”43 
Christopher Bruell is alone among current scholars of the Hippias Major in founding his entire 
interpretation of the dialogue on a translation of τὸ καλόν as “noble.”44 Finally, David Wolfsdorf, 
while agreeing with Woodruff that “‘fine’ has a broader semantic range,” also believes “fine” to 
be “anemic,” and declares, “In fact, no single English word is satisfactory.”45 
 My response to this plethora of interpretations is: If we wish to understand the Hippias 
Major, then we have to try to adopt Hippias’s and Socrates’s usage of “beauty.” Socrates and 
Hippias clearly see beauty as something which manifests itself in many different ways among 
many types of beings. Both characters also agree that the word, kalon, is capacious enough to 
encompass all these manifestations of beauty. If this word were not so capacious, then the 
philosophical question which both men will attempt to answer will be confused from the start. At 
the beginning of the dialogue, no claim has been made as to whether the word has a “univocal” 
meaning, or several “equivocal” or “analogical” ones. Rather, Socrates notes that Hippias claims 
to know what he is talking about when he talks about beauty, and Socrates would like to look 
more deeply into the issue. The dialogue is as much an inquiry into the limits of what we can call 
beautiful, as it is an investigation into its essential components. As we have already noted, 
Socrates and Hippias are able to use the term before knowing its essential definition, yet they 
                                                          
41 Seth Benardete, The Being of the Beautiful, xi-xlvi. 
42 David R. Sweet, “Introduction to the Greater Hippias.” In The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten 
Platonic Dialogues, edited by Thomas L. Pangle (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 340-355. 
43 Plato, Socrates and the Sophists: Plato’s Protagoras, Euthydemus, Hippias Major, and Cratylus. Trans. Joe Sachs 
(Newburyort, MA: The Focus Philosophical Library, 2011). 
44 Christopher Bruell, On the Socratic Education: An Introduction to the Shorter Platonic Dialogues (Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 75-91. 
45 David Wolfsdorf, “Hippias Major 301b2-c2: Plato’s Critique of a Corporeal Conception of Forms and of the 
Form-Participant Relation,” Apeiron 39 (2006): 221n. 
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both employ it in many different ways, attempting to test its limits as well as to discover its 
ultimate meaning. The dialogue is an invitation to reconsider what we take to be the possible 
range of applicability or attribution of that word, and as a consequence to discover its essential 
core. But this investigation can only be conducted with the common starting point that Hippias 
and Socrates acknowledge: that “beautiful” may refer to all kinds of beauty, and not exclusively 
to “aesthetic” or “physical” beauty. 
In order to adopt this broader and properly speaking Socratic point of view on the 
beautiful, it is imperative that we first divest ourselves of this Kantian understanding of beauty as 
aesthetic.46 Only having done this, can we enter into a frame of mind in which “beauty” is 
something that can be predicated of spoons, women, ideas, sciences, statues, and actions, as it 
was in Plato’s culture, and as it is in the Hippias Major. The linguistic question of proper 
translation is secondary to the philosophical one. The key to liberating the beautiful from its 
qualification as “aesthetic” lies in a revised understanding of “appearance.”47 
 As noted above, the modern idea of the “aesthetic” reduces the range of applicability of 
the term “beautiful” exclusively to those objects which can be known through the senses. Yet it 
is very easy to see how “beautiful” in English refers to more than objects of sense perception. 
                                                          
46
 This is how Hyland distinguishes the Socratic view of beauty from the Kantian notion of “aesthetic”: “With the 
advent of the distinguishing in Kant and others of ‘aesthetics’ as a separate discipline from other disciplines … 
beauty as an issue comes to be located fundamentally in aesthetics, and so, most basically, in art …” Instead, “for 
the Greeks beauty begins, as it were, with the beauty of human bodies ...” Hyland, Plato and the Question of Beauty, 
15. This is of course, as Hyland notes, only where our understanding of beauty begins. But the Greeks also 
appreciated the beauty of non-human bodies, even tools, as well as the beauty of actions and ideas. 
47 Jessica Moss presents a similar argument for the consistent translation of τὸ καλόν, but with regard to its use in 
Plato’s Laws: “We are most charitable to Plato if we take him to use the term in one sense only: all kalon things are 
kalon in the same way. On Plato’s view, this means that they all participate in one Form. Participation in this Form 
renders art beautiful, and actions and characters ethically fine, but these are not two different qualities. (Compare: 
participation in the Form of the Good makes food nutritious, and knives sharp, but on Plato’s view both are good in 
a univocal sense. Or: participation in the Form of the Large makes numbers high and cats fat, but this does not show 
that there are two distinct senses of ‘large’). Thus it is a mistake to ask which sense of kalon Plato has in mind at 
various points, or whether the ethical or aesthetic sense is prior.” See Jessica Moss, “Art and Ethical Perspective,” in 
Plato on Art and Beauty, ed. A. E. Denham (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 209.In Chapter 2, I will consider 
the question the “univocity” of τὸ καλόν. 
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We can say, “Beautifully done,” to a student who has just derived the Quadratic Formula on the 
chalkboard; we can call that a “beautiful goal,” when a player scores from a free kick. We say 
that people have “beautiful souls.” We also say that a certain automobile “runs beautifully.” 
When someone hits a particularly strong and straight drive on the golf course, people say, “Now 
that’s a beaut [sic].” Once, while riding a bus, I noticed a blind young woman climbing up the 
steps into the bus, led by her guide dog. She sat next to an old man who told her, “You have such 
a beautiful dog.” She responded with, “I know.” Obviously, they were both referring to the same 
dog, but to different aspects of that dog’s beauty: The old man to the dog’s looks, and the young 
woman to the dog’s nobility and trustworthiness. (It could not have been otherwise: literally 
speaking, she could not see the dog). Thus the English word, “beautiful,” may be used to 
communicate the idea of τὸ καλόν. In other words, a contemporary discussion of τὸ καλόν must 
adopt this broader sense of “beauty” which goes beyond the merely aesthetic, and the English 
word “beautiful” is more than up to the task.48 
 Unfortunately, many commentators use the terms “aesthetic” and “beauty” 
interchangeably, and claim that τὸ καλόν can be rendered as “beautiful” only in those cases when 
it refers to sensory objects.49 But the Hippias Major itself can help us to question this modern 
                                                          
48 Gabriel Richardson Lear makes a similar observation in his response to Kosman: “However, it does not strike me 
as strange to attribute beauty to wisdom or any other nonsensible thing, at least in principle. It is common to say that 
a person is beautiful, where what we are describing is his character. And mathematicians and scientists routinely 
describe the proofs and theories of their disciplines as beautiful. Moreover, as central a philosopher to the history of 
modern aesthetics as Hutcheson can speak of the beauty of proofs. So I simply deny that the concept of beauty is 
limited to what we can literally perceive.” Lear, “Response to Kosman,” 360. 
49 See, for example, once again, Raymond: “In the Hippias Major alone it [τὸ καλόν] applies to everything from 
quails to customs to kitchen utensils, with no clear connotation of aesthetic value. A more reliable translation of 
kalos would be ‘fine’ or ‘admirable’, words which better reflect the versatility of the Greek. In asking after the 
essence of the kalon itself, Socrates wants to know what it is, in the most general way imaginable, for a thing to be 
an object of value. Beauty is only a species of value: the kalon ‘in appearance’ ” (Raymond, 32). This is an exercise 
in question begging: Raymond assumes that Plato has a notion of “value” similar to our own, a notion which, I 
would argue, is more abstract than is our notion of “beautiful.” Moreover, all of the objects discussed in the Hippias 
Major – even the most ideal ones, like the noble life (Hippias’s third definition) have to “appear” to the philosopher 
– that is, the philosopher must have a direct intuition of it at some point in his life in order to be able to judge it 
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concept of the beautiful as merely aesthetic, and we can use the Hippias Major to re-evaluate our 
own understanding of what beauty is and can be.50 Briefly put, we must be open to the fact that 
non-physical objects are also beautiful. Kosman writes: “it would be a will-o’-the-wisp to 
suppose that somewhere there is a translation that’s just right,” and that “the dream of an ideal 
translation … is vain.”51 Yet this is a problem for translators, not philosophers; both the Greeks 
in Plato’s time, and we in our own, have the same experience of seeing the radiance of just laws 
and beautiful landscapes; modern people admire the beauty of Greek painted ceramics, and I 
would wager that a Plato or a Socrates would feel the same frisson at hearing about Rosa Parks’s 
courage and sense for justice as would our schoolchildren today. In other words, there is a 
unitary phenomenon that we must investigate, and when referring to it, “the beautiful” is just as 
good a word as “τὸ καλόν.”52  
The aesthetic can be transcended only by broadening our notion of “appearance.” If 
beauty is a phenomenon that is not merely aesthetic, then what kind of phenomenon is it? That 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
either as beautiful (as I would have it) or valuable (as Raymond would). For another instance of a thinker confusing 
the beautiful with the aesthetic, see the article in the aforementioned symposium in Classical Philology, where 
Rachel Barney writes first about the link between τὸ καλόν and virtue, arguing that “the virtuous person acts to 
promote the fine; he is motivated by the fine; and he is not motivated to benefit himself.” Barney is thus trying to 
link τὸ καλόν with the good, and finds in Plato and Aristotle an understanding of τὸ καλόν as a psychological 
motivating spectacle that is allied to virtuous action. Moreover, she parses out an “aesthetic” dimension in the τὸ 
καλόν: “Since it need not be operationalized, the kalon has its natural range over goods conceived as objects of 
contemplation, as opposed to objects whose value can only be realized when they are acquired and used. This is 
where the ‘aesthetic’ dimension of the kalon, in which it is best translated as ‘beauty,’ comes in. As Aquinas notes, 
the kalon is what evokes the approval of the spectator rather than the desire of the agent … ” What is unclear in her 
account, however, is whether she is using “beauty” in a purely aesthetic sense, i.e., referring only to sensory objects, 
or in a Platonic sense, i.e., referring to the virtues considered as forms. She argues that “we discern τὸ καλόν 
perceptually” (370), but it is unclear whether by this she means an immediate intuition or an actual, sensible 
perception of an object. See Rachel Barney, “Notes on Plato on the Kalon and the Good.” Classical Philology (105) 
2010: 363-377. 
50 As Lear puts it: “It is, of course, true that Kant and the modern discipline of aesthetics limited beauty to perceptual 
appearances, but perhaps the thing to say is: so much the worse for their theories.” Lear, “Response to Kosman,” 
360. 
51 Kosman, “Beauty and the Good,” 352. 
52 With this claim, I am aligning myself with the following scholars who have written commentaries on the Hippias 
Major: Drew Hyland, Seth Benardete, and David Sweet. It should also be noted that Woodruff, while opting for 
“fine” over “beautiful” in his translation of the Hippias Major, choses to use “beautiful” in the Diotima section of 
the Symposium, which he translated with Nehamas.  
21 
 
is, how does it appear to us, how do we become aware of it? In analyzing the essential 
components of τὸ καλόν, Kosman opts for a sense of the word “appearance” which goes beyond 
the sensory: “for Plato, appearance is not something separate from being, but simply a 
presentation of what is to a subject: being, as we say, making its appearance.”53  Beauty, he 
writes, is “what appears well,” or what “reveals the integrity of being and its proper 
appearance.”54 Beauty is a truthful and complete appearance. An object can appear to us in ways 
that go beyond the senses: that is, there is more than one way for an object to make an 
appearance. 
The term “appearance” works well as a replacement for “aesthetic.” Beauty concerns 
appearances, though not necessarily aesthetic appearances. By “appearance” here, we mean the 
way a being presents itself to us. An idea also can have an appearance, as can a work of art that 
is not corporeal, like a poem. We can have an intuition of a non-corporeal being: and that 
intuition is a form of appearance. The beauty of a full life, as discussed by Hippias, requires the 
direct intuition of an idea. I can consider that idea—a full life—from different aspects (a life of 
action, a life with children, a long life, etc.) and each aspect is a different appearance of the same 
idea. As Nehamas writes, “Appearance and the physical are the names we use to denote what we 
already know in the world.”55 But things from beyond the physical world can also appear to us. 
The “eidetic variation” exercised by Hippias and Socrates is one in which they attempt to 
exhaust the term, τὸ καλόν. Socrates wants to measure its limits, and so be able to demarcate 
                                                          
53 Kosman, “Beauty and the Good,” 354. Emphasis mine. 
54 Kosman, “Beauty and the Good,” 354. 
55 Nehamas, Only a Promise of Happiness, 71. This statement by Nehamas should be coupled with another 
statement he makes in the same work: “Beauty is never detached from appearance but is not exhausted by it.” 
Nehamas argues that the beautiful in an object compels us to know it ever more deeply, to seek out new 
“appearances” of it.  
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them on a sort of philosophical map.56 They want to see it in all of its varied appearances, until 
they are able to find the one thing present in every type of appearance possible.57  
 One important implication of this understanding of appearance is that the beauty of a 
body or a law (or anything else that is discussed in the Hippias Major) is immediately grasped.58 
The beauty of certain examples brought up by either Hippias or Socrates is not contested; what is 
contested is whether these examples constitute the definition of the beautiful. Several examples 
of beauty are found to be deficient, but they are never found to be ugly (with the exception, 
perhaps, of the first example, the maiden, who is found to be ugly, but only relative to the beauty 
of a god). The domain of the beautiful, the expansive map of possible legitimate uses of the term, 
is constantly expanded with each new example: in order to understand beauty’s essence it 
appears that we must see how many different objects can be attributed as beautiful. But once the 
object appears, its beauty is intuited without controversy. The controversy between Hippias and 
Socrates is their disagreement over what the beautiful is, and not over particular judgments of 
beauty.  
 
 
                                                          
56 I believe that, in saying this, I am in full agreement with Hyland’s description of what Socrates and Hippias are 
doing. Hyland says that they are seeking a “definition,” that is, seeking to “comprehend (in the literal sense, to take 
entirely together) the meaning of a term, and to do so fully and adequately” (Hyland, Plato and the Question of 
Beauty, 7). This “taking together” requires that one examine what things can naturally come together; that is, it 
requires an investigation into what sort of things can be called beautiful, so that we may examine what they all have 
in common and thus merit that common characteristic. 
57 Of course, “appearance” carries with it an ambiguity found in both Greek and English: it may signal the way an 
object shines forth to an observer, or it may signal an illusion, a lie, about an objects true nature. Such an ambiguity, 
however, need not prevent us from using the word here. The issue of appearances and illusion arises later in the 
dialogue, and we cover it in Chapter 3. 
58 Cf. Lear: “The point, it seems to me, is not that beauty can be perceived, but that it is, like sensible properties, a 
property of which we are immediately aware.” See Lear, “Response to Kosman,” 360. Also Barney: “ … the kalon 
is what evokes the approval of the spectator rather than the desire of the agent: it represents a kind of value which is 
complete as it stands. This completeness is perhaps one reason why Plato seems to think of the kalon as by nature 
manifest or radiant, immediately experienced and easily recognizable.” See Barney, “Notes on Plato,” 370.  
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Outline of this Study 
 The forthcoming study is divided into six chapters. Each chapter corresponds to what 
constitutes a significant, unified moment in the philosophical drama of the Hippias Major. 
Moreover, each of these moments will be interpreted in terms of philosophical eros. 
 In the first chapter, I will analyze the lengthy preliminary discussion in the Hippias 
Major, which precedes the posing of the question of the beautiful (281a-286c). I will do so in 
order to show how the discussion gives birth to Socrates’s question about the beautiful, and 
which factors in the discussion lead to making the beautiful the theme of a philosophical 
discussion. Briefly put, Hippias claims to be wise about matters both public and private, and he 
appeals to beauty as the value which certifies his wisdom. Socrates naturally desires to question 
Hippias about the value which the sophist uses to justify himself. Moreover, I will show that the 
birth of this question must be understood in terms of Socrates’s eros for the good. It is Socrates’s 
desire for the good above all things, which manifests itself in the performance of asking 
questions, that naturally seeks know the beautiful itself.  
 The second chapter deals with the first three definitions of the beautiful, which are all 
formulated by Hippias (παρθένος καλὴ, “a beautiful girl,” 287c; χρυσός, “gold,” 289e; human 
life, 291d). In this chapter, I look at the arguments which Hippias uses to advance each of these 
definitions, as well as Socrates’s dialectical engagement with each. I also pay close attention to 
the allusions and implications that surround each definition and each counterexample which 
Socrates brings to the philosophical discussion, in the hopes of gaining a deeper understanding of 
what exactly is happening during this section of the dialogue. I will argue that what is happening 
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is a sort of “ascent,” akin in some ways to Diotima’s ascent, an ascent toward a deeper 
understanding of the beautiful itself. 
 In the third chapter, I will consider Socrates’s statement that the eidos of the beautiful 
makes things be beautiful “whether they are seen to be beautiful or not” (294c). This occurs at 
the moment when Socrates takes over the direction of the dialogue. Socrates begins his takeover 
by posing the question of the relationship between a beautiful being’s appearance and its nature 
as beautiful, a particularly complicated question given the fact that beauty is a quality most often 
associated with appearances. I will argue that in Socrates’s statements about the beautiful and 
appearances, we see something akin to the unique status that the Socrates of the Phaedrus 
affords the beautiful in his second speech: the beautiful is a form which is more “visible” to 
human beings than other forms. It is a form which appears radiantly to whoever directs his eros 
toward the good—that is, to the philosopher. 
 In the fourth chapter, I will explore the significance of the shift that occurs in the 
dialogue when the category of goodness enters into the dialogue (296c-297d). I will argue that 
this shift is best understood in erotic terms. The discovery that the beautiful is good makes it that 
much more certain that the disposition required to know (noesis) the beautiful itself is that of the 
philosopher, and not the sophist. It is the disposition in which one’s eros is directed toward the 
good. Only someone whose eros is directed toward the good has the relationship with being 
required to know the beautiful itself.  
 I will analyze the dénouement of the dialogue in Chapter Five, looking at the final 
moments of the dialogue according to the canons of comedy and tragedy. First, I will argue that 
the dialogue exposes Hippias’s and Socrates’s limitations with regard to the possibility of 
25 
 
knowing the beautiful itself, and that this is what produces the comedy of the Hippias Major. But 
I will also argue that the dialogue contains elements of tragedy in the stories of both Hippias and 
Socrates, and that through these tragic conventions, we can learn about the degree of limited 
success or finite transcendence which Socrates is able to achieve in his quest for the beautiful 
itself. Once again, philosophical eros will be the central term of my interpretation. Both 
Hippias’s and Socrates’s stories are tragic, but they differ from each other. The difference hinges 
on Socrates’s embrace of philosophical eros, an embrace which yields a limited noetic success. 
 In the final and sixth chapter, I will attempt to harvest the findings, as it were, of my 
reading of the Hippias Major. Having established that noesis of the beautiful itself is contingent 
upon eros for the good, I will explore the possibility that this Platonic account of the relationship 
between desire and aesthetic contemplation can be cast in such a way that is constructive for 
contemporary aesthetics. I will articulate the relationship between desire and beauty as it appears 
in the Hippias Major, and will place it in conversation with Kant’s notion of “disinterestedness.” 
I will suggest that Plato’s treatment of beauty and desire allows for both the uniqueness of 
aesthetic contemplation which “disinterestedness” safeguards, but also gives us an account of 
aesthetic contemplation that is connected to desire for the aesthetic object, and therefore in some 
ways more encompassing of the data of human experience than Kant’s account. This final 
chapter will, I believe, establish the significance of all the work that precedes it—that is, will 
give us the ultimate reason why another look at the Hippias Major, according to the theme of 
eros, is worth taking. 
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Chapter One 
The Birth of Socrates’s Question  
 
Socrates’s question, “ ‘Would you be able to say what the beautiful is?’ ” (ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν 
τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν;, 286d) is a major mark of philosophical eros in the Hippias Major. 
Philosophical eros (eros that seeks the good) makes it possible for Socrates to ask such a 
question. While both Hippias and Socrates speak about beautiful objects in such a way that 
shows that both have a “naïve” or “pre-philosophical” knowledge of the beautiful, it is Socrates’s 
philosophical eros, in contrast with Hippias’s art of sophistry, which will give birth to the 
question about the “beautiful itself.” In this chapter, I will outline the reasons why this is the 
case. First, through a close reading of Hippias’s and Socrates’s opening discussion, I will show 
how the difference between Socrates’s and Hippias’s understanding of wisdom and virtue 
establishes the difference between sophistry and philosophy as it plays out in this dialogue. This 
difference sets the stage for, and leads to, a discussion about “the beautiful itself.” Second, 
building on my analysis of the opening discussion between Hippias and Socrates, I will outline 
the erotic structure of Socrates’s philosophical engagement with Hippias, by focusing on 
Socrates’s activity of questioning (his “interrogative stance”) and his abiding interest in the good.  
Hippias and Socrates: Two Contrasting Characters 
The Hippias of the opening passages of the Hippias Major is at odds morally and 
intellectually with both the Socrates that emerges in those same passages, as well as the Socrates 
that we know from other sources within the Platonic canon. The interlocutors have clashing 
appearances, characters, occupations, and views of what constitutes wisdom and virtue. 
Moreover, Hippias’s and Socrates’s appearances hint at a more fundamental moral and 
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intellectual difference. This clash is only implied in the opening section; Socrates does not attack 
Hippias directly. But Socrates’s philosophical eros, as opposed to Hippias’s art of sophistry, 
provides a ground for a possibly intractable conflict, and a dramatic tension which endures for 
the length of the dialogue.59 The dramatic tension between these characters will lead to a 
discussion about wisdom and virtue; the tension will be relaxed by turning to beauty as a topic 
instead. But the concern for wisdom and virtue will remain latent throughout the dialogue. It is 
this concern which sets the stage for a discussion about the beautiful.  
 The first and most immediate difference between the two characters lies in their 
appearance, a difference which would probably have been evident to any Athenian reader with 
general knowledge about Socrates and Hippias, and which hints at more complex moral 
differences beneath the surface. When Socrates addresses Hippias as both beautiful and wise 
(281a), he is not being completely disingenuous about the former epithet. Hippias’s self-
confidence, wealth, and popularity suggest that he is an attractive figure in appearance, in the 
way that self-confident, successful, and popular people often are.60 Socrates refers to Hippias as 
“beautifully dressed, beautifully shod, and famous for wisdom all over Greece” (291a). Hippias 
was also a diplomat, a job that requires a certain degree of attention and care for one’s physical 
appearance. One could say then that Hippias is beautiful to behold. The same could not be said 
about Socrates. The dialogue does not contain any description of Socrates’s appearance, but 
                                                          
59 I am not here attempting to contrast a general theory of philosophical eros with a general theory of the art of 
sophistry. I am only focusing on this particular manifestation of philosophical eros, and its confrontation with one 
particular manifestation of sophistry. On the task of defining “sophist” in the Platonic canon, see Marina McCoy, 
Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). McCoy writes 
that “…there is no unified account in the dialogues of a specific set of characteristics that define either sophist or 
rhetorician,” yet “Plato seems less concerned with offering definitions of the philosopher and sophist than with 
opposing through dramatic conflict the person of the philosopher, Socrates, to a number of different sophists and 
rhetoricians” (1-3). The Hippias Major is an almost quintessential example of such a dramatic confrontation. 
60 “Hippias, who often served Elis as an ambassador, especially to Sparta (G. Hp. 281a-b), is represented as 
supremely self-confident…” Debra Nails, The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics 
(Hackett: Indianapolis, 2002), 168-169. 
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traditionally we know him to be ugly. Culling from various sources, Debra Nails describes 
Socrates as someone who “went about barefoot and unwashed; had bulging eyes that darted 
sideways and enabled him, like a crab, to see not only what was straight ahead, but that sniffed 
all around; large fleshy lips like an ass; an arrogant expression; and an intimidating swagger—
which could be misinterpreted as condescending…”61 If Socrates is an attractive figure to his 
followers, it is in spite of his appearance, not because of it. This dramatic contrast between an 
ugly Socrates and a beautiful but anti-philosophical interlocutor is a trope that occurs more than 
once in the Platonic canon. It occurs in the closing sections of the Symposium, where the 
interlocutor is the beautiful Alcibiades,62 and the Hippias Major presents us with a similar 
dramatic contrast. Hippias, because he is a beautiful person, would presumably be an authority 
on the beautiful. Socrates, as an ugly man, would not appear to be such an authority. But the 
dialogue will, in due course, provide reasons to abandon these preliminary assessments. 
 As the opening discussion develops, we see other contrasting characteristics between 
Hippias and Socrates, characteristics which have to do with their respective ways of life, and 
which therefore cut deeper into the souls of both men. Early on (281c), we learn that Hippias is 
both successful politically (as an ambassador for the city-state of Elis) and financially (as a 
popular sophist). Socrates mentions both of these accomplishments and classifies the 
ambassadorial work as public, while the educational work (if we may call it that) is private 
(281c).63 This distinction will bear some significance later on in our discussion, because the 
beautiful is characterized in part by its “public” nature. At this point, however, we can see that 
                                                          
61 Nails, The People of Plato, 264.  
62 On Alcibiades’ beauty and his other attractive qualities, see Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 165-166. “He 
was, to begin with, beautiful. He was endowed with a physical grace and splendor that captivated the entire city.” 
63 “That is what it is like to be truly wise, Hippias, a man of complete accomplishments: in private (ἰδίᾳ) you are 
able to make a lot of money from young people (and to give still greater benefits to those from whom you take it; 
while in public (δημοσίᾳ) you are able to provide your own city with good service (as is proper for one who expects 
not to be despised, but admired by ordinary people)” (281c). 
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Socrates’s own life clashes with both of these points: Socrates is not financially successful, and 
he is not a politician. We must look closely at both of these points of contrast. 
 First, financially, Hippias towers above Socrates. “If you knew how much money I’ve 
made, you’d be amazed,” Hippias tells Socrates (282d). Visiting Sicily while he was still young, 
Hippias could make “much more than a hundred and fifty minas in a short time—and from one 
very small place, Inycum, more than twenty minas” (282e). The Hippias Major does not give us 
an explicit assessment of Socrates’s own wealth; for this, we can once again appeal to tradition, 
which tells us that Socrates was known to be poor. According to Xenophon, all of Socrates’s 
belongings and property amounted to no more than five minas.64 The Apology provides us with 
another point of reference. The fine which Socrates offers as compensation and punishment is 
100 drachmae, or one mina.65 The financial disparity becomes even more acute when one 
considers that Hippias is approximately the same age as Socrates, and thus both men have had 
the same amount of time to accumulate wealth.66 Obviously, they have chosen to lead very 
different lives. The Socrates of the Apology, at the moment when he explains to the jury that he 
does not make money from teaching, names Hippias as an example of someone who does (19e-
20a). The Socrates of the Hippias Major does not distinguish himself explicitly from Hippias. 
Yet one cannot help but read this line in an ironic tone, given the differences between the two 
men: “The mark of being wise, I see, is when someone makes the most money” (283b). If 
                                                          
64 “ ‘I suppose,’ said Socrates, ‘that my chance and all my property would bring quite easily five minas, if I chanced 
on a good buyer; but I know with some accuracy that your things would bring more than a hundred times that.” 
Xenophon, Shorter Socratic Writings: “Apology of Socrates to the Jury,” “Oeconomicus,” and “Symposium,” 
trans. Robert C. Bartlett (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 44. Nails cites this source in order to illustrate 
Socrates’s poverty. It is unclear how much validity she gives it, however, because she simply says, “On Socrates’s 
poverty, consider Xenophon’s remark…” (Nails, The People of Plato, 264). Regardless of its historical precision, 
we can at least assume that Hippias’s wealth vastly overshadowed Socrates’s. 
65 On Greek currency, see Sita von Redden, Money in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), xv. Socrates suggests a fine as punishment in Apology, 38b. 
66 Nails, “Hippias,” 168. 
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Socrates were to mean that statement in earnest, it would mean disavowing his whole 
philosophical enterprise and way of life.  
 Related to the issue of money is the psychological disposition which Hippias claims that 
money induces in a person. Hippias’s father and other citizens were “amazed and thunderstruck” 
(θαυμάζειν τε καὶ ἐκπεπλῆχθαι, 282e) by the amount of money that Hippias had made in Sicily. 
Hippias uses θαυμάζειν with respect to money, and this may be a provocative act, given that in 
Plato’s Theaetetus, the word is used to denote the origin of philosophy (ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας, 155d). 
Instead, Hippias uses it in a superficial way. Socrates will use it too, in an adjectival form, to 
express his shock at the fact that Hippias’s sophistical services were rejected by the Spartans: 
S. Tell me this: from which of the cities you visit did you make the most money? 
From Sparta, obviously, where you visited most often. 
H. Lord no, Socrates. 
S. Really? Did you make the least? 
H. Nothing at all, ever. 
To this, Socrates responds: τέρας λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστόν, ὦ Ἱππία (“That’s weird, Hippias, and 
amazing”). Socrates uses the word for wonder in the same way as Hippias does: to react to a 
financial matter. This time, however, it’s the fact that Hippias didn’t make money which induces 
wonder. It is an ironic riposte, followed by more irony. Socrates asks Hippias, “Tell me, isn’t the 
wisdom you have the sort that makes those who study and learn it stronger in virtue?” (283c). All 
of a sudden, Socrates compliments Hippias for teaching virtue. This is not something Hippias 
necessarily has claimed for himself. Hippias certainly claims to have taught young Greeks 
excellence in the particular fields of moneymaking and speech. But he has not claimed to be able 
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to give a student a moral education, that is, an education for the aim of obtaining the good in 
one’s life. 
 Beyond the differences in financial well-being, the political side of Hippias, the “public” 
part of his life, is another aspect of his personality which distinguishes him from Socrates. 
Judging by the text alone, we can see that the difference between Hippias and Socrates and on 
this score is clear: nothing in the Hippias Major would indicate that Socrates engages in politics 
in the way that Hippias does. Hippias is an ambassador for a city-state in a politically 
complicated time when Athens and Sparta were each attempting to increase their regional power 
over the rest of Greece through alliances and conquest.67 His job would appear to be analogous 
to that of a third world leader during the Cold War. Socrates, on the other hand, does not claim to 
be anyone’s leader. 
But the political distinction is more complex once we take into account the fact that 
Hippias distinguishes himself from those thinkers which Socrates and Hippias considered to be 
their common ancestors: Thales of Miletus, Anaxagoras, Pittacus, and Bias. Socrates mentions 
them right after establishing a public/private distinction, and poses the question: “But Hippias, 
how in the world do you explain this: in the old days people who are still famous for wisdom—
Pittacus and Bias and the school of Thales of Miletus, and later ones down to Anaxagoras—that 
all or most of those people, we see, kept away from affairs of state?” (281c). Hippias responds, 
“What do you think, Socrates? Isn’t it that they were weak and unable to carry their good sense 
successfully in both areas, the public and the private?” (283c-d). Thales, Pittacus, and Bias were 
among the Seven Sages of Greece, revered for their wisdom,68 and Anaxagoras, too, was 
                                                          
67 Woodruff, Hippias Major, 53ff. 
68 Diogenes Läertius lists them: “The men who were commonly regarded as sages were the following: Thales, 
Solon, Periander, Cleobulus, Chilon, Bias, Pittacus. To these were added Anacharsis the Scythian, Myson of Chen, 
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considered to have been a thinker of some stature.69 For Hippias to refer to them as “weak” 
(ἀδύνατοι) is quite arrogant.  Socrates, however, does not disagree with Hippias’s claims to 
superiority, at least not at this point in the dialogue. Instead, Socrates helps him to further cement 
his claim to superiority: “Should we say that your skill—the skill of the sophists 
(τὴν τῶν σοφιστῶν τέχνην)—has been improved in the same way, and that the ancients are 
worthless compared to you in wisdom?” (281d). Hippias agrees, and Socrates pushes further: 
“So if Bias came to life again in our time, Hippias, he would make himself a laughingstock 
compared with you people, just as Daedalus also, according to the sculptors, would be laughable 
if he turned up now doing things like the ones that made him famous” (282a). Hippias agrees 
once again. Socrates even contributes a small joke at Anaxagoras’ expense. Anaxagoras was 
once wealthy, but he lost all of his money because “there was so little intelligence [ἀνόητα] in 
his wisdom” (283a), punning on Anaxagoras’ idea of nous.70 Hippias, on the other hand, has 
been able to keep his money. Yet Socrates keeps pressing Hippias with questions about his 
wisdom and later, about beauty. His questions signal that Socrates is not altogether impressed 
with Hippias’s claims to wisdom. There are obvious gestures of Socratic irony, such as, “But 
none of these early thinkers thought fit to charge a monetary fee or give displays of his wisdom 
for all comers” (282c-282d). But it is also the case Socrates is not completely allied with the 
ancients, either. 
 The text does not explicitly tell us whether or how Socrates distinguishes himself from 
the ancient thinkers. It is hard to know whether the joke about Anaxagoras is only there to humor 
Hippias, or if Socrates truly found Anaxagoras lacking in intelligence. We know from other 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Pherecydes of Syros, Epimenides the Cretan, and by some even Pisistratus the tyrant.” Diogenes Läertius, Lives of 
the Eminent Philosophers, Volume One, trans. Robert Drew Hicks (United States: Witch Books, 2011), 13. 
69 Diogenes Läertius, Lives, 14. 
70 Woodruff, Hippias Major, 39. 
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sources that elsewhere in the Platonic canon Anaxagoras’s thought is consistently attacked.71 We 
cannot find in the Hippias Major the same sort of articulate understanding of Socrates’s own 
philosophical mission as we find in the Apology, where  he distinguishes himself from both the 
sophists as well as ancient thinkers by claiming to have a “human wisdom” (ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία, 
20d). But we do know that, in practice, the Socrates of the Hippias Major is already 
distinguishing himself from Hippias and his τὴν τῶν σοφιστῶν τέχνην merely by engaging him 
in dialectic. Moreover, the way in which he distinguishes himself from Hippias is not by 
practicing the philosophy of the ancients, which is interested a great deal in cosmology, but by 
inquiring about the practical and moral benefits of Hippias’s purported wisdom, his art of 
sophistry. 
Before we go on to the difference between τὴν τῶν σοφιστῶν τέχνην and Socrates’s 
dialectic, however, there is one more thing to say about Socrates’s and Hippias’s reference to the 
ancient thinkers. The fact of the matter is that Socrates’s and Hippias’s are factually mistaken on 
three counts. Bias, Pittacus, and Thales actually did not keep “away from affairs of the 
state” (ἀπεχόμενοι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων, 286c). Diogenes Läertius writes that during the siege 
of his home city of Priene, Bias was said to have tricked the besieging forces by fattening a 
couple of mules, and impressing upon the enemy the idea that Priene was so prosperous that 
even the animals were fat.72 From the same source we learn of another story, in which Pittacus of 
Mitylene challenges Phrynon, the general in charge of the Athenian army, to combat. He defeats 
him by using a net which he hid behind his shield.73 About Thales, we have even more intriguing 
stories, from different sources. Aristotle relates a story about Thales using his knowledge of 
                                                          
71 Nails, The People of Plato, 26. 
72 Diogenes Läertius, Lives, 44. 
73 Diogenes Läertius, Lives, 74. 
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meteorology to predict a rich harvest of olives; he invested in several cheap presses, and 
eventually made a fortune. This was said to be evidence of a philosopher’s ability to wield 
practical wisdom and become rich, should he wish to do it.74 He was not inferior to Hippias in 
moneymaking. From Herodotus we read that both Bias and Thales were involved in Ionian 
politics.75  
We cannot know whether Socrates and Hippias knew of the same stories recounted in 
Herodotus’ Histories, much less Diogenes Läertius’ Lives, but it would not be a stretch to say 
that, for the common Greek in Socrates’s day, the eminence of the Seven Sages came in part 
because of impressive feats that they had accomplished on behalf of their respective cities. The 
significance of this apparent inaccuracy on Socrates’s part, and Hippias’s agreement with it, is 
unclear. But we can at least see that the Socrates of the Hippias Major, like Hippias, differs in 
character and lifestyle from what we read about Thales, Bias, and Pittacus in the few sources that 
we have. We could guess, perhaps, that Socrates here feeds Hippias with misleading information 
on purpose, as a test of his wisdom—a test Hippias fails.76  
But it is the differences between Hippias and Socrates which fuel their dialogue, much 
more than their own respective differences with the ancients. Given all the biographical 
differences cited above, we can now turn to the question of understanding Hippias’s wisdom, and 
                                                          
74 Aristotle, Politics, 1258b39. 
75 “He [Bias] proposed that the Ionians should pool their resources, set sail for Sardo, and then found a single city 
for all Ionians… This proposal by Bias of Priene was made to the Ionians after their defeat, but another good 
proposal had been put to them, even before the conquest of Ionia, by Thales of Miletus, a man originally of 
Phoenician heritage. He suggested that the Ionians should establish a single governmental council, and that it should 
be in Teos (because Teos is centrally located in Ionia), and that all the other towns should be regarded effectively as 
demes” (Histories, 1.170). Herodotus, Histories, Carolyn Dewald and Robin Waterfield trans. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 74-75. 
76 In an article dealing with the passage in 281c, David Sider argues that the words “Pittacus and Bias” should 
simply be deleted from the text, because they were almost beyond a doubt the addition of a later scribe. Sider writes, 
“I do not believe that there was anyone in the fifth or fourth centuries who could have believed that Bias and 
Pittacus were apolitical” (181) including Hippias, Socrates, and Plato, and that “Apart from the passage under 
discussion, there is no ancient testimony of any date which classes these two with the notorious stargazers like 
Thales, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, etc.” (182). See David Sider, “The Apolitical Life: Plato, Hippias Maior, 281c,” 
L’Antiquité Classique 26 (1977): 180-183. 
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its link to the question of beauty. Ugly, apolitical, and poor, Socrates is intrigued by both the 
material success of the beautiful, political, and rich Hippias.77 Socrates wants to know the 
content of Hippias’s wisdom—τὴν τῶν σοφιστῶν τέχνην. 
One crucial aspect of Hippias’s wisdom is that it justifies itself, and gives evidence of its 
efficacy, by earning Hippias money. Socrates will inquire whether this valuable, desirable 
thing—money—has a bearing on another valuable, desirable thing, virtue (ἀρετή). This 
juxtaposition of two valuable objects is the starting point of the dialectical confrontation between 
philosophy and sophistry which endures throughout the dialogue. Following this starting point 
step by step, we can learn the differences between Hippias and Socrates at their deepest, that is, 
philosophical, level.  
The first thing which the text tells us about Hippias’s wisdom is that it earns him money. 
Socrates is the first to mention this (281c), and Hippias agrees (281d). Socrates then praises the 
sophists Gorgias, Prodicus, and Protagoras (282b-282d), who have also made a lot of money, 
right after telling Hippias, “You’re putting beautiful thoughts in beautiful words” (282b). Hippias 
responds with the story about the amount of money he made in Sicily and Inycum (282e). 
Socrates continues to praise him and attack the ancients. He concludes, “The mark of being wise, 
I see, is when someone makes the most money” (283b). At this juncture, however, Socrates 
introduces the topic of virtue into the discussion. Socrates introduces the theme virtue by first 
inquiring where Hippias has made the most money. “Tell me this: from which of the cities you 
visit did you make the most money? From Sparta, obviously, where you visited most often” 
(283b). Hippias responds that he has never made any money in Sparta. Socrates is amazed by 
this response, and introduces the word, virtue, without any immediately apparent connection to 
                                                          
77 Of course, in a deeper sense, Socrates is political: he cares for the polis as a philosopher. But here we are using the 
most conventional meaning of “political” – that is, directly involved with the affairs of state. 
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anything said before: “Tell me, isn’t the wisdom you have the sort that makes those who study 
and learn it stronger in virtue?” (283c). Hippias agrees: “Very much so, Socrates.” All of a 
sudden, Hippias has agreed with Socrates that his wisdom, his art of sophistry, makes more than 
money: it makes people virtuous. 
After introducing virtue into the discussion, Socrates and Hippias also agree that the law 
of a city should be in harmony with it, i.e., that law should reflect what is good for citizens. 
Spartan law forbids “foreign education” (ξενικὴν παίδευσιν, 282c4). Socrates is able to convince 
Hippias that law, properly understood, is something that makes people good (284d), and that 
therefore “the Spartans are breaking the law” (285b). Bad law is not law at all. Woodruff writes 
that Hippias only agrees because, for him, this discussion with Socrates is meaningless, because 
Hippias does not believe in the value of philosophy.78 Hippias does seem to be able to teach in 
Sparta anyway, albeit probably for free. Socrates continues: “So we find the Spartans to be 
lawbreakers, and that on the most important issue, though they appear to be most lawful. So 
when they applaud you, really, Hippias, and enjoy your speech, what sort of things have they 
heard?” (285b-285c). With this question, we have moved from virtue to the specific subjects 
which Hippias teaches.  
Hippias is unique among sophists for his expertise in astronomy and arithmetic, among 
other sciences.79 Socrates asks Hippias (285b-285e) whether the Spartans prefer astronomy (τὰ 
ἄστρα τε καὶ τὰ οὐράνια πάθη, “things about stars and movements in the sky”), geometry 
(γεωμετρίας), arithmetic (λογισμῶν), or poetry and music (τε γραμμάτων δυνάμεως καὶ 
                                                          
78 Woodruff, Hippias Major, 128-129. 
79 Nails, “Hippias,” 168. This passage from Plato’s Protagoras, where Protagoras explains the substance of his art, 
also supports the claim that Hippias was different from the other sophists with regard to his knowledge of the 
sciences: “ ‘The others abuse young men, steering them back again, against their will, into subjects the likes of 
which they have escaped from at school, teaching them arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, music, and poetry’ – at 
this point he gave Hippias a significant look – ‘but if he comes to me he will learn only what he has come for’ ” 
(318e), from Plato, Protagoras, trans. Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 13. 
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συλλαβῶν καὶ ῥυθμῶν καὶ ἁρμονιῶν, “the functions of letters, syllables, rhythms, and 
harmonies”), and Hippias answers for each that the Spartans are too dense to understand or care 
about any of those lofty fields of knowledge (about geometry, for example, Hippias retorts that, 
among the Spartans, “Many of them can’t, even, well, count” [285c]). But he is proud to be 
knowledgeable about many subjects. His versatility is good for business. 
An interesting contrast to Hippias’s attitude toward his own knowledge of the sciences is 
found in the Republic. The list of sciences discussed by Hippias and Socrates—astronomy, 
arithmetic, poetry, music—is not random. It is the same that is discussed in Book VII of the 
Republic.80 In that book, the task of developing a plan of education for the rulers of the ideal city 
leads to a discussion of the nature of dialectic. Such rulers would have to be lovers of 
philosophy, and would have to make “that ascent to what is which we shall truly affirm to be 
philosophy” (521b12-13). The Socrates of the Republic wants to know “in what way such men 
will come into being” (521b6-7), and “what studies have such a power” (521d) to make men 
lovers of wisdom. Glaucon and Socrates are seeking a course of study which would “by nature 
lead to intellection” and “draw men toward being” (523a1-3). In other words, they are seeking to 
make their rulers lovers of the unchanging intelligible realm, even though they (the rulers) will 
have to deal with the everyday world of politics—the world of coming to be and passing away—
on a daily basis. Music (μουσικὴ, 522a), calculation (λογίζεσθαί τε καὶ ἀριθμεῖν, 522a), 
geometry (γεωμετρίας, 526d), and harmony (ἁρμονίας, 531a), are discussed and affirmed as 
sciences that could help with this task. Astronomy is rejected for being a science which leads us 
to look—ironically—“downward” (529a8) toward the visible and not upwards toward “what is 
and is invisible” (529b4-5). The capstone of this education is “an overview which reveals the 
                                                          
80 Woodruff notes that similar lists appear in the Protagoras 318e and Gorgias 447c, but he does not make the 
connection with the Republic VII. See Woodruff, Hippias Major, 42. All translations from the Republic are from 
Plato, the Republic, Allan Bloom, trans. (New York: Basic Books, 1991). 
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kinship of these studies with one another and with the nature of that which is” (537c1-3). The 
value of these sciences lies in their relation to their aid in fulfilling the task of leading mean to 
the unchanging being which is the Good. 
The contrast between the way these sciences are discussed in the Republic and in the 
Hippias Major is instructive. In the latter, Hippias knows these sciences, but does not seem to 
care about their ultimate purpose, which is to contribute to knowledge of reality—that is, to 
philosophy. To be sure, nothing in the Hippias Major indicates that Hippias does not actually 
know astronomy, geometry, arithmetic, poetry, and music. But Hippias does not place those 
sciences in any specific order or scheme which contributes to an overall philosophical 
worldview, the way the Socrates of the Republic does. These sciences do not mean as much to 
Hippias as they do to the Socrates of the Republic. Instead, Hippias puts his knowledge of these 
sciences to use; he makes money off it.81 He is also quite ready to drop these sciences if they do 
not lend themselves to making money—if they are not, in other words, useful. The only thing 
that the Spartans do enjoy hearing from Hippias, and the only topic they seem to be able to 
understand, is “the genealogies of heroes and men… and the settlements (how cities were 
founded in ancient times), and in a word all ancient history—that’s what they most love to hear 
about. So because of them I have been forced to learn up on all such things and to study them 
thoroughly” (285e). Hippias is lettered in many things, but also capable of pursuing—for the 
sake of his audience, such as the Spartans—what we would today call professional development.  
                                                          
81 Gene Fendt seems to be making an argument along the same lines about this section of the Hippias Major, when 
he argues that the Spartans understand education to consist of “the practice of the communal virtues,” which is 
something that a foreigner like Hippias, who is not part of the community, cannot teach the Spartans. Hippias, 
instead, merely imparts information, which Fendt deems “valueless” (94), and is mostly out for money.. However, I 
am not sure I would go so far as to say that Hippias is the dead white male at the secret heart of postmodern 
multicultural wen-based education” (95). See Gene Fendt, “Hippias Major, Version 1.0: Software for Post-Colonial, 
Multicultural Technology Systems,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 37 (2003): 89-99. 
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Here we see too that Hippias makes use of pleasure, and that he distinguishes pleasure 
from beauty. Hippias’s learning may be deep and wide ranging, but it is his delivery or the action 
of teaching which gains him much (if not most) of his fame. His teaching is, in a sense, 
mellifluous. It sounds good, and it gives pleasure. This is at least one reason why the Spartans 
enjoy hearing about those “genealogies of heroes and men.” (Another reason would probably be 
that the militaristic Spartans enjoy hearing about heroic deeds.)82 Yet Hippias distinguishes 
pleasure from “τὸ καλόν.” Socrates is the one who first makes this observation: “the Spartans 
enjoy you, predictably, because you know a lot of things, and they use you the way children use 
old ladies, to tell stories pleasantly (ἡδέως)” (286a).83 Hippias agrees, but adds: “Yes—and, good 
lord, actually about beautiful activities, Socrates.” The stories may be pleasurable to hear, but 
they are not about just any activities. They are about beautiful activities. Moreover, his speech is 
not only pleasurable, but beautiful: “Just now I made a great impression there speaking about the 
activities a young man should take up. I have a speech about that I put together really beautifully, 
and I put the words particularly well” (286a). To have put words well together is to have made 
them beautiful in their arrangement. David Sider reads this statement ironically, in part based on 
the fact that Hippias is reputed to have written a book titled the Synagagê, a hodge-podge of 
writings from other sources collected together by Hippias to form a dubious (and ugly) whole.84 
                                                          
82 Notice too that in this section of the Republic, a distinction is made between speeches which are “tales” and those 
which are “of a truer sort” (522a). 
83 I have slightly altered Woodruff’s translation of ἡδέως to reflect that the word used is an adverb. 
84 “In the case of the Hippias Major, where both the first and the last attempts to define τὸ καλόν are essentially 
esthetic, and where the last definition concerns the harmonious relationship between parts and individuals, it would 
be foolish to refuse even to consider the possible relevance of Hippias’s introduction to (probably) his Synagogê: ‘It 
may be that some of this has been said by Orpheus, some briefly by Hesiod, some by Homer, and some by the rest 
of the poets; and some by prose writers both Greek and foreign. What I have done is to collect from all these writers 
the most important material of a like sort, and so will here produce a new and composite logos’ (B 6 DK). Since 
Clement quotes this valuable fragment to demonstrate what he takes to be a particularly egregious example of Greek 
plagiarism, it seems reasonable to suppose that the first readers of Hippias Major came to the dialogue not only 
knowing that Hippias’s writings (the Synagogê for sure, and of course all of his various published lists) were clearly 
composite in nature, but that he was also proud of them, claiming that thanks to his artistic arrangement of like with 
like the work was now ‘new’ and hence his.” David Sider, Review of Hippias Major: An Interpretation by Ivor 
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Sider’s interpretation is compelling, but we must also note that Nails argues that the Synagagê 
was probably written by a different Hippias.85 Regardless, the statement shows that Hippias is 
concerned with beauty, and that beauty is an important value in his profession as a sophist. 
At this juncture in the dialogue, the beautiful emerges as a value with ambiguous 
meaning, distinct from pleasure, but not necessarily associated with goodness. As we saw above, 
Hippias refers to his moneymaking prowess as beautiful (282d). Socrates has referred to 
Hippias’s knowledge of sciences as beautiful (285c). Here we see Hippias refer to activities as 
beautiful. Presumably, these activities are virtuous ones. But Hippias has subtly turned away 
from the discussion of virtue. He tells Socrates that he will recite a speech to the Spartans in 
which Nestor gives advice to the younger Neoptolemus concerning “what activities are 
beautiful.” These activities are not beautiful because they make the young virtuous, but because 
they would make “someone most famous if he adopted them while young” (286b). These 
activities are taught by the elder Nestor along with some “beautiful customs” (286b). Hippias 
uses “beautiful” to qualify whatever it is that he likes—money or fame or customs. Socrates, it 
can be assumed, realizes this, and this is one of the reasons for redirecting his conversation with 
Hippias toward a discussion about the beautiful itself. 
It is this juncture which Socrates believes to be the opportune moment to ask the question 
about the beautiful. If we retrace the steps which have lead us here, we can see that the question 
is born out of the contrast and clash between the two ways of life represented by each character, 
and Socrates’s philosophical eros for the good. Socrates engages Hippias’s claims to wisdom by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ludlam, Bryn Mawr Classical Review (3.5.11), http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1992/03.05.11.html#NT1. See also David 
Sider, “Plato’s Early Aesthetics: The Hippias Major.” In Plato on Art and Beauty, edited by A. E. Denham, 75-83. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Originally published in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 35 (1977): 
465-70. On what some claim was the content and process of composition of the Synagogê, see Håkan Tell, Plato’s 
Counterfeit Sophists (Washington, DC: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2011), 3-5.  
85 Nails, The People of Plato, 169. 
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engaging him in dialectic about the relationship between sophistry and virtue. As we have seen, 
Hippias dodges this problem, and then continues to speak about his worldly successes, in 
particular by pointing out the beauty of his speeches and of those he counts as his disciples. 
Motivated by Hippias’s own claim to knowledge about the good life and the validity of the 
technique of sophistry for acquiring it, Socrates questions him about the word which Hippias 
uses to indicate the desirability and value of his preferences (for money and fame) and of his 
glamorous lifestyle. It is, in other words, the term of praise which Hippias employs. This word is 
“the beautiful.” The two men will turn to discuss a philosophical question. 
This philosophical question is born of an aporia Socrates claims to have recently come 
across in conversation with a friend. In fact, it is an aporia which Hippias is experiencing at this 
very moment, though he himself does not admit to it. An unnamed friend has posed the question 
to Socrates recently, a friend who “got me badly stuck when I was finding fault with parts of 
some speeches for being foul, and praising other parts as beautiful” (286d). The literary device of 
the unnamed, absent friend has much rhetorical depth. One of its functions is perhaps as a way of 
defusing the tension of the dialogue.86  It may also serve a pedagogical function, as a foil for 
Socrates and a model for Hippias. Before his absent friend’s questioning, Socrates models a 
proper philosophical attitude for Hippias. Hippias is not a philosopher. He is merely entertained 
by the question of the beautiful, and is willing to follow Socrates’s lead in attempting to answer 
it. The question, in its first expression in the dialogue, is stated as follows by the unnamed friend: 
“how do you know what sorts of things are beautiful and foul? Look, would you be able to say 
what the beautiful is?” (286d). Thus we see the question cast as concerning the ability to 
                                                          
86 For more on this peculiar literary device, which appears nowhere else in Plato, see Halsten Olson, “Socrates Talks 
to Himself in Plato’s Hippias Major,” Ancient Philosophy 20 (2000): 265-287. It is presumed that this unmentioned 
character is a fictitious portrayal of Socrates himself, as he will refer to him as “Sophroniscus’s son” toward the end 
of the dialogue (298b). I will reflect upon this device more in Chapter Five. 
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properly praise a speech, something which Hippias has already claimed to be able to do. But if 
Hippias truly knows what makes a speech beautiful, he must know at least something about the 
nature of the beautiful itself. This would also be true of Socrates, who has already used the word 
“beautiful” as a modifier for various things, including Hippias himself in the first line of the 
dialogue. Both Hippias and Socrates have primordial, practical knowledge of the beautiful. But 
Socrates believes that in order to justify the judgments made using the term, a deeper 
understanding of it is required.87 Moreover, Hippias’s presumption that he can answer the 
question without much trouble (286e) means that Hippias believes he somehow “controls” the 
beautiful, that is, that the beautiful can always be put to use for his sophistical art, for the sake of 
making money, and that it does not point to something beyond his own immediate advantage—
for example, to the good as an ideal which lies beyond Hippias’s interests as he understands 
them. Socrates, in posing the question, will subsequently show that Hippias’s claims to expertise 
about the beautiful are dubious at best, and that the truth of the matter is that the beautiful itself, 
which causes beings to become beautiful, is also good, and therefore admits of a standard beyond 
the manipulative, rhetorical persuasion practiced by the sophists. Thus we see that, out of the 
contrasting lives of Hippias and Socrates, and through a Socratic inquiry into Hippias’s life 
based upon τὴν τῶν σοφιστῶν τέχνην, we have arrived at an inquiry into τὸ καλόν. 
Socrates’s Philosophical Eros 
Having looked at the dialectical path which has taken Socrates and Hippias to the 
question of what the beautiful is, we can now examine the erotic structure of Socrates’s 
engagement with Hippias, and the way Socrates’s philosophical eros accounts for the birth of the 
                                                          
87 My analysis here is based on the article by Jacques Antoine Duvoisin, “The Rhetoric of Authenticity in Plato’s 
Hippias Major,” Arethusa 29.3 (1996): 363-388. As Duvoisin puts it, “the question ‘what is the beautiful’ arises 
from, and terminates in, an aporia concerning the possibility of praise” (367). 
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question of the beautiful. I will focus on two fundamental aspects of Socrates’s philosophizing in 
the Hippias Major, both of which have an erotic structure. First, there is Socrates’s interrogative 
stance, which manifests itself in ceaseless questioning, and which is essential to the way he 
engages Hippias. Second is Socrates’s interest in the good, which emerges during the discussion 
about law and virtue in Sparta, and which re-emerges later in the dialogue. 
The Interrogative Stance 
Socrates’s engagement with Hippias is conducted from an interrogative stance, which is 
the stance taken by a person who possesses philosophical eros.88 This stance consists of two 
parts, an acknowledgement of lack, and also the possession of an underlying noetic insight which 
makes the awareness of a lack possible. This interrogative structure reflects the structure of eros 
that we find in various passages in the Symposium. For example, Diotima calls eros the offspring 
of “poverty and plenty” (203c-e). In his engagement with Hippias, we see that Socrates both 
admits of a lack (“poverty”), and also possesses the required underlying noetic insight (“plenty”). 
(We might also consider the nature of Hippias’s own “stance” before the beautiful. Since it is 
characterized primarily by the goal of possessing and using beautiful beings for one’s own 
advantage, we might call his stance “utilitarian.”)  
Socrates expresses his lack of knowledge when he makes an avowal of ignorance about 
the beautiful (286d). As the preceding section shows, this avowal of ignorance is also the 
recognition of an aporia about praising speeches as beautiful, an aporia which both Hippias and 
Socrates encounter, though only Socrates admits to having encountered it. Socrates starts from 
the notion that Hippias is “beautiful and wise” (281a), and his subsequent questioning of Hippias 
                                                          
88 I borrow the term “interrogative stance” from Drew Hyland, The Virtue of Philosophy: Interpretation of Plato's 
“Charmides” (Cleveland: Ohio University Press, 1982). I believe I am using the term the same way he does in the 
Introduction of the book. 
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reveals that much of what Hippias claims about the art of sophistry and its superiority as a way 
of life hinges on knowledge about the beautiful. In order to obtain knowledge about the 
beautiful, and in order to test Hippias’s claims to knowledge, Socrates assumes the interrogative 
stance, first by admitting to a lack. Moreover, the fact that questioning, interrogation, and 
dialectic are Socrates’s preferred methods of addressing this lack shows that Socrates does not 
only begin with a lack, but that his subsequent actions also express this lack. Questioning can 
only be done from the position of intellectual humility: Unless I am making a rhetorical move of 
some sort, whenever I ask a question in a philosophical discussion, I perforce admit that I don’t 
know its answer.89 
 Socrates’s sense of lack becomes more evident when we consider its contrast to Hippias’s 
comparatively arrogant behavior. Hippias claims to be wise; for him, the question about the 
beautiful “is not large” (287b). He is a speech-giver. He is known as a politician and sophist 
primarily for the beautiful speeches he gives, which can be about many different topics. 
Moreover, he is able to adjust the content of his speech in order to suit the interests of his 
audience (as he does with the Spartans). In his actions, Hippias is the exact opposite of the 
questioning, erotic Socrates. Socrates wants to know about Hippias’s wisdom, and he does not 
make big speeches. He is the driver of dialogue between himself and Hippias only because he 
                                                          
89 Gordon has done a lot of work to show how Socrates’s claim to erotic expertise and his claim to ignorance are in 
harmony with each other. “Socrates’s knowledge of erotic matters can be seen in his unrivaled capabilities in 
philosophical questioning. He understands the nature of the desirous searching for fulfillment, of the desire to reach 
beyond oneself, and of openness. Questioning is all of that. We are thus compelled to see that we encounter an erotic 
and eroticized Socrates in the dialogues much more frequently than we had supposed. Every time Socrates engages 
in question and answer, and especially every time he exhorts others to do so with him, he is displaying his erotic 
know-how and engaging in erotic activity.” Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World, 66. Roochnik has similar thoughts about 
the erotic nature of questioning: “The question is the animating force in philosophy, for it is the most erotic form of 
discourse with a logic all its own. To question is to seek an answer. Its being posed implies the answer is not 
possessed, not known, by the questioner. The questioner, however, does know that he does not know the answer, 
which is why he chooses to ask the question. Furthermore, the question assumes that an answer is desirable and, in 
some sense, possible. The question thus puts the questioner in a position in-between knowledge and ignorance. 
(Eros itself is described as being in-between the mortal and immortal at [Symposium] 202e).” David Roochnik, “The 
Erotics of Philosophical Discourse.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 4 (1987): 127. 
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has questions he wants answered. On the other hand, Hippias is an inert being, who would not be 
engaging in questioning if it wasn’t for Socrates. Hippias participates in Socrates’s philosophical 
quest, but with little enthusiasm.90  
At this point we have to describe the second part of the interrogative stance, which is the 
noetic insight that makes an awareness of lack possible. By this, I mean only that in order for it 
to be possible for anyone to pose the question, “What is the beautiful?”, one has to have a 
preliminary sense of the “beautiful.” This is, of course, a truth that Plato often deals with.91 
Within the context of the Hippias Major, this noetic insight begins the normal, everyday 
acquaintance with the beautiful that both Hippias and Socrates share, and which is expressed in 
the way both men use the term. But the noetic insight also has to be of beauty as such, that is, of 
                                                          
90 Ronald Polansky describes Hippias’s participation in Socrates’s philosophical inquiry in this way: “Admittedly 
Hippias is not especially enthusiastic (see, for example, 297b7-8), but there is little reason to think that he is saying 
anything other than what he believes to be the best answer and nearly none that he is doing this because he 
understands the futility of trying to answer Socrates.” See Polansky, “Reading Plato,” 200-209. This is argued in 
response to Woodruff, who writes: “He [Hippias] is not trying to answer the questions, he is trying to shut him 
[Socrates] up.” Woodruff, Hippias Major, 129. Woodruff’s overall argument is that Hippias is aware of the 
“futility” of Socratic inquiry, which often ends in aporia. Hippias is somehow trying to sabotage the dialogue. I 
concur with Polansky in saying that there is not enough textual evidence to make such a strong claim about Hippias. 
Indeed, the mere fact that Hippias submits three possible definitions of the beautiful for discussion, and also sticks 
around to weigh the merits of Socrates’s four definitions of his own, indicates in the very least that Hippias is a 
willing participant of the philosophical venture. This does not mean, however, that he “believes” in philosophy as 
Socrates does, or that he understands what Socrates is trying to achieve with it. Indeed, if we can say anything at all 
about Hippias, it’s that his own way of living life as a sophist is dissimilar from Socrates in one crucial way: it is 
less about questioning than about making speeches and negotiating interests. It is noteworthy that Woodruff does not 
address this issue in his “Reply to Ronald Polansky,” in Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings. Ed. Charles Griswold 
(New York: Routledge, 1988), 210-214. 
91 On Plato’s approach to the problem of preliminary knowledge, see Kelley L. Ross, “Non-Intuitive Immediate 
Knowledge,” Ratio 29 (1987): 163-179. Ross writes that the path from opinion to knowledge can only be secured if 
we posit (as he believes Plato does), a baseline of “non-intuitive” yet “immediate” knowledge against which any 
truth claims are measured. “The paradoxical heart of Platonic philosophy, then, is the thesis that knowledge of being 
and value is somehow obscurely present to everyone, even when explicitly held beliefs may contradict it” (169). I 
follow Ross to the following extent: I believe both Hippias and Socrates share a primordial knowledge of beauty, 
against which every purported definition of “the beautiful itself” is judged. Moreover, I call this knowledge noesis or 
noetic insight, because it is an incomplete insight into the formal characteristics of beauty. In calling it such, I am 
following Hyland’s notion of the “archaic noesis”: “the insight into what the matter for thought is, into how to begin 
our speaking.” See Drew Hyland, Finitude and Transcendence in the Platonic Dialogues (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1995), 182. Woodruff asserts that Socrates and Hippias both claim to have some preliminary sense of what τὸ καλόν 
means before they can actually discuss its essence. See Woodruff, Hippias Major, 138-140. 
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beauty as a formal structure (though not, necessarily, of a Form).92 This insight is made when 
Socrates convinces Hippias that the beautiful itself “is something” (ἔστι τι τοῦτο, 287c-d). This 
insight is the foundation of every other insight into the beautiful itself, e.g., that it causes a being 
to become beautiful when added (289d), that it causes a being to be, and not merely appear, to be 
beautiful (294a), and that it itself is good (297c). This founding insight is crucial, because it is 
the bit of “plenty” which makes Socrates aware of his lack of knowledge. It is the starting point 
for the new discussion which will test Hippias’s claims to comprehensive, definitional 
knowledge about the beautiful and, by doing so, also test the value of his way of life.  
Two things need to be clarified with respect to this notion of noetic insight. The first is 
that there is no claim made in the dialogue about the comprehensive nature of this original noetic 
insight, nor even about the possibility building upon this original insight in order to obtain 
comprehensive, discursive knowledge about the nature of the beautiful. Socrates, in assuming an 
interrogative stance, is prepared to accept a poverty of knowledge, a degree of ignorance always 
standing alongside his partial knowledge about the beautiful. It is Hippias, on the other hand, 
who claims that the question isn’t difficult (287b).93 The second thing to clarify is that this 
original insight itself is not propositional or discursive, meaning that it cannot be put into words. 
It is a sort of flash or intuition that “the beautiful itself is something,” something not reducible to 
                                                          
92 I follow Woodruff and Hyland on the issue of the presence of the Forms in the Hippias Major: I don’t believe 
they appear in the dialogue. The issue will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Two. 
93 As Francisco Gonzalez puts it, “if one knows x in the way in which Socrates’s interlocutors claim to know it, that 
is, in a way that is final, dogmatic, and in no need of philosophical inquiry, then one should be able to define exactly 
what x is.” See Francisco J. Gonzalez, Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato’s Practice of Philosophical Inquiry (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 27. Thus, Hippias’s confidence in his ability to answer Socrates’s 
question is not a sign of Hippias’s trust in the power of dialectical inquiry, but rather an implicit dogmatic 
assumption about the knowledge that comes with being a sophist.  
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its manifestation in particular beautiful objects. While many things can be said of the beautiful 
itself, words cannot comprehensively encompass what the beautiful itself is.94 
Socrates’s Interest in the Good 
 It is not only Socrates’s interrogative stance which gives evidence of the central 
importance of eros in the search for the “beautiful itself” in the Hippias Major. Hippias is erotic 
as well, after all, by virtue of being a human person.95 Hippias experiences lack and desire, and 
beautiful things please him. But Socrates lives his eros with an awareness of, and desire for, the 
good. He does not live his eros like Hippias does, that is, with an eye toward what is useful or 
remunerative, for what is “good for me.” Rather, the Hippias Major gives us evidence that 
Socrates possesses an interest in goodness as it is in itself. We see this first when Socrates begins 
to discuss virtue, in contrast with money (283b-e). We see it later on when Socrates argues that 
                                                          
94 Here I follow Hyland, who claims that the beautiful in the Hippias Major lies beyond the scope of discursive 
knowledge. See the first chapter of Hyland, Plato and the Question of Beauty. I am also building upon a non-
discursive, non-propositional understanding of noesis, as for example articulated here by Gordon: “non-discursive 
intuition, insight, or instantaneous ‘seeing’” (Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World, 30). See also Travis Butler who, while 
arguing for a propositionalist account of Platonic epistemology, nevertheless finds it inevitable to include an 
original, founding insight which precedes dialectic: “… true beliefs about objects presuppose the kind of contact or 
‘fixing on’ at issue. The fact that we can form true beliefs about an object seems more like part of the explanandum 
rather than an acceptable explanans” (25). Butler is ambiguous as to whether this “fixing on” is a noetic insight; he 
argues for the superiority of episteme in Platonic thought (2). See Travis Butler, “Identity and Infallibility in Plato’s 
Epistemology,” Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 39 (2006), 1-25. A useful account of the 
different types of knowledge in Plato, with particular attention paid to “nonpropositional insight,” is found in 
Francisco J. Gonzalez, “Self-Knowledge, Practical Knowledge, and Insight: Plato’s Dialectic and the Dialogue 
Form,” in The Third Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies, ed. Francisco J. Gonzalez (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1995), 155-187. My views here are perhaps most distant from the account of noesis made by W. W. Tait, 
who argues (if I read him correctly) that noetic claims are claims about primary, foundational truths, see W. W. Tait, 
“Noesis: Plato on Exact Science,” in Reading Natural Philosophy: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science 
and Mathematics to Honor Howard Stein on His 70th Birthday, ed. David Malament (Chicago and La Salle: Open 
Court, 2002), 11-31. But even Tait notes that if noetic insight is not drawn from empirical examples: “because the 
empirical examples do not adequately represent the structure” (19). Thus the primary truth which is the object of 
noesis in some important way transcends experience, and this is something that Socrates also seems to believe about 
the eidos of the beautiful in the Hippias Major. 
95 Pace Sweet, who claims that “despite the fact that Hippias begins his definitions with a beautiful body, just as 
Diotima begins her account of the ascent through stages of ‘beautiful’ with love of a beautiful body (Symposium 
210a-b), Hippias has no eros himself.” Sweet, “On the Greater Hippias,” 352-353. Rather, what Hippias lacks is 
philosophical eros, that is, eros for the good. I believe that eros, as depicted in the Phaedrus and Symposium, is an 
intrinsic property of human life itself, and not something that only philosophers possess. The distinction lies in that 
philosophers live their eros in a different way, as I will show below. 
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the concept of utility only makes sense when it is associated with the good, that is, when it is 
useful for achieving some good (296d-e). We see it also when Socrates distinguishes lower 
pleasures from “beneficial pleasure” (303e). As we shall see in subsequent chapters, this abiding 
interest in the good, which I call “eros for the good,” or “philosophical eros,” plays a crucial role 
in conditioning the direction and the structure of Socrates’s engagement with Hippias and his 
inquiry into “the beautiful itself.”  The interest in the good forces Socrates to move beyond his 
experience in order to uncover what a thing is in itself, including what the beautiful is in itself. 
Indeed, Socrates’s later claim (which Hippias shares) that the beautiful is good, and the good 
beautiful (297c) shows that Socrates sees a deep kinship between philosophical eros and the 
beautiful itself (a relationship we will examine in Chapter Four).96 But already at this early stage, 
we see that Socrates’s interest in the good conditions the types of questions he asks Hippias in 
the discussion which precedes the question of the beautiful. Moreover, Socrates’s question about 
the beautiful grows out of his concern to test whether Hippias, as a sophist, is truly “beautiful 
and wise,” because Hippias’s claims to wisdom include the ability to make and teach how to 
make “beautiful speeches.” 
 Socrates’s engagement with Hippias is thoroughly erotic, and it cannot be understood as a 
formal inquiry into a definition. His engagement is intelligible only within the context of an 
erotic quest for the good. It is this erotic quest which gives birth to the interrogative stance, and 
which conditions his subsequent questioning of Hippias. The interest in the good requires, as it 
were, an interrogative stance, because whoever desires the good, admits to lacking the good, and 
admits to a need to reach out and conform one’s self to the good. To desire the good means that I 
                                                          
96 My interpretation of this passage follows Woodruff’s: “Since the fine is good and the good fine (297c), when 
Socrates asks after the fine he is seeking nothing less than the knowledge of good and evil, the foundation of 
justifiable praise and blame.” Woodruff, Hippias Major, 141. Woodruff takes this passage to be of central 
importance to understand the dialogue. He claims that it provides the main motivation for Socrates’s interest in the 
beautiful.  
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don’t create the good, and the interrogative stance is the proper posture to take before something 
that one does not create, but rather must seek out. Moreover, the eros for the good that 
characterizes philosophical eros is also (as we shall see in Chapter Four) related to the beautiful 
insofar as the beautiful is good, and therefore desired by the philosopher. 
Conclusion 
 The aim of this chapter has been to show that the question, “ ‘Would you be able to say 
what the beautiful is?’ ” (ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν;, 286d), is born out of philosophical 
eros. Both Hippias and Socrates experience beautiful beings, and both Hippias and Socrates are, 
properly speaking, erotic (insofar as they are human beings). But only Socrates, as a philosopher, 
poses the question of what the beautiful is in itself. In other words, it is because of philosophical 
eros, which manifests itself in the interrogative stance and interest for the good, that Socrates is 
able to take build upon his preliminary knowledge (the original noetic insight) into the beautiful, 
and pose a philosophical question about it. Already at this point we see then a special 
relationship between philosophical eros and the beautiful as it is in itself: only a philosopher is 
able to interrogate the beautiful, to ask what it is in itself.  
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Chapter Two 
Dialectic and Ascent 
 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that Socrates’s engagement with Hippias has an erotic 
structure, and a philosophical question is the ultimate expression of this erotic structure. It is 
Socrates’s interrogative stance and his interest in the good that allow him to pose the question: 
“What is the beautiful?” In this chapter, I will show that Socrates’s philosophical eros continues 
to play a role even when Hippias is ostensibly determining the course of the dialogue. Hippias’s 
definitions of the beautiful all miss some aspect of beauty as it manifests itself in beings, and 
this, I will suggest, is because Hippias’s eros is not philosophical: it is not interested in the good 
above all things. Instead, in Socrates’s responses to Hippias’s definitions, we see philosophical 
eros at work: Socrates is always refining the question about the beautiful, and providing the 
discussion with a wider sense for the types of beautiful beings which exist in the world. Socrates, 
in other words, while searching for the “beautiful itself,” and engaging Hippias’s definitions, is 
simultaneously making an ascent, which in some way parallels Diotima’s ascent in the 
Symposium.97  
The method employed in this chapter will be to perform an explication de texte: I will 
follow the course of the dialogue and comment the various claims, definitions, allusions, and 
references, as they appear in the unfolding of the drama. My commentary will attempt to bring to 
light the way in which philosophical eros conditions and guides the dialectical inquiry unfolding 
in the dialogue, leading the discussion to mirror Diotima’s ascent. Following this textual 
                                                          
97
 In looking at the interplay between Hippias’s definition and Socrates’s critiques of those definitions, I am 
following the advice of Tarrant on reading the Hippias Major: “One cannot stop at observing that a definition is 
rejected; one must observe also why it is rejected.” See Harold A. S. Tarrant, “The Hippias Major and Socratic 
Theories of Pleasure,” in The Socratic Movement (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 115-116. 
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interpretation, I will present a synthetic view of Hippias’s answers and Socrates’s responses to 
them. This chapter has two main sections. The first is an exegesis of 286d-293d, which will look 
at the different ways eros manifests itself in Hippias’s exchange with Socrates. Following the 
text itself, I will divide the exegesis according to Hippias’s attempted definitions of the beautiful. 
In the second section I will look at the way Socrates speaks about the beauty of different types of 
beings, and see that Socrates’s open-ended, analogical way of speaking about beautiful beings 
corresponds with the type of qualified ascent that Hippias makes in the dialogue. 
Hippias’s Definitions and Socrates’s Responses 
Girl, Maiden, or Virgin (286d-289c) 
Hippias and Socrates’s discussion of Hippias’s first definition of the beautiful, παρθένος 
καλὴ (287e), suggests two things about the relationship between desire and knowledge of the 
beautiful itself. The first is that Hippias’s inadequate definition of the beautiful corresponds to a 
particular type of desire, epithumia, the unreflecting (i.e., not rational) desire for immediate 
pleasure, which skews Hippias’s understanding of the beautiful, as evidenced by his flawed 
definition. Second, the discussion is suggestive of an ascent. Socrates’s engagement with 
Hippias, which in the previous chapter we saw is marked by philosophical eros, attempts to 
persuade Hippias into adopting a broader view of the types of beings that can be called beautiful, 
and therefore of what may constitute the beautiful itself. This broadening of horizons is a 
necessary consequence of the philosophical inquiry into the definition of beauty, which also 
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requires that Hippias broaden the purview of his attention and love, beyond both epithumia and 
eros for one particular body98  
Hippias’s first definition fails to meet the standards for a definition that he himself agrees 
to prior to making it, and the reason for this appears to be that Hippias has a bias for associating 
the beautiful with carnal desire, that is, with epithumia. After the question of the beautiful is 
posed by Socrates, Hippias quickly comes to an agreement with him about two things: that it is 
by the beautiful itself that beautiful objects are made beautiful, and that the beautiful itself is 
something (287c). However, Hippias does not appear to agree with Socrates as to what would 
qualify as a general term like “the beautiful.” In his first attempt at defining it, Hippias opts to 
name a particular body as his definition of it: παρθένος καλὴ (287e). Whether one renders it “a 
beautiful maiden,” “a beautiful virgin,” or “a beautiful girl,” the phrase evinces sexuality and 
desire.99 From the very start, Hippias reminds us that beauty is linked with desire, though the 
type of desire animating Hippias is different from that which animates Socrates. Socrates is 
directed by eros toward the truth; Hippias appears to be lusting after bodies. His first definition 
bespeaks epithumia, a desire for pleasure and bodies which is tied to the appetites and is 
unchecked—or unenhanced—by reason. The difference between epithumia and eros lies 
precisely in the presence of reason. Whatever their mythological origins, both epithumia and 
eros manifest themselves in a human soul as desire for possession. The difference between them 
lies in the capacity that eros has to differentiate between types of objects to desire, and in its 
ability to desire “higher” objects, like knowledge of the sciences or political justice, which are 
                                                          
98 On the connection between eros and noetic aspiration and reason, see Drew Hyland, “Eros, Epithumia, and Philia 
in Plato,” Phronesis, 13 (1968), 32-46. “Looking forward to the “ascent passage” of the Symposium, the charioteer 
image of the Phaedrus, and even the cave analogy of the Republic, we could well suspect that it will be some 
element of rationality which will accomplish this enhancement of Eros” (36).  
99 Woodruff translates it as a “fine girl,” Lamb as “a beautiful maiden,” and Benardete prefers a “beautiful virgin.” 
“Maiden” has the advantage of including both “girl” and “virgin” in its meaning. 
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beyond the purview of epithumia, a type of desire defined as being for immediate pleasure.100 
Both Hippias’s first definition and his arrogant attitude toward positing a definition evoke the 
lower type of desire. Epithumia, however, can be converted into eros and, through further step, 
into philosophical eros, and this conversion is what Socrates attempts to effect through his 
engagement with Hippias. The conversion of epithumia comes through the intervention of 
reasoning (logos) and dialectic, which broaden a person’s observation and understanding of the 
world, and by doing so, expand the possible objects and types of desire that the person may have. 
There are two ways Hippias’s first definition evokes epithumia. The first way is by 
inviting us to contemplate the human body as a sexual body. Hippias isn’t talking about a merely 
formal or—to use a modern word—“aesthetic” contemplation of a young maiden’s body. The 
sexual dimension of his definition should not be neglected. His answer is roguish and, perhaps, a 
little shocking: You know what’s beautiful? A beautiful young girl, that’s what! Socrates 
understands this, but he isn’t shocked. His unnamed friend, Socrates says, would respond to 
Hippias by citing other examples of beauty that aren’t young girls, and would thus show that 
Hippias’s definition isn’t comprehensive enough to be the answer they’re looking for. Socrates’s 
friend would say: “Isn’t a beautiful mare a beautiful thing? The god praised mares in his oracle” 
                                                          
100 Here I am once again following Hyland, “Eros, Epithumia, and Philia,” 42. “Eros and ἐπιθυμία both desire – this 
is where the overlap – yet the reasoning ability of which eros is capable makes it higher.” Gordon argues for a 
difference in kind, not degree, between epithumia and eros: “Nor is eros one of the appetites in Plato’s psychology, 
so it must be treated distinctly from epithumia. In short, eros signals the divine, epithumia does not…. The closest 
term to Plato’s road use of eros is ‘desire,’ though it is a particular kind of desire.” See Gordon, Plato’s Erotic 
World, 6. Gordon and Hyland agree that epithumia  is not part of the same continuum of desire wherein one also 
finds eros and philia. The two might be in disagreement on the definition of eros, however: Gordon attempts to 
define eros without overt reference to the good, a position which I do not take here, because of the important role 
that the good plays in the Hippias Major (as will become most clear in Chapter Four.) My argument here does not 
require that I take a stance on the question of the ultimate, ontological relationship between eros and epithumia. My 
interest is only in how the two desires manifest themselves in the action of the dialogue in question, and how these 
desires condition the ability to obtain knowledge about the beautiful itself. For both Gordon and Hyland, under the 
generally accepted definition of epithumia as “desire, yearning, passion, appetite” (LSJ), epithumia is something 
distinct from the noetic aspiration that is characteristic of philosophical eros, and both are, in a certain sense, 
incompatible with each other, because a soul must turn away from epithumia in order to focus on higher desires. 
Crucially and also for both scholars, epithumia does not exclude the possibility of such aspiration taking root in a 
soul.  
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(288b-c). Already we see how Socrates immediately attempts to expand the purview of their 
discussion by talking about other examples of beauty. But the example that he cites is also rife 
with sexual humor, evidence that he understands Hippias’s tongue-in-cheek definition. Greek 
sexual humor often made use of horse imagery as a phallic symbol, and the word for “mare” 
puns with Hippias’s own name (ἵππος, Ἱππίας).101 Elis, Hippias’s city of origin, was also known 
for its race horses.102 Socrates’s pun has the double function of jabbing at Hippias while also 
broadening the philosophical horizon of their discussion, because there is more than one way that 
a mare can be beautiful. It may be a beautiful animal, that is, a beautiful specimen of the species. 
Or it may be a beautiful animal for riding. This latter sense of τὸ καλόν is closer to “fine” (as in, 
a fine horse for riding) than what we usually call “beautiful” in English.103 The ambiguity is 
instructive. Socrates pushes Hippias to accept as beautiful those objects which have some sort of 
use for human beings. This pushing, this broadening of horizons, is a manifestation of eros. It 
can also be construed as an ascent, from the contemplation of one body to that of many bodies. 
A second way that Hippias’s first definition evokes epithumia would have been more 
obvious to a reader in Plato’s time than to a reader in our own, as it has to do with the common 
cultural assumptions that Greeks made about young maidens. The word παρθένος, whether we 
render it maiden or girl or virgin, was used by the Greeks to denote a young woman during her 
prenuptial period—usually a moment of great sexual attractiveness. At that stage of her life, a 
Greek woman was considered to be both beautiful and wild, untamed as yet by a husband. As 
                                                          
101 For examples of horse imagery and Greek sexual humor, see K. Dover, Greek Homosexuality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), 1989, 58-59. J. Henderson describes the use of horses as phallic symbols in The 
Maculate Muse: Obscene Language in Attic Comedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 126-127. Horse-
riding and sexual intercourse are often linked in American humor as well. The observation that Socrates is punning 
on Hippias’s name I owe to Professor Fabrice Hadjadj of the Institut Européen d’Études Anthropologiques 
Philanthropos, in conversation. 
102 Woodruff, Hippias Major, 70. 
103 For an analysis of the ambiguities of τὸ καλόν, see Chapter 1. 
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Pierre Brulé argues in Women of Ancient Greece: “The idea that in the parthenos lies hidden a 
wild animal which has not yet been subjected to the process of civilization corresponds well with 
the Greek’s conception of feminine evolution. The tamer of the wild female is the husband; it is 
by taking the parthenos into his home as his wife that he civilizes her.”104 Arguing the same 
point, Sue Blundell writes: “In ancient Greece it was commonly believed that females in general 
were prone to excessive and uncontrolled behavior, and that they were therefore badly in need of 
male guidance, provided first by their fathers and later by their husbands.”105 Thus not only does 
Hippias evoke epithumia by speaking lustfully about young maidens, but young maidens 
themselves were said by the Greeks to be in the throes of epithumia. A parallel becomes visible 
here. Only a husband would be able to tame a parthenos and bring her to full womanhood, that 
is, to get her to act more reasonably, according to the standards of civilization; only a 
philosopher is able to tame epithumia and convert it into eros. A husband, in essence, would love 
the young maiden with a love that is deeper than epithumia—that is, with eros, which in the 
Symposium is linked not only to philosophy but also childrearing.106 The husband’s role is 
analogous to that of the philosopher: to take the lusty, desirous person and educate her to love the 
truth. 
It is not only Hippias’s definition that evokes epithumia. His self-assuredness and 
arrogance also speak of it. Hippias’s utters his first definition of the beautiful with complete 
confidence that it will resolve the discussion: “never will I be refuted” (287e). Socrates, by 
refuting Hippias, shows us that this confidence is unfounded. In fact, Hippias is not meeting the 
minimum Socratic requirement for philosophy, which is the admission of one’s ignorance. This 
                                                          
104 Pierre Brulé, Women of Ancient Greece. Antonia Nevill, trans. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 
61. See also the section titled “ ‘Beauty’ of the Parthenos” on pages 56-61.  
105 Susan Blundell, Women in Classical Athens (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1998), 16. 
106 Cf. Symposium 206e: What the god Eros wants is τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ, “Reproduction and 
birth in beauty” (Nehamas translation). 
56 
 
requirement is erotic in the sense that it is the admission of a lack of, and need for, knowledge. 
Epithumia, being non-rational and unreflective, does not admit to a poverty or lack; it is simply a 
vector of desire, an instinctive force. Philosophy, as an erotic endeavor, can only be born when it 
is first honest with itself about this lack. Yet Hippias’s brazen attitude does not admit to such a 
lack; he wants to show Socrates that the philosophical problem at hand isn’t much of a problem 
at all. He isn’t posing a hypothesis but attempting to bring the discussion to conclusion. His 
answer isn’t humble, because it doesn’t recognize a need.   
It is in contrast and reacting to Hippias’s epithumia and his first definition of the beautiful 
that we begin to see Socrates’s philosophical eros at work. The difference between the respective 
attitudes toward knowledge of and desire for the beautiful itself that exists between Socrates and 
Hippias becomes most apparent in their respective attitudes toward the positing of hypotheses. If 
to hypothesize is, as Jill Gordon writes, “already to express one’s limitation and lack of 
knowledge, since it is an exercise that necessarily rests on conditional claims,” Hippias cannot be 
said to be hypothesizing, because his belief that his first answer will settle the matter is evidence 
that he does not recognize the conditionality of his claims.107 He is still in the throes of 
epithumia. Epithumia desires objects and stays transfixed by them; as a human drive, epithumia 
will not expand its purview towards philosophical contemplation until reason somehow enters 
into it and transforms it into eros. Socrates, on the other hand, suggests examples of beauty not 
as exhaustive definitions of the beautiful, but as examples which point to the ever-elusive 
meaning of “the beautiful itself.” He recognizes, in other words, their conditionality: the 
beautiful mare is an example of a beautiful being which will serve as a stepping stone toward a 
                                                          
107 Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World, 107. 
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fuller dialectical engagement with the question of what the beautiful itself may be. It is not a 
definition which will end the conversation.  
A latent possibility for such a fuller dialectical engagement exists in Hippias’s first 
definition, and in this possibility we get another sense of Socrates’s philosophical eros at work. 
By invoking the human body of a young maiden, Hippias (and the Hippias Major) stands in 
continuity with the two other Platonic dialogues which take up the theme of the beautiful, the 
Phaedrus and the Symposium.108 All three dialogues have a human body as the primary way that 
eros is awakened in a human soul: the Phaedrus speaks of a boy, and in the Symposium, Diotima 
speaks about a human body. A phenomenological argument can be made that a human person’s 
erotic desire for truth in all its forms does not appear fully-formed in his soul, but must be 
awakened through sexual desire for a beautiful body. When we behold a beautiful body for the 
first time, we become aware of our capacity for eros. Our lack of beauty and goodness cannot be 
felt without first witnessing its possible fulfillment standing before us. The assumption 
undergirding this argument is that the desire for another human body—epithumia—is connected, 
somehow, to the desire for philosophical contemplation—the highest stage of eros. Both the 
Phaedrus and the Symposium contain images of a person advancing beyond their initial 
epithumia, and becoming fully erotic. Hippias, too, will make an advance, albeit a stilted one, in 
spite of himself. His epithumia will become broadened by reason.109 
                                                          
108 Hyland, Plato and the Question of Beauty, 54 and 83. In the latter passage, Hyland underscores the fact that 
Diotima uses the word “necessary” in her claim that we must begin to love by loving a body. 
109 There is some debate regarding the logic of Hippias’s first definition. The stakes of the debate do not have direct 
bearing in our own search for the presence of eros in the Hippias Major. We note it here, however, because it does 
illuminate the philosophical dynamic at play in this part of the dialogue. A common philosophical critique of 
Hippias’s first answer is that it confuses the general and the particular – a confusion common in Plato’s so-called 
definitional dialogues, for example, in Euthyphro 5d. Hyland is among the commentators to take this stance: 
“Hippias immediately confuses this [Socrates’s question] with something that is beautiful” (Hyland, Plato, 13). 
Another version of this argument is found in Dorothy Tarrant, The Hippias Major Attributed to Plato; With 
Introductory Essays and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928). 
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 One could argue something slightly different about the ascent passage of the Symposium: 
that its first step is not one of epithumia, but already of eros. In other words, in order for a person 
to be a candidate for the ascent, he or she must already have moved beyond epithumia. The 
ascent is, properly speaking, the ascent of eros, not of epithumia and eros. The lover of a single 
body at the first step of Diotima’s ladder is already generating beautiful logoi about the body he 
or she loves. This capacity to generate logos indicates that the person standing at the first step of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Contradicting this claim, Nehamas points out that that type of confusion does not appear to be the case in 
the Hippias Major, given that Hippias has already understood – or at least, claimed to have understood – Socrates’s 
distinction between the beautiful and a beautiful thing in 287c. Hippias honestly seems to believe that an example of 
a beautiful thing satisfies Socrates’s friend’s question. Nehamas offers other instances in Greek literature (from 
Antigone and Hippolytus) where a particular object is said to encompass the whole definition of an idea.  Nehamas 
argues that it is not plausible that Hippias was confused about Socrates’s question and also confused about the 
difference between a general term and a particular term, or that by which objects are made beautiful, and a beautiful 
object. Hippias was probably not a “naïve nominalist,” as he puts it. He takes Socrates’s question seriously, but his 
answer does not satisfy Socrates, who is in search of a different type of answer. Given this interpretation of 
Hippias’s first answer, Nehamas translates παρθένος καλὴ καλόν differently from what is found in the Woodruff 
translation. Instead of “a fine girl is a fine thing,” which is Woodruff’s rendering of the phrase, Nehamas puts it as 
“Being a beautiful maiden is (what it is to be) beautiful,” adding the bracketed phrase. Hippias is not speaking about 
a specific beautiful maiden, but about being a beautiful maiden; he believes that this being somehow encompasses 
the whole of what it means to be beautiful, and it somehow gives a meaning to the idea of the beautiful. As Nehamas 
puts it, Hippias’s use of “beautiful” in his response “is not a bona fide general term, but … it has a peculiar, strong 
sense, close to what we would mean by the expression, ‘is to be beautiful.’” See Alexander Nehamas, “Confusing 
Universals and Particulars in Plato’s Early Dialogues,” The Review of Metaphysics 29 (1975): 287-306. (His 
discussion of the Hippias Major occurs on pages 297-303.)  
Bernadete’s interpretation of the same passage is almost the same as Nehamas’: “Hippias says parthenos 
kale kalon. The adjective is feminine, the predicate neuter; and, according to Hippias, kalon is the same whether it 
has or does not have the article. Hippias says that a beautiful virgin is the beautiful, and he means that whatever is 
beautiful is the beautiful.” See Benardete, xxv-xxvi. 
 Woodruff disagrees with Nehamas (and, by association, Benardete), arguing that while Hippias does 
understand the question, he does not want to participate in its discussion, because he finds philosophy to be a 
pointless exercise. Woodruff finds it more likely to be the case that Hippias shares a Gorgian belief in the non-
existence of formal ideas, and for that reason focuses only on concrete objects. As a consequence of these 
metaphysical beliefs, the sophist Gorgias only believes in partial definitions, because “he does not believe there is 
any common being underlying the various uses of” a term, like beautiful, or virtue. Partial definitions are not 
actually definitions, and Gorgias does not actually attempt to do philosophy and discover definitions.  Woodruff 
believes that this is the likely reasoning behind Hippias’s first answer to Socrates’s question. Hippias and Gorgias 
were, after all, fellow sophists (though this is a weak argument, given the evident diversity of philosophical views 
among the sophists). With this answer Hippias is probably trying to trivialize or mock Socrates’s attempt to do 
philosophy. Moreover, Socrates’s response and critique of Hippias’s first definition is to show that it is insufficient 
as a general, all-encompassing term; he does not address it as being the type of answer that Nehamas has in mind. 
See Woodruff, Hippias Major, 50-51. 
 Regardless of the stance that one takes on this question, however, the effects of eros on Hippias’s first 
answer is clear. Hippias initiates a philosophical discussion by speaking about one specific body, and Socrates – as 
the erotic element in the dialogue – prompts Hippias to expand his consideration and contemplation to a wider array 
of objects, and this to a greater sense of possibility as to what the nature of the beautiful might be. Regardless of 
whether Hippias is trying to shut Socrates down by sabotaging the discussion, or whether he is attempting to answer 
his question in a colloquial way, or whether he actually is a naïve nominalist, the effects of eros remain the same.  
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the ascent is already erotic, and not merely in the throes of epithumia. But even if we adopt his 
view of Diotima’s ascent, the parallels with the Hippias Major still hold. Hippias may be said to 
have been in the throes of epithumia before meeting Socrates. Upon meeting Socrates, Hippias is 
able to say, “The beautiful itself is a beautiful girl,” and this phrase constitutes the first of many 
logoi that he is able to utter about the beautiful. Thus Socrates is able to bring Hippias to the 
point of being able to speak about beauty, and in doing so he prepares him for a possible ascent. 
Socrates’s rebuttal of his first definition will force Hippias to make concessions and to 
advance beyond his epithumia, even though he might not be fully aware that he is doing so. 
Hippias’s conversion is gradual and incomplete; we cannot say that, at any given point in the 
dialogue, Hippias becomes truly interested in a philosophical approach to the question of the 
beautiful. But at this stage, Socrates does get Hippias to accept three important claims: that the 
definition of the beautiful must include many different types of objects; that a hierarchy of 
beautiful objects exists and that, in this hierarchy, the gods are above human beings; and that the 
human person has a unique place as the spectator of, or witness to, the beautiful. The first two 
claims are made explicitly, and the third one is implied. In different ways, all three of these 
claims reflect or echo aspects of erotic desire. The expansion of Hippias’s attention toward a 
greater horizon of objects is linked to the rational component of eros, which does not allow us to 
contemplate merely one body but to move on to other and greater bodies and beings; the 
establishment of a hierarchy of beautiful beings dovetails with the claim that erotic desire 
ascends to ever greater manifestations of goodness; the human being, as an erotic seeker, has a 
special place as a witness to the beautiful, given that he is both desirous of it and witness to its 
existence in different forms. 
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With regard to the first claim, Socrates convinces Hippias to expand his consideration of 
beautiful bodies first by summoning the image of a beautiful mare, which we discussed above. 
After this example, he also discusses a beautiful lyre (λύρα καλή, 288c) and a beautiful pot 
(χύτρα καλή, 288c). One development in this part of the discussion is to nudge Hippias into an 
understanding of the beautiful that is more oriented towards human action and human needs. A 
lyre, more than a mare, becomes beautiful by being useful to and used by human beings. 
However, it may also be beautiful in other ways. A lyre may be beautiful because it produces 
beautiful music, or because it simply looks beautiful. A pot is similarly tied to human use. Sider 
points out that χύτρα simply means a pipkin, or a small earthenware pot.110 Socrates is not 
necessarily referring to the beautiful painted pottery we see in museums today. He is most likely 
referring to an object for everyday use in the kitchen. In fact, Socrates does not mention any 
beautiful images on the pot, but instead refers to its form and function: “If the pot should have 
been turned by a good potter, smooth and round and beautifully (καλῶς) fired, like some of those 
beautiful two-handled pots that hold six choes, very beautiful ones—if he’s asking about a pot 
like that, we have to agree it’s beautiful” (288d-e). Notice that Socrates refers to what the pot can 
do: it can hold six choes (a Greek unit of measurement). Socrates refers to the object’s function 
when he attempts to describe its beauty, though certain visible aspects of the pot (its smoothness, 
roundness, symmetry) may also play a role in its being beautiful. In both cases—the lyre and the 
pot—we see an expansion of “the beautiful” to refer both to the look and the use of an object. 
                                                          
110 “Socrates makes no reference to painting on the pot, and the word he uses, chytra, when it is not used loosely for 
pot in general, refers to the most common kind of cooking ware. The chytra is so common, that it finds no place in 
Richter and Milne’s excellent little pamphlet on the names of Greek vases. 
“There is sufficient evidence, moreover, to associate the name chytra with the rather globular (perhaps 
dumpy is a better word) pot found in great numbers in the Athenian agora and elsewhere. Although bronze examples 
are known, they are usually of clay; and not only where they not decorated with pictures, they were usually left 
unpainted, as the smoke from the fire in the kitchen would soon provide a black surface as dark as any glaze. There 
even seems to have been a proverb, ‘to paint a chytra,’ to indicate a useless effort.” Sider, “Plato’s Early Aesthetics: 
The Hippias Major,” 78. 
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As for the second claim, it is actually Hippias himself who argues for a hierarchy of 
beauty, and Socrates builds upon Hippias’s idea. Hippias accepts Socrates’s claim that these 
objects are also beautiful, but he will not allow that all beauty is equal. Hippias defends his 
definition by appealing to a hierarchy of value: “Even that utensil [i.e., a pot] is beautiful if 
beautifully made. But on the whole that’s not worth judging beautiful, compared to a horse and a 
girl and all the other beautiful things” (288e).The implication is that some objects are more 
beautiful than others, and thus more worthy of being called “the beautiful,” or at least, more 
worthy of being discussed in a serious conversation.111 Hippias believes that living creatures, like 
girls and horses, are more worthy of being called beautiful than mere tools. In effect, he is 
resisting Socrates’s nascent tendency to discuss the beautiful in terms of what is useful for 
human beings. Hippias believes that living creatures are more beautiful than tools. Socrates’s 
response will be to accept the notion that some beings are more beautiful than others—that is, he 
will embrace the idea of a hierarchy of beauty and expand the hierarchy to include the gods. His 
final refutation of Hippias’s first definition makes use of two interrelated aphorisms from 
Heraclitus, which he paraphrases. To gauge the philosophical significance of what Socrates is 
doing, we should quote them in full: 
The fairest of apes is ugly in comparison with the human race … The wisest of men will appear 
like an ape compared to a god, in wisdom, in beauty, and in every other respect.112 
These aphorisms constitute a hierarchy: apes-humans-gods, with gods at the top. The 
most beautiful ape is ugly compared to a man, but a man is but an ape compared to the beauty of 
the gods. Socrates draws an analogous hierarchy with the objects that he and Hippias have been 
                                                          
111 There is also the suggestive grouping of women with horses. It is evidence of the degree of misogyny prevalent 
in ancient Athens, where women were not held to be alike in dignity and intelligence as men. 
112 Translation is from Daniel W. Graham, trans. The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments 
and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics, Part I (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
178. 
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discussing: “If you put the class of girls together with the class of gods, won’t the same thing 
happen as happened when the class of pots was put together with that of girls? Won’t the most 
beautiful girl be seen as foul?” (289b). What follows is that a girl’s beauty is relative, and 
therefore she is not completely beautiful in every instance. Her beauty is contingent upon her 
surroundings: if she happens to be in the vicinity of the gods, her beauty pales in comparison, 
and she may legitimately be called ugly. Such an incomplete or limited instance of beauty cannot 
be the answer to Socrates’s question. 
By introducing the gods into the dialogue, Socrates establishes a divine standard for the 
beautiful, and defines the top of the hierarchy. Not only are the gods held to be superior to 
humans as a matter of Greek cultural prejudice. Reasons can also be adduced as to why they are 
superior, and those reasons carry philosophical weight. The divine qualities that human beings 
lack are immortality, permanence, and power. Unlike a human life, the life of a god or goddess 
does not end. Thus, if there is a general consensus among the Greeks that the gods are more 
beautiful than human beings, then immortality, power, and permanence must have something to 
do with beauty. Moreover, the divine standard not only allows us to say that some beings are 
more beautiful than others, but it also allows us to say that some beings are more worthy of 
human desire than others. Both Hippias and Socrates agree that the word “beautiful” appears to 
be more valid for some beings rather than others (for Hippias, girls and mares as opposed to lyres 
and pots; for Socrates, gods as opposed to girls). Implied in their judgment is that some things 
are more worthy of admiration and love—of eros—than others. 
At this juncture Socrates’s implicit third claim comes into view: The human being retains 
a special place within his Heraclitus-inspired, ape-human-god hierarchy. It is the place “in 
between” beauty and ugliness, and also a place from which the human person is able to judge 
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whether something is beautiful or ugly. An ape could not do so, and a god would not care to do 
so. The human being is thus situated in a place quite similar to that of the lover in Diotima’s 
account of eros: ἐν μέσῳ ἐστίν, in the middle, shuttling between lesser and greater forms of 
beauty, or perhaps, advancing from one to the other.  
By this moment in the dialogue, we can see that Hippias has already ascended from his 
epithumia-inspired first definition, and chosen to consider some of Socrates’s rebuttals to it. By 
“ascended,” I mean that he has expanded his sense for the possibility of what kinds of beings 
might be beautiful, and has therefore adopted a more open, erotic stance toward the question of 
what the beautiful itself is. In a sense, Hippias has allowed himself to become partially converted 
to philosophy. He has chosen, at least, to go along with Socrates a little while longer. Now he 
will try once again to define the beautiful. 
Gold (289d-291c) 
 In the discussion of Hippias’s second definition, “gold” (χρυσός, 289e), the force of 
philosophical eros upon the search for the beautiful itself consists of bringing into focus the 
relationship between what it is that makes beings become beautiful, on the one hand, and a 
beautiful being’s appearance, on the other. In other words, during their discussion of the second 
definition, Hippias and Socrates will confront, in the most explicit way thus far in the dialogue, 
the question of whether a being’s beauty is a feature of appearance or of its being. (The question 
is revisited later on (294a), as we shall see in Chapter Three.) By arguing for beauty as 
something intrinsic to being, and not appearance, Socrates gestures to the erotic disposition 
required for the search for the beautiful itself: for a philosophical eros that goes beyond 
appearances to discover the truth about being as it is in itself. If Socrates is in search of true 
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opinion about the beautiful itself, this search will require a transcending of appearance in order to 
obtain it; that is, Socrates’s search will require the transcendence of the particular point of view,  
for a point of view that is adequate to what the beautiful is in itself. 
The dialogue begins anew with Socrates restating his question according to the standard 
of being over appearance: “He’ll say: ‘If I had asked you from the beginning what is both 
beautiful and foul, and you had given me the answer you just gave, then wouldn’t you have 
given the right answer? Do you still think that the beautiful itself by which everything else is 
beautified and seen to be beautiful that form is added to it (προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος)– that 
that is a girl or a horse or a lyre?’” (289d, Socrates is still reporting what his absent friend would 
say in response to Hippias’s attempts to answer his question). Having surpassed Hippias’s first 
definition, Socrates believes that his friend would refine the question. The problem is to discover 
the form (εἶδος) which, when added (προσγένηται), will make a being become beautiful, and be 
seen to be so. Obviously, one cannot “add” a girl, or a horse, or a lyre, to another object. Thus 
the question has become more philosophically precise: we are asked to find a definition of 
beauty which accounts for an object’s becoming beautiful. The word Socrates uses, προσγένηται, 
is a compound of γίγνομαι, meaning “to come into a new state of being.” We are looking for 
what it is that causes an object to come into the state of being beautiful.   
 Hippias posits an answer to the restated question which corresponds to a beautiful being’s 
appearance, and not to its being: gold (χρυσός, 289e). This is what, when added, will cause a 
being to become beautiful. It is unclear whether Hippias willfully or innocently misunderstands 
Socrates’s restated question; nevertheless, his answer once again bespeaks a reluctance to follow 
the philosophical erotic path, one that takes the seeker for truth beyond appearances. Socrates 
refutes Hippias by arguing that one must take into account the nature of each thing and discover 
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what is appropriate to it in order to understand the cause of beauty in a being (290d). Gold would 
be appropriate for some beings, but not for others. The dynamic between the interlocutors is 
similar to what occurred when they discussed the beautiful maiden: Hippias’s definition once 
again focuses on material reality, this time on a visible aspect or characteristic of a body; 
Socrates makes an effort to expand their dialogue to include a principle—appropriateness—
which is not necessarily tied to the material aspect of beauty. The erotic impulse is at play in 
Socrates’s continued widening of Hippias’s horizons: Socrates will show him that there is a way 
in which the beautiful lies beyond the appreciation of the senses. 
 Before we proceed to explicate this section of the dialogue, however, we must go back to 
the passage cited above and comment on an important word whose presence should alert any 
close reader of Plato: εἶδος. Does this word refer to the Form of beauty, in the sense that Plato 
would use the term in the Phaedo or Republic? Or is it being used in a nontechnical way? The 
text does not present us with an explicit discussion about the Forms in general or the Form of 
Beauty in particular. Nor has anything leading up to Socrates’s use of the word prepared us for 
such a complex philosophical theory. The use of the word appears to be colloquial.113 
Nevertheless, Socrates’s commitment, in this dialogue, to defining the essence of a phenomenon 
as elusive as the beautiful does send us on the same dialectical path which leads, in other 
dialogues, to the Forms.114 We cannot find any ontological theory in the Hippias Major, but we 
do find that Socrates’s prodding of Hippias opens up a horizon of through within which one can 
                                                          
113 Hyland argues that this use of εἶδος is “not even close” to Plato’s theory of forms, but that it does signal a search 
for a “connotative” definition of the beautiful, which is something that points to an essence. See Hyland, Plato and 
the Question of Beauty, 16. Woodruff argues that this use of εἶδος is a more commonplace one, not bearing any of 
the philosophical significance which Plato gives it in other dialogues. See Woodruff, Hippias Major, 55.   
114 I agree then with Woodruff when he writes that in the Hippias Major: “Plato has Socrates mark off a Form from 
its instances more systematically than in other dialogues of search,” with the added caveat that “the marking off is 
not presented as part of an ontological theory.” One could say that the Forms are never presented as a “theory” even 
in the Phaedo or Republic, but this is a separate issue. See Woodruff, Hippias Major, 168. 
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see the beautiful as a principle which can be thought about independent of its manifestation in 
material reality. In this section, the principle is “appropriateness.” This idea (to which Socrates 
returns once he has taken over the discussion in 293e) forces us to consider the possibility that 
the essence of the beautiful—a visible, sensory phenomenon—could lie beyond the realm of the 
sensible. Beyond this we cannot conjecture about the presence of the Forms in this dialogue 
without venturing into a large-scale interpretation of the whole of Plato’s philosophical 
trajectory—a very difficult task.115 In any case, εἶδος can mean “form” but also “that which is 
seen,” and Socrates will make use of both meanings—an invisible principle, and a visible trait or 
characteristic—in his rebuttal of Hippias’s second definition of the beautiful. 
 Hippias persists in thinking about the beautiful as a visible characteristic. His response to 
Socrates’s friend has the same blustery tone of someone who thinks they know what they’re 
talking about: 
H: But if that’s what he’s looking for, it’s the easiest thing in the world to answer him and tell him 
what the beautiful (thing) is by which everything else is beautified and is seen to be beautiful 
when it is added. The man’s quite simple; he has no feeling at all for beautiful possessions. If you 
answer him that this thing he’s asking for, the beautiful, is just gold, he’ll be stuck and won’t try to 
refute you. Because we all know, don’t we, that wherever that is added, even if it was seen to be 
foul before, it will be seen to be fine when it has been beautified with gold. (289d-e) 
Hippias has accepted the refined version of their question, but he has not advanced far beyond 
his initial point of view. There is no great progress from saying that the beautiful is a beautiful 
                                                          
115 Though one that has been attempted by scholars of the Hippias Major. See Woodruff, 175-179, the section titled 
“The Place of the Hippias Major in Plato’s Philosophical Development.” Also John Malcolm, “On the Place of the 
Hippias Major in the Development of Plato’ Thought,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 50 (1968): 189-195. 
Both of these sources are discussed in Charles Kahn, “The Beautiful and the Genuine: A discussion of Paul 
Woodruff, Plato, Hippias Major. Translated with Commentary and Essay, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3 
(1985): 261-287. 
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maiden, to saying that the beautiful is gold. Hippias could have put it this way: “It’s her gold 
make-up”—perhaps she is Egyptian—“which makes her beautiful.” Hippias still identifies the 
beautiful with something physical. (We can speculate also that by invoking the color, “gold,” he 
is also invoking money and wealth—something Hippias has that Socrates lacks.) In responding 
to him, Socrates makes use of a common cultural touchstone, the work of the sculptor, Pheidias, 
known for his sculpture of Athena Parthenos inside the Parthenon. “The point is,” Socrates 
argues (saying what he says his friend would say), “that Pheidias didn’t make Athena’s eyes out 
of gold, nor the rest of her face, nor her feet, nor her hands—as he would have done if gold 
would really have made them be seen to be the most beautiful—but he made them out of ivory” 
(290b). If Hippias is right about what causes something to be beautiful, Pheidias’ reputation as a 
sculptor would have to be revised. But Hippias will not challenge the popular taste: Pheidias’ 
statue is beautiful, so therefore he must amend his theory: “We’ll say he made the statue right. 
Ivory’s beautiful too, I think” (290c). Socrates will push further: Pheidias didn’t craft the middle 
part (τὰ μέσα τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν) of Athena’s eyes with ivory, but with stone. He used stone “and he 
found stone that resembled (ὁμοιότητα) ivory as closely as possible” (290c).Socrates then 
introduces a principle: stone would be beautiful “when it is appropriate”  (ὅταν γε πρέπων ᾖ, 
290d). Hippias agrees: “Whatever is appropriate to each thing makes that particular thing 
beautiful” (290d). Following this principle, Hippias is forced to concede that, given certain 
conditions, figwood could be said to be more beautiful than gold—for example, as the 
appropriate material with which to fashion a soup spoon (291b-c). 
 Socrates’s appeal to artistic taste (consistent with his earlier commendation of the work 
of the sculptor Bias [281d-282a]) is related to the philosophical importance of this passage, 
which has to do with judgment. The judgment of beauty in bodies (a judgment of taste, in 
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modern parlance) requires sensory observation (we must experience the object) but also a 
principle by which we determine whether the being we apprehend in experience merits being 
placed under the category of “beautiful beings.” That principle can be something linked to a 
sensory attribute (like gold), or a sort of measurement which can be applied to different types of 
beings (e.g., sculptures, spoons). “Appropriateness” is the latter sort of principle, applicable as it 
is to all kinds of beings. The claim that the appropriate is the cause of beauty in objects means 
that we may judge an object’s beauty using appropriateness as a principle by which to make that 
judgment. We may take one aspect of an object (e.g., Athena’s eyes, the material of a spoon, the 
cut of a piece of clothing) and judge whether the way it is fashioned is appropriate to the end for 
which it was fashioned. If it is indeed appropriate, then we may call it beautiful. (Note that 
“appropriateness” with regard to Greek sculpture does not necessarily mean “accuracy.” The 
“appropriateness” which corresponds to artistic taste is, of course, a vast topic, one which 
Socrates merely touches upon in this passage.) 
With the introduction of the principle of appropriateness into the dialogue, we have 
reached a new level of philosophical sophistication: we are no longer merely speaking about 
bodies and sight, but also about principles whose application require more than a simple check 
with the eyes. Unlike the presence of gold color, “appropriateness” can only be determined 
through reflection, not just perception. It is worth noting, however, that πρέπω may also mean 
“clearly seen” or “conspicuous.” Socrates has chosen a principle which also evokes the sense of 
sight. But as a principle by which we can judge whether an object is beautiful, it could also apply 
to objects which are not bodies and cannot be experienced by the senses (such as beautiful laws, 
to which Hippias and Socrates refer in 298d). Perhaps their appreciation for the word’s 
versatility is the reason why neither Socrates nor Hippias comments on the ambiguity in their use 
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of “appropriate.” They use it to mean what is appropriate for a work of art (a sculpture), which 
implies an appropriateness in taste or for representing something accurately in an image. They 
also use it as appropriateness in a tool (a spoon), which means appropriate for the intended 
function of an object. Both uses, however, imply the existence of a human being which both 
makes and uses the beautiful object. (In cases where the object is not directly linked to human 
use, the principle becomes more questionable: What is appropriate within a beautiful landscape?)  
In making this argument Socrates in effect reaffirms the third implicit principle that we 
discussed above, by giving the human being a special role when it comes to determining what is 
beautiful. The thrust of Socrates’s engagement with Hippias brings the focus back on the human 
being who has to judge whether something is “appropriate” for an object. “Appropriateness” is a 
principle that must be used or applied to understand the beautiful. It must be used by someone—
a human being. The beautiful is linked to the human activity of judging. It has its seat in the 
human subject—it is an “event” of a sort, in a human life.  
 The importance of this last point shows up in high relief when we see how seemingly 
fruitless any reading of the Hippias Major becomes when one misses it. The conclusion of 
Christopher Raymond’s analysis of Hippias’s second answer is a case in point, worth examining 
here. Raymond proceeds by first defining a series of concepts and philosophical positions 
concerning aesthetic judgment which he will use to create categories with which to organize 
Plato’s thought. He eventually discovers that Plato’s thought does not fit comfortably into any of 
his categories. An aesthetic reason is “any consideration that supports an aesthetic concern.” An 
aesthetic reason could be, for example, the sense of urgency in a given piece of music. This 
reason has valence for some types of music (say, punk rock) but not for others (a lullaby). There 
are two philosophical positions with regard to aesthetic reasons: Holism holds all aesthetic 
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reasons to be variant, that is, that an aesthetic reason that has valence for one object will have 
valence for only that object, and not necessarily for all objects. Atomism holds that aesthetic 
reasons carry their valence universally: they make an object aesthetically valuable regardless of 
context. Hippias, by claiming that “gold” is the universal cause of beauty in beings, shows 
himself to be an atomist about aesthetic reasons, at least at this point in the dialogue (and at least 
insofar as he is choosing to philosophize at all, which he is, but only because he is playing along 
with Socrates).116 
  Beyond these positions on aesthetic reasons, Raymond gives us two concerning aesthetic 
judgment. The first position is called particularism, and it holds that the rationality of aesthetic 
judgment does not depend on the truth of its principles. The generalist stance holds the opposite 
view. Aesthetic principles are related to reasons, but they can be either contributory or absolute. 
Absolute principles, by their very presence, make an object aesthetically valuable; contributory 
principles merely give some reason to value an object aesthetically, though perhaps not enough 
to make it valuable overall. Hippias (again, insofar as he is going against his usual way of life 
and philosophizing) is a generalist about aesthetic judgment, and gold for him is an absolute 
aesthetic principle.117 
 These principles are easy to apply when it comes to Hippias’s views, as we have seen. 
Though, strictly speaking, there is no mention of “principle” in the dialogue, one can interpret, 
say, Hippias’s contention that “gold” makes objects become beautiful as the expression of the 
idea that gold is an aesthetic principle. Raymond’s technical vocabulary can, in other words, 
                                                          
116 See Raymond, “The Hippias Major and Aesthetics,” 39. The claim that gold, in this dialogue, functions as an 
aesthetic reason is supported by Sweet’s observation that “Gold has the virtue of possessing a value and an existence 
independent of the things that are beautified by it.” See Sweet, “On the Greater Hippias,” 346. Certainly, Hippias 
appeals to gold precisely because of this independent existence it has. As such, it functions as a so-called aesthetic 
reason. 
117 Raymond, “The Hippias Major and Aesthetics,” 40. 
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supply a hermeneutic which elucidates Hippias’s positions. But his vocabulary does not fully 
explain Socrates’s position. Raymond claims that the Socrates of the Hippias Major holds to a 
unique form of particularism when it comes to aesthetic judgment and holism when it comes to 
aesthetic principles. According to Raymond, particularists often take a holistic position with 
regard to reasons. They believe that aesthetic reasons only make sense within the context of a 
certain object, and they don’t believe that their rationality is contingent on the truth of those 
reasons.  Moreover, Raymond claims that a particularist “would not be troubled by an inability to 
give an account of beauty” because beauty “does not figure into his picture of how aesthetic 
value works.”118  The particularist has no need to appeal to something further, like beauty, to 
explain aesthetic value, because aesthetic value is rooted in a sort of idiosyncratic moment of 
valuation. We may argue that “urgency” or “gold” make an object beautiful, but asking why this 
is so is not relevant to the particularist. 
Raymond builds upon his analysis of the Hippias Major in order to extrapolate a general 
theory of Plato’s views about aesthetic judgment and aesthetic reasons: “the Pheidias passage in 
the Hippias Major, taken in conjunction with passages from the Phaedo and Republic, supports a 
holistic conception of aesthetic reasons,” and: “Plato is an aesthetic particularist.”119 But Plato is 
a particularist of a peculiar sort, Raymond argues, for a very important reason. A common 
particularist does not care about the “meaning” of the “beautiful,” but is only concerned with 
understanding the principles by which we can categorize something as “beautiful.” On the 
contrary, at least in the Hippias Major (which is what concerns us here) Socrates believes that 
understanding the nature of the beautiful is of paramount importance to understanding how an 
object becomes beautiful. The only “aesthetic reason” that Socrates accepts is “the beautiful” as 
                                                          
118 Raymond, “The Hippias Major and Aesthetics,” 46. 
119 Raymond, “The Hippias Major and Aesthetics,” 46. 
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such.120 We should add that the “appropriate”, for Socrates, is not an aesthetic reason, but a 
principle which allows us to judge whether a being is beautiful, and whether we can categorize 
an object as beautiful. (The same will go for the other principles that Socrates discusses once he 
takes over the dialogue, as we shall see in the next chapter.) It is different in kind from Hippias’s 
“gold.” In essence, the two answers mirror the personages in the dialogue: Hippias’s attachment 
to appearances and wealth (gold), and Socrates’s preference for dialectic and ideas (the 
appropriate). 
 Socrates’s response to Hippias’s second definition works only to deepen the mystery of 
what exactly makes an object beautiful, and of what the beautiful is, in and of itself. Raymond 
concludes: “The value of the Platonic notion of the beautiful is not, as far as I can see, that it 
inspires us toward abstract reflection. It reminds us, rather, that beauty is elusive, and will always 
resist being contained in rules and formulae.”121 But this does not go far enough in explaining the 
philosophical importance of Socrates’s response to Hippias. Socrates’s point does not leave us at 
mere skepticism or bewildered before the mystery of the beautiful. He points to the fact that the 
beautiful is intimately linked to the subject who beholds it. It cannot be understood without some 
reference to human action, or to human life. The modern formal categories of “aesthetic reasons” 
and “principles” do not reflect this dimension of Socrates’s inquiry. 
There is, however, one modern thinker that may help us to better understand this passage 
in the Hippias Major. With his attention to the place of human perception in making an account 
of what the beautiful is, Socrates anticipates, in an oblique way, the aesthetics of Kant. In the 
Critique of Judgment, Kant advances a theory of aesthetic judgment which is particularist and is 
                                                          
120 As Raymond puts it, “If a property appears beautiful in a certain context, that is never due to the nature of the 
property; it becomes beautiful only by sharing in the form of the kalon itself.” Raymond, “The Hippias Major and 
Aesthetics,” 46. 
121 Raymond, “The Hippias Major and Aesthetics,” 47. 
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neither holistic nor atomistic, because it does not appeal to aesthetic reasons. Aesthetic judgment 
is, instead, both subjective (or particularist) and universal; it does not rest on any concepts or 
attributes.122 The elements which make an object beautiful cannot be described.  An aesthetic 
judgment is both an interior experience and one can be wrong about it—but since the judgment 
is not about any of the attributes of the form being contemplated, it cannot be described. I can 
only say: “This flower is beautiful,” and another subject can agree or disagree, but we cannot 
argue against each other in any meaningful way. The ultimate principle that makes something be 
beautiful lies beyond the realm of experience, within the noumenal world of the supersensible.123 
It can only be pointed at. The sign of a correct judgment is a communal agreement between 
rational beings, who all agree that something is beautiful—for example, popular approval of 
Pheidias’s statue of Athena. 
 Of course, a great chasm exists between Plato’s thought and Kant’s, but we can see some 
similarity in their views on aesthetic judgment in the passage discussed here. Both Plato and 
Kant agree that it is not a particular attribute which makes an object beautiful, but that the 
beautiful inheres in an object wholly. For Kant, the principle by which an object is judged to be 
beautiful cannot be articulated, and Socrates, who in this section attempts to articulate it as the 
appropriate, will soon change his mind. Both thinkers seem to claim that the beautiful is both an 
intelligible cause of the beautiful in beings, but cannot be known through articulated 
                                                          
122 “A judgment of taste, on the other hand, is merely contemplative, i.e., it is a judgment that is indifferent to the 
existence of the object: it [considers] the character of the object only by holding it up to our feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure. Nor is this contemplation, as such, directed to concepts, for a judgment of taste is not a cognitive 
judgment (whether theoretical or practical) and hence is neither based on concepts, nor directed to them as 
purposes.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 51. 
123 “As for the subjective principle—i.e., the indeterminate idea of the supersensible in us—as the sole key for 
solving the mystery of this ability [i.e., taste] concealed from us even as to its sources, we can do no more than point 
to it; but there is nothing we can do that would allow us to grasp it any further.” Kant, Critique of Judgment, 213-
214. Emphasis mine. 
74 
 
principles.124 Just as Kant’s theory of judgment opened up his thought to a whole world of 
complicated conjectures on the nature of the supersensible, so too does Socrates’s refutation of 
Hippias’s second definition open us up to greater philosophical vistas about the relationship 
between human life and the beautiful which will be explored in depth once Socrates begins 
positing his own answers to the question of the beautiful. The dialogue that Socrates has begun 
with Hippias has forced Hippias to consider the beauty of an ever greater assortment of objects. 
The eros of Socrates’s inquiry has brought Hippias to an appreciation of the beautiful that lies 
beyond his initial notions about it. 
Human Life (291d-293c) 
 The third and final definition proposed by Hippias involves the introduction of an 
axiological theme into the dialogue about the beautiful. As such, it mirrors another step upon the 
ascent toward the beautiful itself as it is proposed by Diotima (Diotima’s ladder starts with 
bodies and advances up to the beauty of souls as well as those laws which form souls). “Would 
you like me to tell you what you can say the beautiful is—and save yourself a lot of argument?” 
(291b). Hippias’s arrogance has not abated, despite the humbling treatment he has received at the 
hands of Socrates. But now Hippias thinks he can make a winning move. The answer that should 
finally satisfy (or at least silence) Socrates is the following: 
                                                          
124 Hyland’s Plato and the Question of Beauty makes a similar claim about the Hippias Major and other works on 
the Platonic canon – in fact, this is one of the major ideas which the book aims to articulate. Nehamas echoes us 
here: “At this point, Kant and Plato converge: just as nothing we know is enough to prove that something is 
beautiful, everything we love is always a step beyond our understanding. The pleasures of the imagination are 
pleasures of anticipation, not accomplishment.” Nehamas, Only a Promise of Happiness, 76. The second sentence is 
an interpretation of the first. To say that we cannot “prove” that something is beautiful is not to be a skeptic about 
the existence of beautiful objects, according to Nehamas. Rather, he points out that no attributes may be appealed to 
in an argument for an object’s beauty. Only direct intuition will tell us whether an object is beautiful. This intuition 
invites us to look more deeply into the sources of this object of beauty that we are beholding. But those sources are 
always a bit beyond our grasp. At this point in the dialogue, neither interlocutor has admitted that the sources are 
beyond our grasp. But by the end of it, they may have changed their minds. 
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I saw, then that it is always most beautiful, both for every man and in every place, to be rich, 
healthy, and honored by the Greeks, to arrive at old age, to make a beautiful  memorial to his 
parents when they die, and to have a beautiful, grand burial from his own children. (291d-e) 
The complete, fulfilled human life of a Greek male is what it is to be beautiful. The word 
“beautiful” is used as part of the definition, and Hippias does not care. He has not taken seriously 
Socrates’s requirement that the definition of beauty include a causal explanation of what makes 
an object become beautiful. Yet despite this, Hippias’s final definition constitutes a definite 
philosophical ascent. With it, Hippias introduces an axiological dimension to the question of the 
beautiful, as his definition is the first occasion in which the two interlocutors return to the 
question of a life well lived, which animated their conversation from the very beginning. Thus 
the philosophical eros of Socratic inquiry broadens the debate about the nature of the beautiful to 
include a consideration of the relationship between the beautiful and a life well lived. Neither 
interlocutor mentions “the good” as a theme, but the ground has been cleared for its appearance 
later in the dialogue.125 
Given this new axiological dimension, it is odd to see, in this section, one of the most 
violent passages in the dialogue. This passage also, however, brings to relief the fidelity that 
Socrates has to philosophy as an activity. Socrates argues that his absent friend (who, we recall, 
has been driving the discussion all along, according to Socrates) would be so disgusted with 
Hippias’s third answer that “If he happens to have a stick, and I don’t run and run away from 
him, he’ll try to give me a thrashing” (292a). Moreover, Socrates agrees that Hippias’s third 
definition is so bad, that violence is warranted: “Should I tell you why I believe he’d have a right 
                                                          
125 Woodruff’s translation does not make clear that “beautiful” in this passage appears both in the comparative—“ 
… it is always most beautiful … (κάλλιστον)”—but also as an adverb. The word καλῶς is used both to modify the 
act of being buried by one’s offspring (περιστείλαντι), as well as providing a funeral (περιστείλαντι). Thus we see 
that beauty is, for these two Greeks, a term that can be used to denote the way that things manifest themselves, or 
stand out and “shine,” before an observer.  
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to hit me if I gave that answer? Or will you hit me without trial too? Will you hear my case?” he 
tells Hippias (292b). The strangeness of this passage lies in that Socrates appears to claim that 
power can be used for, or may be on the side of, philosophy. Socrates’s friend is impatient 
because of Hippias’s lack of philosophical understanding. He would use force to promote 
philosophy, and Socrates ostensibly agrees with him. What a contrast from the opening passages 
of the Republic, where Socrates prefers persuasion to force (327c)! Still, it seems instead that 
Socrates is using the fictitious “friend” as foil in order to model a proper philosophical attitude 
for Hippias. In response to this possible violence, Socrates chooses to keep philosophizing, 
obeying his eros for the good, which requires him to seek out a true opinion about the beautiful 
itself, that is, an adequate definition. Socrates here seems to be saying that he would not cower in 
fear before anti-philosophical power. The question of violence and power will return once 
Socrates discusses beauty as power (296c). 
In order to see just how much more philosophically rich Hippias’s third answer is—and 
in order to justify our claim that with it, Hippias makes an ascent—we should compare the 
substance of his third definition of the beautiful with two similar ideas in the philosophical 
canon, from Aristotle and Kant. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that a happy life 
must be a complete one, and that one cannot judge a life to be happy, but only to have been 
happy (1100a5-6). Like Hippias, Aristotle also considers the role of one’s ancestors and 
offspring when assessing whether a life has been happy (1100a30-31, also 1101a1-39). Surely, 
Aristotle would not hesitate to call a complete and happy life beautiful (kalon). 
Kant, in the Critique of Judgment, makes a related point. In section 17, “On the Ideal of 
Beauty,” Kant writes that “It is man, alone among all objects in the world, who admits of an 
ideal of beauty, just as the humanity in his person, [i.e., in man considered] as an intelligence, is 
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the only thing in the world that admits of the ideal of perfection.”126  This is because only man 
can “determine his purposes by reason,”127 and fulfill them through action. We can imagine an 
ideal fulfilment of his purposes, and thus craft an ideal beautiful man, or beautiful human life. 
Other objects—mansions, trees, gardens (to name those cited by Kant)—are insufficiently 
determined by concepts. We simply do not know enough about their nature to craft an ideal. But 
we do about man, because man is a reasonable creature able to understand and pursue his moral 
fulfillment. Hippias’s definition, which includes the moral aspects of fulfilling one’s duty to the 
city and to one’s family, has much in common with Kant’s view. 
A closer look at Hippias’s third answer, however, reveals some important differences 
between it and the Aristotelian and Kantian examples. As a whole, Hippias’s view is not tethered 
to any rigorous philosophical argument. Aristotle attempts to judge whether a life has been 
happy as a whole, and this whole is composed of achieved virtues as well as circumstantial, 
contingent sufferings. Only once both have reached an end in death can we judge life as a whole. 
The criterion by which we judge this is the fulfillment of virtues within a life, in spite of the 
adversities or misfortunes which may have occurred during it. Kant, on the other hand, does not 
here use the language of virtue, nor does he speak about grasping a life as a whole, but rather of 
fashioning an ideal of beauty out of a human life. Yet this ideal also has to do with the 
fulfillment of a man’s rational capacity for exercising a good will. Like Aristotle, he sees moral 
fulfillment as the key to understanding life as a whole. 
These examples from Aristotle and Kant allow us to see Hippias’s definition in a clearer 
light. Hippias’s definition is in line with their philosophical concern over a life well lived, and all 
                                                          
126 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 81. 
127 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 81. 
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three thinkers agree in calling such a life “beautiful.”  Moreover, all three speak of a life 
considered as a whole. But the contrast also shows us the relative intellectual poverty of 
Hippias’s views. Hippias’s understanding of life as a whole does not appear to be linked to 
morality or virtue in a philosophically rigorous sense. It does have an axiological dimension, 
because Hippias does value this life above all others. But its value consists of two things—
wealth and honor—which are more likely to come from luck than from virtue.128 (Incidentally, in 
the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle states that wealth and honor are not worthy of being the final 
end of one’s life.129) Moreover, the “beautiful memorial” has something to do with the virtue of 
respecting one’s parents (and being respected, in turn, by one’s children), but it is unclear how 
such a virtue fits into Hippias’s view of the whole. At the very least, we can say that Hippias’s 
view of life as a whole is not as clearly based on moral fulfillment as it is for Aristotle and Kant. 
This is significant (and not merely an unwarranted comparison between a Platonic character and 
two philosophers who came after him) because it shows us that Hippias’s view of life as a whole 
does not include a philosophical ideal of flourishing, but rather a more traditional, Greek political 
ideal of fulfilling one’s duty to the state. Unlike Socrates’s lifestyle, Hippias’s ideal life, as stated 
here, would not raise the eyebrow of the Athenian political elite. In fact, his definition mirrors 
the ideals of that elite.130 One could also argue that Hippias does not even give us a view of life 
as a whole at all, because he does not identify a unifying element that would under which we 
                                                          
128 Here I am building upon an observation made by Sweet, “On the Greater Hippias,” 347: “The emphasis is on 
physical well-being, on honoring and being honored, but there is no mention of the soul or of what the virtues’ of 
such a man should be, neither that of courage, the most Spartan beauty, nor that of wisdom, the virtue Hippias prides 
himself on. And the only ‘beautiful pursuit’ the man is said to engage in actively is the beautiful burial of his 
parents.” 
129 1095b13-1096a10. 
130 Tarrant writes that, with the third definition, Hippias explains the beautiful “in terms of the archetypally desirable 
human life according to Greek tradition. We have a glimpse of that which is ‘fine’ not merely because of its 
delightful appearance or its utility, but of something that is fine qua end: the final object of striving for any ordinary 
Greek.” See Tarrant, “The Hippias Major and Socratic Theories of Pleasure,” 119. 
79 
 
could unify all the particulars that form a life.131  The wholeness is implied, but we can find no 
concept under which life becomes whole, and as a whole, beautiful. Unlike Kant and Aristotle, 
who held rational moral inclination and virtuous flourishing, respectively, as the unifying 
elements to an ideal human life, Hippias does not present us with any unifying element. What he 
has given us is the most unique and strange of all the answers to the Socratic question in the 
Hippias Major. He has forced us to consider what the relationship between beauty and life as a 
whole may be, and he has deepened the discussion by bringing to it an axiological dimension. 
In his swift and short response to Hippias’s third definition, Socrates reasserts two claims 
from earlier sections of the dialogue and also introduces a new theme into the dialogue. All three 
topics have a bearing on philosophical eros. Socrates re-asserts the need to understand the 
definition of the beautiful as something which causes a being to become beautiful, and he also 
makes use, once again, of the hierarchy of beauty which includes the gods. Socrates also makes a 
new claim, relevant here because of its echoes with the Symposium, about the temporal nature of 
the beautiful. 
First, Socrates restates his earlier requirement, that the definition of “the beautiful” 
include that which causes a being to be beautiful “when added” (292d). The definition of the 
beautiful, in other words, must be a causal explanation. Socrates reports what his friend would 
say: “Aren’t you capable of remembering that I asked for the beautiful itself?” Socrates 
continues: “For what when added to anything—whether to a stone or a plan or a man or a god or 
any action or any lesson—anything gets to be beautiful?” (292d). This passage echoes the one in 
289d, and uses the same verb, προσγίγνομαι, “to attach oneself to” or “add,” to denote the 
                                                          
131 Benardete argues along these same lines: “The phrasing thus gives the illusion of a whole while the definition is 
in fact episodic.” Benardete, The Being of the Beautiful, xxxii. 
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relationship between the beautiful object and that which causes it to be beautiful. Thus Socrates 
reinforces his understanding of what a proper and satisfying answer to the question of the 
beautiful would have to be. 
Second, Socrates also reasserts the hierarchy which he introduced earlier in the dialogue, 
between gods and human beings. Hippias’s third definition does not meet Socrates’s requirement 
of universality, because it cannot include, for example the life of Achilles (292e). Achilles’ 
mother, Thetis, is a god; therefore, Achilles will never bury her, because she will never die. 
Hippias does not dispute Achilles’ beauty, just as he did not dispute Socrates’s earlier assertion 
that the most beautiful girl is ugly compared to the class of gods. Instead, he replies: “But I 
didn’t mean it [the definition] for the gods” (293a). Socrates adds (in his unnamed friend’s 
voice): “Apparently you didn’t mean it for the heroes either,” namely Achilles, or any hero who 
has a god for a parent. Socrates also cites other heroes with divine parentage: Herakles, Tantalus, 
Dardanus, and Zethus (293a-b), as well as Pelops, the son of Tantalus (and lacking divine 
parents) as a point of contrast: why would the definition of the beautiful apply to Pelops and not 
to his father? 
Third, the novelty in this section lies in that Socrates introduces time into the discussion. 
Socrates asserts that the definition of the beautiful must be something which always is and 
always will be beautiful. Hippias defends his third definition by arguing that “I know perfectly 
well that what I said is beautiful for everyone—everyone will think so” (292e). But Socrates 
questions even this. He asks whether a human life will be beautiful, as well as whether it always 
has been beautiful. Hippias believes that his definition is valid in both the past and future. This 
theme is dropped almost immediately, but the exchange leaves us with an interesting thought 
from Socrates’s absent friend: ‘ἀεὶ γάρ που τό γε καλὸν καλόν’ (292e), “For that which is 
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beautiful always and for everyone.” With this, Socrates alludes to a way of being beyond the 
concrete manifestations of beauty that have been discussed thus far in the dialogue, including 
that of a human life. Woodruff argues that the “always” in this passage is not temporal.132 Yet 
there is enough in the sentence to at least make the claim that the answer to the question, “What 
is the beautiful?” must have a permanent stability in time. The gods, for example, are always 
considered to be beautiful, and they are permanently in being. Whatever causes a being to 
become beautiful must cause it to remain beautiful. 
 However unique Hippias’s third definition may be, Socrates has less to say about it than 
the others. The drama shifts quickly with Socrates’s announcement (293d) that his unnamed, 
absent friend, apart from rejecting other’s philosophical theories, sometimes proposes his own. 
And so Socrates will take over the discussion. 
Hippias’s Ascent 
Socrates’s dialectical engagement with Hippias’s definitions of the beautiful has the 
result of broadening the latter’s understanding of what the beautiful might be. Socrates’s 
questions about Hippias’s definitions, in other words, have forced Hippias to consider the 
possibility that the beautiful inheres not only in sexually attractive bodies, but also in tools and 
animals, musical instruments and even noble lives. This expansion of Hippias’s horizons is a 
movement of the soul akin to what we find in the Diotima section of the Symposium. Diotima 
speaks of a soul moving from the love of one body, to the love of all bodies, and from the love of 
all bodies, to the love of laws and institutions and sciences. Hippias goes from the notion of 
                                                          
132 Woodruff, Hippias Major, 61. Woodruff also compares this passage with Symposium 211a and its description of 
the form of the beautiful, but he does not find enough similarities to argue that the two passages are directly related. 
See Woodruff, Hippias Major, 73-74. 
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beauty as the epithumia for an attractive female body, and “ascends” to consider the beauty of 
other types of bodies and even of the notion of a noble life.  
A more detailed tracing of Hippias’s and Socrates’s dialectical steps illuminates the 
“ascending” dynamic that they take. Hippias begins by declaring, first, a beautiful maiden to be 
the definition of the beautiful, second, a principle (a visible one: gold, an invisible one: 
appropriateness), and finally a value (a human life, well-lived). Each answer corresponds to a 
different levels of being, if we accept Diotima’s scheme of placing non-bodily entities (e.g., 
principles and laws) above bodies (i.e., maidens), and if we place a value (i.e., human life) above 
both. Moreover, this ascent is a product of Socrates’s questioning. Socrates prompts Hippias to 
broaden his mind about what types of objects can be considered beautiful—from maidens to 
pots, works of art to heroic lives. He also prompts Hippias to change his answers and to seek 
after greater truthfulness. Hippias also agrees with Socrates’s suggestion of a hierarchy of 
beautiful beings, wherein the gods are at a higher position than human beings (though the very 
top of the hierarchy has not been defined nor even inquired about). Because Socrates plays such 
an obvious role in Hippias’s ascent, we can say that the latter is caused by Socrates’s 
philosophical eros. Hippias is philosophizing in spite of himself, because he has allowed himself 
to be led by a philosopher.  
 Recapitulating the plot of this section of the dialogue, we can see how this ascent 
happened. The Hippias of the Hippias Major is initially in thrall to epithumia, which is a form of 
desire that orients him toward bodies. This orientation is also part and parcel of his character, 
which appears to be mostly concerned with material reality. Hippias does not affirm much, 
beyond the judgment that a maiden is beautiful, gold makes some things beautiful, and a full 
human life full of honors and fulfilled duties is beautiful. That is, Hippias’s three answers are at 
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least as much mere affirmations concerning those things which Hippias personally holds to be 
especially beautiful, as they are attempts at answering Socrates’s philosophical question. It is 
true that Hippias accepts Socrates’s challenge, and goes along with the discussion. But by only 
naming bodies—either persons, or physical attributes—he does not approach the question in a 
truly philosophical way. His materialistic stance is not a philosophical stance but rather an anti-
philosophical one: he does not appear to be open to the possibility that a higher type of concept 
or explanation is possible, which would satisfy Socrates’s question.133 Yet with every answer he 
poses, Hippias becomes philosophical because he heeds Socrates’s prompting responses. In other 
words, he performs an ascent. (Whether this conversion to philosophy will remain a permanent 
                                                          
133 By characterizing Hippias’s worldview as “anti-philosophical,” we do not mean to imply that it is without its own 
doctrinal content, but merely that it is opposed to the type of inquiry that Socrates engages in the Hippias Major. As 
to what the doctrinal content of Hippias’s own views might be, we have two theories, from Woodruff and Sweet. 
Woodruff’s theory is that Hippias is a follower of Gorgias’ school of skepticism. Gorgias is traditionally held to 
have been a proponent of skepticism both about the existence of reality and of our ability to know and communicate 
about it even if it does exist.  Woodruff argues that the Gorgian skepticism about our ability to know reality does not 
allow Hippias to make any general claims about an underlying being (or nature) of the beautiful, but instead forces 
him to stick to concrete examples – even if, with his third example, Hippias is stretching the bounds of what an 
“object” or “body” could really be. Woodruff argues that Hippias sticks to concrete examples precisely because of 
this Gorgian skepticism. It should be noted, however, that the Gorgian skepticism does not commit Hippias to any 
overarching philosophical views about being. See Woodruff, Hippias Major, 117. 
 On the other hand, by calling Hippias a “materialist,” Sweet does commit Hippias to a philosophical view 
about being. If Hippias limits his definitions to concrete bodies which are beautiful, it is not because he doesn’t 
believe in general concepts, but also because he believes that bodies are the only beings that exist. Socrates’s 
question, Sweet writes, raises three issues: “whether or not many things can be understood in terms of one, what the 
causal relation between those many and the one is, and what the status of one is with respect to being.”   The first 
issue deals with the ancient problem of the one and the many. The second deals with the “added” quality of beauty, 
which causes an object to be beautiful, and which we have seen Socrates mention twice in this dialogue. The third 
has to do with the ontological status of whatever the answer to Socrates’s question might be.  
Hippias, as a materialist, would have a brief response to these three issues. He believes, Sweet writes, that 
“only things in being are bodies. Beauty is any beautiful thing.”  Therefore, all beautiful things cannot be understood 
in terms of one; the problem of the one and the many is not resolved, or rather, the many are affirmed and the one is 
rejected. Hippias also does not attempt to make a causal account of how an object becomes beautiful – he simply 
gives examples, because only the many “are.” Finally, Hippias does not give an ontological account of “the beautiful 
itself.”  It makes sense, then, that Hippias would be tied to the form of desire which is most closely associated with 
physicality and bodies: ἐπιθυμία. See Sweet, “On the Greater Hippias,” 345. (See also Hoerber, 183: “We should 
observe that he [Hippias] is merely giving examples of what is beautiful to him and that his concepts of beauty are 
essentially on the level of materialism.”) In any case, it is difficult to assign a stable philosophical position to 
Hippias, whether it be Gorgian or materialist. The point is that Hippias is resisting the activity of philosophy, and is 
resisting the ordering of his eros towards goodness and truth. 
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feature of Hippias’s life is something that only the dénouement of the dialogue will reveal, and 
which I will discuss in Chapter Five.) 
The crucial point here is that Hippias’s ascent is made possible because of the eros of 
Socratic philosophical inquiry. Without Socrates’s pressing Hippias, without his engaging him in 
dialectical examination, Hippias would never have opened his mind. Moreover, it is this 
particular theme of the beautiful that also has a special “broadening” effect. Socrates’s invitation 
to look at the beautiful in a philosophical way, and his invocation of the beauty of various 
beings, helps Hippias to gradually expand his horizons. In short, both Socrates’s philosophical 
discourse and the theme of his philosophical discourse provoke Hippias to rise toward an erotic 
engagement with the world around him.  
Socrates’s Analogical Way of Speaking about the Beautiful 
 My argument in the preceding section has been that Socrates’s dialectical engagement 
with Hippias’s definitions of the beautiful results in an ascent by Hippias, which parallels some 
of the steps on Diotima’s ladder. In this section, I will dissect one of the conditions for the 
possibility of this ascent: Socrates’s open-ended attribution of beauty to different kinds of 
objects. In his responses to Hippias’s three definitions, Socrates uses the word, “beautiful” in an 
elastic way; he is able to attribute the beautiful to all sorts of beings, from tools to gods. The 
priority is always with reality, that is, with the beings that Socrates actually sees. Any way of 
speaking is a way of speaking that Socrates adopts only because he believes it is adequate to the 
beauty that he is attempting to describe. The best way to describe the way that Socrates speaks 
“the beautiful” is to call it analogical. An analogical way of speaking about the beautiful is open 
to speaking about the beautiful both as one thing, and as one thing that appears to us in many 
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different ways. The beautiful is at once univocal (it refers to one thing, which Socrates and 
Hippias are attempting to discover) but it also manifests itself in different ways in different 
beings. By allowing himself to be led by Socrates, Hippias effectively adopts this analogical way 
of speaking about beauty, because he accepts all of the ways Socrates uses the word, and never 
disputes any of his particular judgments about what may be beautiful. Socrates’s analogical way 
of speaking makes the ascent possible because it is already philosophically oriented toward an 
ascent. In other words, Socrates’s analogical way of speaking corresponds to his philosophical 
eros. In this section, I will first look at Socrates’s criticisms and objections to Hippias’s 
definitions, and consider how his criticisms and objections open up the question of just what kind 
of term “the beautiful” would have to be in order to satisfy Socrates. Second, I will articulate the 
way in which Socratic discourse on the beautiful is “analogical.”  
Socrates’s Requirements for a Proper Definition 
Socrates’s responses to Hippias’s answer rely on three arguments. The first is that none 
of Hippias’s answers include an explanation of what causes something to be beautiful “when 
added.” Implicit here is the idea that a definition of the beautiful should contain such an 
explanation. Second, Hippias is looking for a definition with universal scope—that is, a 
definition that can encompass every possible type of beautiful object, from maidens to spoons to 
human lives considered as a whole. Related to this point is the third one: Socrates is looking for a 
definition of the beautiful that has permanent validity, for everyone at all times.134  
                                                          
134 Woodruff lists the criteria differently. According to him, Socrates is looking for a definition that (1) explains the 
fineness of fine things in such a way as to justify praise for them, (2) is fine itself, and (3) occurs in every fine thing. 
Moreover, he adds three more Socratic criteria which arise as the dialogue develops: the definition must (a) be the 
logical cause of fineness, (b) must under no circumstances be foul, and (c) must be one and the same in all cases of 
fineness. See Woodruff, Hippias Major, 150. (a) is a development of (1), and I mention it above. (b) is related to (2), 
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We can easily see how none of Hippias’s answers met these criteria. A beautiful maiden 
does not have causal power, does not have universal scope, and it is not always valid to claim 
that she is beautiful. Comparing her to a god, she is found to be relatively ugly. Gold does not 
meet any of these criteria, either, but the damning argument against it is its lack of universality: 
Gold can make some things more beautiful, but not all. Lastly, a human life also lacks 
universality: such a definition would not encompass the lives of the gods.  
Hippias’s threefold failure to answer the question of the beautiful inspires another 
question: that of the type of term would satisfy Socrates’s criteria for a definition. It would have 
to be univocal, because Socrates has already affirmed that the beautiful itself “is something” 
(ἔστι τι τοῦτο, 287c). But it would have to also account for the manifold ways that this word may 
be predicated accurately of different beings in the world. It would also have to account for the 
way in which Socrates is able to summon so many different examples of beauty—from mares to 
noble lives. It would have to be a term which lends itself the possibility of ascent—that is, it 
must be as intelligible to speak about the beauty of spoons (tools) as of noble lives (virtues). Is 
Socrates using the word “beautiful” in an intelligible way? Is there a conceptual or logical 
framework with which we can understand the intelligibility of Socrates’s use of the word? 
Socrates’s Analogical Attribution of Beauty 
My claim is that the best way to characterize Socrates’s manner of speaking about the 
beautiful is that it is “analogical.” Contrary to various other views, I am not claiming that 
Socrates has a specific form of predication in mind.135 Instead, “analogical” is merely the best 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and is also mentioned above. (3) is implied by (a). I will dispute (c) at the end of this chapter, by arguing that 
Socrates accepts, implicitly, a version of analogical predication. 
135 See Woodruff, who argues that Socrates’s requirement that “the beautiful” be a univocal term precludes him from 
finding the correct definition of it. “… Socrates holds the unity requirement because he knows know other way to 
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word we have for describing the way that Socrates talks about the beings he sees before him. I 
am not claiming that either Socrates nor Plato are adopting a rigorously methodical form of 
predication, and that Socrates as a literary character is speaking with a logical consistency that 
Hippias does not have. Rather, I am trying to be descriptive of the way Socrates uses the word, 
“beautiful.” His manner of using the word is open-ended, elastic, and applicable to many types of 
beings. I will employ logical jargon to deepen our understanding of the implications of this way 
of speaking. We will also see, however, that Socrates is not completely consistent in the way he 
speaks about the beautiful. Indeed, Socrates is not consistent logically because he is not 
attempting to build a system of rigorous logical predication; rather, he is describing a reality that 
he sees before him in many different forms. Socrates is pointing to the fact that the beautiful 
itself is “added” to many different types of beings, making each of these beautiful in a way that 
corresponds to the nature of each being. 
In order to describe Socrates’s discourse, we can first make use of one type of analogical 
attribution, which Aristotle describes in the Topics.136 A term is “analogous” when it can be 
applied to more than one object. If one compares, e.g., “round” as applied to both a baseball and 
an arching hilltop, in either case one is using the term “round” in a way that is both similar and 
different to the other case: roundness in a hilltop is both similar and different to roundness in a 
baseball. Absolute similarity (identity) would mean the term being applied is univocal; absolute 
difference would mean it is equivocal. This dynamic of similarity and difference also holds if the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
satisfy his purpose in definition. He does not have available the Aristotelian conception of focal meaning, or the 
Wittgensteinian tool of family resemblance, either one of which could have gathered together various ways of being 
fine. Instead, he has to choose between extreme accounts of the matter; he can either list different ways of being fine 
without connecting them (in the tradition of Gorgias), or he can insist on there being simply one way of being fine.” 
Woodruff, Hippias Major, 156-157. On the same question, Benardete writes: “Predication of beauty is in the literal 
sense metaphor.” See Benardete, Being of the Beautiful, xvii. 
136 Christopher Shields, “Aristotle,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/aristotle/. Accessed 12/9/2013. This article has a very 
lucid discussion and thorough bibliography of forms of predication in Aristotle. 
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analogy is made with reference to a “focal meaning.” Aristotle’s notion of a focal meaning 
requires a focal term around which all other predications are made. Another term for this type of 
predication captures its structure: it is a core-dependent homonymy. A term—say, “health”—can 
be used in different but interrelated ways. Here is an example (from the Stanford Encyclopedia): 
Socrates is healthy. (1) 
Socrates’s exercise regimen is healthy. (2) 
Socrates’s complexion is healthy. (3)137 
Statements 2 and 3 derive their meaning from statement 1; that is, they are either indicative of 
Socrates’s health, or contribute to it. A similar type of logic is at play in Socrates’s and Hippias’s 
usage of “beautiful” in the Hippias Major. At times, the focal meaning appears to be 
anthropocentric: beautiful things are beautiful insofar as they appear useful for human beings. 
Therefore, mares and spoons and statues are beautiful insofar as they please or are useful for 
human beings in a certain way. But there are other times, in Socrates’s use of the term especially, 
when a focal meaning is more difficult to find. The following passage (from a later point in the 
dialogue than the section I have been treating in this chapter) gives us one instance where 
“beautiful” is used in an analogical way, while its focal meaning in “beautiful” is elusive. 
Socrates attempts to defend his definition of the beautiful as “ability” (or power) or “usefulness” 
(τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ταῦτα τὰ χρήσιμα, 295c) in the following way: 
And that’s how we call the whole body beautiful, sometimes for running, sometimes for wrestling. 
And the same goes for all animals—a beautiful horse, rooster, or quail—and all utensils and 
means of transport on land and sea, boats and warships, and the tools of every skill, music and all 
the others; and, if you want, activities and laws—virtually all these are called beautiful in the 
                                                          
137 Shields, “Aristotle.” 
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same way (σχεδόν τι πάντα ταῦτα καλὰ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ). In each case we look at 
the nature it’s got (ᾗ πέφυκεν), its manufacture, its condition; then we call what is useful 
“beautiful” in respect of the way it is useful, what it is useful for, and when it is useful… (295d-e) 
(Emphases mine.) 
In this passage, Socrates appears to be describing such a dynamic of similarity and difference 
that is proper to analogical attribution: a rooster is beautiful in a way that is both the same and 
different from the way a law is beautiful. A being’s nature is always different, but beauty is 
always in some sense the same. Socrates expresses his concern for the unchanging dimension of 
beauty when he says that all beings are said to be beautiful in the same way. Yet the word 
σχεδόν, “nearly” or “almost,” is the key here, because it indicates the possibility of analogical 
attribution, that is, of a negotiation between same and difference in every different type of being. 
If Socrates meant to express the idea that the beautiful, as a term of attribution, is purely 
univocal, he would not have used that word. Rather, Socrates takes into account the nature of 
every being in order to determine the way in which its beauty (i.e., usefulness), manifests itself. 
However, a focal term is not easy to find. If the focal term were beauty as useful for human 
beings, then why is a rooster also beautiful? Some of the items on Socrates’s list could be roped 
into an anthropocentric focal meaning—boats, warships, even horses for horseback riding. But 
others—roosters, quails—do not easily lend themselves to such a focal meaning. 
Even before this passage, however, the dialogue provides us with a definition of the 
beautiful which implies analogical attribution. The notion of appropriateness also evokes 
analogy: what is appropriate for making a beautiful statue of Athena may not be appropriate for a 
statue of Zeus. The appropriate is understood only with reference to what is the same and what is 
different in every being. A beautiful statue of Athena and Zeus both require the same materials, 
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but different colors. Understanding the beauty according to the principle of appropriateness 
requires an analogical understanding of the beautiful. Once again, however, its focal meaning is 
elusive. Is beauty-as-appropriateness the same thing as taste, which is defined according to a 
particular human culture? Or does its appropriateness depend on the particular nature of an 
object (e.g., Athena requires different colors because of properties inherent to Athena, not 
because of cultural standards of taste). The Hippias Major does not settle the matter here. 
 A more accurate summary of the above would be to simply say that Socrates does two 
things with the word, “beautiful.” First, he consistently applies the word “beautiful” in an 
analogous way, that is, in a way that retains a degree of sameness and difference in every 
application. Second, he sometimes appeals to a focal meaning, and sometimes he does not. But 
Socrates’s inconsistency, if it is right to call it that, is due to the fact that he keeps his horizon 
open. He wants to be able to consider the beauty of beings both in their relation to human life 
(i.e., in relation to an anthropocentric focal meaning), and as they are in themselves (such as the 
beauty of gods, which has nothing to do with usefulness for human beings). The philosophical 
impulse moves a soul beyond its own experiences; an erotic search for the beautiful itself will 
necessarily encounter both beings beautiful for human beings, and beings beautiful in 
themselves. The interrogative stance, which (as I argue in Chapter 1) is one characteristic of 
philosophical eros, is open to new possibilities of what the beautiful might be. Socrates is 
inconsistent only if one adopts the standard that beauty must be encapsulated in one type of 
attribution. Instead, the inconsistency is a sign that Socrates’s understanding of beauty is always 
conditioned by those objects he encounters.  
Of crucial importance for our purposes here is the fact that analogical attribution, which 
we see in the Hippias Major, is also a requirement for an “ascent” to take place. Whether it refers 
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to a focal meaning or not, analogical attribution has the effect of opening up the discourse about 
the beautiful, and making an “ascent” possible. Analogical attribution dovetails with usage of 
“the beautiful” implied in Diotima’s “ascent” passages. In order to make an ascent, I would have 
to call a human body beautiful, and then several other bodies (of different types, but all 
beautiful); second, I would have to judge a soul to be beautiful as well, in a very different way. 
From there, I would have to discover the beauty of laws, and scientific principles, etc. The 
implication is that beauty “happens” in all different levels of being, yet something remains the 
same. Socrates’s manner of speaking about the beautiful and the beauty of beings in the Hippias 
Major and Diotima’s way of doing the same in the Symposium are, in this respect, essentially the 
same. A person is led by eros to perceive the beauty of all kinds of objects, and it is Socrates’s 
and Hippias’s eros which allows them to do the same in the Hippias Major. 
 To be sure, text of the Hippias Major does not ever make a theme of the “forms of 
predication.” Nor does the idea of analogical attribution appear explicitly in the philosophical 
writings of Plato. What the preceding reflections accomplish is a descriptive account of 
Socrates’s usage of the term, “the beautiful,” as well as of the logic of that usage. These 
reflections allow us to see a similarity between Socrates’s and Hippias’s dialogue in the Hippias 
Major and Diotima’s in the ascent passage of the Symposium. Socrates’s way of speaking about 
the beautiful and beautiful beings is de facto analogical because it is ascending and erotic. 
Moreover, Socrates’s speaks in a way that is not univocal or equivocal, but analogical, only 
because this is the best way to approach the multiplicity of beings that are beautiful in the world. 
In this context, reality dictates speech. Socrates is not worried about the internal consistency of 
his discourse of predication so long as it describes the beautiful as he experiences it. At this point 
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in the dialogue, when the main objective on Socrates’s part is the broadening of Hippias’s 
horizons, nothing more is required.  
Conclusion 
In The Imaginary, his phenomenological treatise on the imagination, Jean-Paul Sartre 
makes the following remark about the Hippias Major, which gives us a concluding perspective 
on the dialogue as a whole, and this section in particular. In a section analyzing the relationship 
between image, thought, and illustrations of thought, Sartre writes:  
Socrates asked Hippias, “What is beauty?” and Hippias responded “It is a beautiful woman, a 
beautiful horse, etc.” This response seems to me to mark not only an historical step in the 
development of human thought but also a necessary step (although the habit of reflection can 
curtail it) in the production of a concrete individual thought. The first response of thought 
naturally takes the form of the image.138  
The eros of Socratic inquiry, on the other hand, takes us not necessarily beyond images per se, 
but beyond concrete sensory experiences of beauty, and toward moral or theoretical entities (e.g., 
noble lives). The eros of Socratic inquiry, in other words, takes us in a philosophical direction. 
The impetus or drive behind his questioning constitutes an ascent, of sorts: from sexuality, to an 
appreciation of the beauty of other types of beings—from mares, to spoons, to noble lives. At 
least in this, admittedly very general, sense, the dialectical trajectory which Hippias takes (at 
Socrates’s prompting) parallels that of the initial movements of Diotima’s ascent passage in the 
Symposium. Socrates is motivated by an eros of inquiry, and his questions inspire philosophical 
thought and demand philosophical answers. Hippias, whose life and profession are opposed to 
                                                          
138 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination. Trans. Jonathan Webber. 
(London: Routledge Classics, 2010), 111. 
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philosophy, and whose character is (at the beginning of his encounter with Socrates) dominated 
by epithumia, nevertheless makes an ascent by allowing himself to be led by philosophical eros. 
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Chapter 3 
From Appearances to Being 
 
So far in the Hippias Major, we have seen philosophical eros play a role as an implicit 
motivator of action. We have seen how the question of the beautiful is born out of philosophical 
eros, and how Socrates’s engagement with Hippias, before and after the posing of the question of 
the beautiful, bears an erotic structure (Chapter 1). We have also seen, in Socrates’s response to 
Hippias’s three definitions of the beautiful, how philosophical eros has the effect of opening up 
new vistas of possibilities for exploring what “the beautiful itself” might be, in a way that bears 
similarities to Diotima’s ascent in the Symposium (Chapter 2). In this chapter, as we venture into 
the part of the Hippias Major when Socrates decides to present his own definitions, we will 
see eros emerge, not only as a motivator of action, but as a necessary requirement for making 
any insights into the nature of the beautiful itself. More specifically, will see how only a person 
driven by philosophical eros (such as Socrates himself) has the adequate disposition to make any 
such insights. It follows that Hippias will make insights into the eidos of the beautiful only to the 
extent that he adopts Socrates’s philosophical stance—that is, unless he lives his eros in an 
interrogative stance, and with an interest in the good.139 
            This thesis is founded primarily on Socrates’s statement that to search for the beautiful 
itself means to search for that which, “by coming to be present,” makes things be beautiful, and 
not merely be seen (φαίνεσθαι) to be beautiful (294a). This statement (to which Hippias 
eventually assents) implies that it is possible for a human being to make an insight into the 
beautiful as it is in itself. This implication raises the following questions. First: Given that our 
                                                          
139 We continue to use eidos interchangeably with “the beautiful itself,” as is justified by Socrates’s usage in 289d: 
“Do you still think that the beautiful itself by which everything else is beautified and seen to be beautiful when that 
form (τὸ εἶδος) is added to it – that that is a girl or a horse or a lyre?” 
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initial knowledge of the beautiful comes only from beautiful appearances (e.g., maidens, pots, 
and virtues) is it possible to pass from knowledge that certain objects are beautiful, to an insight 
into the beautiful itself as being something both distinct from beautiful objects, and also that 
which causes beautiful objects to be beautiful? This question leads to a second one, which strikes 
at the very heart of this dialogue. Hippias and Socrates come to an agreement early on that “the 
beautiful itself is something,” and this agreement formed the foundation of their dialogue. 
Socrates is now effectively putting that foundation into question. How could they know about the 
existence of the eidos of the beautiful, of “the beautiful itself,” which they are searching for, if 
neither Hippias nor Socrates had, at that point, claimed to have moved beyond appearances? Or, 
conversely, could Hippias and Socrates be said to have (somehow) already passed from 
appearances to being right at the beginning of their dialogue, in merely becoming aware that “the 
beautiful itself is something”?  
            Addressing these questions requires three steps. First, I will expound upon the operative 
notion of “knowledge” in the Hippias Major. This will allow for a clearer picture what then is 
meant by a correct account of the beautiful itself, one that corresponds to being and not 
appearances. Second, I will argue for the following claim, the first half of the thesis stated above: 
The passage from beautiful appearances to the beautiful itself is made possible by the fact that 
the eidos of the beautiful manifests itself in appearance more readily, and more clearly, than 
other forms. As I aim to show, this “special” status that the beautiful has is expressed in this 
statement: “Then if the appropriate makes things be seen to be more beautiful than they are, it 
would be a kind of deceit (ἀπάτη) about the beautiful, and it wouldn’t be what we are looking 
for, would it, Hippias?” (294a). Third, I will defend the notion that only the philosopher has an 
adequate disposition with which to make an insight into the eidos of the beautiful. The reasoning 
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for this is as follows: Only the seeker driven by philosophical eros has the desire to know 
(however unfulfillable this desire might be) the truth beyond appearance and of being itself, and 
thus only the erotic seeker can make sense, and make use, of the radiant nature of the beautiful. 
Only the philosopher seizes the possibility opened up by the beautiful, which manifests itself 
more clearly than other forms in appearance. Thus the drama of the Hippias Major hinges on the 
pressing fact that Hippias will never be able to know the beautiful unless he follows Socrates and 
becomes a philosopher. If he merely dwells in appearance—if he continues to enjoy beautiful 
speeches disconnected from truth, and beautiful dress disconnected from a concern about the 
beauty of his soul—he will never be able to see the beautiful as it is in itself. On the other hand, 
Socrates has been driven by philosophical eros from the beginning—that is, his questioning leads 
him to desire knowledge beyond appearances already from the very beginning of the dialogue, 
and this is why he is able to ask the question about the “beautiful itself.” 
Socrates’s “Knowledge” 
 My claim in this chapter is that philosophical eros is required for knowledge of the 
beautiful itself. In order to make this argument, the term “knowledge” needs to be clarified. I 
believe that the notion of knowledge operative in the Hippias Major is noesis, as opposed to 
episteme—that is, a flash of insight, as opposed to a demonstrable and exhaustive account of 
what the beautiful itself is. In what follows, I will articulate why I believe this to be the case.  
 First, we should take stock of the terms for different types of knowledge which appears in 
the text. First and foremost is sophia, in the adjectival form, sophos. The word makes its 
appearance in the very first line of the dialogue: “Here comes Hippias, beautiful and wise! How 
long it’s been since you put in to Athens!” (Ἱππίας ὁ καλός τε καὶ σοφός: ὡς διὰ χρόνου ἡμῖν 
κατῆρας εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας, 281a). This word, of course, can be used to refer both to the knowledge 
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of craft, or to the shrewdness that is proper to a wealthy sophist. It may also refer to the higher 
wisdom that Socrates is after in his philosophical work. The juxtaposition between sophia and 
beauty at this initial point in the dialogue suggests that the two concepts will have a bearing on 
the other. On the one hand, Hippias claims to have wisdom about beauty, insofar as he claims to 
know how to speak beautifully, and gain money from doing so. On the other, Socrates seeks a 
different kind of wisdom about beauty, the type of wisdom which makes an insight into its 
intelligible nature. Soon after, Socrates brings up the question of what it means to be truly wise 
(τὸ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σοφόν, 281b). While at this early point in the dialogue, Socrates is busy flattering 
Hippias for his purported wisdom and material success, it will soon become clear that his 
wisdom will be tested, rather than taken for granted. The way it will be tested is by measuring its 
capacity to explain what the eidos of the beautiful is. Thus with this word, sophia, the dialogue 
introduces the stakes at the heart of this dialogue, and also indicates something of the type of 
knowledge that the dialogue is after: a knowledge that is both related to life (insofar as sophia 
includes a sense of prudence), but also one that is separate from the shrewdness and skill of the 
sophists (because Socrates makes clear that the technique of the sophists will be rejected in favor 
of a philosophical investigation of the beautiful itself140). 
 Further confirmation that the understanding of sophia which Socrates favors is one which 
is tied to philosophy and not to sophistry comes when he uses the word again much later in the 
dialogue: “Good! Then doesn’t it follow from these points that, by god, wisdom is really the 
most beautiful thing of all, and ignorance the foulest?” (296a). Wisdom, the most beautiful thing, 
is wisdom about how to best run a city, that is, how to run it according to sound principle.  But 
the location of this exclamation in the dialogue suggests that this sound principle is one that is 
linked to wisdom about the good—Socrates’s exclamation comes right before he begins to speak 
                                                          
140 As I argue in Chapter One. 
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about the beneficial, and eventually the good, as guiding standards for the proper exercise of 
power. The arrival of the category of goodness constitutes a shift in the dialogue (which I discuss 
in Chapter Four).  
 The word techne appears with the reference to the “skill of the sophists” (τὴν τῶν 
σοφιστῶν τέχνην, 281d). A close reading of the ensuing passages will show the manifold skills 
of which Hippias boasts, and which constitute the whole of his “sophistical” art.141 However 
much Hippias elaborates on this art, and however much Socrates indulges Hippias by listening 
and congratulating him for the same, the thrust of the dialogue will eventually lead to placing 
this art or skill on trial. With every criticism that Socrates makes of Hippias’s inadequate 
definitions of the beautiful, the latter’s boasts to wisdom become ever more doubtful. Thus 
balance between the two meanings of sophia, which I discuss above, is tilted toward 
philosophical wisdom; that is, the type of wisdom that the dialogue shows to be more viable for 
the task of making some sort of insight into the nature of the beautiful itself is shown to be 
philosophical wisdom rather than the art of sophistry. Thus the dialogue favors philosophical 
wisdom over and against the techne of sophistry, at least with regard to the task of obtaining 
knowledge about the nature of the beautiful itself. 
 The verb noein only appears in the negative form, ἀγνοεῖσθαι (294d). However, the 
context in which the word is used suggests that noesis is the type of knowledge which most 
properly describes what Socrates is after. All of those “customs and activities” which are both 
“thought and seen to be beautiful” (πάντα τὰ τῷ ὄντι καλὰ καὶ νόμιμα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ 
δοξάζεσθαι καλὰ, 294d) are not always incontrovertibly beautiful; often, Socrates argues, there is 
much strife and contention about them, because they are “unknown” (ἀγνοεῖσθαι, 294d). Hippias 
concurs, using the same word. Socrates’s speech in this passage associates being “unknown” 
                                                          
141 See Chapter One for a more extensive discussion of the art of sophistry in the Hippias Major. 
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with being “unseen” and “not thought.” In other words, a beautiful object can be seen to be 
beautiful or not be seen to be beautiful, and it would be the same thing to say that it can be 
known to be beautiful, and not known to be so (ἀγνοεῖσθαι). To see the eidos of the beautiful in 
the appearance of a beautiful object (e.g., a custom or activity) is to know it (noesis). Thus this 
passages suggests that the proper term for the type of knowledge that Socrates is after—the 
knowledge that makes insights within beautiful objects as to the nature of that which causes them 
to become beautiful (i.e., their eidos)—is noesis. 
The importance of noesis in the dialogue is also suggested by Socrates’s phrasing of his 
question about the beautiful. This phrasing does not make use of technical philosophical 
vocabulary. Socrates does not explicitly state that he is after a comprehensive demonstrative 
account, or episteme, of the beautiful.142 The initial phrasing of the question (286c) uses a more 
common verb for knowledge, οἶδα. The way in which Socrates phrases his question is open-
ended. He phrases it (or his imaginary friend does) in terms of giving an account: ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν 
τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν (“Could you be able to say what the beautiful is?” 286d). He also phrases it in 
terms of an explanation for the root cause of all particular instantiations of the beautiful: ταῦτα 
πάντα ἃ φῂς καλὰ εἶναι, εἰ τί ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ταῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη καλά;’ (“Come now, Socrates, 
give me an answer. All those things you say are beautiful, will they be beautiful if the beautiful 
itself is what?” 288a). Also, as we have already seen, his question rests upon a premise, “the 
beautiful itself is something” (ἔστι τι τοῦτο, 287c-d). It follows that this premise can only be 
classified as a noetic insight, a “flash” which forms the foundation for further dialectical inquiry 
into the beautiful itself. It is a noetic insight into a formal structure which exists independently of 
                                                          
142 Here I am going by Hyland’s account of episteme, in Hyland, Finitude and Transcendence, 192. 
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its particular instantiations. As noted above, the type of insight that sees the eidos within the 
beautiful object is noesis.143 
From all the above claims, we can see that Socrates does not necessarily ask for a 
comprehensive, demonstrative account (an episteme) of the beautiful, but rather that his question 
is open-ended and non-technical in expression. Moreover, since his question is founded upon a 
noetic insight, we can reasonably infer that every knowledge claim that Socrates makes in the 
Hippias Major, as well as the object of his question—an account of the beautiful itself—is 
noesis. 
More support for this inference can be seen further into the dialogue. All of the 
subsequent claims that Socrates makes with regard to the beautiful in the Hippias Major—such 
as that it is a form (eidos) with causal power (289d), which causes a being to be, and not merely 
appear, to be beautiful (294d), and which is “father” of the good (297c)—can only be understood 
as a deepening of the original noetic insight that the beautiful itself is something. These claims 
are all founded upon this initial insight, and are not intelligible without it. It would not make 
sense, for example, to argue that the beautiful itself is an eidos, if it were not also something in 
itself. It would not make sense to distinguish the causal power of the beautiful as corresponding 
to being and not appearances, if the beautiful were not already something in itself. The initial 
noetic “flash” into the formal structure of the beautiful is the source and foundation of all 
subsequent knowledge about the beautiful, and this knowledge can only be characterized as 
noesis.   
But there is more to the concept of noesis than the solitary or static insight into a formal 
structure. The idea that Socrates and Hippias “deepen” their understanding of the founding noetic 
insight implies that noesis is a type of knowledge which admits of degrees. The initial noetic 
                                                          
143 See Chapter One for a discussion of the definition of noesis in Plato. 
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insight does not yield comprehensive or absolute knowledge about the beautiful itself, but rather 
the knowledge that there is a formal structure, independent of appearances, of which we can 
deepen our knowledge through dialectical inquiry and dianoia, or discursive reasoning. All of 
the claims which Socrates makes about the beautiful (that it is an eidos with causal power, etc.), 
are discovered in a process of dialectical inquiry conducted with Hippias, which is nevertheless 
founded upon, and conducted in light of, the original noetic insight. Thus there is no 
contradiction between the notion of noesis—knowledge coming through an immediate insight—
and the notion that knowledge comes at the end of a dialectical process. In order to see how the 
two can come together, it is helpful to adopt Hyland’s distinction between “archaic noesis” and 
“telic noesis.”144 While the founding noetic insight is the “archaic” foundation for further 
inquiry, and insight into what the matter for thought is, the “telic” insight is the product of the 
refining and elucidating work of dialectic which is performed in the Socratic dialogue, and is the 
“final or culminating insight toward which speech hopefully leads us, but which again is not 
reducible to the speech itself.”145 An important corollary to this is that an ultimate, “absolute” 
noesis is impossible, because it would entail a comprehensive knowledge of a formal structure, 
and such an accomplishment does not seem to be possible within the finite horizon of 
understanding available to a human being. (It would perhaps entail something like the journey to 
the heavenly realm which we see in the Phaedrus. Or, to put it in Cartesian terms, it would entail 
a certain, “clear and distinct” idea of what the eidos of the beautiful is, something which Socrates 
never claims to have).146 The erotic structure of philosophical questioning is, in fact, a reflection 
of this finitude: the philosopher asks questions because he is both the bearer of a founding noetic 
insight and also because he is aware of the incompleteness of his knowledge about the matter 
                                                          
144 Drew Hyland, Finitude and Transcendence, 182. 
145 Drew Hyland, Finitude and Transcendence, 182. 
146 As Hyland puts it, both the archaic and telic noeses are “partial.” Hyland, Finitude and Transcendence, 192. 
102 
 
which the noetic insight gives but a glimpse. Therefore, every time Socrates or Hippias claim to 
“know” something about the beautiful as it is in itself (e.g., that has causal power or that it is 
good), this knowledge corresponds to an incomplete noetic insight into the beautiful, an insight 
which has come about through repeated experiences of beautiful beings. These repeated 
experiences bring the philosopher to an awareness of certain traits, which he then is able to 
name. He does not know that these traits are “certain,” in the Cartesian sense. But he knows that 
they form a consistent, trustworthy part of his experience of the beautiful. That said, his 
knowledge about the beautiful does not amount to an “absolute” account or a quasi-Hegelian 
absolute consciousness of the beautiful itself. The philosopher is both “rich” and “poor”—rich in 
insights, but short of absolute knowledge. 
 If the type of knowledge that Socrates is after is an ever-deeper noesis of the eidos of the 
beautiful, then this has a special bearing on the theme taken up in this chapter: appearances and 
being. Socrates argues that the eidos of the beautiful is a property of a beautiful object’s being, 
not its appearance. This means that any noesis of the beautiful itself is a noesis of something as it 
is beyond appearances, although it is, at the same time, an insight made within appearances. It is 
a type of knowledge that seeks a non-perspectival standpoint, or rather, a standpoint from the 
perspective of the object to known, rather than the knower. However, the philosopher, in his 
noetic aspiration, can never find this standpoint, nor know the object as it is in itself. The 
philosopher can only ever make noetic insights into the object’s nature based on what its 
appearances reveal.  
This distinction between appearance and being is already foreshadowed in the implied 
distinction between true and false opinion which undergirds Socrates’s question from the very 
beginning (if you are asking “What is the beautiful?”, it is implied that there are true and false 
103 
 
answers to this question). At the point of the dialogue I treat in this chapter (294a), this 
distinction between true and false opinion is recast in terms of appearance and being: appearance 
is false, and being is true. The beautiful corresponds to being, and not to appearance. A wrong 
opinion about the beautiful is an account of the beautiful itself would be one which only takes 
into account a beautiful object’s appearance within a particular perspective, and a correct account 
is one which touches upon the beautiful object’s being. However, here lies the rub: Since the 
beautiful manifests more brilliantly than most forms do in appearance (as I will argue in the 
following section), the philosopher who is seeking after the eidos of the beautiful will have an 
easier time making noetic insights about it. Beauty is, as it were, “friendly” to the philosopher. 
The Beautiful is Radiant 
 Socrates states explicitly that whatever the eidos of the beautiful may be, it should not be 
associated with that which deceives; that is, if it is present in a being, then that being more than 
likely should appear beautiful as well.147 Socrates lays the foundation for this claim first when he 
rejects the “appropriate” as a definition of the beautiful on the grounds that it may be deceptive: 
“Then if the appropriate makes things be seen to be more beautiful than they are, it would be a 
kind of deceit (ἀπάτη) about the beautiful, and it wouldn’t be what we are looking for, would it, 
Hippias?” (294a). Appearances cannot make a beautiful being appear more beautiful than it is, 
and they cannot make a being appear to be beautiful if it is not beautiful in itself. The claim is 
further established in this exchange: “S: Is it impossible for things that are really beautiful not to 
                                                          
147 This interpretation of this section of the dialogue may sound odd at first, but as we shall see, it is found 
indifferent forms in other commentaries of the dialogue. Making the point most explicitly is, perhaps, Joe Sachs’s 
commentary, which claims that, in the Hippias Major, “One criterion of the beautiful, then, may be that it belongs 
only, or more properly, to things that reveal rather than conceal what they are.” This notion that “revealing” rather 
than “concealing” is an essential attribute of the beautiful is later cast by Sachs in terms of “accessibility”: “[the 
beautiful is] an activity with the twofold property that allows access to the enjoyment of the beautiful.” See Sachs, 
Plato and the Sophists, 26-27. In this chapter, I attempt to understanding this essential attribute of “revealing” and 
“access” in terms of philosophical eros. 
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be seen to be beautiful, since what makes them be seen is present? H: It’s impossible” (294c).148 
What “makes them be seen” to be beautiful is both the beautiful itself and the human observer. 
Both come together in a radiant appearance of the beautiful itself. This unique property of the 
beautiful—that it shines forth and communicates itself to the human observer more readily, and 
more brilliantly, than other forms—is one which Socrates affirms but does not explicitly justify, 
though it plays a key role in understanding how a person would be able to discover the eidos of 
the beautiful.149 In order to make an insight into the eidos of the beautiful, one must aim to know 
a beautiful being as it is in itself. This type of knowledge, noesis, is always incomplete, precisely 
because it is impossible to know what an object is like in itself, beyond appearances. We can 
only ever know a beautiful object as it appears to us, and any insight into the eidos of the 
beautiful is made based on those appearances. Any noetic insight made into the eidos of the 
beautiful therefore is an insight that will always fall short of capturing with comprehensiveness 
the nature of the eidos. It will always be incomplete, a striving for knowledge beyond 
appearances that cannot actually go beyond what the appearances themselves reveal.150 
Nevertheless, Socrates does seem to hint at something when he says that the eidos of the 
                                                          
148 Hyland argues that with this second passage, Socrates shifts “the sense of phainesthai (unannounced, of course) 
away from the sense of mere seeming to the more positive sense of appearance.” See Hyland, Plato and the 
Question of Beauty, 21. According to my interpretation, Socrates is not so much shifting from one sense to another 
as he is overcoming the ambiguity of phainesthai. An appearance can entail both an object “seeming” like 
something it is, or “seeming” like something it is not; Socrates (so we argue) is saying that the beautiful will always 
seem to be what it is in itself. 
149 Hyland argues that Socrates never provides a justification for this belief: “…Socrates assumes that the fact that 
beauty might be deceptive on this definition is enough to refute it. He seems unwilling to accept that beauty might 
very well, at least some of the time, have something to do with deception or illusion. He does not argue against this 
impossibility but simply asserts it. Should we accept it without argument? This is hardly obvious.” See Hyland, 
Plato and the Question of Beauty, 20. I will attempt to provide a justification for Socrates’s assumption in Chapter 
Four, arguing that Socrates’s view that the beautiful is good provides a ground for trust in the beautiful – although 
the notion of beauty’s goodness itself actually does lack justification. 
150 D.C. Schindler has a useful formulation of this same problem in his study of Plato’s Republic: “If knowledge is 
going to be possible, it will require a kind of relation that is at the same time a non-relation, or manifestation of what 
is non-manifest, as non-manifest.” That is, knowledge of an object as it is in itself begins with a relation between 
knower and o6bject (which we call “appearance”) but must attempt to know the object as it is known in itself, 
independent of any relation (independent of appearances). See D.C. Schindler, Plato’s Critique of Impure Reason, 
122. 
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beautiful has nothing to do with deceit, and that it cannot make an object appear to be beautiful 
when it is not in fact beautiful. The beautiful itself has a certain radiance for Socrates, and this 
radiance makes it easier for the philosopher to make insights into the eidos of the beautiful when 
looking at beautiful objects. In order to see how this is so, we must first comb the text to unearth 
the basic claims that Socrates makes about being and appearances, and the radiant nature of the 
beautiful. Having done this, we can move on to elaborate and develop the reasons why the 
beautiful, thanks to its radiant nature, is able to mediate the passage from the appearance of 
beauty to the beautiful itself.  
 Socrates makes several substantive claims concerning being, appearances, and the radiant 
nature of the beautiful, in one relatively short, but dense, passage (293e-295a). The setting of the 
scene which immediately precedes this passage is important because it involves the moment in 
which Socrates decides to assume the leadership of the dialogue and begin to propose his own 
definitions of the beautiful. This “restart” provides important context to his subsequent claims. 
Socrates tells Hippias that his (Socrates’s) imaginary friend will scold him (Socrates) for not be 
able to define the beautiful correctly (after having refuted three possible definitions from 
Hippias). The imaginary friend would instead propose a return to a definition which was briefly 
entertained in the preceding discussion about the definition of the beautiful as “gold” (289d). 
This definition is: the beautiful as the “appropriate” or “fitting.” Earlier in the dialogue, Socrates 
notes that gold “makes things be seen to be beautiful when they’re appropriate [πρέπῃ]” and 
Hippias responds that perhaps the appropriate may be the eidos they are looking for (290d). But 
the definition is dropped after a few lines; Socrates uses it mostly to debunk “gold” as a possible 
definition. Now, Socrates’s imaginary friend suggests a return to it (or rather, he would suggest 
such a thing), and Socrates decides to steer the dialogue in this direction. Socrates will continue 
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to control the direction of the dialogue from this point onwards until its conclusion. “I’ll show 
you” (293e) he says, signaling that he has taken the reins of the discussion. 
 The return to a discussion of the appropriate is the occasion for Socrates to lay down 
some essential elements to their investigation into the beautiful itself, essential elements which 
we will parse below. But already the discussion about the appropriate gives hints of the 
discussion to come. The Greek word at play, πρέπῃ, comes from the verb πρέπω, which may 
mean both “to be conspicuously fitting” and “to be clearly seen.” Socrates and Hippias quite 
clearly use the term in the sense of “fittingness,” as they refer to the fact that a spoon made out of 
fig is more fitting for stirring soup than one made out of gold (291b-c). However, the other 
meaning of the word must resonate as well, especially to a Greek audience. That resonance has a 
philosophical import. As we saw in Chapter 2, the term already signals a departure from 
Hippias’s definitions up to that point: “a beautiful maiden” (287e) and “gold” (289e). Those 
definitions are oriented toward the visual (gold) or perceptual in a greater sense (beautiful body). 
The appropriate, on the other hand, is not something one can see or touch; it is a principle by 
which certain things are made to conform with their purpose or to conform with a certain “look.” 
Wood is appropriate for a spoon, and a tuxedo is appropriate for a formal dinner. Thus to 
propose the appropriate as the definition of the beautiful is to take one step away from the purely 
“perceptual” or vision- and body-oriented view of beauty that Hippias has been espousing up to 
that moment.151 Yet the appropriate is still tied to appearance in a way that, as we will see below, 
Socrates finds to be a problem. 
                                                          
151 G.M.A. Grube makes a similar interpretation of this part of the dialogue: “Hippias’s first definition of ‘beauty,’ 
as a beautiful maiden, is plainly only a particular concrete example of beauty. When this is pointed out he proposes 
gold, which is, no doubt, still a particular concrete, but it would not at once appear to be so to an untrained mind, 
since gold is beautiful in combination with a large number of different things. This gives Socrates an opportunity to 
make plain that προσγίγνεσθαι when applied to ideas, is not to be understood in the literal physical sense, that the 
universal is not something which is added to the particular from outside.” “From the outside” I take to mean, 
“appearance.” Socrates is making a point about form and being, not about appearance. See G.M.A. Grube, “The 
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 Socrates begins to establish claims about appearances, being, and the radiant nature of the 
beautiful when he asks the following question: “What do we say about the appropriate? That it is 
what makes—by coming to be present—each thing to which it is present be seen [φαίνεσθαι] to 
be beautiful, or be [εἶναι] beautiful, or neither?” (294a). The question is the ground upon which 
Socrates will make distinctions about appearance and being. Hippias responds: “I think it’s what 
makes things be seen to be beautiful. For example, when someone puts on clothes and shoes that 
suit him, even if he’s ridiculous, he is seen to be more beautiful” (294a). This is an interesting 
response, because Hippias himself is said to be well-clad (“you’re so beautifully dressed, 
beautifully shod…” 291a). It is self-serving, but in a provocative way. Hippias seems to value 
appearances more than reality. Regardless, the phrase also implies a lack of proportional 
correspondence between moral character and physical beauty: one may appear beautiful (because 
of fitting clothing) while still being ridiculous (γελοῖος, “mirth-provoking, ludicrous, absurd”). 
Socrates does not like the possibility of such discordance at all: “Then if the appropriate makes 
things be seen to be more beautiful than they are, it would be a kind of deceit [ἀπάτη] about the 
beautiful, and it wouldn’t be what we are looking for, would it, Hippias?” (294a). This statement 
suggests that the beautiful is never deceptive in appearance, or that, somehow, the two things do 
not go together, beauty and deception. It is, I contend, a key sentence in the Hippias Major, as it 
hints at the radiance of the beautiful which we have been discussing thus far—the fact that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Logic and Language of the Hippias Major,” Classical Philology 24 (1929): 370. Likewise, David Wolfsdorf, writing 
in a more analytical idiom, observes: “…Socrates describes the Ff relation as one of addition (προσγένησις). He 
clearly does not mean that the physical attachment of F to f particulars makes them beautiful. But Hippias’s 
conception of F and of the Ff relation appears to be quite concrete. Under the influence of the verb ‘κοσμεῖται,’ 
which Hippias interprets to mean is adorned, and the word εἶδος, which he interprets to mean visual aspect or 
appearance, Hippias takes Socrates to be asking him to identify the kind of physical thing that when added to other 
objects, beautifies them. … Thus, the Ff relation is conceived as one of physical contiguity.” Wolfsdorf allows for 
the possibility that Hippias moves beyond this corporeal understanding of beauty: “…arguably by the time Hippias 
proposes his third definition, he no longer conceives of the definiendum as corporeal; consequently, he would not 
conceive of the Ff relation as corporeal... Certainly when he proposes his third definition, Hippias cannot have a 
corporeal conception of τὸ καλόν in mind. Nevertheless, he might revert to one later in the investigation.” See David 
Wolfsdorf, “Hippias Major 301b2-c2: Plato’s Critique of a Corporeal Conception of Forms and of the Form-
Participant Relation,” 248-249. 
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eidos of the beautiful appears to be more easily accessible in appearances than other forms, and 
as a consequence it is easier for the philosopher to make insights into its nature. Hippias never 
explicitly says that he agrees with it, but he also never attacks it. He chooses to accept it, at least, 
as a premise to the rest of their discussion. His next response to Socrates will be to say that the 
appropriate makes things “both be beautiful and be seen to be beautiful, when it’s present” 
(294c, emphasis mine). The hedging involved in that statement gives the sense that Hippias is 
trying to have it both ways: he wants to know what may follow from holding the premise that the 
beautiful is radiant, but he will not clearly declare himself to be a believer in the claim. 
 But before Hippias makes this last statement, Socrates makes a relatively long speech 
where he makes several claims about the beautiful and its radiant nature. Also, right after 
Hippias makes this last statement, Socrates establishes several other claims, to which Hippias 
gives his implicit assent, inasmuch as he does not contest them. He is, at the very least, allowing 
Socrates to make his claims, uninterrupted. The complexity of all of these claims requires that 
we look carefully at almost every line in this passage, and that we divide the claims into two 
groups, those which concern the eidos, and those which concern appearances. This division is 
prefigured by Socrates’s statement that he is searching for the cause of being, and not of 
appearances: “S: We must try to say what it is that makes things be beautiful [τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν εἶναι 
καλά], whether they are seen to be beautiful or not, just as I said a moment ago. That’s what 
we’re looking for, if we’re really looking for the beautiful” (294c).152 This implies that being and 
appearance could have different causes, a belief which he attempts to justify in the subsequent 
claims. Together, these claims support the notion that the beautiful is radiant and open to 
philosophical inquiry in a special way, and that thanks to this radiance, the eidos of the beautiful 
                                                          
152 Slightly modified from Woodruff’s translation. I added the word “be” to emphasize εἶναι.  
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is more readily accessible to the philosopher who is searching for it within the beautiful objects 
that appear before him. 
 Concerning the eidos, Socrates makes the following claims. First, as we have already 
seen, the eidos, “the beautiful itself,” is that which causes a being to be beautiful. Second, the 
eidos causes a being to be beautiful in itself, not relative to the observer. The eidos gives an 
object an intrinsic property, one which Socrates compares with the concept of extension: “S: I 
thought we were looking for that by which all beautiful things are beautiful. For example, what 
all large things are large by is the projecting [τῷ ὑπερέχοντι, also “the excess”]. For by that all 
large things—even if they are not seen to be so—if they project they are necessarily large [or 
excessive]” (294a-b). In other words, beauty is not a property that only makes sense in a relation, 
like the size of one object compared to another. I deem something to be large or small relative to 
my size. But extension, or projection, is something intrinsic to any object insofar as it occupies 
space.153 Third, by itself, the eidos does not cause a being to appear to be beautiful. The eidos is a 
necessary, but not sufficient cause to the beauty of an object. Socrates asserts this by using the 
appropriate as a possible cause of the beautiful: “Therefore, if the appropriate is what makes 
things beautiful, it would be the beautiful we’re looking for, but it would not be what makes 
things be seen to be beautiful. Or, if the appropriate is what makes things be seen to be beautiful, 
it wouldn’t be the beautiful we’re looking for. Because that [i.e., what we’re looking for] makes 
things be; but by itself [μόνον] it could not make things be seen to be and be, nor could anything 
                                                          
153 Socrates’s analogy of “largeness” is questionable. Is not largeness a concept that only makes sense relative to 
something else? An elephant is large relative to a mouse, but small relative to the Moon. Nevertheless, it does seem 
that Plato or Socrates believes that largeness can be an absolute magnitude or form in and of itself. Nothing in the 
text would indicate otherwise. Benardete makes sense of Socrates’s analogy by saying that it refers to “the eidetic 
big,” that is, largeness or bigness as a formal concept, and not as it is manifest in reality (where it would become 
relative). See Benardete, The Being of the Beautiful,  xxxv. Woodruff notes a parallel between this passage and 
Phaedo 102b-c. See Woodruff, Hippias Major, 65n119. A more striking parallel is found in 102d, where Simmias 
speaks of “the greatness in us will never admit the small or allow itself to be exceeded” (τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος 
οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ᾽ ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι). (Quoted from Fowler’s translation.) 
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else” (294d-e, emphasis mine). This is also an argument for the earlier claim that being and 
appearance have different causes. The eidos causes a being to become beautiful, but a being 
appears to be beautiful only because of a combination of both the eidos and some other element, 
which has yet to be identified.  
 Based on this last claim, we can see that although the eidos causes a being to be, and not 
be seen, to be beautiful, it does have a bearing on its own appearance. Socrates states: “I still 
have some hope that the beautiful will make itself be seen for what it is (295a, emphasis mine),” 
implying that the beautiful contributes to its own appearance. What does this contribution consist 
of? It consists of its radiant nature. The eidos of the beautiful never makes an object appear to be 
more beautiful than it is—it does not contribute to confusion or deception about the degree of 
beauty an object has: “Then if the appropriate makes things be seen to be more beautiful than 
they are, it would be a kind of deceit (ἀπάτη) about the beautiful, and it wouldn’t be what we are 
looking for, would it, Hippias?” (294a). Whatever the beautiful itself is, it is shows itself forth in 
appearance in such a way that this showing-forth does not make an object appear more beautiful 
than it is. But Socrates takes it one step further. Whenever the eidos of the beautiful is present in 
a being, it is impossible for that being not to be seen to be beautiful: “S: Is it impossible for 
things that are really beautiful not to be seen to be beautiful, since what makes them be seen is 
present? H: It’s impossible” (294c). (To support this, we may also add this exchange from earlier 
in the dialogue: “H: I’ll tell you. I think you’re looking for an answer that says the beautiful is 
the sort of thing that will never be seen (φανεῖται) to be foul for anyone, anywhere, at any time. 
S: Quite right, Hippias. Now you’ve got a beautiful grasp of it.” [291d]. To say that the beautiful 
will never be seen to be foul is another way of saying that it will never deceive.) In describing 
the contribution that the eidos makes to its own appearance, we can see that the ground for 
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distinguishing appearance from being is deceit: being corresponds to truth, and appearance may 
or may not communicate truth (there is no necessary connection between truth and appearance, 
in other words—except in the case of beautiful appearances). Moreover, we can see one reason 
for claiming that eidos causes a being to be, and not be seen to be beautiful. If it merely caused a 
being to be seen to be beautiful, then it would be deceptive, because it would not communicate 
something about what the being actually is. But, according to Socrates, the beautiful itself does 
not make an object appear to be more beautiful than it is, and when it is present in an object, that 
object is seen to be beautiful. 
 With regard to appearances, Socrates makes the following claims. First, human beings 
can be in error about whether an object is beautiful. That is, human beings can make an incorrect 
judgment about the appearance of a beautiful object: “S: Then shall we agree to this, Hippias: 
that everything really beautiful—customs and activities both—are both thought [δοξάζεσθαι] to 
be, and seen [φαίνεσθαι] to be, beautiful always, by everybody. Or just the opposite, that they’re 
unknown [ἀγνοεῖσθαι], and individuals in private and cities in public both have more strife and 
contention [ἔριν καὶ μάχην] about them than anything? H: Much more the latter, Socrates. They 
are unknown” (294c-e). Second, if beautiful appearances were to have the same cause as 
beautiful beings, then human beings would never be wrong about whether some objects are 
beautiful or not: “S: They wouldn’t be, if ‘being seen to be’ had been added to them. And that 
would have been added if the appropriate were beautiful and made things not only be but be 
seen to be beautiful” (294d, emphasis mine). That is, Socrates claims that the reason for human 
“strife and contention” over the beautiful is due to the fact that the cause of an object’s being 
beautiful is different from the cause of an object’s appearing to be beautiful. The former is the 
eidos of the beautiful. The latter is the eidos plus some other element, as we have already seen. 
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Taken together, these claims appear to contradict the claim that the eidos of the beautiful is 
radiant in appearance, that it is more readily accessible in appearance to the philosopher. 
However, as we will see below, the two claims are reconciled in a proper understanding of the 
cause of appearance, which is the third claim about appearances that Socrates makes: The cause 
of appearance is the eidos of the beautiful, plus the human observer herself. This is implied by 
the first two claims. There is “strife and contention” about beautiful objects because individuals 
and cities do not perceive them or perceive them incorrectly; the objects remain ἀγνοεῖσθαι, that 
is, “un-perceived” by human beings. When these same human beings turn to a beautiful being 
and notice and acknowledge its beauty, then that beauty appears. Or, to put it another way, that 
human beings turn toward a beautiful being is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for that 
“appearance” to occur.  
 The beautiful itself causes a being to be beautiful, and the beautiful itself plus the human 
observer (or something about the human observer) causes a being to appear to be beautiful. But 
before we become too content with this tidy theory, we must take into account something 
Socrates says that appears to contradict it. He says that the cause of appearance may be the 
appropriate, that is, that the appropriate is a possible and reasonable hypothesis for a cause of the 
appearance of the beautiful.: “S: Let’s choose whether we think the appropriate is what makes 
things be seen to be, or be, beautiful. H: It’s what makes things be seen to be, in my opinion, 
Socrates. S: Oh dear, it’s gone and escaped from us, our chance to know what the beautiful is, 
since the appropriate has been seen to be something other than the beautiful” (294a). This claim 
poses the following problem: if the appropriate is a possible cause for beauty’s appearance, then 
where does that leave the observer? Is the observer a necessary (but not sufficient) cause of 
beauty’s appearance? 
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 Gathering these claims together, we can make the following summary: The eidos of the 
beautiful (the beautiful itself) causes an object to be beautiful. It causes an object to be beautiful 
in itself, not relative to any human observer. However, in doing so, the eidos announces its 
presence in that object’s appearance, i.e., in its relation to a human observer. But the eidos by 
itself does not cause the object’s “appearance.” Nevertheless, the beautiful itself seems to 
command a certain power over its own appearance: it does not cause appearance (not by itself), 
but it will always announce itself, radiantly, in appearance. Socrates believes that this must 
always be true. The reason for this is not made explicitly clear anywhere in the Hippias Major, 
though at the end of this chapter, and in the next one, we will conjecture as to what that reason 
may be. Furthermore, on the “appearance” side, human beings are at least part of the “cause” of a 
beautiful object’s appearance, insofar as an appearance is a relation to a human observer; an 
appearance is an appearance to someone. Thus human beings are a necessary condition for an 
object’s appearance (they are not a sufficient condition because the presence of the object is also 
necessary).154 However, human beings may disagree about whether an object is truly beautiful or 
not (beautiful objects inspire “strife and contention” [ἔριν καὶ μάχην]). Here we reach the first 
impasse in Socrates’s words, one of three that are found in the above statements. 
The impasses all concern the cause of an object’s appearance, and the claim of beauty’s 
radiant nature. First, how do we reconcile the claim that the beautiful manifests itself radiantly in 
                                                          
154 Commenting on this same passage, Halsten Olson has a useful explanation about how an observer can be 
considered a “cause” of an object’s appearance: “Consider again the octagon. Though having eight sides is what 
makes a place figure an octagon, having eight sides does not always make such a figure seem, or be seen, to be an 
octagon. Some octagons are entirely unobserved. And some observers are inattentive. Someone who fails to notice 
the presence of eight sides as he observes a plane figure will not take even the first step toward recognizing it as an 
octagon, even if he has firmly in mind the analysis that an eight-sided figure is an octagon. Even the possession of 
an analysis cannot protect us against the errors of inattention.” In other words, even knowledge of the eidos of the 
beautiful does not mean that one is experiencing the appearance of a beautiful object in one’s life. Only in the 
presence of both a human observer and a beautiful object can we say that a beautiful object has an “appearance.” 
Beyond this, Olson’s crucial notion of “attentiveness,” which he does not develop, will become important in our 
own interpretation of this passage, below. See Olson, “Socrates Talks to Himself in Plato’s Hippias Major,” 277. 
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appearance, as well as the claim that human beings are (at least in part) the cause of an object’s 
appearance, while also holding that human beings can be wrong (and suffer strife and 
contention) about which objects are beautiful? By claiming that the beautiful itself is “radiant,” 
do we not mean that the eidos of the beautiful is readily accessible to the human observer, and 
that therefore there should not be too much “strife and contention” over whether objects are 
beautiful? Second, how can we claim that the beautiful itself does not cause an object’s 
appearance, while also holding that the beautiful itself always manifests itself radiantly in 
appearance? There would seem to be a causal relationship lurking within that “always,” one that 
Socrates either does not accept or overlooks. Moreover, how do we reconcile the claim that the 
beautiful does not cause its own appearance, with Socrates’s confidence that the beautiful “will 
make itself be seen” (ἐκφανήσεσθαι τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν, 295e)? Socrates’s statement would seem to 
indicate that the beautiful has a way of causing its own appearance. Finally, what are we to make 
of Hippias’s statement (which Socrates accepts) that the appropriate causes a being to appear to 
be beautiful? Would not that entail the possibility of deception with regard to beauty—of beings 
which, because they are appropriate in appearance, appear to be, but are not in fact, beautiful?  
 The first three of these impasses can be resolved with the subtle but significant nuance in 
Socrates’s statement about the cause of being and appearing: “by itself [μόνον] it [the 
appropriate] could not make things be seen to be and be, nor could anything else” (294d-e). 
Neither the appropriate, nor any other candidate for the eidos of the beautiful, could by itself 
make things both be and be seen to be beautiful at the same time. The beautiful itself cannot 
cause its own radiant appearance by itself. But this does not rule out that it causes its appearance 
in tandem with some other cause—namely, the human person. The beautiful manifests itself 
radiantly always in appearing before human beings. Therefore, there is no contradiction in saying 
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that the beautiful does not cause its own appearance, but that it also always appears, radiantly. 
Whenever it does appear, it appears because it is manifesting itself before a human being. Both 
the beautiful object and the human observer are necessary conditions for an “appearance” to 
occur. Moreover, even though that appearance is always radiant, accessible to the human 
observer, this does not mean that human observers will always take advantage of this 
accessibility, of this radiant nature. They perhaps won’t hold up their own end of the bargain, 
and they will not look for the eidos of the beautiful. They may be inattentive.155 The word that 
Socrates uses to indicate the ignorance of human beings before beautiful customs and laws is 
ἀγνοεῖσθαι, which literally means the “not perceived” or “unknown.” If human beings were to 
choose to look, to turn toward the beautiful, and to search therein for an insight into the eidos of 
the beautiful, then they would be met with (and become partial cause of) a radiant, accessible, 
self-disclosing appearance of the beautiful itself. Lastly, the beautiful can be said to “make itself 
seen” precisely because of its radiant power; whenever it is seen (i.e., whenever a human 
observer turns attentively toward it), it is likely that it will be seen (because it is radiant).  
 The peculiar problem of Socrates and Hippias agreeing that the “appropriate” may cause 
a being to “appear” to be beautiful, and thus be deceptive, does not actually challenge, but rather 
further validates, the above claims. When a human person is concerned with appropriateness, he 
is not concerned with the beautiful as such. Recall that Socrates asks: “Is it impossible for things 
                                                          
155 “…some observers are inattentive.” Olson, “Socrates Talks to Himself in Plato’s Hippias Major,” 277. Also, 
Sean Kirkland notes that phainesthai, “appearing,” creates a phainomenon, or “appearance,” that is formed by equal 
participation from observer and observed. Notice too that his understanding of phainomenon does not find within it 
an ambiguity between “seeming” and simple “appearing” or “shining forth,” but includes both by admitting that a 
phainomenon may be erroneous, incomplete, etc.:  “Thus, a phainomenon or ‘appearance,’ as always an appearance 
of something to someone, entails a connectedness between the observer and what presents itself to the observer via 
the movement of appearing. Moreover, this movement can occur and a connection between the observer and what is 
presenting itself can thereby be established, even if the appearance does not wholly and completely reveal or 
manifest what appears there. ‘What is’ can present itself to us even by way of obscure, oblique, indirect, partial, 
multiple, or self-contradictory appearances.” See Sean D. Kirkland, The Ontology of Socratic Questioning in Plato’s 
Early Dialogues (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2012), 26. 
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that are really beautiful not to be seen to be beautiful, since what makes them be seen is present? 
(294c).” A person who is concerned with appropriateness is not present before the beautiful in an 
attitude of desiring to know it as beautiful, and in an attitude of desiring to know the nature of 
that which causes it to be or become beautiful. He is only concerned with using the beautiful 
object. The Greek verb πρέπω, as we saw above, means “to be clearly seen; to be conspicuous.” 
It may refer to a tool which works well (a spoon), or clothing which fits the occasion (wedding 
dress). Either way, the word is always used to refer to the aspect of an object relative to a human 
being. The “appropriate” always only refers to an object as it relates to human projects or human 
uses. It is not employed to signify something about an object as it is in itself, independent of 
human interests. Therefore, it could never be employed to speak about the eidos of the beautiful 
as it is in itself. As we saw above, the central problem this part of the dialogue posits is the very 
possibility of knowing the eidos of the beautiful as it is in itself, because this eidos is responsible 
for the beautiful object’s being, not its appearance. Anyone who is concerned with 
appropriateness is not going to be concerned with what an object is like in itself, but only with 
what an object is like with relation to human use. (Notice too that Socrates later goes on to reject 
utility as a definition of the beautiful [296d].) If one is interested in answering Socrates’s 
question about getting to know the eidos of the beautiful, one is necessarily not interested in 
what is appropriate, but rather in what is inherent in an object independent of appropriateness.156 
  
                                                          
156 Nickolas Pappas makes a useful comparison between Plato and Kant on the issue of appropriateness, likening the 
appropriate to what Kant calls “dependent beauty,” i.e., beauty that is contingent on a concept and not purely on 
form. “Kant calls the beauty that is appropriateness ‘dependent beauty’ (Critique of Judgment, section 16). Such 
beauty threatens to become a species of the good. Within the accepted corpus of genuine Platonic works beauty is 
never subsumed within the good, the appropriate, or the beneficial; Plato seems to belong in the same camp as Kant 
in this respect.” See Nickolas Pappas, “Plato’s Aesthetics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/plato-aesthetics/. However, 
I do not agree with Pappas’s conclusion that the reason why the appropriate is an inadequate definition of the 
beautiful is because it is associated with the good. For more on this, see Chapter Four. 
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 Having combed the text and resolved its apparent impasses, we can now elaborate the 
reasons why the radiant nature of the beautiful is what makes it possible for appearances to 
disclose the eidos of the beautiful. This requires that we develop the ontology that lies beneath 
Socrates’s distinction between being and appearance as they relate to the beautiful. This ontology 
will allow us to see why only philosophical eros can make this insight into a beautiful object’s 
being from within the beautiful object’s appearances, and it will also deepen our grasp of how, 
despite the radiant nature of the beautiful, beautiful objects still create “strife and contention” 
among human beings. 
 The ontology of the beautiful espoused by the Socrates of the Hippias Major is that of the 
beautiful as radically objective. The beautiful is objective because it inheres in a being, not in 
that being’s appearance. It modifies a being’s way of being, not its way of appearing before 
others. The beautiful is present within an object, and not within the observer. The beautiful 
“resides” within an object, and it is not a value projected onto an object by an observer. Nor is 
the beautiful reducible to the effect (emotional or physical) that it may have on an observer. But 
this objectivity has an attribute that is crucial for philosophy: its objectivity does not exclude 
relativity. The beautiful includes a relation to the observer, which we call “appearance.” The 
beautiful manifests itself radiantly in appearance. This is because, while the passage from 
appearances to being constitutes a philosophical problem, appearances are also part of being, in 
the sense that a being may manifest itself before an observer.157 The maiden, the spoon, the noble 
life, the works of Pheidias—all of these examples are easily identifiable as “beautiful” by 
Socrates and Hippias. Their beauty is apparent. The beautiful, while it inheres in being, appears 
when a human observer turns toward it. Moreover, whenever it does appear, it always appears 
                                                          
157 Schindler argues: “while appearance is in some respect opposed to being, being is not opposed to, but rather 
inclusive of, appearance. The κοινωνία with others is part of being, taken as a whole…” Schindler, Plato’s Critique 
of Impure Reason, 114. 
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generously, in such a way that its nature, or eidos, shines forth and makes insights into it possible 
for the human observer.  
 We can sharpen our sense of the radical objectivity of Socrates’s understanding of the 
beautiful by contrasting it with a philosophical notion of the beautiful that is its complete 
opposite. In the closing pages of The Imaginary, Jean-Paul Sartre sketches a radically relative 
ontology of the beautiful. For Sartre,  “the real is never beautiful,” because any object perceived 
as beautiful is only perceived as such because it has been reconstituted and recast as beautiful by 
an act of imagination on the part of the subject.158  The imagination apprehends an object in a 
particular way, and an object becomes beautiful only due to that mode of apprehension. This 
mode of apprehension is called “aesthetic.” The object’s beauty has nothing to do with the object 
itself. Once it is apprehended, the object becomes “irreal,” that is (according to Sartrean 
terminology), an image of itself. Sartre writes: “As for aesthetic enjoyment, it is real but is not 
grasped for itself, as produced by a real color: it is nothing but a manner of apprehending the 
irreal object and, far from being directed on the real painting, it serves to constitute the 
imaginary object through the real canvas. … This does not come from some mysterious way, that 
we are sometimes able to use, of apprehending the real. It is simply that the aesthetic object is 
                                                          
158 Sartre, The Imaginary, 193. For an analysis of this passage in the book, see Thomas R. Flynn, Sartre: A 
Philosophical Biography (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 134-136. It is interesting to note that 
elsewhere, Sartre expresses the view that the beautiful is, as a concept, something essentially negative:  “Beauty is a 
veiled contradiction.” A contradiction to what? It is difficult to tell from the context (this line is thrown in at the end 
of a literary essay) but it appears to be precisely a contradiction to the human desire for happiness, to the project of 
human fulfillment. But this “contradiction” is a necessary part of a view of the beautiful that considers the beautiful 
to be nothing more than a value projected by human desire. It is nothing real, it is an illusion. Therefore, it is a 
“contradiction.” Notably, this was written around the same time as The Imaginary. The later was published in 1940, 
while the literary essay was published in 1938. See Sartre, “On John Dos Passos and 1919,” in We Have Only This 
Life to Live: The Selected Essays of Jean-Paul Sartre, 1939-1975. Ronald Aronson and Adrian van den Hoven, ed. 
(New York: New York Review of Books, 2013), 16. For another version of Sartre’s ontology of beauty, consult 
Camille Paglia: “How did beauty begin? Earth-cult, suppressing the eye, locks man in the belly of mothers. There is, 
I insisted, nothing beautiful in nature. Nature is primal power, coarse and turbulent. Beauty is our weapon against 
nature; but it we make objects, giving them limit, symmetry, proportion. Beauty halts and freezes the melting flux of 
nature.” Camille Paglia, Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence from Nefertiti to Emil Dickinson (New York: Vintage, 
1991), 57. 
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constituted and apprehended by an imaging consciousness that posits it as irreal.”159 For Sartre, 
anything can be beautiful, even a death in a bullfight.160 
According to the terminology of the Hippias Major, Sartre’s account of the beautiful is 
exclusively concerned with what causes a being to be seen to be beautiful. He rules out the 
possibility that the beautiful has anything to do with being. That which causes a being to be seen 
to be beautiful is a particular mode of apprehension: an “imaging consciousness” that posits an 
object as irreal, valued, and therefore “beautiful.” For Sartre, as for Hippias, to be seen to be 
beautiful is what it means to be beautiful. There is nothing intrinsic to an object that qualifies it 
for the status of beauty; all that is required is that an observer apprehend the object aesthetically. 
 In contrast with Sartre’s ontology, for Socrates the beautiful is something that wholly 
inheres within the beautiful being, whether it is a spoon or a maiden or a sculpture crafted by 
Pheidias. The eidos of the beautiful in an object has nothing to do with its being seen by this or 
that person, but precisely by the presence of the beautiful itself, of the eidos of beauty, within the 
being in question. Therefore, the beautiful can never be construed as a value projected onto an 
object by an observer. Nor can a beautiful object be beautiful merely because of its manner of 
involvement in appearance before someone. The beautiful is never beautiful because somebody 
thinks it is beautiful or admires it; rather, the beautiful is admired because it is beautiful. 
(Whether it ought to be admired is a separate question.) Moreover, whatever we may feel before 
a beautiful object because of its beauty, and whatever attitude we may adopt before it because of 
its beauty, must be at least in part conditioned by the beautiful object itself.161 That is to say, my 
relation to the beautiful, mediated by appearance, is always partially determined by the beautiful 
itself. Socrates agrees with Hippias that “a beautiful girl is a beautiful thing” (287e), because a 
                                                          
159 Sartre, The Imaginary, 191. Emphasis mine.  
160 Sartre, The Imaginary, 191. 
161 “Because of its beauty,” and not because of some other interest, like utility. 
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beautiful girl commands admiration; Socrates only disagrees with the implied notion that a 
beautiful girl is the eidos of the beautiful. Socrates also believes that Pheidias’s statue of Athena 
commands admiration (290a-b), and that political wisdom is beautiful and therefore to be 
admired (296a). The structure of admiration, then, weighs heavily on the side of the beautiful 
object, which has its own force of attraction.162 No doubt that the proverb with which this 
dialogue concludes also expresses, among other things, the sense for the objectivity of the 
beautiful: “What’s beautiful is hard” (304e). Beyond the Hippias Major, we can see the same 
structure of admiration in the Phaedrus, where Socrates says that when one sees “a godlike face 
or bodily form that has captured Beauty well, first he shudders and a fear comes over him like 
those he felt at the earlier time then he gazes at him with the reverence due to a god…” (251a).163 
The “divinity” of beauty means, among other things, that the beautiful is radically sovereign and 
other than the human observer. To be sure, we “see” beauty, and beauty appears to us; but the 
beauty in appearance originates in the being of the beautiful object. 
 The validity of Socrates’s ontology of the beautiful bears itself out in experience. The 
encounter with a beautiful object always has the quality of newness about it. The sense of beauty 
comes a moment before the desire: I meet a beautiful woman first, and then I desire her. I don’t 
project feelings onto someone. (Or if I do, I eventually become aware that my feelings of desire 
are inauthentic, and—therefore—not indicative of a real encounter with beauty.) The 
mountainous landscape, the beautiful piece of music, the wonderful caterpillar making its way 
across a tree branch, all of these things come from the outside, and shock me. They command 
                                                          
162 As Paula Gottlieb puts it, “… the good cannot simply be what anyone happens to desire, nor the things that are 
not good nor beautiful at all. What is good, then, is not simply what is desired, but what is desirable. Similarly, what 
is beautiful is not simply what is admired, but what is admirable. Therefore what is good is what deserves to be the 
object of desire (boulesis, epithumia/general eros), and what is beautiful is what deserves to be the object of eros…” 
See Paula Gottlieb, “Response to Barney,” Classical Philology 105 (2010): 379. 
163 In a similar vein, Fragment 31 from Sappho: “How like a god I feel he is/this man, when he sits close…” Both 
the Phaedrus passage and the Sappho fragment are quoted from the Nehamas and Woodruff translation. 
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attention. They command reverence or awe or even terror because of a quality they have which 
does not come from my own consciousness. In a similar vein, the beautiful objects are often 
accompanied by a felt sense of “being found.” They feel like at least partial, at least temporary, 
answers to the erotic drive, to that part of the human person that seeks beauty. The objectivity of 
the beautiful object manifests itself in this sense of achieved discovery that accompanies them. 
 Having laid out Socrates’s view of the absolute nature of the beautiful, we can see more 
clearly what Socrates means by appearances. Beauty is not a value projected onto an object by an 
observer; instead, the eidos of the beautiful makes an object be beautiful. Therefore, if an object 
appears, its appearance implies a communication of its own essence outward toward whoever is 
experiencing the appearance. The arrow of communication originates in the object, and heads 
toward the observer. The observer, however, has an essential role to play: the object defines its 
appearance, but the appearance itself does not take place without an observer who witnesses it. 
An appearance is thus a phainomenon, an event that happens when an observer turns toward a 
beautiful object. Socrates uses the verb, φαίνω, “to bring to light,” when talking about the beautiful 
(e.g., φαίνεσθαι [294a] and ἐκφανήσεσθαι [295a]). Phainomena are always of particular beautiful 
objects. Phainomena are also always “positional,” that is, they are glances (accurate or 
inaccurate, deceptive or probing, more or less, but never absolutely, complete) that reveal an 
object in the world.164 They are not mere images (like the εἰκόνες at the lowest part of the 
Divided Line), but moments when a person sees something in her experience. In this sense, they 
are like beliefs or opinions, because they always involve the observer taking a stance and saying, 
                                                          
164 Kirkland emphasizes the fact that phaino means “light,” and that this nuance further deepens the objective side of 
phainomena: “The original meaning of appearance indicated by dokein and phainesthai is … a movement toward 
the observer out of darkness and into the light that establishes a connection between what appears and the observer.” 
See Kirkland, The Ontology of Socratic Questioning, 27.  
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“This is beautiful,” implying that he or she believes this to be the case.165 Whenever Hippias and 
Socrates speak about spoons or maidens or sculptures, they speak about these as instances of the 
beautiful which can be identified as such. They are never spoken about in a theoretical way as 
pure images or εἰκόνες. Hippias and Socrates speak about real beings qua beings-that-appear; 
they are not spoken about as phenomena considered in their phenomenality. Appearances for 
Socrates and Hippias are always glances at a pot, a work of art, a woman, a noble life. Even if 
these objects are not actually present in the action of the dialogue, Hippias and Socrates both 
make references to experiences they have had with pots, art, women, and noble ideals. These 
memories are memories of phainomena: memories of events in which Socrates or Hippias beheld 
a beautiful pot, work of art, woman, or ideal.166 (If I were staging the dialogue, I would bring 
these objects onto the stage, and would not need to change a word of the text to justify my doing 
so.) Most importantly, appearances are not necessarily sensory appearances (as we argue in 
Chapter One). Beautiful things may appear in different ways, and many different types of beings 
may be beautiful. That Socrates believes this becomes clear when he and Hippias discuss 
Hippias’s third definition of the beautiful. When Hippias describes a noble life, one where a man 
is “rich, healthy, and honored by the Greeks” (291d-e), Socrates, along with the reader, 
                                                          
165 While my claim only pertains to the Hippias Major, other scholars have argued that the predominant meaning of 
phantasia in Plato always includes belief. Allan Silverman argues that a “full-fledged Platonic phantasia” is “a kind 
of belief” (135), something distinct from mere sense-perception (aisthesis) (125). That is, implicit in the very notion 
of appearance is the assent, however small, to a certain belief (whether erroneous is irrelevant). See Allan 
Silverman, “Plato on ‘Phantasia,’” Classical Antiquity 10 (1991): 123-147. Similarly, Rachel Barney writes that 
Plato has a “judgmental account” of appearance, by which she means an account of appearances in which “what 
constitutes an ‘appearance’ is not some bare sensory stimulus but a judgment that something is the case – or at least 
an inclination so to judge, which can reasonably be interpreted in psycho-dynamic terms (as by Plato) as a 
preliminary judgment passed by some lower cognitive authority” (288). See Rachel Barney, “Appearances and 
Impressions,” Phronesis 37 (1992): 283-313. Both Silverman and Barney appeal to the Sophist in making their 
arguments, and Barney also cites the Republic Book X. 
166 There is a distinction to be drawn here between perception and memory, both of which are interrelated by distinct 
types of phenomena. For the purposes of my current discussion, however, I think that the phrase, “memories of 
phenomena” works to convey what I am trying to say. 
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experiences an appearance of a whole life, in all of its moral aspects.167 This description is not a 
sensuous appearance, but it remains an intuition of something that is beautiful.168  
Given this understanding of appearances, we can venture to ask how one might be able 
to, through appearances or within them, make insights about the eidos of the beautiful (that is, 
make insights which deepen our founding noetic insight that the beautiful itself is something). 
All of our knowledge of beautiful beings come from appearances. Socrates and Hippias know 
about beautiful sculptures and maidens and spoons. In the past, these beings have all appeared 
before them, in their radiant beauty. What the two men must do is make an insight into that 
which causes all of these beings to be beautiful: the eidos. But to grasp the eidos of the beautiful 
requires that they somehow understand the beautiful as it is in itself independent of any 
appearance, or somehow prior to and causal of appearance. This is why Socrates draws the 
distinction between being and being seen (294a), making it clear that he is searching for “that by 
which all beautiful things are beautiful.” “Beautiful things,” that is, instances of the beautiful that 
are disclosed to human beings in appearance, must have an eidos that exists independently of 
appearances, which causes beings to become beautiful when “added” (289d). This journey from 
appearances to the eidos itself can only be bridged by a privileged insight into the eidos that 
somehow overcomes the limitations of perspective and the incompleteness of appearances. It can 
only be bridged by something which reconciles the relativity of my experience of the beautiful 
                                                          
167 Wolfsdorf agrees that this description by Hippias amounts to a non-corporeal definition of the beautiful. This 
would mean, then, that the appearance we are given in the text is of non-sensuous beauty: “Certainly when he 
proposes his third definition, Hippias cannot have a corporeal conception of τὸ καλόν in mind.” Wolfsdorf, , 
“Hippias Major 301b2-c2: Plato’s Critique of a Corporeal Conception of Forms and of the Form-Participant 
Relation,” 249. 
168 Ludlam makes the same point, that phainomena cannot be reduced to sensuous phenomena. Critiquing Woodruff, 
he writes: “Beauty, whatever else one might say about it, pertains to perception, both sensory and intellectual. We 
have already had occasion to see that Woodruff rejects the aesthetic roots of the word καλός … This mistake is 
compounded by restricting φαίνεσθαι to the field of visual perception. Of course not all beautiful things are seen to 
be beautiful. This does not mean that they are really beautiful, but that they are perceived to be beautiful by means 
other than sight.” See Ludlam, Hippias Major: An Interpretation, 113. 
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with the eidos of the beautiful itself, which causes a being to be, and not merely appear, 
beautiful.  
The radiant nature of the beautiful is what makes this bridge possible. The radiant, 
showing-forth nature of the beautiful is what makes the eidos accessible. Another way to put this 
is that the eidos of the beautiful is itself the bridge. That it is never allied to deceit means that we 
are always given visual confirmation of the presence of the eidos of the beautiful within a 
beautiful object’s appearance. It is in the nature of the beautiful to always communicate and 
show forth its own presence in appearance.169 The beautiful will always be “true” in appearance. 
As Hans-Georg Gadamer says about the beautiful as it is presented in the Phaedrus, “The 
ontological function of the beautiful is to bridge the chasm between the ideal and the real.”170 In 
the Hippias Major, the bridge can be more accurately described as that which covers the chasm 
between the eidos of the beautiful and its manifold appearances. 
 The Socrates of the Phaedrus is more emphatic than the Socrates of the Hippias Major 
about the unique status of the beautiful as the bridge between eidos and appearances. The 
contrast helps us to see the fuller implications of this unique status that the beautiful enjoys. In 
the Phaedrus, Socrates says: 
Justice and self-control do not shine out through their images down here, and neither do the other 
objects of the soul’s admiration; the senses are so murky that only a few people are able to make 
out, with difficulty, the original of the likenesses they encounter here. But beauty (κάλλος) was 
radiant to see at that time when the souls, along with the glorious chorus (we were with Zeus, 
while others followed other gods), saw that blessed and spectacular vision and were ushered into 
the mystery that we may rightly call the most blessed of all (250b, emphasis mine).  
                                                          
169 As Benardete puts it (referring specifically to the Hippias Major), “The beautiful is the impossible union of the 
eidetic and dimensionality.”  That is, the union between the ideal form of the beautiful, and our human, three-
dimensional experience of beautiful beings. See Benardete, The Being of the Beautiful, xxxv. 
170 Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays. Robert Bernasconi, trans. (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 14. 
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Also:  
Now beauty (κάλλους), as I said, was radiant among the other objects; and now that we have come 
down here we grasp it sparking through the clearest of our senses. Vision, of course, is the 
sharpest of our bodily senses, although it does not see wisdom. It would awaken terribly powerful 
love if an image of wisdom came through our sight as clearly as beauty does, and the same goes 
for other objects of inspired love. But now beauty alone has this privilege (νῦν δὲ κάλλος μόνον 
ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν), to be the most clearly visible and the most loved” (250c-e, emphasis 
mine).171  
These passages describe the beautiful as having a special mission with regard to human beings. 
This mission has both an erotic and noetic dimension. Its erotic dimension involves attraction: 
the beautiful attracts the admiration of human beings because of its radiance. The noetic 
dimension lies in the beautiful making “visible” those things which cannot be seen with “bodily 
senses”—the ultimate “objects of the soul’s admiration.” 
C.D.C Reeve calls this special mission or capability beauty’s “incandescence,” grounding 
this claim on insights from the Republic as well as the Phaedrus.172 Parsing what he perceives to 
be the differences between the good, the beautiful, and the other forms as they are presented in 
the Platonic canon, Reeve argues that Platonic characters such as Adeimantus and Glaucon 
cannot “distinguish the advantage of being beautiful from those of seeming beautiful,” because 
                                                          
171 Both passages quoted from the Nehamas and Woodruff, translation. Both passages employ the noun, κάλλος, 
rather than the adjective, καλός, which is more often used in the Hippias Major to refer to the beautiful. As stated in 
the Introduction, these words are distinct, though related. Nevertheless, for the philosophical problem at hand, and 
given the argument about translation that I made in the Introduction, we can claim that both words refer to the same 
phenomenon which, in English, we call “beauty.” 
172 C. D. C. Reeve, “Plato on Begetting in Beauty.” In Plato on Art and Beauty, ed. A. E. Denham (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 142-172. John Sallis, also writing about the Phaedrus, makes a similar remark: “To men 
the beautiful shines, not simply by itself, not immediately, but only through beautiful things, only through its 
‘earthly’ images,” yet nevertheless, the beautiful “names the way in which being itself shines forth in the midst of 
the visible.” See John Sallis, Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1996) 156. Similarly, Gordon says that in Socrates’s vision in the Phaedrus, “Beauty is the object 
of eros, and the beauty of the ordered visible world, most especially heavenly bodies, incites human investigation, 
which can lead back to noetic insight.” Noetic insight is insight into the eidos which is the source of appearances. 
See Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World, 36. 
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the various forms of virtues, such as justice, temperance, wisdom, as well as beauty, are 
“reputation-reality indifferent.”173 The good, however, is unique in not being reputation-reality 
indifferent: we cannot be satisfied with anything but an actual good, though what the good 
actually is remains elusive. Thus the good is “explanation-elusive.”174 Between the “reputation-
reality indifferent” forms which generate virtuous living, and the “explanation-elusive” good for 
the sake of which we live our lives, stands the beautiful. Building upon Phaedrus 250b, Reeve 
argues that the beautiful is also unique, because it alone manifests itself in a clear image of itself 
in the world, “because it itself can be seen blazing out in a way that other forms do not.” This 
“pre-eminent visibility” is called “incandescence.”175 
 The incandescence (or, as I call it here, radiance) of the beautiful does not enjoy such 
lofty mythical treatment in the Hippias Major, but it does shine just as brightly. That is, in the 
Hippias Major, the beautiful has the same capacity to guide the seeker of truth from appearances 
to being itself. The logical upshot of this idea can be seen by contrasting different types of truth 
claims. For me to say, “Elizabeth is strong,” depends completely on Elizabeth’s strength in 
relation to me (that is, her appearance before me). About her strength, I may be wrong or I may 
be right. I may perhaps be deceived by Elizabeth’s appearance into thinking she is stronger than 
she actually is. Either way, her appearance will ultimately confirm or deny whether she is strong: 
she can hit me and I will feel it. Her appearance will communicate a truth about herself. 
However, this type of truth—“Elizabeth is strong”—is only relative truth, and not truth with 
regard to either the eidos of strength or the eidos of Elizabeth, but only of these with relation to 
me at a particular moment in time. The claim, “Elizabeth is just,” on the other hand, does require 
knowledge of the eidos of justice, and as such it does pose the problem of appearance and being: 
                                                          
173 Reeve, “Plato on Begetting in Beauty,” 143. 
174 Reeve, “Plato on Begetting in Beauty,” 144. 
175 Reeve, “Plato on Begetting in Beauty,” 145-146. 
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how does Elizabeth’s justice manifest itself before me? (This, of course, is the problem tackled 
by Socrates in the first two books of the Republic.) But the claim, “Elizabeth is beautiful,” has a 
unique status. It is a claim about eidos that is greatly aided by appearances. I can confirm it if I 
take her appearance seriously. I can confirm it in my experience of Elizabeth; in a perceptive 
glance or touch. That is, Elizabeth’s appearance (her manifestation relative to me) communicates 
something absolute about Elizabeth and about the eidos of the beautiful itself, because in 
Elizabeth I see something of the eidos of the beautiful. Elizabeth’s beauty is “incandescent.” 
 Another example can perhaps provide further clarity about incandescence. Imagine 
attending a symphony performance, and being seated in an inexpensive seat, way in the back, 
atop a balcony. You can barely make out the performers in the orchestra. Looking at the 
orchestra, you are casually deceived by appearances. A violinist may look like a woman, and is 
actually a man with long hair. A viola might be indistinguishable from a violin. Even the sound 
of the performance might be imperfect, if the acoustics of the symphony hall are not of a good 
quality. Yet insofar as the music does appear to you, that is, insofar as you can hear it, it will 
communicate its beauty to you. You may not know whether that man (or woman) is playing a 
violin (or viola), but you do know that, for example, Beethoven’s Ninth is a beautiful piece of 
music. This is because its beauty is incandescent.176 
                                                          
176 Another objection to the idea of beauty’s radiance can be stated as follows. Do we not encounter objects which, 
to borrow a line from Wordsworth, are “by distance made more sweet,” i.e., are seen as beautiful due to its shifting 
or otherwise deceptive appearance?  An old house might look more beautiful from a distance, where its colors are 
seen brightened by the sun, than up close, where the peeling paint and rotting wooden frames are more visible. But 
the claim here is that the beautiful is radiant and incandescent in appearance only to a person driven by philosophical 
eros, i.e., to the seeker of truth, to a person who has oriented her eros toward an interrogative stance with regard to 
wisdom (and crucially, as we shall see in the next chapter, toward the good). The seeker of truth goes to the house in 
an effort to know the truth about it. She will not rest satisfied with the appearance of the house as it appears in the 
gleaming sun. She will seek out more than one appearance of it, in her effort to get to the truth about it. One can 
imagine a more complex example of this dynamic: for example, of a music lover who spends a lot of time listening 
to a particular composer, in an attempt to come to a judgment about whether his music is beautiful. 
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 At first blush, the above claim about beauty’s radiance or incandescence may appear to 
be at odds with the textual evidence as well as with common sense. First, with regard to the text, 
Socrates and Hippias have already accepted that the beautiful itself, that by which objects 
become beautiful, “is something” (287c-d). This implies that both Socrates and Hippias have had 
at least an intimation of the eidos of the beautiful, because they know enough to know that it 
exists. Their knowledge of the beautiful has transcended appearances at least insofar as they 
know that the beautiful itself “is something.” But neither Hippias nor Socrates has claimed to 
have transcended appearances at this juncture of the dialogue. Second, with regard to common 
sense, Socrates and Hippias both agree that there is much “strife and contention” surrounding 
beautiful laws and customs (294c-e). This means that people do not always agree on whether 
certain laws and customs are beautiful. But how can this be, if beauty is incandescent, and gives 
sensory evidence of its own eidos in appearance? As we stated above, the immediate answer is 
that the strife and contention is due to the fact that beautiful beings are “unknown” [ἀγνοεῖσθαι]. 
They are simply not seen, and no one can agree on the beauty of things that are not seen. It is 
true that Socrates never disputes the beauty of any of Hippias’s examples of beauty, nor vice 
versa. But do we not see beautiful things all of the time—only to have our neighbor come to tell 
us that we are wrong, and that the thing we hold to be beautiful is not, after all, beautiful? Why 
does the radiant nature of the beautiful not help us then? 
 The answer to both of these objections is found in philosophical eros. The incandescence 
of the beautiful only helps the one who is searching for the eidos. Only the person who has an 
eros for being its, and desire to transcend appearances, will actually be affected by the “pre-
eminent visibility” of beauty. Only a philosopher, who wants to know the truth, will find in the 
beautiful the bridge that will lead him to his beloved.  
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…Only to the Person Driven by Philosophical Eros 
 The beautiful is radiant in its appearance, but this fact matters only to those who care 
about the truth. The eidos of the beautiful discloses itself more clearly to perception than other 
forms do, but this is good news only to those who are trying to understand the eidos of the 
beautiful. The Hippias Major is not an essay about the beautiful, but a staging of Socrates’s 
pursuit of the eidos of the beautiful—of Socrates’s pursuit, that is, of the object of his eros. 
Above, I argued that the two causes of the beautiful appearance are the beautiful itself and the 
human observer who turns toward the beautiful. But here we will see that this observer must 
have a particular disposition, if he is to see the eidos manifesting itself in appearance. He must 
desire to know it; he must live his eros philosophically. Without philosophical eros, the eidos 
does not appear.177 The radiant appearance of the beautiful makes it possible for a human being 
to know the beautiful itself, but human beings must desire this knowledge first. Thus knowledge 
proceeds only from erotic desire, that is, from a desire that points beyond itself, rather than to 
itself, in the quest for knowledge.178 Noesis happens only in a life of philosophical eros.179 But a 
                                                          
177 Ludlam underscores the noetic import that appearances have in the Hippias Major: “In the argument following 
the Questioner’s proposal, Socrates equates φαίνεσθαι with δοξάζεσθαι, opposing both these terms to ἀγνοεῖσθαι 
(294c8-13). The opposite of ἀγνοεῖσθαι is νοεῖσθαι. It would seem, then that φαίνεσθαι here implies ‘to appear 
through good reasoning’.” See Ludlam, Hippias Major: An Interpretation, 177.  My purpose here is to emphasize 
that eros is a necessary requirement for “good reasoning” to take place. As Ludlam himself says elsewhere in his 
book, “One of the conclusions we can draw from this dialogue seems to be that the wise man can sense and perceive 
things as they really are in the world of phenomena” (181). A wise man is a “lover of wisdom”; love is a 
requirement for wisdom. The phenomena disclose “what they really are” only to one who first desires to know what 
they really are. 
178 Discussing the Symposium, Hyland writes: “Far from our erotic experience of beauty being ‘blind’ or irrational, it 
is infused with reason. This is the crucial difference, as I have indicated previously, between eros and epithumia 
(desire), the latter of which we shall see in the Phaedrus is explicitly characterized as irrational… Eros is inherently 
rational; only as such can philosophy itself be erotic at the core …” See Hyland, Plato and the Question of Beauty, 
54. If in his essay, Hyland begins with eros and discovers its rationality, here we have taken the opposite (but 
complementary) route: we began with Socrates’s rational search for the eidos of the beautiful, and have discovered 
its erotic nature. 
179 Roochnik usefully summarizes the importance of eros for noesis according to the Socrates of the Symposium: 
“To vary the  Aristotelian formula, the object of Platonic discourse is not being as being, but (being as being) as 
object of desire. There can be no undisturbed theory of the real for Plato. Instead, Diotima tells us that as 
philosophers our logos gives voice to a desire for the real.” The same could be said for the Socrates of the Hippias 
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lived and fully cultivated philosophical eros is rare in human beings. As we shall see below, 
Socrates has it, and he enacts this desire in the dialogue, both in the way he conducts his 
investigation into the eidos of the beautiful, as well as in the pedagogy which he employs with 
Hippias. The reason he is even able to pose the question of “the beautiful itself” is because he is 
philosophical and has transcended appearances from the very beginning. In contrast, Hippias has 
eros for fame and money, but does not orient his eros toward philosophical wisdom or the good, 
and he does take an interrogative stance—though, at moments, we see him being tugged a little 
in the direction of philosophy by Socrates.  
 In the Hippias Major, Socrates’s philosophical eros for knowledge of the beautiful, a 
desire which is ecstatic and other-oriented, a desire which is open to experiencing new 
instantiations of the beautiful and to abandoning its own prejudices for the sake of understanding 
the beautiful, manifests itself with particular clarity in three moments in the dialogue. Each of 
these moments marks an occasion for Socrates make another clarification about the nature of the 
truth that he desires to know; each moment further clarifies the conditions for noesis of the 
beautiful itself. Moreover, with each moment Socrates deepens his point, that the knowledge 
they seek is knowledge of the beautiful as it is in itself, not relative to an observer. As such, each 
moment is also an erotic movement toward the eidos beyond appearances, culminating in the 
third moment, which establishes that the beautiful manifests itself radiantly in appearances.180  
The first of these moments occurs when Socrates establishes that the beautiful itself “is 
something,” orchestrating a conversation between Hippias and Socrates’s unnamed, absent 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Major: the object of this dialogue is (the beautiful as beautiful) as object of desire. See David L. Roochnik, “The 
Erotics of Philosophical Discourse,” 126. 
180 Rosemary Desjardins writes that an important step in a Platonic dialogue usually consists of a special moment of 
clarification: “Given the problem of ambiguity in language, and the need to move from surface to deep-level 
meaning, it is hardly surprising that the first step in a dialogue’s development usually requires that one be shaken 
from a complacent kind of satisfaction with the surface of language and forced to recognize that language does not 
transparently and unequivocally mean, just like that.” See Desjardins, “Why Dialogues? Plato’s Serious Play,” 116. 
My contention here is that (at least) three such moments occur in the Hippias Major.  
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friend. First, he convinces Hippias that it is by justice that people are just, and that justice “is 
something.” He makes the same argument with regard to wisdom and goodness. Wisdom is that 
by which wise people become wise, and wisdom itself is something. Goodness is that by which 
the good become good, and goodness itself is something (287c). Hippias affirms: “They are 
[something]” (οὖσι μέντοι, 287c). The same should hold for the beautiful. “S: ‘Then all beautiful 
things, too, are beautiful by the beautiful, isn’t that so?’ H: Yes, by the beautiful. S: ‘ … by that 
being something?’ H: It is. Why not?” (287c-d). This moment marks the first movement in the 
erotic passage from appearances to the eidos. Socrates has effectively claimed two things in this 
passage. The first is that he has a desire to know the beautiful as it is in itself, beyond its 
manifold appearances or manifestations in reality. The second is that he has a desire to make this 
investigation according to the demands that the investigation itself makes. That is, the method of 
his journey—from instantiations/appearances, to the thing itself which is revealed in 
instantiations/appearances—is to be determined by the thing itself, that is, by that which is 
revealed in the instantiations/appearances. Whether Hippias makes the same movement is in 
question. He agrees with Socrates, but he merely appears to do so: he is not convincing, and he 
does not seem to weigh the significance of the philosophical claims that Socrates is making. 
Rather, he seems to be playing at philosophy, just to see where Socrates will take him. 
 The second important moment in the development of this dialogue occurs when Socrates 
further qualifies the terms of his investigation with Hippias, by saying that what they are looking 
for is that which causes a being to be beautiful when “added.” Socrates claims this during the 
culmination of his response to Hippias’s first definition of the beautiful (a beautiful girl or 
maiden), a response that has also summoned beautiful mares and lyres to the discussion. “Do you 
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still think that the beautiful itself by which everything else is beautified [κοσμεῖται]181 and seen 
to be beautiful [καλὰ φαίνεται] when that form [τὸ εἶδος] is added [προσγένηται] to it—that that 
is a girl or a horse or a lyre?” (289d). Hippias reacts to this statement by suggesting that the form 
they are looking for is “gold.” Socratic eros thus makes another movement, by identifying a 
form, the eidos, as the object of its search. Moreover, the eidos is said to be that which makes 
things appear to be beautiful (καλὰ φαίνεται), and which generates beautiful arrangement 
(κοσμεῖται). Socrates thus anticipates the distinction he will make later on in the dialogue 
between appearance and the eidos. Already he is saying that the search for the beautiful itself is a 
search beyond appearance, for the causes of those very appearances. Already, indeed, Socrates is 
beholding beautiful beings (mares, lyres, girls) and seeing through them toward that which 
causes them to be the way they are, toward that which makes them be beautiful. He does not 
know what that might be, but at this point, he has seen that it is a form, and that it has a causal 
power of an undetermined sort. Hippias, while again expressing agreement with Socrates, does 
not appear to understand Socrates’s point. “Gold” is still a part of appearances; it is a color that 
modifies an object’s appearance, not its being. Instead, the word that Socrates uses to describe 
the relationship between the eidos of the beautiful and a beautiful object is προσγένηται, a 
compound word rooted in γίγνομαι, the Greek word which denotes coming into being, “to 
happen truly,” “to be born,” and not merely to appear or seem. Even if we take the secondary, 
connotative meaning of “gold,” that is, money or value (a meaning that the wealthy Hippias 
probably wishes to evoke), even then we are only left with a beauty that is relative to the 
observer. Gold (that is, money) is valuable for me, as currency for my use, and is not worth 
                                                          
181 Interestingly, Woodruff himself renders this word “beautified.” The word κοσμεῖται, taken with καλὰ, can be 
rendered: “arranged beautifully.” Woodruff does not opt for “finely arranged,” and instead breaks with his consistent 
refusal to render to kalon as “beautiful.” This is probably because κοσμεῖται refers to physical beauty – what 
Woodruff would call “aesthetic.” See Chapter One for a critique of this view.  
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anything in itself. Thus, while Socrates has taken another erotic step deeper into the truth about 
the beautiful, Hippias has only feigned it, or attempted it and failed. As argued in Chapter Two, 
Hippias is following Socrates on an as-if basis, not fully committing himself to the truth claims 
that these steps involve.  
 The third moment comes when, as we saw above, Socrates makes it even more explicit 
that their search is “what makes—by coming to be [παραγενόμενον] present—each thing to 
which it is present” be beautiful (294a). Once again we see a compound with γίγνομαι, this time 
in participial form (παραγενόμενον). But now, more clearly than before, Socrates declares that 
the search for the eidos which causes things to be beautiful and not merely appear to be so, 
though the eidos itself must also be sought through appearances because we only know about the 
beautiful by first experiencing beautiful objects in the world. The cause of a beautiful maiden’s 
beauty is something distinct from her appearance, though our access to it comes through her 
appearance. The cause of a beautiful spoon’s beauty is something beyond its uses, but it must be 
encountered in its uses. That is, the cause of the beauty of a beautiful object is something which 
exists in itself, not relative to my experience of the beautiful, but I only have access to it within 
the experience of a relation to the beautiful object. As we saw above, Hippias agrees, once again, 
even going on to Socrates to dismiss the “appropriate” as the correct definition of the beautiful 
(294e). After this point, Hippias allows Socrates to take command of the dialogue and pose his 
own possible definitions of the beautiful. He becomes more passive while Socrates becomes 
more active. Philosophical eros takes center stage in the dialogue, as Socrates enacts the erotic 
quest to make an insight into the eidos beyond appearances, that is, to make a noetic insight of 
the beautiful itself as it is in itself. Moreover, he enacts this step now with full conviction that the 
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eidos will manifest itself radiantly in appearance, which helps and, in a metaphorical sense, 
“rewards” his erotic search. 
 These three philosophically-erotic moments in the Hippias Major are not so much three 
methodological advances or points in an argument, as they are dramatic moments when Socrates 
gains a clearer understanding of his own erotic search for truth. They are all moments in which 
Socrates’s attention is turned away from the beautiful as it exists relative to himself (or to 
Hippias or the reader) in his experience of beautiful objects, and toward the question of what it is 
in itself, as an eidos which inheres within these objects. To be sure, all three moments involve an 
advance in philosophical precision and as such, they are moments of advances in noesis. But 
these moments of noetic progress are inextricable from their erotic context. In all three moments, 
the ecstatic nature of the erotic search is re-established. The search is always for something 
other; whatever the beautiful is, it is not something that is reducible to my emotions or whims or 
lesser desires (epithumia). Moreover, with every moment the fact that the search entails a desire 
to move beyond appearances is also laid bare. Whatever the eidos of the beautiful is, it is not 
reducible to its manifold appearances in reality. Of the three, the third moment is most important, 
because in it Socrates relates that the beautiful itself aides the erotic search by being radiant. He 
does not defend this point, however, but sees it as self-evident.   
 There is another thing that these three erotic moments establish, but which can only be 
seen with clarity after the third moment: the dynamic of poverty and plenty. This dynamic 
which, as the Socrates of the Symposium tells us, is proper to eros, manifests itself in the Hippias 
Major in a unique fashion, as the dynamic between, on the one hand, Socrates’s desire to get to 
the root cause of beauty in beautiful beings (his search is an admission and expression of 
poverty, as we saw in Chapter One) and, on the other hand, an encounter with the beautiful as it 
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manifests itself radiantly in appearances (this is “plenty”—eros finding an answer to its quest 
within an appearance that is more than an appearance, because it discloses the eidos). Without 
this dynamic, there is no question (poverty: “What is that, the beautiful?”) and no answer (plenty: 
the radiant appearance of the beautiful, which makes it hospitable to making an insight into the 
beautiful itself). Indeed, without it there would be no dialogue. 
 Given this dynamic of poverty and plenty, an instructive comparison can be made 
between these three moments in the Hippias Major and one key moment in the Symposium. In 
the latter dialogue, before he begins to relate the story of meeting Diotima and learning the truth 
about eros, Socrates, addressing Eryximachus, smugly declares: “In my foolishness, I thought 
you should tell the truth [τἀληθῆ λέγειν] about whatever you praise, that this should be your 
basis, and that from this a speaker should select the most beautiful truths and arrange them 
suitably” (198d, emphasis mine). Socrates makes this declaration right before he launches into 
his own contribution to the symposium, that is, his own attempt at “telling the truth” about eros. 
But his way of going about this task will first be to engage Agathon in a round of questioning in 
which, among other things, he gets Agathon to agree that to love something implies a lack of that 
thing which one loves (200b). Already the form of Socrates’s approach to “telling the truth” 
admits of a lack: questioning implies lacking the truth, and questioning is (as we saw in Chapter 
1), an expression of eros. Moreover, Socrates enacts the erotic dynamic of poverty and plenty by 
both admitting he has a desire to know about eros, and also accepting what he will receive from 
the priestess Diotima.182 
 This declaration of allegiance to the truth is the point of contact between this passage in 
the Symposium, and the three erotic moments in Hippias Major. By “truth,” I do not mean truth 
                                                          
182 Moreover, there is no form of eros – Diotima does not initiate Socrates into a vision of “eros itself,” but of beauty 
itself. Eros is metaxu, in the middle between the divine (forms) and mortal (phenomena). Socrates’s knowledge of 
eros is not a “formal” knowledge.  
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as an achievement, an “absolute noesis,” but truth as a guiding ideal of philosophy, always 
incompletely attained. In both dialogues, Socrates sees it necessary to declare his allegiance to 
the truth before enacting an erotic search for the truth about the subject at hand. In the 
Symposium, Socrates admits to learning about eros from Diotima, which implies that he did not 
know about eros before he met her. Before “giving” his audience the wisdom that he has 
received from Diotima, and before enacting (or rather, re-enacting) the erotic journey which took 
him (poor, with a question) to Diotima for answers (the plentitude which he was to receive), 
Socrates sees it necessary to say that this erotic journey and his recounting of it is faithful to the 
truth about eros, as opposed to any beautiful speechmaking about eros that is not expressive of 
truth. Similarly, in the Hippias Major, Socrates has a question (his poverty), and he considers 
definitions from Hippias which fail to satisfy him (more poverty), but he also has the beautiful 
itself which does not deceive (his plenty), and within this context, he sees it necessary to assert 
and re-assert his fidelity to the truth beyond appearances, as a necessary requirement for 
engaging in a search of the beautiful itself. In both the Hippias Major and the Symposium, 
Socrates enacts an erotic search, and in both dialogues he sees the need to declare himself on the 
side of the truth as an important part of this erotic search. 
 These three moments in the Hippias Major show us a Socrates whose noetic search is 
tied up with his eros for the truth. The eros for the truth is what allows him to advance from the 
dynamic of poverty and plenty toward the beautiful itself which, because it discloses itself 
radiantly in appearance, is both the path and the end of Socrates’s philosophical search. 
Moreover, these moments show us that Socrates has been a philosopher from the very beginning, 
and that this is why the question of the beautiful was born (see also Chapter One). 
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 In contrast with Socrates, Hippias is erotic—he is desires beautiful objects, and this 
desire is manifested in his love of honor and excellent statecraft, as well as beautiful speeches—
but it is not philosophically erotic. It is not oriented towards that which causes beautiful beings to 
become beautiful, nor is it interested in the good as it is in itself, beyond the self-interest and 
advantage that Hippias can gain from it. Therefore, Hippias cannot truly engage the question of 
what the beautiful is in itself, beyond appearances. He is not interested in finding the cause for 
the appearances within the appearances. He may indeed contest and cause strife over the beauty 
of objects, and this is because he cannot behold beauty for what it is in itself. At best, we can 
argue that Hippias attempts, at times, to adopt Socrates’s erotic standpoint, though he never full 
internalizes it and only makes an aborted “ascent” (see Chapter Two). For the most part, Hippias 
is attached to beautiful objects in a way that precludes his advancing beyond them toward the 
form that makes them beautiful. His sense of the beautiful is always tied with his own interests 
(which are political or financial) and his own pleasure. In other words, he cannot move from a 
relative notion of the beautiful (beautiful beings in relation to him), to an attitude wherein he can 
ask the question about what the beautiful is in itself. Only Socrates is able to bring him to 
consider adopting this attitude. And even though he gives notional assent to Socrates’s erotic 
declarations, Hippias cannot existentially bring himself to define the beautiful in any way that 
does not betray a relative, self-interested notion of the beautiful. His first definition, “a beautiful 
girl is a beautiful thing” (287e), made after he has accepted Socrates’s premise that the beautiful 
itself “is something” (287d), does not cohere with the substance of that agreement. A beautiful 
girl is something, indeed, but she is not the type of “something” they are looking for. Nor is 
“gold” (289e) the form which causes a being to become beautiful, but rather only something 
which changes an object’s appearance (either in color or in value). Likewise, the sense for the 
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beautiful that “gold” inspires is one of self-interest: gold can make me shine beautifully before 
others, or gold can make me rich. Finally, Hippias’s third definition of the beautiful as an 
honorable life (291d-e), hinges on a sense of honor that is very worldly (see Chapter Two). It too 
gives evidence of an understanding of the beautiful as ultimately about one’s self, and the way 
one looks before others. “Beauty is something I can use for my advantage.” Telling in this regard 
are Socrates’s reasons for rejecting this third definition: “it is beautiful for some, but not for 
others” (293c). That is, the honorable life (in the particular way that Hippias conceives of it) has 
a beauty that is relative to certain people. A true eidos of the beautiful commands universal 
assent, because its validity is not relative to that of any particular observer—though the observer 
must be one whose eros is directed by philosophy. 
 One way to look at Hippias’s approach to the beautiful is by looking at the notion of 
charm. Charm is an object’s sensory or emotional appeal.183 Hippias appears to be more 
susceptible to beauty’s charms than Socrates.184  Well clad and well shod (291a), a teller of 
interesting stories (285e), and declaimer of beautiful speeches (286a), Hippias is thoroughly 
charmed by beauty and is charming himself. The beautiful maiden is charming: just thinking 
about her titillates, and by summoning her image, Hippias is no doubt attempting to titillate 
Socrates. In order to truly love a maiden for her beauty, one would need to consider her as a 
whole person—not as a titillating image. Gold is charming, both as jewelry and as money. One 
                                                          
183 According to the Kantian understanding of the term, charm (Reiz) has nothing to do with beauty as such: “Any 
taste remains barbaric if its liking requires that charms and emotions be mingled in, let alone if it makes these the 
standard of its approval.” The main discussion on charm is found in §13, “A Pure Judgment of Taste is Independent 
of Charm and Emotion.” See Kant, Critique of Judgment, 69. I would not argue that the same is true for Socrates or 
Plato in the Hippias Major. The distinction between beauty’s charms and the beautiful is not found in the text. 
However, there is a distinction between an approach to the beautiful which seeks to understand it according to its 
own formal intelligibility (philosophical eros), and one which only enjoys or makes use of beautiful beings 
(Hippias’s approach). Chapter Six takes a deeper look at this distinction. 
184 Sweet points out that, in contrast with the Symposium, the Hippias Major points out the ways in which beauty 
does not lead to an ascent, but rather “tempt[s] one to fix one’s gaze upon the charming appearances.” See Sweet, 
“On the Greater Hippias,” 355. 
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cannot understand the value of gold, in either sense, without making a self-referential judgment: 
it looks good, or it is useful for buying stuff. Finally, the honors that Hippias lists in his third 
definition are all honors that impress others, or that benefit one’s self: “ … it is always most 
beautiful, both for every man and in every place, to be rich [self-interest], healthy [self-interest], 
and honored by the Greeks [impressive to other, and therefore of interest to myself], to arrive at 
old age, to make a beautiful memorial to his parents when they die [impressive to others], and to 
have a beautiful, grand burial from his own children [self-interest]” (291d-e). If this definition 
were indeed to be “most beautiful, both for every man and in every place,” it is not so because it 
contains an eidos that stands in itself beyond appearances, but only because it is a list of 
achievements and customs which any man striving for success should seek to obtain. 
 The pursuit of the eidos of beauty is something which requires a certain detachment from 
beauty’s charms. It requires placing one’s self before a beautiful object in an attitude of 
philosophical inquiry, instead of a utilitarian or pleasure-seeking attitude. This different attitude 
is what Hippias ultimately does not adopt. Hippias does not show an inclination to travel with 
Socrates beyond every immediate example of beauty that they are discussing; it is almost always 
Socrates who brings up a new example of beauty, such as a statue of Pheidias or a god or a 
spoon. Employing Kantian jargon, one would say that Hippias is incapable of taking a 
“disinterested” stance, but in Socratic terms, one should say that Hippias is not philosophically 
erotic. (There is a big difference between disinterestedness and eros, of course, which we will 
explore in Chapter Six.) Both Hippias and Socrates are able to appreciate the charms of beauty, 
but only Socrates takes the next erotic step of positing the question of the formal intelligibility of 
beauty, and of not giving up on that question, seeing its pursuit as worthwhile even if 
inconclusive (as we shall see in Chapter Five). Instead, Hippias is more like what in today’s 
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language we call an “aesthete”: someone who enjoys beautiful works of art but does not have a 
very deep grasp about what they mean in a moral or philosophical sense. He is never wrong 
about whether certain objects are beautiful (Socrates and Hippias never dispute the beauty of 
particulars, only the definition of the beautiful itself), but he sees each object as a beautiful this 
or beautiful that, not as an instance of the beautiful itself.  
 Part and parcel of his inability to adopt a philosophical standpoint is Hippias’s inability to 
accept the dynamic of poverty and plenty without which the philosophically erotic journey to the 
eidos of the beautiful cannot be made. First off, he does not accept his own poverty. He cannot 
see that he is beautifully dressed, but that he lacks knowledge of the beautiful. It does not bother 
him that he speaks beautifully, but cannot speak the truth about beauty. He boasts from the 
beginning that “ … the question is not large” (287b). Consequently, he cannot accept the plenty 
that reality gives him: the radiant disclosure of the beautiful itself in the realm of appearances. 
Since he does not enter into this give-and-take dynamic, and because he is not philosophically 
erotic, he cannot know the beautiful. 
Exactly what inhibits Hippias from becoming a philosopher is unclear. Certainly, he 
desires, to a certain degree, to follow Socrates, or at least to entertain a dialogue with him for a 
sustained amount of time. However, his inability to comprehend Socrates is perhaps actually a 
reluctance to take him seriously. (Hippias may not be wise, but he is certainly clever enough to 
understand Socrates.) Hippias therefore does not seem to be too interested in truly tackling the 
question of the beautiful. His motives are, to a certain degree, inscrutable. Either way, however, 
he serves as a foil to Socrates, and as such, he helps us to see more clearly that the eidos of the 
beautiful only discloses itself to an erotic being. However, we can glean something more about 
Hippias’s character from the two aspects of Socrates’s attitude toward him, two aspects of what 
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we may call an “erotic” pedagogy, designed to help Hippias to take interest in and ultimately 
seek after the eidos of the beautiful. These two aspects are: attention, and vulnerability. 
 The purpose of attention is to educate the soul to turn away from charm and toward the 
beautiful itself. The radiance or incandescence of the beautiful means that the eidos of the 
beautiful is somehow more clearly manifest, more clearly visible, within particular beautiful 
objects. Whoever desire to get to the heart of what makes beautiful objects beautiful must turn 
their attention to way which beautiful objects appear. Therefore, attention is a virtue of 
paramount importance. It is not an innate capacity, but a moral conditioning, which requires a 
certain kind of inculcation, performed on one’s self by another. In the Hippias Major, Socrates is 
constantly turning both Hippias’s, and the reader’s attention toward an ever-expanding list of 
beautiful objects. From works of art, to gods, to lower animals, to tools or ships or roosters, 
Socrates finds it useful to draw attention to the wide range of beauties which inhabit the world of 
appearances. He does not believe that appearances encumber our understanding or focus on the 
beautiful as it is in itself, beyond appearances. He does not advocate detachment from 
appearances. Even though he seeks the eidos beyond appearances, he summons more 
appearances to the discussion than Hippias does. However—and this it the crucial distinction—
Socrates summons all of these appearances within the context of an erotic interest in coming to 
know the eidos of the beautiful. He wishes to make a noetic insight into the source behind the 
appearances. Even though he has no choice but to stay within the appearances, and he does not 
want to stay there in the sense that he wishes to know something beyond them. For him, the 
appearances are fragments of evidence, or pieces of evidence, about the eidos itself. They are 
necessary steps on the erotic journey, but not that journey’s destination (despite the fact that, in 
this sublunary realm, the destination cannot be reached, or rather, the destination does not lie 
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within it).185 Attention, however, is essential to Socrates’s search. Moreover, the “strife and 
contention” (ἔριν καὶ μάχην, 294d) which results when beautiful beings are “not perceived” 
(ἀγνοεῖσθαι, 294d) is a sign of a lack of attention: discord comes when everyone tries to promote 
their relative view of the beautiful, to have it overcome other relative views, instead of paying 
attention to what the beautiful is in itself, i.e., independent of particular points of view.  
 Attention to the beautiful precedes the discovery of the eidos of the beautiful, because 
without attention first, there would be nothing to discover. Once one turns one’s attention to 
beautiful objects, however, one can recognize the beautiful, because it is radiant. The person who 
wishes to make a noetic insight into the beautiful must adopt the ethic of a seeker, that is, an 
erotic stance before the beautiful, and this includes the willingness to pay attention to any source 
of beauty whenever it appears in one’s experience. Taking this into account, we can see how a 
dispute over the beauty of an object—a debate, say, between my neighbor and me over the 
beauty of our local cathedral—should be resolved: By paying close attention, in attendant 
expectation of an answer from the object itself.  
 Looking at the text, we can see in greater detail how this education to attention takes 
place. Ever since the beginning of their discussion in the beautiful, Socrates has effectively been 
teaching Hippias how to be attentive. Earlier in the dialogue, he broadens Hippias’s mind about 
the beauty of objects which Hippias had never before considered to be beautiful—for example, 
                                                          
185 On this point, I differ with Kirkland’s understanding of Socrates’s attitude toward appearances, at least as it 
pertains to the Hippias Major (his book deals with so-called “early” or “definitional” dialogues, the Hippias Major 
among them). Kirkland writes: “The Socrates of the early dialogues is then a strange, peculiarly ancient Greek kind 
of phenomenologist, one who approaches the earnest opinions of his interlocutors about virtue and attempts to 
clarify what exceeds those opinions even in already presenting itself by way of them. As suggested above, then, 
Socratic philosophy would not be aimed at objective being, but rather at phenomenal being – at ‘what virtue is’ 
understood as that which has always already presented itself in the everyday appearance of virtue. Socrates wants 
nothing more than what we already in some sense ‘have’.” See Kirkland, The Ontology of Socratic Questioning, 27. 
Kirkland’s interpretation of Socrates’s attitude toward appearance, it seems to me, over-emphasizes the “plenty” 
side of the poverty-plenty dynamic (“what we already in some sense ‘have’”), and does not do justice to the Socratic 
injunction to move beyond appearances. Perhaps this shortcoming is due to the lack of attention with which he treats 
the notion of eros, which he defines in a Heideggerian manner as “nothing but this concerned relatedness at a 
distance that we have associated with aporia” (227n).  
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wooden spoons (290d). Later on, Socrates brings to Hippias’s attention several other beautiful 
beings: the beauty of tools, animals, warships, and other powerful objects (295d-e). He also 
brings to Hippias’s attention the claim that the beautiful itself (whatever that may be) causes 
various goods to come into being (297e). Moreover, Socrates explicitly rejects the notion that the 
beautiful could be the “useful”, but that it must be useful for some good, thus going against a 
notion of the beautiful that is relative, to one that must conform itself to an outside standard of 
goodness (296d-e). Socrates tries to discipline Hippias’s mind by prodding him to consider the 
beauty of things he has never thought about, and to think about the nature of the beautiful in a 
more complete, and philosophically rigorous, way. The conversion to philosophical eros which 
might slowly be happening in Hippias’s soul is a function of a greater attentiveness to the wide 
range of beautiful objects which, before his encounter with Socrates, Hippias was not able to 
recognize. Hippias is, in effect, adopting the ethic of a philosophical seeker—though, as we have 
seen above, it may all be on an “as-if” basis. Nevertheless, Socrates is at least trying to educate 
him to adopt an open, interrogative stance before the truth about the beautiful itself. 
 From a renewed attention toward beautiful objects comes a sense of vulnerability before 
them. By bringing beautiful objects to our attention, Socrates is also showing us that we are, in a 
sense, vulnerable before them. As we saw above, Socrates’s ontology of the beautiful indicates 
that there is a distance between beautiful object and human observer. This distance allows for 
certain feelings to bubble up in the observer: awe, lust, and other passions. Our sense before the 
beautiful is one of beholding something both radically attractive and something which I do not 
define, but that in some respects defines me, insofar as it presents itself as something I want. 
Since it is both attractive and sovereign in itself, it has a measure of power over me. The 
beautiful girl or the great work of art is quasi-worshiped for this reason: she is inescapably 
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attractive, and therefore I am vulnerable before her. The beautiful inspires eros and this means 
that eros influences our feelings (of vulnerability) as much as it inspires our action (to 
philosophize, to discover).186 One sees this vulnerability at play in the care that Socrates takes to 
define and redefine the question at the heart of the dialogue: he knows that, whatever the 
beautiful itself may be, it is something that is outside of his own ideas about it, something which 
has its own properties and which Socrates must strive to discover. Socrates is vulnerable before 
the beautiful because he desires to know it; Hippias does not acknowledge vulnerability just as 
he does not really accept that the question at hand is difficult (“… the question is not large”, 
287b). 
  The calls to attention and vulnerability which are implicit in Socrates’s engagement with 
Hippias both work to summon, within the soul, an eros for truth beyond appearances. But the 
“success” of this enterprise is always incomplete, because as a noetic insight into the beautiful 
itself will always be incomplete. Socrates loves the beautiful, so he is able to approach it 
philosophically and come to insights about it. Hippias loves himself first and foremost and the 
beautiful only insofar as it benefits himself. Therefore, he cannot know the beautiful, though 
Socrates gives him an opportunity to change his character into one that loves the truth. 
Ultimately, both Hippias, as well as the reader of the Hippias Major, must choose whether or not 
to follow Socrates down the philosophically erotic path. The rewards of doing so are plentiful. 
Conclusion 
                                                          
186 Elaine Scarry argues that there is a discrepancy between the “radical vulnerability” assigned to the beholder of 
beauty in the past (especially in Ancient Greece) and the “aura of complete immunity” they are given today. She 
argues, “the vulnerability of the perceiver seems equal to, or greater than, the vulnerability of the person being 
perceived.” These observations are certainly borne out in the Hippias Major. See Scarry, On Beauty and Being Just 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 73-75. Commenting on the Symposium, Marina Berzins McCoy 
notes one specific way in which eros is vulnerable: “Eros is always vulnerable to loss.” The beautiful object before 
me is not permanent; it will not always make an appearance in my life. Because I am in love with it, I am also 
weakened by the prospect of its leaving me. See Marina Berzins McCoy, Wounded Heroes: Vulnerability as a 
Virtue in Ancient Greek Literature and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 121. 
145 
 
 One way of summarizing what the Hippias Major argues about appearances, 
philosophical eros, and the beautiful, is by showing how the dialogue allows us to interpret these 
famous lines from Sappho: “Some think a fleet, a troop of horse/ or soldiery the most beautiful 
sight/ in all the world; but I say, what one loves [ἔραται].”187 A relativistic interpretation of this 
line would argue that it points to the fact that whatever one chooses to love the most is ipso facto 
the most beautiful thing. The Hippias Major gives us an alternative way of reading it, one which 
gives much more importance to that word, eros: the most beautiful thing is the beautiful itself, 
the eidos of the beautiful, which can be seen only by the person living philosophical eros. The 
most beautiful thing is the absolute beautiful thing, the eidos: and the eidos can only be known 
by a seeker driven by eros. But not everyone loves like Socrates loves—that is, with the intensity 
and desire for truth which takes one to the highest beauty. 
This is the picture of the human experience of the beautiful that emerges from the 
Hippias Major: We encounter beautiful things in the world. We become enchanted, enthralled. 
We feel vulnerability before them. We also have a desire which compels us to investigate their 
source, to uncover that which makes them be the way they are. When we follow up on this 
desire, when we let our investigations into the world become driven by this desire, we discover 
that those beautiful things reward us in an interesting way, by giving us an appearance of itself 
more radiant than that of other objects. What exactly makes this appearance “more radiant” 
cannot be explained on its own terms, at least not at first. Perhaps, it is impossible to do so with 
words.188 Regardless, our desire (eros), in its encounter with beautiful beings (in their radiant 
                                                          
187 From Sappho et al., Greek Lyric Poetry, M.L. West, trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 37. I 
modified the translation by changing “finest” to “most beautiful.”  
188 This is Hyland’s thesis, that by showing us how difficult it is to define the beautiful, Plato us is pointing us 
toward the ultimate non-discursive nature of philosophical knowledge. Hyland interprets the proverb with which 
Socrates concludes the Hippias Major – “Beautiful things are difficult,” as he translates it – as an acknowledgement 
of this non-discursive end to the search for a verbal definition. See Hyland, Plato and the Question of Beauty, 26. 
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appearance), has already taken us beyond ordinary experience, toward a deeper engagement with 
reality which we may call philosophical: a love of wisdom for the eidos which is the source of 
appearances, beyond appearances. The beautiful discloses itself, partially, incompletely, 
tenuously—and only to lovers of wisdom. 
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Chapter Four 
The Goodness of the Beautiful 
 
Philosophical eros is the force behind Socrates’s questioning (Chapter One); it gives birth 
to his question about “the beautiful itself” (Chapter One); it manifests itself with every Socratic 
effort to make that question more precise and clear (Chapter Three); and it guides Socrates’s 
engagement with Hippias’s definitions of the beautiful (Chapter Two). In the last chapter, I 
articulated a more fundamental significance of eros for the question of beauty, a significance 
which stands independent of Socrates’s character and action in the dialogue; briefly put, there 
can be no noesis of the beautiful itself without philosophical eros. More than that, the beautiful 
itself “rewards” eros by manifesting itself radiantly in appearance. In this chapter, I will show 
that the relationship between “eros for” and “noesis of,” as well as beauty’s radiant appearance, 
is grounded in beauty’s goodness.  
The notion of goodness or the good, which up to this point had only been hinted at in 
Socrates and Hippias discussion of virtue and teaching (283c-e) and implied in their discussion 
of a beautiful Greek life (291d-293c), is a key to interpreting the dialogue as a whole. Once it is 
brought up again in a more explicit way by Socrates, it produces a shift in the way both Hippias 
and Socrates understand the beautiful. The shift begins from the point where Socrates asserts, 
“the useful-and-able for making some good—that is the beautiful” (296d) and is completed when 
he, along with Hippias, rejects this definition, but only because such a definition fails to 
encompass the fact that the beautiful is good, and that the good is beautiful (297d). In this 
indirect way, almost by a sort of via negativa, Socrates and Hippias suggest that the beautiful is 
good, and that the good is beautiful. The upshot of this shift is to provide the ground for the 
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claim I argued for in the last chapter. It is philosophical eros precisely as eros for the good which 
is decisive for making a noetic insight into the eidos of the beautiful. Noesis of the beautiful itself 
is only possible within a soul whose eros is directed toward the good.  This shift, which I will 
argue is an erotic shift, gives us a new perspective from which to address those three questions 
which were left open in the last chapter: Why are only some souls philosophical? Why is beauty 
radiant? What do we love when we love the beautiful “beyond” appearances?  
My argument in this chapter has three parts. First, I will articulate the erotic shift as it 
appears in the dialogue, and show how the shift allows us to make a fresh interpretation of some 
of the events and dialectical themes preceding the shift. Second, I will show how this shift also 
conditions and redirects the subsequent dialectical inquiry and dramatic action in the dialogue. 
Third, I will attempt to articulate with greater detail the relationship between eros for the good 
and the noesis of beauty that is suggested by the erotic shift. Briefly put: In order to know the 
eidos of the beautiful, I must love the good, because by loving the good, I learn to love a thing as 
it is in itself, and will desire to know it as it is in itself, independent of appearances. To love the 
good means to be a philosopher.  
The Erotic Shift 
The task here will be first to articulate how the shift comes about in the dialogue, what it 
consists of, and why it is “erotic,” and second, to see how the shift illuminates some of the 
dialectical themes and dramatic events which precede it in the dialogue. Both of these points will 
make evident that the “erotic shift” is an axial moment in the Hippias Major.189  
                                                          
189 Sweet also argues that a turn occurs in this section of the Hippias Major: “Therefore, Socrates first changes 
Hippias’s proof by asserting that if power is beautiful, wisdom is most beautiful of all. This step can be drawn by 
inference from the fact that the definition started in the mind, but wisdom is especially difficult in that it combines 
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The introduction of the good into the dialogue is a new datum which demands a 
corresponding adjustment on the part of Hippias and Socrates. This adjustment, or shift, reorients 
Hippias’s and Socrates’s philosophical discussion toward the good. It is therefore a shift that 
Hippias and Socrates undergo together. But the shift also has an effect on our (the reader’s) 
understanding of Hippias as a sophist. Up to this point, Hippias and Socrates have searched for a 
definition which would make sense of their variegated experiences (i.e., the manifold 
appearances) of the beautiful—a definition, in short, that is completely dependent upon, and 
relative to, their perspective on the beautiful. But the good stands outside of relative or personal 
perspective. One does not define the good out of whim or desire, but rather seeks to conform 
oneself and one’s desires to it. If the beautiful is good, then the beautiful is defined by something 
outside of personal perspective and interest. Instead, the good points us beyond what is 
immediately apparent, and toward an ideal which we might not understand, but which commands 
our attention and respect precisely because it is good. In the words of Reeve, the good is 
“explanation-elusive,” while still being the commanding ideal for erotic striving, and in 
particular for philosophical striving, which is erotic striving that is aware that its overarching 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
interest in other with interest in self. Socrates’s subsequent fear (296a) may be based on his recognition that 
Hippias’s wisdom is finally wisdom for oneself.  Therefore he completes his argument by attaching the beautiful as 
useful and powerful to helpful and good.” See Sweet, “Introduction to the Greater Hippias,” 351. The “fear” that 
Sweet refers to in 296a is unclear, because Socrates does not explicitly express a fear. Sweet probably means that 
Socrates fears the idea that the beautiful is power, and that it is only power. The most important element in Sweet’s 
interpretation here, however, is his notion that Socratic wisdom is at odds with Hippias’s wisdom because it is not 
only about “oneself” but ordered towards something outside of the self. It is this other-oriented structure, akin to 
“intentionality” as I will argue below, which indicates an erotic turn in the Hippias Major points to the central role 
that eros, as desire for the good, plays in any philosophical approach to the question of the beautiful. In a similar 
vein, Christopher Bruell argues that the Hippias Major forms part of a “turn” that takes place through several so-
called “early” dialogues, which taken together as a whole constitute an education in how to “turn another toward 
philosophy.” The Hippias Major plays a part in this by helping to exhort the student “to seek to know the identity of 
the noble pursuits (to which we my then dedicate ourselves) or the noble objects (worth as such of our devotion).” 
This interpretation (which is contingent in part on Bruell’s translation of τὸ καλόν as “noble”) is in its general thrust 
akin to my own interpretation presented in this chapter, though I find the “turn” within the dramaof the dialogue 
itself, rather than envision the whole dialogue to be part of a turn which happens over several different works. See 
Bruell, On the Socratic Education, 75. 
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desire is the good.190 As such, the erotic shift consists of a move away from appearances and 
toward being. It affirms the ontology of the beautiful that has already been implied in the 
dialogue: the beautiful inheres in an object, not in a value projected by an observer. The shift 
also shows us why the eidos of the beautiful is radiant before philosophical eros—to a soul, in 
other words, who desires the good and is seeking the beautiful itself. The shift opens up a new 
way of understanding both Hippias and Socrates, and their respective approaches to the question 
of the beautiful. 
 The shift happens in two main stages. The first stage is the turn from a definition of the 
beautiful as the “useful” or powerful, to one of the beautiful as the “beneficial.” This constitutes 
a shift from an anthropocentric or self-centered definition of the beautiful, which claims that the 
beautiful is somehow the product of the human being’s actions and projects and power, to an 
erotic one. This erotic definition is based in large part on the intentional nature of eros. This 
latter definition recognizes that the beautiful is defined not only by its relation to the human 
person, but also by a standard not defined by the human person, with which a human being has 
an intentional relationship.191 This intentional relationship is to be understood not only in terms 
of the projection of desire for an object (which is nevertheless an important part of what eros is), 
but also in terms of that which is desired—the good—which in a certain way conditions how it is 
desired. To put it another way, if I have genuine eros for the good, I am prepared to divest 
myself of my ideas of what the good might be, and to conform myself to what the good actually 
is, and to those things which are actually good; I will not rest content with the mere appearance 
                                                          
190 See “Plato on Begetting in Beauty,” 142-144. 
191 On the notion that eros has an intentional structure, see Schindler, “Plato and the Problem of Love,” 206, and 
Roochnik, “The Erotics of Philosophical Discourse,” 117-118. Eros is always eros of something, and philosophical 
eros is eros of the good. 
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of goodness, but only with actual goodness.192 To desire the good is then to allow the good to 
define my desire, because I must desire what actually is good, not what I perceive or opine it to 
be. The beneficial, or beneficence, is a term which contains this intentional structure in its very 
definition, because as a concept it includes both goodness in itself, and goodness relative to a 
person. If I seek for the beneficial, I seek to conform myself to a standard of what actually in 
itself is good for me. 193  
The second stage of the shift consists of the further refinement and eventual rejection of 
the definition of the beautiful as the beneficial. The definition is revised from “beneficial” to that 
of the beautiful as “maker” of the good, and finally to “father” of the good. This final definition 
is rejected because it places the beautiful above or in any case outside the good, and this would 
contradict the truth (as Hippias and Socrates believe it) that beautiful is good. Thus, in rejecting 
this final definition, Socrates and Hippias affirm that the beautiful is good—a new affirmation in 
the dialogue. Since the beautiful is good, it follows that it is also beneficial, even if the beneficial 
                                                          
192 This I take to be Reeve’s point when he argues that, of all the forms discussed by Plato in the Republic, the good 
is the only one which is not “reputation-reality indifferent.” That is, unlike, say, temperance, the good cannot be 
faked. See Reeve, “Plato on Begetting in Beauty,” 143-144. 
193 The point that the “beneficial” is both an absolute and relative concept is made quite convincingly by Schindler, 
in his discussion of Book I of the Republic, where the term is introduced to modify Thrasymachus’s definition of 
justice as the advantage of “the stronger”: “Socrates immediately remarks (339a-b) that Thrasymachus’s answer 
bears a strong resemblance to the one he himself would have given had Thrasymachus allowed him, namely, that 
justice is ‘the beneficial’ (τὸ συμφέρον). Thrasymachus claims that the difference is, indeed, slight, while Socrates 
states his intention to investigate it further. The difference turns out to be revealing. One could say, initially, that 
what the phrase ‘for the stronger’ adds to the definition Socrates would be willing to accept is a relative condition. 
To refuse the addition is to make justice beneficial in an absolute and unqualified sense – not, of course, in a way 
that excludes relation, for it would make no sense for something to be beneficial without being beneficial for 
someone or something – but in a way that does not restrict that relation to one class, to the exclusion of others.” 
Schindler, Plato’s Critique of Impure Reason, 67-68. The word which Schindler renders as “beneficial”, τὸ 
συμφέρον, is not the same one that is used in the Hippias Major. That would be ὠφέλιμος. However, the logic of 
Schindler’s argument is still applicable for the Hippias Major: the “beneficial” is a concept that has both absolute 
and relative content. Something is beneficial to someone: that “something” is the absolute dimension of the concept, 
and the “to someone” is the relative dimension. The beneficial is an excellent “bridge” term between appearances 
and being. 
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as such is not what defines the beautiful.194 With this affirmation, the shift is completed. Most 
importantly, the relative (or relational) as well as the objective nature of the beautiful is retained: 
if the beautiful is good, it is both something objective (good in itself) and something relative 
(good for me). The relationship with the beautiful is erotic: intentional and other-oriented. 
The first stage of the shift begins with Socrates digressing once again, after having 
rejected the appropriate as a possible definition of the beautiful, and having established that the 
beautiful is that which causes a being to be, and not merely appear to be, beautiful. Socrates now 
goes back to reporting the abuse that his imaginary friend would heap upon him, because of his 
continued inability to give an adequate definition (295a-b). Hippias insists that if he were to go 
“off and looked for it myself—in quiet—I would tell it to you more precisely than any 
preciseness,” (295a), but Socrates, while agreeing that Hippias could undoubtedly do such a 
thing, begs him, “But for god’s sake, find it in front of me, or look for it with me if you want, as 
we’ve been doing” (295b). The method for discovering the beautiful remains the same: to look, 
pay attention, and discuss. However, the shift will change this method. For the person who seeks 
the eidos of the beautiful, it will no longer be enough to look for instances of the beautiful and 
attempt to craft a connotative definition, which takes account of all of the instances. The 
definition must also always include the good.  
                                                          
194 As Hyland points out, the fact that a definition of the beautiful has not been reached does not mean that a truth 
about the beautiful has not been reached. Discussing “power,” but with a logic that is applicable to any definition, he 
writes: “… perhaps ‘power’ is indeed insufficient as a definition of the beautiful. It hardly follows that the issue of 
power is not a central feature of any adequate understanding of the beautiful. … the context of or the demand for a 
definition of a complex issue such as beauty seems more to close off than to open up an adequate understanding of 
the term.” See Hyland, Plato and the Question of Beauty, 21-22. The fact, then, that the definition “the beautiful is 
the beneficial” is ultimately rejected does not mean that the claim, “the beautiful is good” has been rejected. In fact, 
the rejection of the definition that the beautiful is beneficial was the occasion of the affirmation that the beautiful is 
good. Woodruff argues the same thing: “When he [Socrates] calls a virtue beneficial he is not defining it, but stating 
one of its guiding properties.” See Woodruff, Hippias Major, 187. 
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Having convinced Hippias to remain with him and keep searching for a definition, 
Socrates makes his next claim: the beautiful is “whatever is useful” (ὃ ἂν χρήσιμον ᾖ, 295c). But 
Socrates’s understanding of usefulness is not very broad. Most of the examples Socrates draws 
up to illustrate this definition have something to do with what is useful for human beings. There 
is, in other words, a distinctively anthropocentric, or self-centered, slant to this definition. 
Beautiful eyes (καλοί, φαμέν, οἱ ὀφθαλμοί) are eyes which are useful for seeing—they are able 
to do the task that they exist to accomplish (295c). The whole body (τὸ ὅλον σῶμα) can also be 
said to be beautiful and to be so “in the same way” (οὕτω), “sometimes for running, sometimes 
for wrestling.” Branching out to the greater animal family, Socrates says that a beautiful horse, or 
rooster, or quail can also be beautiful. But the anthropocentric focus returns with the mention of 
utensils and tools (obviously “useful”), as well as means of transport on land and sea, boats and 
warships (whose use, ostensibly, is war and killing—activities not necessarily, nor even very 
often, linked to goodness). Tools of every skill (ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις), including music, are 
beautiful, along with “activities and laws” (τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τοὺς νόμους, 295e). All of these 
beings manifest beauty as a function of their usefulness.  
 In giving examples of utility, and despite his anthropocentric focus, Socrates remains 
consistent in the wide-ranging analogical way he speaks about the beautiful.195 Almost anything 
can be beautiful. The first meaning of “use” for Socrates has to do with the teleology of an 
organic being, or part of an organic being: the eye. Thus use, and therefore beauty, are said to 
abide in phusis. From the teleology of a sense organ, Socrates extrapolates the teleology of the 
body, though Socrates implies that that teleology has to do with activities—running and 
wrestling—that human beings enjoy, as opposed to strictly biological functions (e.g., nutrition or 
                                                          
195 See Chapter Two for more on this theme. 
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reproduction). Socrates’s teleology of the body is at least as much about cultivating human 
pursuits, like art and sport, as it is about the biological telos of human life. This type of teleology 
is not the only one at play, however. Practical teleology, concerning the consequence or goal of 
action, is also evoked by the mention of utensils and tools, modes of transport, and musical 
instruments. Thus Socrates claims that the beautiful is also found in techne. Finally, a practical 
moral teleology is hinted at with the mention of law: law is useful for justice, and as such 
(Socrates implies), it is beautiful. There is also beauty in nomos. Socrates’s understanding of 
beauty is inclusive of many of the types of beings which form part of Diotima’s Ladder: bodies, 
art, and laws. 
A notable omission in Socrates’s list of useful and beautiful beings and activities is 
philosophy itself. As an activity, philosophy is useful for determining the truth about beings. It is 
therefore the only activity that has the power to bring us the truth about the beautiful itself—the 
truth about that which, when added to a being, makes it become beautiful. Yet it does not occur 
to Socrates to mention philosophy at this juncture of the dialogue. He does, however, mention 
philosophy indirectly, but only after he speaks about the beautiful as beneficial: “wisdom is the 
most beautiful thing of all” (296a), Socrates says, and he subsequently claims that wisdom is 
beautiful, and therefore good. The eros for the good that is required to know the beautiful is 
precisely philosophy. It is a necessary “ability” one must have in order to approach the question 
of the beautiful itself. But this becomes clear only after the shift has been completed.  For the 
shift to take place, the notion of beauty as δύναμις must be overturned. 
 Further into the first stage of the shift, we encounter what amounts to a gesture of great 
provocation, as well as a significant philosophical development in the dialogue, when Socrates 
attempts to capture the essence of the beauty of this diverse group of beings (including instances 
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of phusis, nomos, and techne) with one term: δύναμις. His argument distills all usefulness under 
the one concept of ability, or power (both translations are valid): “S: So what’s able to 
accomplish a particular thing is useful for that which it is able; and what’s unable is useless. H: 
Certainly. S: Then is ability fine, but inability foul? H: Very much so…” (295e). To claim that 
the beauty of such a diverse group of beings could be captured by the term δύναμις is 
provocative because the list of beings which Socrates calls beautiful is so broad, each having a 
unique “utility.” Socrates brings each type of utility together by claiming that usefulness in itself 
cannot be understood without reference to the concept of power: “So what’s able (τὸ δυνατὸν) to 
accomplish a particular thing is useful for that for which it is able; and what’s unable is useless” 
(295e). Eventually, Socrates’s definition becomes power itself: “S: Then is ability (δύναμις) 
beautiful, and inability ugly? H: Very much so” (295e-296a). This ability or power, however, is 
mainly human ability or power. Usefulness or utility are always used with reference to specific 
tasks, projects, or any other sort of clearly-defined end. An object’s usefulness is measured by its 
success in achieving its appointed end. But power is a much more open-ended concept. Power 
can refer to the ability one has to define one’s own ends; power can refer to the ability to make 
things become useful for specific ends. Moreover, power does not need to be “defined” by a 
particular purpose or end. One who has power is able to change his or her surroundings. One 
could say that, the more power one has, the less one is defined by one’s surroundings, or by ends 
and purposes that are “given” from outside oneself, by nature or political authorities or any other 
influential force. But is it advisable to wield power in this way—that is, without caring for 
outside influences and authorities? Should power, in other words, be at the service of something 
distinct from the interests and whims of the soul? Should it be for something? The question of 
human power eventually summons the question of goodness.  
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By bringing all forms of usefulness under the umbrella of “power,” Socrates makes it 
possible to ask the question of what usefulness is ultimately for. If it is merely “for” human 
desires, then it is nothing more than whatever a human being is willing at any moment. Instead, 
if the usefulness is “for” achieving some good, then it is also involved with something both 
relational (good for me) and objective (good in itself). If power is for the good, then power is 
really a manifestation of eros, and not really an exertion of the human soul but a response to a 
good that the soul desires. The philosophical question that δύναμις poses is this: does power truly 
meet the criteria that Socrates already has set, that is, that the eidos of the beautiful inhere in a 
being, and not merely make something “appear” to be beautiful? On the one hand, we have seen 
that the concept of power implies the question of goodness, because it implies the question of 
what the power is useful for. On the other hand, power can also be used to overcome the need for 
goodness and the need for knowledge about the eidos of beauty. If beauty is power, then it does 
not need to be determined by any eidos; it could be whatever the person wielding power wishes 
it to be. If power does not accept a defining standard outside of itself, then it is on the side of 
appearances.   
 Socrates seems to indicate that he is aware of this by how quickly he revises the 
definition. He measures power against the ideal of wisdom in politics: “The most beautiful thing 
of all is to be able politically powerful in your own city,” Hippias says, and Socrates responds, 
“Good! Then doesn’t it follow from these points that, by god, wisdom (σοφία) is really the most 
beautiful thing of all, and ignorance the foulest?” (296a).196 Political power must admit of a 
standard outside of itself. Political power must be wise in order to be beautiful. But this wisdom 
is not just any wisdom. It is certainly not the wisdom that has made Hippias rich. Instead, we see 
                                                          
196 Translation slightly modified: I changed “politically able” to “politically powerful” to enhance the sense that 
Socrates is talking about a moral check on political power. 
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that wisdom must be good to be wise, and good according to an objective standard, rather than 
merely the standard of self-interest, i.e., “good for me”: “Then here’s what got away from us: the 
able-and-useful without qualification is beautiful. And this is what our mind wanted to say, 
Hippias: the useful-and-able for making some good (ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τι ποιῆσαι)—that is the 
beautiful” (296d, emphasis mine). The utility of something is measured according to its ability to 
produce a good. It is, in other words, measured by its ability to meet a standard outside of itself. 
(Even Hippias’s wisdom, which is self-interested, eventually must recognize a standard of 
goodness outside of itself, if it is to be beneficial. This is what Socrates attempts to explain to 
Thrasymachus in Book I of the Republic.)  
Therefore, power is beautiful only insofar as it allows itself to be defined by wisdom and 
the good. Power must conform itself to wisdom and the good; it must obey it. Otherwise, power 
is merely self-assertion, and does not recognize an essential component to the beautiful, that is, 
the good. “So the beneficial (τὸ ὠφέλιμον) appears to be the beautiful we wanted,” Socrates 
says, concluding the first stage of the reversal. Power without reference to the good is mere 
appearance in the sense that it is the expression of the observer, and that it expresses only the 
desires or whims of the observer. It does not attempt to know or revere an object, but merely to 
control it. Instead, if the beautiful is power to achieve a good, then the beautiful is at least in part 
defined by something outside of power, by an essence that is good, and must be discovered to be 
good. This discovery requires that the observer move beyond his own interests and power, in 
order to be able to put his power to “good” use. 
 A contrast with a modern perspective allows us to see Socrates’s argument with power in 
high relief. Socrates’s critique of power, and his insistence that the beautiful is both powerful but 
also good, sounds almost like an anticipation and rejection of Nietzsche, who often expressed a 
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notion of the beautiful as power. In The Will to Power, we can find sentences that could logically 
fit into the Hippias Major as elaborations of the definition of beauty as δύναμις: “... ‘becoming 
more beautiful’ is a consequence of enhanced strength. Becoming more beautiful is the 
expression of a victorious will, of increased co-ordination, of a harmonizing of all the strong 
desires, of an infallibly perpendicular stress.”197 Beauty is power, and power in a human being 
means (among other things) strength, as well as the victorious grasp of desired things. At its 
heart, however, power is the ability to change the world: “Likewise our love of the beautiful: it 
also is our shaping will. The two senses stand side-by-side; the sense for the real is the means of 
acquiring the power to shape things according to our wish. The joy in shaping and reshaping—a 
primeval joy! We can comprehend only a world that we ourselves have made.”198 This last line 
encapsulates precisely why power is on the side of appearances: power does not need to know 
the world, because it can reshape it. The real is a means for acquiring power, rather than 
something to be known. The world can be changed by the powerful man; the powerful man does 
not search the world for beautiful beings, but merely creates them. For Socrates, power implies 
the question of what power is good for, and therefore can lead one to goodness. For Nietzsche, 
power creates goodness.199  
 The beneficial overturns the power because it takes away its primary position as that 
which defines the beautiful. To be sure, while the beautiful is not power, it is powerful: the 
                                                          
197 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, trans. (New York: Random 
House, 1968), 420.  
198 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 272. 
199 Similar thoughts are found in The Twilight of the Idols: “[Man’s] feeling of power, his will to power, his courage, 
his pride—are all diminished by ugliness and increased by beauty …” Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols: Or 
How to Philosophize with a Hammer. Duncan Large trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 53. See also 
this passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra: “When power grows gracious and descends into the visible: I call such 
descending beauty. And I desire beauty from no one as much as I desire it from you, you man of power ...” Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One. R.J. Hollingdale trans. (London: Penguin 
Books, 1961), 141. 
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beautiful has power over the seeker of the beautiful, but this is a persuasive power, the power of 
goodness. It is not a power imposed upon a human being, but is rather the power of erotic 
attraction. In a sense, it is not power at all, because it does not manifest itself as a force moving a 
human being, but only as being the object of the human being’s erotic desire, a desire intrinsic to 
human existence, and not imposed upon human beings by an outside force. If beauty were mere 
power in a merely coercive sense, then those who wield the most power would essentially be the 
ones who get to define the beautiful. But if power must be beneficial in order to be beautiful, this 
means that power must bow before a standard outside of itself. Moreover, the beneficial is a 
better definition of the beautiful because, unlike power, the beneficial has both an objective and a 
relational (or relative) dimension. It has an objective dimension because it is defined by its 
goodness, but it also has a relational dimension because it must benefit someone. Therefore the 
beneficial meets the criteria for a definition that Socrates set when he claimed that the beautiful 
must lie in being and not (only) in appearance, and it also is a concept that is open to eros, 
because of its relational dimension which allows for an intentional relationship between eros and 
itself. To know the beneficial, one must reach beyond the immediate interests, opinions, and 
judgments that one must have, in order to learn and conform one’s self to an outside standard. 
This reaching-beyond is perhaps always incomplete, or always must be re-verified and re-
accomplished. Yet it remains an intrinsic part in the life of anyone who wishes to act well, in 
accordance with the good. The erotic shift in the Hippias Major is thus a turn away from self-
assertion (beauty as power), and toward a relationship that is both erotic and ecstatic, that forces 
one to strive to understand something outside one’s own thoughts (beauty as good for me and 
good in itself). An erotic relationship is between the soul and something other than itself. It is a 
desire for goodness outside of one’s self. If beauty is beneficial, then my striving for the eidos of 
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the beautiful is in a fundamental sense other-directed, and defined outside of myself. In striving 
for beauty, I am striving to conform myself to the good. 
 It is part of the genius of the Hippias Major in general, and of its employment of the 
poetic device of the reversal in particular, that it both gives space for the proto-Nietzschean idea 
of beauty as power, and also presents a philosophical and dramatic way of transcending it. 
Socrates clearly believes that power untethered to anything beyond itself cannot be beautiful, 
because the beautiful is something independent of appearances and human desires. The space to 
elaborate on these arguments is made possible in part by the dialogue format, which allows 
Socrates to make claims, draw them out toward their logical conclusion, and then watch them 
fail. But in particular, it is the force of the erotic shift which challenges the definition of beauty 
as power, because it also challenges Hippias’s own exercise of power. The shift has a literary 
dimension, which communicates more than philosophical arguments. It also communicates the 
dramatic forces underlying the arguments. Specifically, the shift is a shift not only of the 
argument that Socrates is having (mostly with himself) over whether the beautiful is useful and 
powerful, or useful and powerful for something; it is also a shift in Hippias’s understanding of 
politics. By arguing that political wisdom is the most beautiful wisdom, and also saying that 
political wisdom must be good if it is to be beautiful, Socrates is implicitly critiquing any notion 
of politics that does not take goodness and beauty into account. If Hippias does not understand 
the beauty is good, then he is not politically wise. In fact, he may be dangerous for the city. 
 Before we can fully gauge how the reversal affects Hippias, however, we must conclude 
relating the second stage of the shift. The second stage begins with a refinement of the definition 
of the beautiful as the power to achieve some good. Socrates goes on to articulate how this 
beneficial power works. The relationship between the beautiful and the good is a “causal” one, 
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but of a very special sort. Socrates uses four words to describe the relationship: τὸ ποιοῦν, τὸ 
γιγνόμενον, τὸ αἴτιον, and πατρός. Each captures a distinct nuance in the relationship. Socrates 
asserts that whatever is the maker is also the cause: “And the maker (τὸ ποιοῦν) is nothing else 
but the cause (τὸ αἴτιον), isn’t it?” (296e). Thus the cause in question has something to do with 
the act of making. But the text allows us to see more than that. The product of this making is 
referred to as τὸ γιγνόμενον, that which has come-to-be, the same word which Socrates employs 
to describe the effect that the eidos of the beautiful has on the object in which it inheres (289d). 
The term τὸ γιγνόμενον appears in (among other places) 297a: “Then the thing that comes to be 
and the maker are different things” (emphasis mine). Socrates thus characterizes the distinction 
between that which is made (the good) and that which brings it into being (the maker, that is, the 
beautiful). But by using the term τὸ γιγνόμενον, Socrates is also describing the product of this 
“making” in a specific way. That product is something new and unprecedented. Commenting on 
this same passage, Giovanni Casertano uses the word “born”: “[ποιεῖν] then is a relative concept, 
because the cause (τὸ αἴτιον) is that which produces (τὸ ποιοῦν) something, and this something is 
something which ‘is born’ (τὸ γιγνόμενον), because at first it was not [in existence].”200   The 
beautiful begets; it generates new things. It begets the good the way that a father (ὁ πατρός) 
begets sons and daughters. Thus the biological metaphor of fatherhood is foreshadowed and 
aided by the gerund τὸ γιγνόμενον.  
                                                          
200 See Giovanni Casertano, “Causa (e concausa) in Platone,” Quaestio: Annuario di storia della metafisica 2 
(2002): 7-32. The above quotation is my translation of a section of the following passage: “Esso è legato ad una 
sfera, a quella del ποιεῖν, per cui la causa appare come la messa in moto di un processo che porta all’apparizione di 
un qualcosa che prima di quel processo non esisteva. Si tratta quindidi un concetto relativo, perché la causa (τὸ 
αἴτιον) è ciò che produce (τὸ ποιοῦν) qualcosa, e questo è un qualcosa che ‘nasce’ (τὸ γιγνόμενον), perché prima 
non c’era.” Casertano, “Causa (e concausa) in Platone,” 8. Casertano goes on to argue that the conceptual link 
between ποιεῖν and γίγνεσθαι becomes more explicit in other dialogues where Plato discusses causality. Casertano, 
“Causa (e concausa) in Platone,” 9-10. See also Blackson, who believes that the “productive” meaning of τὸ αἴτιον 
operates throughout the dialogue as a whole: “Plato has only one official view in the Hippias Major on cause and 
definition and the connection of these topics in explanation. He claims that ‘causes’ are ‘producers.’ Plato does not 
say that some Aitia are productive causes and other Aitia are logical causes, and he does not say that ‘Aitia’ and its 
cognates have multiple senses” (10). Thomas A. Blackson, “Cause and Definition in Plato’s Hippias Major,” 
Philosophical Inquiry 14 (1992): 1-10. 
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We can infer that, as the eidos of the beautiful has the capacity to beget goodness, every 
beautiful being, which bears this eidos, exercises this capacity according to this nature. The 
examples that Socrates and Hippias have already discussed testify to this “generative” power. A 
maiden is to be given over to marriage, in order to generate the next generation of human beings. 
But she also generates a new life for herself, and her future husband. The beautiful spoon, used 
to stir the soup, creates a good situation for a human being: nourishment and pleasure. Likewise, 
the lyre: music that elates the soul. Broadly speaking, a beautiful being is able to bring about a 
new event, situation, or being which enriches human life. The beautiful has the effect of making 
life better, indeed good, for human beings. Socrates’s claim here also has another possible 
implication: the beautiful may also inspire a human desire to make something good happen, or to 
participate in goodness in some other way.  
 At this point, however, we come across a possible contradiction, or impasse, in the shift. 
How can it be that beauty is both defined by the good, but also productive of it? This difficulty 
would not have appeared had we stuck to the definition of the beautiful as beneficial. As we have 
already seen, the beneficial has both relative and absolute dimensions and therefore it is 
indicative of an erotic relationship between the seeker of beauty and the beautiful itself. The 
trouble starts with the metaphor of beauty as the “father” of the good. Fatherhood reverses the 
erotic relationship that the beneficial established. Fatherhood, at first glance, appears to be 
characterized by power. A father stands above his progeny; a father does not have to conform 
itself, in any sense, to what he has himself brought into being. Rather, the form of the progeny 
comes from the father; the father forms his offspring. Most importantly, Socrates argues that a 
father is not his son, however alike the two may be. If the beautiful is the father of the good, it 
cannot itself be the good.  
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 Yet this is a poor understanding of what constitutes fatherhood. A father is most 
definitely related to his progeny, and while the father and child are each autonomous in their 
existence, they are also part of each other by virtue of kinship. The father and the child each have 
an insight into the other’s autonomous existence because they share common roots. Thus the 
relationship between father and child preserves the relational or relative dimension to the 
beautiful that is of central importance to Socrates. Fatherhood implies something shared in 
common between father and progeny. This also means, then, that the beautiful can both be good 
and be the father of the good. The relational part of the good makes this possible. 
Nevertheless, Socrates will reject the definition of the beautiful as the father of the good, 
because it would not allow for the complete identification of the beautiful with the good. The 
beautiful is good, and the good is beautiful, plain and simple. Socrates affirms a deep kinship 
between beauty and goodness on the one hand, and the creation of life and works of art and 
beautiful customs and virtues, on the other. Socrates’s argument is as follows: If the beautiful is 
the maker, cause, or “father” of the good, could it still be said to be good? No, because a cause is 
not the same thing as its effect: “S: Then see if this is beautiful as well: the father is not a son and 
the son is not a father. H: Beautiful. S: The cause is not a thing that comes to be (γιγνόμενόν), 
and the thing that comes to be is not a cause. H: That’s true. S: Good god! Then the beautiful is 
not good, nor the good beautiful (297a-b).” Socrates and Hippias both agree that this outcome 
should be rejected: “S: So are we happy with that? Would you like to say that the beautiful is not 
good, nor the good beautiful? H: Good god, no. I’m not happy at all with it” (297c). The 
objection could be made that a being can be both cause and effect—that is, that something can be 
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self-caused, and that the beautiful could both be the cause of, and be itself, the good.201 But this 
objection cannot apply to the very specific understanding of “cause” (τὸ αἴτιον) that Socrates has 
in this passage, which is clearly defined by the ability to give birth. One cannot give birth to 
one’s self. Socrates’s notion of cause in the Hippias Major is akin to the birthing metaphor 
employed by Diotima in the Symposium: in both dialogues, the beautiful is associated with 
creation. In the Hippias Major, by using the fatherhood metaphor, Socrates claims a creative 
power in the beautiful, rather than a mechanistic relationship, between beautiful beings (or 
images, or works of art) and good acts. In rejecting the fatherhood metaphor, he is not rejecting 
the birthing capacity of the beautiful. Once again, he affirms an attribute (the birthing capacity) 
while rejecting a metaphor (fatherhood) and a definition (“the beautiful is the beneficial”).202 
We should not overlook the strangeness of this new claim: the beautiful is good, and the 
good beautiful. The claim does not say that the eidos of the beautiful is the eidos of the good, or 
                                                          
201 Hyland calls the conclusion that the beautiful cannot be both cause of the good and good in itself is “unjustified,” 
though he admits that the Greek notion of αἴτιον adds a nuance to Socrates’s argument that the English rendering 
does not capture: “This step [that nothing is self-caused] is even more problematic with the Greek aition than the 
English “cause,” for which the very notion of a ‘self-cause’ would at least be a complication here.” See Hyland, 
Plato and the Question of Beauty, 25n12. I argue above that it is precisely the meaning of αἴτιον as modified by the 
fatherhood metaphor which justifies Socrates’s argument. My interpretation is closer to Hoerber’s: “Although 
beauty and good are not necessarily interchangeable terms, identical in essence, there is no need to deduce, as 
Socrates does, that each may not have the other as an attribute – beauty may be a good thing and the good may be a 
beautiful thing, without implying that each term is identical in essence.” See Robert G. Hoerber, “Plato’s Greater 
Hippias,” Phronesis 9 (1964): 154. As I will argue below, I believe that a fruitful way of interpreting the Hippias 
Major involves taking an agnostic stance toward the precise relationship between beauty and goodness on the 
ontological level, and to focus instead on how the two concepts relate to each other in action. Ludlam also argues 
that Socrates commits a fallacy: “The conclusion does not follow from the premise. The main conclusion which 
should be drawn from this premise is that τὸ ἀγαθόν is καλὸν (being a product of τὸ καλὸν), while τὸ καλὸν is not 
ἀγαθόν (not being a product, but the producer, of τὸ ἀγαθόν).” See Ludlam, Hippias Major: An Interpretation, 127. 
But the conclusion that Ludlam takes to be valid is premised on the idea that beauty is a sort of quality that is 
transferrable from father to son, or from some sort of productive relationship. Socrates is not speaking of beauty in 
this way, at least not in this section of the dialogue. He is merely saying that the beautiful is good, and the good 
beautiful, but this implies nothing about the type of quality or being that goodness and beauty are, and nothing about 
how it may be transferred. He only speaks of giving birth to goodness, using the biological diction of fatherhood. 
202 Any parallels drawn between the birthing metaphor in the Symposium and the fatherhood metaphor in the 
Hippias Major should take into account the many layers of meaning found in the former. For a discussion of the 
various interpretations of “pregnancy” in the Symposium, see the chapter titled “I, a Man, am Pregnant and Give 
Birth,” in Stella Sandford, Plato and Sex (Cambridge: Polity, 2010). As the discussion makes clear, the female 
gender plays an important role in Diotima’s account. Nevertheless, the capacity to give birth broadly speaking is 
extended, by Socrates, to the male gender. 
165 
 
that the definitions of both goodness and beautiful are one and the same; the ontology behind the 
claim is murky. Socrates appears to be speaking about qualities: the beautiful is good in quality, 
and the good is beautiful in quality. The Greek shows us that Socrates does not speak about “the” 
beautiful or “the” good. If the beautiful is the father of the good, then, Socrates says, the logical 
consequence would be: οὐδὲ ἄρα τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καλόν (297b-c).203 The 
Greek says, “Neither is the beautiful good, nor is the good beautiful,” but Socrates does not say 
that the good is not the beautiful and the beautiful is not the good.  He is not setting down a 
definition of either the good or the beautiful, but simply naming an attribute that each has. 
Curiously, neither Socrates nor Hippias (who stands in agreement with everything stated) finds it 
necessary to present an argument defending this view. Yet the claim is contestable, complex, and 
centrally important to the dialogue, and I will elaborate upon it later in this chapter. 
Provisionally, however, the claim can be justified with a simple argument: both Socrates and 
Hippias believe beautiful beings to be objects of desire (we all desire maidens, works of art, 
cooking utensils, and noble lives), and therefore each believes beautiful objects are good. Human 
beings desire an object because they believe that object to be good, either instrumentally or as an 
end in itself. But does this also justify the inverse claim that the good is beautiful? This second 
claim would imply that all good objects, which are good because they are desired, are also 
beautiful because they are desired. There is no room, in Socrates and Hippias’s worldview, for an 
object that is both desirable and not beautiful. Beauty and goodness are, if not the same eidos, at 
least a sign of each other’s presence in a being. They each have the quality of the other. When I 
am in the presence of beauty, I am also in the presence of goodness, and vice versa.204  
                                                          
203 Lamb translation. 
204 Woodruff interprets these passages along the same lines as I do, though he does not find them significant: “What 
Socrates implies is that the fine is good, and that the good is fine. In the context these are strict predications and 
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With the claim that the beautiful is good, the second stage is complete, and we have 
reached the consummation of the shift. Notice that no proper definition of the beautiful has been 
reached. Regardless, new claims have been made about the beautiful: that it is beneficial because 
it is good, and that it cannot be mere utility or power. Moreover, the ontological structure of the 
beautiful is once again disclosed. The beautiful, as good, is beneficial, but it is also good in itself. 
Therefore, the beautiful inheres in a being; it is not a value projected onto a being. This shift, 
however, is not only a shift in the immediate discussion that Hippias and Socrates have been 
having in this moment of the dialogue. It is also a shift in the entire dynamic of the dialogue, of 
the dialogue as it has been taking place thus far. This becomes clear when we take stock of how 
the shift casts Hippias’s career as a sophist in a new light, by challenging his claims to wisdom 
and virtue. 
In their preliminary discussion, Socrates calls Hippias “Beautiful and wise” (281a), and 
lionizes him for his successful public work as an ambassador, as well as his lucrative private 
work as a sophist (281b-c). Hippias is much obliged, and regales Socrates with talk of his 
successful career. However, the one sore spot in Hippias’s otherwise stellar trajectory as a 
sophist has been his inability to break into the Spartan market: the Spartans do not allow foreign 
teachers because of their laws which forbid “any education contrary to established customs” 
(284b). This topic of conversation opens up a more serious discussion about the relationship 
between law and goodness. Laws ought to be “beneficial,” and those laws which fail to make 
men good are not truly lawful (284d). Despite his claims that his teachings make men stronger in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
entail that fine things, in being fine, are good, and vice versa. Now fine things, for Socrates, are beneficial, and that 
means they produce good things. But the good things they produce are, in being good, fine. So we have the odd pair 
of results: in being beneficial, fine things produce fine things, and good things produce good things. To say that 
those are uninformative is an understatement.” See Woodruff, Hippias Major, 188. Perhaps the reason why 
Woodruff finds the above uninformative is that he does not see the way in which Socrates’s identification of the 
beautiful and the good has a bearing on his dramatic encounter with Hippias, as we shall see below. 
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virtue (ἀρετή, 283c), Hippias is nevertheless prohibited from teaching the Spartans simply 
because he is foreign.  
A central part of the shift hinges on the notion of political wisdom: the most beautiful 
power is political wisdom, Socrates says (296a), and power must be power to achieve some good 
if it is to be beautiful (296d-e). It follows that political power, must be wisdom about the good, 
and about governing cities well. Hippias also claims to have political wisdom, inasmuch as he 
claims to be successful in his public role as ambassador from Elis. He also claims be able to 
bring his “good sense” to both the public and private realms, unlike Thales, Pittacus, and Bias 
(281c). The bridge between these two realms must be that which Hippias sees as good, or most 
valuable. Now, Hippias does not appear to reject the idea of goodness, at least insofar as he 
claims to teach virtue (283c). But his notion of virtue is not grounded in an objective value. 
Instead, it is grounded in relative value: Hippias boasts about the money he has made in Sicily 
(282e), and does not dispute Socrates’s statement, “The mark of being wise, I see, is when 
someone makes the most money” (283b). Money is not valuable in itself, but only valuable 
because it allows the person who has a lot of it to obtain whatever he or she desires. It is a form 
of power. Hippias believes that virtue lies in making money, and therefore that the beautiful 
speeches his pupils are able to make (286b) are the reflection of a sophistical education that sees 
moneymaking as the ultimate sign of virtue, or perhaps virtue itself. Moreover, whatever 
political wisdom Hippias has, it must be based on this relative, monetary view of virtue. For 
Hippias, virtue is power, and beauty is a manifestation of power. Therefore, because it grounds 
beauty and wisdom in an objective goodness, the shift directly challenges Hippias’s enterprise as 
a sophist. He does not seem to be fully aware of this; in fact, as we have seen, he agrees with 
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Socrates that the beautiful is good, and the good beautiful (297c). Nevertheless, the entire thrust 
of the discussion from this point on goes against the grain of Hippias’s career as a sophist.  
The revelation that beauty is good shifts the movement of the dialogue, by establishing a 
new standard by which to understand the nature of the beautiful and with which to judge 
Hippias. It also confirms that the beautiful is part of the object, not a value projected by a seeker 
of the beautiful. But the shift also comes in tandem with a moment of recognition: From now on, 
the desire to know the eidos of the beautiful must be one and the same as the desire for goodness. 
The way forward in the dialogue is to continue the search for the eidos of the beautiful, but in a 
way that is guided by the goodness of the beautiful.  
The Recognition of Beauty’s Goodness 
  The main effect of the erotic shift in the Hippias Major is Socrates’s and Hippias’s 
explicit recognition that the beautiful is good, and the good, beautiful. Whatever the good itself 
might be, it is beautiful, and whatever the beautiful itself might be, it is good. This recognition 
has a philosophical and dramatic impact on the rest of the dialogue. Philosophically, the 
recognition of beauty’s goodness (the more immediately relevant part of the shift, for Socrates 
and Hippias) reveals that the search for the eidos of the beautiful is eudaimonistic, in the sense 
that it is both ordered toward the good as an end, and also blessed with good fortune in execution 
(recall that the first meaning of εὐδαίμων is “blessed” or “fortunate”). Thus the goodness of the 
beautiful suggests that the reason why the beautiful discloses itself radiantly to the erotic being is 
because of its goodness good. The desire for goodness cannot be satisfied with anything but 
actual goodness, and the beautiful, by being both radiant and good, allows the erotic seeker to 
have an easier time spotting a good. But the recognition of beauty’s goodness has more than a 
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philosophical meaning; it also has dramatic repercussions. As we shall see, their subsequent 
discussion about the beautiful is conditioned by the awareness that the beautiful is good, and it 
has a bearing on the conclusion of the dialogue itself (as we shall see in Chapter Five).   
 There are textual indicators which hint at the significance of the shift for the rest of the 
Hippias Major.  Michael Davis points out that the word ἐκεῖνος is “a common idiom used to 
indicate a sudden recognition” in Greek literature, and among the examples they cite which 
makes use of this idiom is the reversal passage Hippias Major.205 Socrates says, “Then here’s 
what go away from us: the able-and-useful without qualification is beautiful. And this, Hippias 
[ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Ἱππία, emphasis mine], is what our mind wanted to say: the useful-and-able for 
making some good—that is the beautiful” (296d-e).206 This seems to indicate that the erotic shift 
is not merely a philosophical clarification or qualification of the definition of the beautiful, but a 
significant development or axial moment in the drama of the dialogue, which has effects on its 
resolution. With this statement, Socrates does more than modify the latest definition of the 
beautiful. He recognizes a whole new dimension to the beautiful—its goodness—that had not 
been perceived or acknowledged before. Whatever the beautiful may be, any definition of it must 
include a reference to this goodness. This fact gives Hippias and Socrates’s search a more 
definitive direction.  
 The effect of the erotic shift and the recognition of beauty’s goodness becomes 
immediately clear during the discussion of the next, and final, definition of the beautiful that the 
interlocutors consider: the beautiful as the pleasant “through hearing and sight” (διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς 
καὶ τῆς ὄψεως, 297e). The pleasant through hearing and sight is the seventh and final definition 
                                                          
205 Michael Davis, Introduction to the Poetics. Aristotle. Translated by Seth Benardete and Michael Davis (Notre 
Dame, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2002), 9n31. Davis finds the same phrase in Poetics 1448b17-18. 
206 Translation modified to bring together “this” and “Hippias.” 
170 
 
of the beautiful, and it is the one which inspires the longest discussion. Before the shift, every 
posited definition (a beautiful maiden, gold, a noble life, the appropriate) was an attempt to 
capture a multiplicity of experiences of the beautiful all under one term. The definitions were 
dropped when counterexamples were brought up by Socrates, which demonstrated that the 
definition did not cover every manifestation of the beautiful. The horizon for crafting and 
rejecting the definitions was the same: the experience of the beautiful as Hippias and Socrates 
know it.  The shift makes this insufficient, because no matter what Socrates or Hippias have 
experienced about the beautiful, they must include the beneficial as part of the beautiful. This is a 
sign of the eudaimonistic character of their search: it is conditioned by the good, and it is guided 
by it. It is unclear whether they have experienced the beautiful as good. Either way, they claim to 
know that it is good. The change in approach manifests itself most clearly in Hippias and 
Socrates’s discussion of the beautiful as pleasure through hearing and sight at the moment when 
Socrates distinguishes higher pleasures from lower ones (303e). Pleasures through hearing and 
sight are the best and most harmless pleasures; they are above other pleasures which involve the 
flesh. According to Socrates’s imaginary friend, the best way to classify them, and thus to define 
the beautiful, is “beneficial pleasure” (ἡδονὴν ὠφέλιμον, 303e). The shift conditions the final 
discussion of the final definition: it brings about a conclusion that would not have been possible 
before the reversal. The beautiful, even if it is pleasure, must be ordered to the good in some 
fashion. Even if the beautiful is not defined by its beneficial nature, it is still beneficial in some 
fundamental way that Socrates cannot ignore.  
 The definition of the beautiful as “beneficial pleasure” also restores the erotic aspect of 
the search for the eidos of the beautiful. Pleasure is defined by the observer: pleasure is what I 
call to good feelings that I experience. The beautiful as pleasure is, then, the beautiful as defined 
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by appearance. But the erotic shift—the same one which occurs in the shift from beauty as power 
to beauty as power to achieve some good—happens when the pleasures in question are said to be 
“beneficial.” Pleasures by hearing and sight (unlike pleasures of the flesh) are pleasures 
associated with music and art. These pleasures are pleasures which may edify, that is, 
communicate some good. They are pleasures which may conform themselves to a good standard 
outside of the observer’s own sense of pleasure. These pleasures, in other words, are acquired by 
any observer who wishes to have the ability to appreciate them. They are pleasures that are 
“good for me,” and I must change myself so that I may be receptive and appreciative of them. 
The definition of the beautiful itself as “beneficial pleasure” reaffirms the erotic relationship at 
the heart of this dialogue: whatever the beautiful may be, it must be “beneficial,” and this 
requires that I go out of myself, and beyond my experience of appearances, to grasp what it may 
be.  
There is another way that erotic shift and consequent recognition of beauty’s goodness 
conditions the latter parts of the dialogue. In the speech with which he concludes the dialogue 
(304d-e), Socrates thinks about what his imaginary friend will tell him when he hears about his 
(Socrates’s) failure to discover the definition of the beautiful: “So when I go home to my own 
place and he hears me saying those things, he asks if I’m not ashamed that I dare discuss 
beautiful activities when I’ve been so plainly refuted about the beautiful … ‘Look,’ he’ll say, 
‘How will you know whose speech—or any other action—is beautiful presented or not, when 
you are ignorant of the beautiful?’” Socrates believes that his sort of abuse is actually good for 
him: “But I suppose it is necessary to bear all that. It wouldn’t be strange if it were good for me 
(ὠφελοίμην). I actually think, Hippias, that associating with both of you has done me good 
(ὠφελῆσθαι). The proverb says, ‘What’s beautiful is hard’—I think I know that.” Socrates uses 
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the verb ὠφελέω, “help, aid, succor,” related to the word he uses earlier to describe the beautiful 
as beneficial (ὠφέλιμόν, 296d). The search for the beautiful itself has both an objective and a 
relational dimension. Its objective dimension is captured in that word, “difficult.” Difficulty is a 
relational concept—something is difficult for me—but it presupposes an encounter between 
myself and an object that is completely other, that is not in harmony with my desire to know it or 
use it (therefore, I call it “difficult”). The relational dimension of the search for the beautiful is 
captured in the idea that is good for me, that builds up my character and wisdom. This imaginary 
exchange between Socrates and his absent friend states a question that lies at the heart of this 
dialogue: How can one identify beautiful beings without knowing the definition of the beautiful? 
The answer to this question lies in Socrates’s affirmation that the dialogue itself has “done me 
good.” The question is a variation of Meno’s Paradox: How can I recognize what I am searching 
for before I have found it? What this exchange suggests is that, in the case of the Hippias Major, 
the goodness of the beautiful itself is a partial answer to this question, or at least, a necessary 
component of a complete answer. The eros for the good opens me up to good things, among 
them, beauty. 
Socrates’s statement that the search for the beautiful is “good for me” implies a harmony 
between eros for the good and beauty’s goodness. Socrates, as a philosopher, is someone who 
directs his eros toward the good. Because the beautiful is good, this suggests that Socrates’s eros 
for the good and his search for the eidos of the beautiful somehow coincide (I will attempt to 
articulate how this is so in the following section). The good is what accounts for the radiant 
appearance of the beautiful, because the good has an objective or intrinsic (good in itself), as 
well as a relative or relational (good for me, beneficial), dimension. Therefore, Socrates’s search 
for the eidos of the beautiful is facilitated by beauty’s goodness, and his search has been “good 
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for him,” regardless of his friend’s chiding. The moment of recognition opens up a search for the 
beautiful itself that is eudaimonistic. It is marked by good fortune; it bodes well for the erotic 
seeker. Moreover, the goodness of the beautiful, in opening itself up to the erotic seeker, makes 
noesis of itself possible. The dénouement of the Hippias Major is marked by this eudaimonistic 
turn that is occasioned by the recognition of beauty’s goodness. 
By far the most self-evident aspect of the erotic turn, however, is also the most easily 
missed: the goodness of the beautiful means nothing to a being which is not driven by 
philosophical eros. The goodness of the beautiful is a piece of knowledge relevant only for 
someone who is searching for the good. The beautiful itself appears before philosophers only, 
that is, to persons who are in search for and attuned to the formal structure behind beautiful 
beings. Hippias learns from the recognition only insofar as he becomes philosophically erotic, 
like Socrates. The goodness of the beautiful means something to someone who desires the good; 
only such a being is able to see the beautiful because of beauty’s goodness. The life of the erotic 
seeker is a life of pursuit of a real good beyond the appearance of goodness; in the midst of this 
pursuit, the beautiful appears to the seeker. Socrates exemplifies this kind of seeking in the 
Hippias Major: he shows concern for the virtue of citizens in his preliminary discussion with 
Hippias, and he repeatedly shows his inclination to seek for truth beyond appearances (as we saw 
in Chapter Three). Thanks to the erotic shift, we can see that his search is not in vain. Hippias, on 
the other hand, remains in an ambiguous situation. His highest value is a relative one (money), 
and his soul is divided into a private realm that cares for the art of sophistry, and a public one 
which ostensibly deals with the goodness of his city, Elis. But his fragmented self is one which 
does not recognize itself as such; Hippias believes he is whole and complete because he is rich. 
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Hippias has not made the decision to follow Socrates and embrace the goodness beyond himself, 
an embrace that would require a philosophical way of life.  
This embrace of philosophy is possible for Hippias, as it is for anyone. One needs only to 
embrace philosophical eros; to desire the good. For the person who makes that choice, the 
subsequent path is blessed. This does not mean that the philosopher is able to have complete 
demonstrative knowledge of the beautiful (episteme), nor some sort of “absolute noesis” of the 
formal structure of the beautiful. But it does mean that only the philosopher is attuned to the 
formal structure which informs beautiful beings. Only the philosopher has a noetic insight into 
the goodness of the beautiful, because only he desires the good.   
The Relationship Between the Beautiful and the Good  
 The erotic shift, and its consequences, sheds light upon the relationship between the 
beautiful itself and the good as it is presented in the Hippias Major, in three ways. First, it shows 
us why eros for the good is necessary for achieving noesis of the eidos of the beautiful. Second, 
it presents us with a notion of the beautiful as a sort of lodestar for the questioning philosopher, 
sign of the moral and theoretical fruitfulness of the philosophical life. Third, we are able to see 
why Plato chose to depict this revelation is in terms of action, that is, in dramatic terms. The 
Hippias Major does not give us enough to construct a metaphysical theory of the good and the 
beautiful. What it does give us is a Socrates who enacts a discovery of this relationship, through 
a dialogue with Hippias.207  
                                                          
207 Of course, scholars have attempted to construct such a system (or at least, a basic account), in commentaries of 
the Republic, Symposium and Phaedrus. Interestingly, many scholars have argued that the beautiful and the good (as 
it is presented in these three dialogues) are essentially the same thing. See, for example, Roochnik, “The Erotics of 
Philosophical Discourse,” 118: “Eros, Diotima says, has as its object ‘beautiful things’ (204d3). Quickly, and 
without argument, she substitutes ‘the good’ for ‘the beautiful’ (204el).” Also, Charles Kahn: “In terms of the 
psychology developed in the Republic, the phenomenon of falling in love involves not only the physical desire of 
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Eros, Noesis, and the Good 
Eros for the good is necessary for making any noetic insight into the the eidos of the 
beautiful. On the one hand, we have philosophical eros, which leads us to ask questions, to posit 
the existence of a formal principle informing beautiful beings, to posit also the possibility of 
obtaining noetic insight of this formal principle, and which also desires the good (both the good 
in particular beings, and the good as the formal expression of a general overarching desire). On 
the other, we have beautiful objects in their various manifestations and degrees of attractiveness, 
objects which stand apart from the observer and open up a space for desire and vulnerability on 
the part of the observer. The task before us is to see how these two realms are brought together in 
the erotic shift.  
The starting point for helping us to solve this task is the figure of Socrates himself as he 
appears in the dialogue. Socrates unites within himself all of the elements we are trying to unite: 
he encounters beautiful beings, he asks about their formal principle, and he desires the good. As 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
epithumia or lust, but also a metaphysical element that properly belongs to the rational principle that desires what is 
good, that is to say, what is good-and-beautiful.” See Charles H. Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The 
Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 268. Finally, A. E. Taylor: 
“There can, at least, be no doubt that the ‘form of good’ [in the Republic] is identical with the supreme Beauty, the 
vision of which is represented in the Symposium as the goal of the pilgrimage of the philosophic lover. Hence, 
though it is true that the name ‘form of good’ occurs nowhere but in the central section of the Republic, it would not 
be true to say that the object named does not appear in the Symposium with much the same character.” See A.E. 
Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1927), 287. Finally, Gadamer, commenting on 
the Philebus: “Thus, in the intrinsic connection between the good and the beautiful … we can see an indication that 
‘the good,’ which is at the same time ‘the beautiful,’ does not exist somewhere apart for itself and in itself, 
somewhere ‘beyond.’ Rather, it exists in everything that we recognize as a beautiful mixture.” Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, The Idea of the Beautiful in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy. P. Christopher Smith, trans. (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1986), 115. My purpose here is not to argue for an essential identity between the good and 
the beautiful, nor to make any other such metaphysical claim. Rather, I want to capture the relationship between the 
good and the beautiful as it is presented in the action that the Hippias Major portrays. My views here are more in 
line with attempts to describe the relationship between the good and the beautiful in terms of function. For example, 
see White, who argues that beauty plays a “secondary role” with respect to the good in the Symposium: “Beautiful 
things and Beauty itself provide a needed environment for the creation of the good” (153). F.C. White, “Love and 
Beauty in Plato’s Symposium.” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 109 (1989): 149-157.  Also consonant with my 
approach is Dorothea Frede’s argument that the good provides “a fairly abstract principle of general fittingness and 
proportion” which allows the mind to grasp the formal intelligibility of particulars. See Dorothea Frede, “Plato on 
what the Body’s Eye Tells the Mind’s Eye,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 191-209. 
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such, he represents philosophical eros. It follows then that an account of how the good figures 
into the philosophical quest for the beautiful itself must be recounted in terms of Socratic action. 
In order to do this, I will appropriate two terms from Maurice Blondel’s philosophy of action: 
mobile and motive.208 “Motives are ideas that draw to action. Mobiles are forces or impulses that 
incline us to act.”209 The two concepts are mutually dependent. According to Blondel, a motive 
always reflects a mobile, because the ideas we have for actions always have a root cause in the 
experience of sense perception or animal instinct for preservation of some sort. But the 
relationship is reciprocal: the best human life (the philosophical one) cannot be lived according 
to mobiles. A mobile must become a motive for the fullness of human rationality to become 
expressed in an act. A mobile, that is, must become a proper idea, and for this to happen, we 
must think critically about our impulses and desires.210  
                                                          
208 Alternate ways of describing the goodness of the beautiful which do not take the dramatic and erotic into account 
inevitably give an incomplete picture of the Hippias Major. Woodruff’s claims, “Although Socrates does not say 
outright in the Hippias Major that the fine is beneficial as pathos rather than ousia, his believing such a thing would 
explain the tension between his rejection of the proposed definition and his treatment of the fine as beneficial…” 
Woodruff, Hippias Major, 184. But this theory, while plausible, fails to address the erotic dynamic of questioning 
and the event reversal and recognition, which reveals the goodness of the beautiful to Socrates and Hippias. 
Likewise, we could consider Schindler’s interpretation of the Symposium for the Hippias Major; namely, that the 
good functions as a final cause of eros, while the efficient cause is beauty. See Schindler, “Plato and the Problem of 
Love,” 207. While this theory is attractive, it ultimately raises the burden of proof on the interpreter of the dialogue, 
because it requires that one give a metaphysical account of how this “causality” functions. Such an account could 
perhaps be sustained by Diotima’s myth in the Symposium, but not by the Hippias Major. 
209 Quoted from Oliva Blanchette, Maurice Blondel: A Philosophical Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 
610-611. 
210 “…motives are ideal representations of what the mobiles at work in our psychic makeup would have us do. There 
is no motive that is real for us unless it corresponds to something indigenous in our nature. … At the same time, 
however, no mobile is truly a mobile for human action unless it is taken up by thought as an idea or a motive. 
Merely instinctive impulses, or the power of images, are not enough for an act to be human. There has to be some 
quickening of ideation from a motion higher than impulses of animal life or the attractions of desire.” Blanchette, 
Maurice Blondel: A Philosophical Life, 610-611. See also the original work: Maurice Blondel, Action. Oliva 
Blanchette, trans. (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004): “Mobiles are valid only through the 
motive that they prepare and propose for themselves” but “But the motive itself is no longer a motive, if it does not 
in turn become a ‘mobile’” (113). Leo Strauss articulates the relationship between love and the good that comes 
close to what I am attempting to express here: “All human love is subject to the law that it be both love of one’s own 
and love of the good, and there is necessarily a tension between one’s own and the good, a tension which may well 
lead to a break, be it only the breaking of a heart.” See Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 35. 
177 
 
Applied to the Hippias Major, these terms illuminate the relationship between 
philosophical eros, beauty, and goodness in this way: beautiful beings are mobiles, and the good 
is a motive. The beautiful itself, the eidos of the beautiful, assimilates the mobiles into the 
overarching motive.  
 Socrates and Hippias both experience beautiful things as mobiles, and they both love 
them (eros). Hippias betrays an attraction for beautiful maidens, and he also enjoys beautiful 
speeches. Likewise, Socrates enjoys the beautiful maiden as much as Hippias does—at least, we 
have no reason for thinking otherwise, and in other dialogues (such as the Phaedrus and the 
Charmides) he admires beautiful bodies. He also has a penchant for good soup, music from the 
lyre, and the works of Pheidias. Both Socrates and Hippias feel eros before these instances of 
beauty, and they both desire to possess them or join themselves to them. These instances of 
beauty “mobilize” the two Greek men through their attractiveness. But Socrates also expresses 
his eros in a way that Hippias does not: he asks about the formal structure which causes them to 
be the way they are, i.e., beautiful. This difference has the effect of making Socrates take a 
distinct attitude toward the beautiful than Hippias. Take, for example, the case of the beautiful 
maiden. For Hippias, the maiden is an object of lust, with an only tangential relationship to the 
philosophical question that Socrates is asking Hippias to answer. For Socrates, on the other hand, 
the maiden’s beauty is an individual instance of the eidos of the beautiful, and Socrates is able to 
incorporate her beauty into a greater search for the beautiful itself.  
This “greater search” that Socrates engages in is the motive. The greater search is a search 
for goodness, the desire for which drives his philosophical life. To desire goodness is to be 
erotic, that is, to desire knowledge about being beyond appearances, to become other-oriented, to 
ask questions, and to shift one’s attention from the aim to know not only what is good for me, to 
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what is good in itself. Thus, after the erotic shift, Socrates is able to bring all of his experiences 
of the beautiful under the concept of goodness: power, which includes all sorts of beings, can be 
beautiful only if it is beneficial. The same goes for pleasures: they are beautiful insofar as they 
are beneficial. Goodness is a motive under which all mobiles are collected and transformed into a 
full human action, which is the philosophical act of questioning.211  
The beautiful itself is what allows Socrates (or anyone who has directed his eros toward 
the good) to unite mobiles and motive into action. The beautiful itself is, in turns, both mobile 
and motive. It is a mobile in its instantiations: it is the beautiful beings which eros desires. It is a 
motive because it is good. If one’s eros is directed toward the good, one begins to enquire about 
the intelligible causes of beings, about the formal principles which make beings be what they are. 
If one’s eros is directed towards the good, and one begins to ask the question of what causes 
beautiful beings to be beautiful, then one will begin to see that these beautiful beings, these 
mobiles, are good—which is what happens to Socrates in the erotic shift in the Hippias Major. In 
other words, to become motivated by the good causes a shift in one’s attitude toward beautiful 
beings: it causes one to begin to see them as instances of the eidos of the beautiful, and therefore 
as good (because the eidos is good). As good, these mobiles have a relational and objective 
aspect: they are good for me, and in themselves. In this way, they form a bridge between eros for 
particulars (mobiles) and eros for the good (the motive). Thus the goodness of the beautiful 
allows philosophical eros to move from admiring a beautiful maiden, to asking what causes that 
                                                          
211 Hyland writes that “the Good is not so determinate, not an answer, again, but an issue.” Hyland, Finitude and 
Transcendence, 194. Hyland’s commentary has to do with the Republic, but it also applies to the Hippias Major. 
Goodness is Socrates’s abiding issue during the dialogue, and its connection to the good only serves to heighten the 
stakes of the search for the beautiful itself. Moreover, as I argue here, the good has a bearing on the development of 
that search. See also Woodruff : “[Socrates] expects the definition of the fine to make it both beneficial and good. If 
the fine were otherwise, he would have no interest in knowing what it is.” Woodruff, Hippias Major, 187.  
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maiden to be beautiful, and to incorporating the question of the beautiful maiden’s beauty to the 
overarching philosophical question of what the beautiful itself is. 
 An important part of this dynamic of motive and mobiles in the Hippias Major is that the 
goodness of the beautiful is a given motive.212 In other words, beautiful beings mobilize, the 
goodness of the beautiful motivates, and the eidos of the beautiful mediates between the two, but 
we are never told why Socrates and Hippias believe that the beautiful is good (and thus a 
motive). As we saw above, the goodness of the beautiful is something that the dialogue presents 
as merely true, and quickly agreed upon by Hippias and Socrates (297c-d). Socrates does not 
present us with a definition or an equation of the eidos of goodness and beauty, but is merely 
ascribing a quality (goodness) to another quality (beauty), and vice versa. The goodness of the 
beautiful is a datum, revealed by the drama of the dialogue, and which reorients the discussion 
about the beautiful. However, we must go deeper into the reasons behind this datum, in order to 
see why it is accepted by both Socrates and Hippias, as well as to see why their agreement that 
the beautiful is good is a superficial one based on equivocal understandings of goodness. 
In the first section of this chapter, I outlined a simple argument in defense of Socrates’s 
claim that the beautiful is good: A beautiful object is an object of desire; therefore, it is good. We 
desire something because we believe it is good for us. Moreover, Socrates does not appear to 
believe in the existence of objects that are both desirable and not beautiful. All desirable objects 
are beautiful, therefore all good objects are beautiful. Hippias can agree with all this because he 
too finds maidens, noble lives, works of art, and even well-made spoons to be desirable. Now, 
                                                          
212 For Blondel, motive is an idea, an “ideal representation of what the mobiles … would have us do.”  In the 
Hippias Major, this “ideal representation” is not a construction and abstraction of the experience of the beautiful, but 
rather a property that Socrates simply ascribes to the beautiful as it is in itself. See Blanchette, Maurice Blondel: A 
Philosophical Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 610-611. 
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however, we can see that this is only a partial explanation. Insofar as Socrates and Hippias have 
taken different attitudes toward the beautiful, they each have a different understanding of what it 
means to claim that the beautiful is good. They agree that the goodness of the beautiful is a given 
datum, but each has a different understanding of what this means. Only Socrates understands the 
goodness of the beautiful as a motive.  
For Hippias, a beautiful object is good because it is good for him. Hippias does not 
philosophize, so he does not concern himself with goodness in itself. Hippias’s go-to examples 
for beauty, as we have already seen (in Chapter Two and Three) always involve self-interest and 
a relative perspective. Hippias dwells in the relative, in what lies in his self-interest. His 
understanding of the goodness of the beautiful is this still very much tied to utility, and the 
goodness of the beautiful is a given datum only because, practically speaking, whatever I desire, 
I desire because I believe it to be good for me. Hippias does not, in other words, recognize a 
“motive,” but rather believes in the relative goodness of mobiles. He is not fully aware that 
goodness implies the existence of a standard outside of one’s own measure. (At least, until the 
moment he chooses to follow Socrates more seriously.) 
On the other hand, there is only one explanation as to why Socrates believes that the 
beautiful is good: he has had an insight into the eidos of the beautiful. Socratic eros enjoys both 
poverty and plenty. Part of Socrates’s “plenty” is his knowledge that the beautiful is good. The 
intuition of the goodness of the beautiful is a fruit of his philosophical life, his erotic search. As 
stated in the last chapter, the beautiful “rewards” such erotic seeking by appearing radiantly. 
There is no other way to account for the knowledge that Socrates claims to have. The insight is 
incomplete—it is a noetic insight—because it does not comprehensively define the eidos of the 
beautiful. But clearly, Socrates has had an experience of the beautiful which has communicated 
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to him that beautiful beings are good. This is not a certainty in a Cartesian sense: Socrates does 
not claim to have a clear and distinct idea of what the beautiful itself is. But it is a trustworthy 
claim, insofar as Socrates says that all beautiful beings are good: “what’s beautiful is good.”  
Socrates claims, as we have already seen, that philosophical questioning about the 
beautiful is good for him (304e), even though beautiful things are “difficult” (χαλεπὰ) and 
therefore distinctly other. He also claims that the beautiful is good. Therefore, the goodness of 
the beautiful must have both a relative dimension (the search is good for me), as well as an 
objective dimension that is proper to the “difficult” nature of the beautiful (that is, to what it is in 
itself, beyond the relative perspective). Moreover, to be able to claim, as Socrates does, that 
beautiful things are obscure (“difficult”), while also claiming that that they are good, is quite a 
philosophical package. It means that Socrates does not know much about the beautiful things, but 
that he does know one very important thing about them. The knowledge must be the result of 
some insight that Socrates has gained in his erotic life as a philosopher (indeed, juxtaposing the 
claim of beauty’s goodness with its “difficult” nature somewhat echoes the “in-between-ness” of 
eros, its way of being both poverty and plenty). Socrates’s philosophical eros gives him a sense 
of the goodness of the beautiful in itself. Nevertheless, the erotic search is incomplete, and 
beautiful things, as well as the eidos of the beautiful, are still difficult, not fully known. Hippias 
and Socrates have different understandings of beauty’s goodness. Hippias understands only the 
relative dimension: beauty is good for me. Socrates has a glimpse of both the absolute and 
relative dimensions of beauty’s goodness. For both, the goodness of the beautiful is a given 
datum, but it is a motive only for Socrates—again, until the moment that Hippias chooses to 
follow Socrates. 
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Having established that the relationship between eros for the good and knowledge of the 
beautiful, and the role that the goodness of the beautiful plays in this relationship, we can move 
on to a further examination of another, related claim that Socrates makes about the beautiful: its 
radiance. While philosophy, as eros for the good, desires to understand the eidos of all kinds of 
phenomena, Socrates suggests (as I argue in Chapter Three) the beautiful itself stands out as 
particularly helpful to philosophy, because it does not usually take part in deception. Now we 
must see why this is so, in light of what we now know about the goodness of the beautiful.  
The Beautiful and Philosophy 
 The upshot of the preceding section can be stated in this way: The appearance of the 
beautiful in human experience is always good for human life. The beautiful spoon, the beautiful 
maiden, the beautiful human life, the beautiful work of art—these are all manifestations of 
beauty that are good for human projects, human flourishing, and human happiness. They all can 
contribute, according to their own proper capacities and purposes and ends, to the human good. 
Moreover, it could also be conjectured that the experience of a beautiful object inspires in a 
human person the desire to partake in goodness, or to produce it in some way. Most importantly, 
the beautiful itself is always radiant and as such, it is a boon, a sign, and a lodestar for the 
philosopher, who seeks the truth beyond appearances as well as the good life. This has one big 
implication for philosophy: Because the beautiful is good, Socrates’s search for the eidos of the 
beautiful is at once a moral and a theoretical search. 213   
                                                          
213 Nickolas Pappas has argued, “The fundamental datum in understanding Platonic beauty is that Plato sees no 
opposition between the pleasures that beauty brings and the goals of philosophy.” This the dialogue tests the validity 
of this “fundamental datum,” by having Socrates and Hippias both agree to it, but also enacting a response to this 
datum in the drama of the play. I will spell out the full development of this drama in Chapter 5. See Nickolas 
Pappas, “Plato’s Aesthetics.” 
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This implication can be seen for the following reasons. Socrates’s noetic insight into the 
eidos is contingent upon his moral character as much as it is his dialectical acumen. The Socrates 
of the Hippias Major, then, gives us a dramatic illustration of the idea that philosophy is a way of 
life. The beautiful will manifest itself only to the one who seeks goodness as much as 
knowledge. The distinction between theoretical knowledge and practical virtue—a distinction 
which is necessary and useful in certain contexts—does not hold when one seeks to know the 
beautiful. For the philosopher, then, the beautiful is the phenomenon which makes his life whole: 
it allows him to unite his moral character with his theoretical pursuits. The beautiful thus also 
invites Hippias to bring his whole life, both his “public” work in politics and his “private” 
teaching of the art of beautiful speech, under the common roof of eros for the good. “Being 
beautiful (kalos) means in the first place being presentable and refers to what can be seen in 
public,” Gadamer writes.214 If he is to fully embrace the beautiful for what it is in itself, Hippias 
must abandon his notion of a “private” self, different from a public one. 
Within the context of this discussion about the relationship between philosophy and the 
beautiful and the unity between moral and theoretical inquiry, it becomes evident that the 
validity of the claim that the beautiful is good—that is, its importance for the philosophical 
project in the Hippias Major—becomes more apparent after it undergoes philosophical 
questioning. Is the beautiful good? How could Hippias not contest this controversial claim? He 
does not, but I can easily summon many counterexamples of “evil” beauty which would contest 
the claim. The cultural archetype of the femme fatale provides one counterexample to Socrates’s 
doctrine of the goodness of the beautiful: A woman who appears to be beautiful, but who 
ultimately leads a lover to his demise. To give another example, we often learn that many of the 
                                                          
214 Gadamer, The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, 116. 
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people in our society who appear to be the most beautiful—those who appear on the cover of 
glamour magazines, the actors and actresses and models—are often plagued by addiction, 
loneliness, and emotional breakdowns. Or perhaps we may marvel at the beautiful, dark, 
powerful storm clouds in the distance, without thinking that they may produce destructive 
tornadoes. A beautiful shiny apple might hold a worm. Everywhere, we see that beauty can be 
deceptive, an active camouflage for phenomena that is ultimately contrary to what is good for 
human life. Yet Socrates does not consider these phenomena, even when confronted with a 
Hippias who is at once beautifully clad and also a sophist with little respect for truth and 
goodness. 
Upon further analysis, however, we can see that the above examples are not instances of 
“evil” beauty, but examples of beauty at odds with human goodness. The distinction is crucial. A 
femme fatale will appear to be beautiful, and there is nothing that makes us doubt her actual, 
physical beauty. The beauty that we see in a femme fatale’s appearance is just as true as her evil 
machinations. What is jarring is that she is evil, and also beautiful: her moral character 
contradicts the promise of beauty. For some reason, human beings often associate beauty with 
goodness. The very association of beauty with something immoral or adverse to the human good 
intuitively seems “off” to us, like a mistake in the very fabric of reality. Otherwise, the femme 
fatale would not be provocative or scary. Likewise, a famous actress remains beautiful even if 
her spiritual life is in shambles. Again, what is jarring is the disjuncture between beauty and 
moral goodness. We have a default expectation that a beautiful actress should have a good life. A 
beautiful sky that is also a menacing sky astonishes us for the same reason: beauty should not 
threaten human life. Even a worm-eaten apple feels like a betrayal of what a shiny apple ought to 
be. We call beauty deceptive only when it is at odds with human projects, with the human desire 
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for good things to happen. But we never truly question beauty qua beauty. If anything, these 
examples deepen our conviction of the “givenness” of beauty’s goodness, of the axiomatic nature 
of the claim that both Socrates and Hippias take for granted, because we perceive them as 
exceptions that prove the rule: beauty is good, except for these few instances where beauty’s 
goodness is contradicted by unknown causes. These examples of beauty at odds with human 
goodness, then, are not necessarily instances where the appearance of beauty masks actual 
ugliness, or where beauty itself masks evil. Rather, they are examples of moments when the 
beautiful itself enters into appearance, and gets mixed up with the non-beautiful. A discerning 
eye—the eye of a philosopher—is able to see the beautiful itself in the mixture. Once again, 
philosophical eros is the key. 
A final, ancillary point about beauty and goodness, based on Socrates’s claims, is the 
following: Beauty inspires the mind to think about, and contemplate, the good. Beauty brings the 
good to mind: Something that shines before us in a beautiful way places us in the frame of mind 
where we can contemplate goodness. This is another way in which beauty is an aid to 
philosophy: it summons within the soul the desire for the good. 
The Drama of Beauty and Goodness 
 The above sections should make clear why the best way to express the dynamic between 
eros, beauty, and goodness, at least as it is presented in the Hippias Major, is through drama. 
That is, through the literary depiction of action. The dramatic dialogue is not merely a literary 
device that Plato uses to make an exposition of certain philosophical truths. Rather, dramatic 
dialogue is the way in which these truths become known by Socrates and Hippias. The dramatic 
form allows us to see not only the relationship between beautiful things, the beautiful itself, and 
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goodness; they also allows us to see why the question about the beautiful itself is born in 
experience, and why, in the course of attempting to answer the question in a philosophical 
manner, the question of the good becomes inescapable. As I have already shown, in the Hippias 
Major Socrates shows us that the question about the beautiful itself is neither purely theoretical 
nor purely practical or moral. The question of the beautiful unifies these elements of life which 
modern thought has rent. Plato gives us a picture of the question as it is lived, and shows us that 
in life, what we today call theoretical and practical are unified in the experience of philosophical 
questioning. 
Nowhere is the lack of a practical/theoretical or moral/theoretical divide made more 
evident than in the way that Socrates speaks about politics in the dialogue. The central political 
statement in the Hippias Major comes right before erotic shift, during the discussion about 
power. It is made by Hippias: “The most beautiful thing of all is to be politically powerful in 
your own city, and to be powerless is the foulest of all” (296a). Once the beautiful is seen to be 
beneficial, this statement acquires a new meaning. The search for the beautiful is now a search 
for the best way to rule over a city. The “practical” question of politics becomes dependent on a 
“theoretical” philosophical question. Most importantly, the effort to demonstrate to Hippias that 
the beautiful is something in itself, now acquires a political significance. If the beautiful is 
something in itself, then everything else follows: that it is beyond appearances, that it is good, 
and that it is good for me. Therefore, Hippias will have to change his way of doing sophistry, if 
he aims to serve the city of Elis well as an ambassador. He will have to become a philosopher. 
Notice that this political point is illustrated dramatically in the dialogue. The character of 
Hippias, with his specific political background, carries a certain dramatic significance when he is 
put head-to-head against Socrates in a philosophical discussion. The political significance of 
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their philosophical discussion is not argued for, but illustrated: the dialogue shows us that there 
are political consequences when our political leaders are ignorant about goodness and beauty. 
More will be said about these consequences in Chapter Five. 
Conclusion 
The Hippias Major becomes a different work after the good breaks into it. The political 
question of virtue and the proper education for citizens was a concern which, until this point, 
seemed to be disconnected to the discussion about the eidos of beauty. Instead, the dialogue, 
which begins after the discussion about cities and politics and virtue, appears as a vector in a 
particular direction: Socrates inquiring into the nature of the beautiful. In Hippias, he has a foil: 
Hippias provides Socrates with hypotheses as well as questions of his own, which help Socrates 
to refine the question of the beautiful. Hippias obliges Socrates, but only to a point. He never 
embraces philosophy. He sometimes follows Socrates down the dialectical path, as we saw in the 
transition from Hippias’s second definition the third one. But he remains in an ambiguous state. 
But now, the arrival of the good challenges this ambiguity. If the question of the beautiful 
is linked to the good, and therefore to politics and to the way a person should live, then Hippias’s 
must make a choice. The dialogue takes on a new urgency, because while before it was merely 
about a question that Hippias chooses to entertain, now it is about a question which has a bearing 
on the way that Hippias—and everyone else—lives his life. The practical and the theoretical 
merge after the erotic shift. In order to make a noetic insight into the beautiful, one must direct 
one’s eros toward the good—that is, one must live like Socrates. 
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Chapter Five 
Comedy, Tragedy, and Beyond 
 
Socrates does make some progress in his dialogue with Hippias: his investigation has 
given birth to the question about the beautiful itself, thus disclosing that the beautiful itself is 
something (Chapter One), something that causes a being to become, and not merely appear, 
beautiful (Chapter Three), and something that is good (Chapter Four). This progress is best 
understood in terms of philosophical eros. Before Socrates takes over the discussion, Hippias’s 
definitions are all centered upon sense experience, or the political and financial self-interest of a 
sophist (Chapter Two). Once Socrates takes over the dialogue, the search for the eidos of the 
beautiful is shown to be one and the same as the love for the good. In order to know the eidos of 
the beautiful, one must love the good; there is no noesis of the beautiful itself without 
philosophical eros. 
Yet the Hippias Major ends in aporia. Socrates and Hippias fail to comprehensively 
articulate the eidos of the beautiful, though they are left with a few noetic insights about it. These 
insights are trustworthy, because they are born out of both their experiences of beautiful being 
(though they are not certain, in a Cartesian sense of being clearly and distinctly true, or in the 
sense of episteme, that is, of demonstrable and discursive reasoning). This fruitful yet 
inconclusive ending to the dialogue is captured in the proverb which Socrates quotes in the final 
lines of the text: χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά, translated variably as “Beautiful things are difficult,” or “hard 
to bear,” or simply, “Beautiful things are hard.” This proverb, along with the dénouement of the 
dialogue, leaves us with a question about Socrates and Hippias’s respective stances or attitudes 
towards the discussion that has just happened. Does Hippias truly see anything useful or true to 
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have come out of it? If so, why doesn’t he follow Socrates in the path of philosophy (304a)? As 
for Socrates: does he see himself as being in the same position with respect to knowledge about 
the beautiful, that he found himself before his dialogue with Hippias began? How does he 
respond to Hippias’s eventual rejection of philosophy? These questions all emanate from a 
central one, which brings together the notion that there can be no noesis of the beautiful itself 
without eros for the good, together with the aporetic ending of the dialogue. That question would 
be: At the end of the dialogue, has anything true been said about the nature of the eidos of the 
beautiful—anything which, in other words, transcends beautiful appearances and touches upon 
the beautiful itself? 
Since, as we saw in the previous chapter, the question of the beautiful itself is one which 
unites both so-called “theoretical” as well as “practical” concerns, and since philosophical eros 
becomes manifest in the dialogue as it is enacted by Socrates, it is reasonable to look for answers 
to the above questions in the dialogue’s comic and tragic elements. More specifically, the comic 
and tragic elements bring to relief the success or failure of Socrates’s philosophical search for the 
eidos, as well as both Hippias’s and Socrates’s assessments of this success or failure. My reading 
of the Hippias Major suggests that the dialogue contains elements of both comedy and tragedy, 
but that its meaning cannot be encompassed by either of these literary categories. The theme of 
the beautiful and the attributions that Socrates has made of the beautiful, allow us to see the 
Hippias Major in a different light, as a uniquely philosophical drama.215 My reading suggests 
                                                          
215 Only a few commentators have attempted to examine the Hippias Major according to the canons of tragedy and 
comedy. Ludlam classifies the Hippias Major as a philosophical dialogue which is neither comic nor tragic, that 
aims not at producing “emotional catharsis” but rather “philosophical enlightenment, which is, after all, the main 
aim of a philosophical dialogue.” See Ludlam, Hippias Major: An Interpretation, 182-184. Woodruff calls it a 
“comic dialogue” on the cover of the later edition of his translation: Two Comic Dialogues: Ion and Hippias Major. 
In his commentary, he writes: of the “unusually marked comedic element in the Hippias Major.” See Woodruff, 
Hippias Major, 99. Hyland agrees with Woodruff: “It is instructive that one of the leading translations of the 
Hippias Major is entitled, Two Comic Dialogues: Ion and Hippias Major.” But whereas Woodruff bases his 
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that the comic elements reveal the limits of Socrates’s and Hippias’s dialogue and quest for 
knowledge of the beautiful, but also that both Hippias and Socrates are tragic figures, albeit each 
of a different sort. Hippias incurs a tragic fate which is related to his rejection of philosophy, 
while Socrates incurs a tragic fate as a result of his embrace of philosophy. Ultimately, however, 
Socrates’s tragic fate is one which gives evidence of a degree of fulfillment of philosophical 
eros, that is, of the achievement of partial knowledge of the beautiful, which gives it a quality of 
consolation that Hippias rejects as impossible. In other words, Socrates’s story is tragic but also 
one which obtains a limited transcendence of those limits indicated by the comic element of the 
dialogue. Looked at from one angle, Socrates’s story is actually not tragic at all. To a certain 
extent, the conclusion of the Hippias Major transcends both comedy and tragically precisely 
because of its philosophical content, which can be understood in terms of philosophical eros, and 
its fulfillment in the search for the eidos of the beautiful. 
This reading requires several steps. First, I will show how the final section of the Hippias 
Major, which begins with a discussion about one final possible definition of the beautiful 
(pleasure of hearing and sight), recapitulates the entire dialogue, and culminates in Hippias’s 
return to his original, anti-philosophical position. At the same time, this dénouement also shows 
us that Socrates’s own stance toward the question of the beautiful remains steadfast: he believes 
that his engagement with Hippias has done him good, and he remains in a philosophical quest for 
the beautiful itself. This analysis of the final passages will put is in a position to consider the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
judgment that the dialogue is comic primarily upon its comedic conventions, Hyland sees the source of comedy in 
the paradoxical nature of Socrates’s pursuit of definitions: “Perhaps the real Platonic comedy is not in this or that 
particular dialogue but in the larger Socratic pursuit of definitions; and perhaps we are to see that it is comic through 
the constant failure of such efforts, yet Socrates’s own persistence in continuing the effort.” See Hyland, Plato and 
the Question of Beauty, 25. My argument here will indirectly address the reasons for Socrates’s persistence: a sense 
of fulfillment that he receives – at least in the dialogue treated here – from the pursuit of the question of the 
beautiful. Gregory Vlastos writes about the denouement of the dialogue: “the gravity of the denouement ... has 
never been properly appreciated in the scholarly literature.” He goes on to refer to it as “tragic.” See Gregory 
Vlastos, Socratic Studies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 71-72. 
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dialogue as a whole in light of its dramatic conclusion. Second, I will consider the overall 
philosophical significance of the comic elements in the dialogue. The comic elements bring to 
light the sense of limitation which surrounds the inquiry into the eidos of the beautiful. In doing 
so, the comic elements force the reader to consider which of the two interlocutors has the more 
reasonable and compelling attitude towards this limitation. Third, in similar fashion, I will 
consider the philosophical meaning of the tragic elements both Hippias’s and Socrates’s stories. 
The tragic elements bring to relief the different consequences that both Hippias and Socrates 
undergo as a result of their respective attitudes toward their failure to define the beautiful. 
Hippias rejects philosophy, because it is useless; Socrates embraces it, finding within it a 
modicum of consolation. Both decisions incur certain consequences. In this last section, I will 
make a few remarks about what my interpretation of the Hippias Major might contribute to the 
debate over the relationship between Plato’s dialogues and classical Greek tragedy. The 
questions raised by this debate also illuminates the Hippias Major in a particular way, by 
allowing us to see the degree of certainty reached by Socrates in the Hippias Major with regard 
to the beautiful, which is the justification for his philosophical path. It also helps us to see the 
nature of Hippias’s rejection of that path. 
Dénouement and Recapitulation 
 The dénouement of the Hippias Major begins with Socrates positing one final possible 
definition of the eidos of the beautiful: a specific set of pleasures, those which cause pleasure 
“just through hearing and sight” (μήτι πάσας τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ ἂν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς ὄψεως, 
297e). This final definition is not only one last, unique attempt at answering the question of what 
makes an object become beautiful when added. It is also a definition which sets up a 
recapitulation of the entire dramatic and philosophical trajectory of the dialogue, and this 
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recapitulation culminates with both Hippias and Socrates staking out their final positions with 
respect to whether the question the eidos of the beautiful might be answerable, or even worth the 
trouble of asking. Hippias attacks Socrates’s philosophical method, preferring to return to the 
relationship with, or stance before, beautiful beings that he had before the discussion started. On 
his part, Socrates both acknowledges his failure to answer the question, but also believes that 
endeavoring to answer it has done him good. A close reading of the dénouement and 
recapitulation will allow us to consider the dialogue as a whole from the vantage point of its 
conclusion, and from this vantage point it will be possible to discern the comic and tragic 
dimensions of the dialogue.216 
 The dénouement and recapitulation begin with the collapse of the definition of the 
beautiful as the “beneficial.” Socrates decides to make one final attempt to answer the question 
of what makes an object become beautiful, even though he admits that their failure to do so is 
“laughable” (γελοιότερος, 297d). He admits to being stuck, and Hippias says that he himself has 
nothing to say, though he still boasts that “I’m sure I’ll find it [the answer] when I’ve looked 
[σκεψάμενος]” (297e). He is thus also admitting to not having completely followed Socrates 
down the philosophical path, or to not have done so with full conviction. Nevertheless, Socrates 
tells him that he cannot wait for Hippias to look, because “I have such a desire [ἐπιθυμίας] to 
know [εἰδέναι]” (297e, emphasis mine). 
 It is striking to see the word ἐπιθυμίας in the context of Socrates describing his own 
inclination to pursue a philosophical question. It is not a word that Plato often uses to refer to the 
desire for knowledge. When it appears in a Platonic text, the word usually denotes a desire born 
                                                          
216 Schindler notes that a final moment of recapitulation is a common feature of Socratic dialogues. He cites as 
examples Book X of the Republic, Parmenides 166c, Lysis 222e, and the Statesman 311b-c. See Schindler, Plato’s 
Critique of Impure Reason, 290. 
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out of instinct, or an inclination toward carnal gratification. In other words, it usually refers to a 
desire that is neither born out of, nor tempered by, rational reflection.217 In the Laws, the word is 
used to refer to the desire for fame, but this use is less common.218 The more common meaning is 
that of instinctive or carnal desire, a meaning evoked by Hippias’s first definition of the 
beautiful, “a beautiful maiden” (as I argue in Chapter Two). By using this word now, Socrates 
appears to be signaling the beginning of a recapitulation of the entirety of the dialogue: from 
epithumia (evoked by Hippias’s first definition), to eros for truth and the good. The discussion 
over the definition of the beautiful as a kind of pleasure also recapitulates the philosophical and 
dramatic trajectory of the dialogue, by shifting from a definition of pleasure understood without 
reference to goodness, to a definition of the beautiful as “beneficial pleasure” (303e). Socrates 
repeats the shift from defining the beautiful itself in a self-referential or self-interested way 
(pleasure is always defined in a self-referential way: pleasure is for me or for you, but never 
something in itself, like goodness), to a definition that requires my conformity with an outside 
standard (beneficence). It is the same shift that occurs earlier in the dialogue (as outlined in 
Chapter Four). 
 Socrates’s and Hippias’s discussion of the final definition of the beautiful involves five 
dialectical moments. The first of these involves the following noetic insight, made by Socrates: 
the beautiful has something to do with pleasure, but only those pleasures of the higher sort (those 
                                                          
217 See Hyland, “Eros, epithumia, and philia in Plato,” 32-46. In attempting to make a connotative definition of 
epithumia as it appears in the Symposium and Phaedrus, Hyland argues that the word usually connotes a carnal or 
instinctive desire, not governed by logos: “ἐπιθυμία, a lower passion, contains virtually no rationality” (37). In 
defining the word as “desire, yearning,” the LSJ cites three Platonic passages, both which use the word to denote 
passionate desire. In the Cratylus, epithumia is said to come as a power in the thymon (spirit or heart): “τῇ γὰρ ἐπὶ 
τὸν θυμὸν ἰούσῃ” (419d). In the Phaedo, it is used to designate desires of the body: “τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν” (82c). 
Finally, in the Phaedrus, the word is used to designate sexual intercourse between lovers: “τῆς ἐπιθυμίας συνεῖναι” 
232b. The upshot of these readings is that the epithumia usually designates carnal or instinctive desire, and is not 
commonly associated with the desire to philosophize.  
218 See Laws 4.271c: “The desire to win glory, instead of lying in a nameless grave, aims at a like object” (τὸ γὰρ 
γενέσθαι κλεινὸν καὶ μὴ ἀνώνυμον κεῖσθαι τετελευτηκότα τοῦ τοιούτου ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία). R.G. Bury translation. 
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associated with hearing and sight, 298a). The first moment thus also includes a judgment that 
there is a hierarchy to the types of pleasures that a human being can have. In the second moment, 
Socrates distinguishes the pleasure of hearing and sight from an added quality which gives these 
their beauty. Neither Socrates nor Hippias believe that it is the pleasure itself of hearing, or the 
pleasure itself of sight, that gives these their beauty, but an added quality which both share 
(300a-b). The third moment is a digression concerning the existence of continuous properties: 
that is, properties which are shared by a pair of objects but not by each individually. Hippias 
believes that no such properties exist, and criticizes Socrates for believing so. In this moment, 
Hippias also engages in a critique of Socrates’s philosophical method, and effectively drops out 
of the search for the eidos of the beautiful (301a-b). In the fourth moment, the dialogue returns to 
the question of pleasure, and Socrates affirms that, while discontinuous properties might exist, 
the beautiful would not be one of them. However, “pleasure through hearing and sight” is a 
discontinuous property, and so the definition must be dropped (303c-d). The final moment 
concludes the discussion of pleasure, by revising the definition “pleasure through hearing and 
sight” to “beneficial pleasure,” only to drop that definition for the same reasons that Socrates and 
Hippias dropped the definition of the beautiful as beneficial power (304a). By examining these 
moments, we can see how Socrates once again affirms the central importance of philosophical 
eros for approaching the question of the eidos of the beautiful, and also see how Hippias 
ultimately rejects Socrates’s invitation to philosophize.  
 The first moment of the dialectic reveals that Socrates’s definition of the beautiful as 
pleasure carries with it the seeds for an eventual “erotic shift” toward beneficence, similar to the 
one which occurs in the shift from “power” to “beneficence” (296-e).219 From the outset, 
                                                          
219 See Chapter Four. 
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Socrates believes that only certain kinds of pleasures, those associated with sight and hearing, are 
possible candidates for being the eidos of the beautiful: “If whatever makes us be glad, not with 
all the pleasures, but just through hearing and sight—if we called that beautiful, how do you 
supposed we’d do in the contest?” (εἰ ὃ ἂν χαίρειν ἡμᾶς ποιῇ, μήτι πάσας τὰς ἡδονάς, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ ἂν 
διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῆς ὄψεως, τοῦτο φαῖμεν εἶναι καλόν, πῶς τι ἄρ᾽ ἂν ἀγωνιζοίμεθα;, 297e). 
Socrates singles out these specific pleasures because they are associated with the arts: “Men, 
when they’re beautiful anyway—and everything decorative, pictures and sculptures—these all 
delight us [τέρπει ἡμᾶς] when we see them, if they’re beautiful. Beautiful sounds and music 
altogether, and speeches and storytelling have the same effect” (298a). Socrates will set these 
pleasures up in contrast against those pleasures which are gained from eating (i.e., taste), smells, 
and sexual intercourse (τὰ ἀφροδίσια, 299a).  Later on, Socrates will call these pleasures (those 
of sight and sound) “harmless” (ἀσινέσταται, 303e) before calling them “beneficial” (ὠφέλιμον, 
303e). Thus in the first moment, Socrates makes two claims: Socrates has a noetic insight about 
the beautiful—he believes it is associated with pleasure in some way, a way which might 
indicate that pleasure has to do with its very eidos. Second, Socrates believes that there are two 
types of pleasure, some of which are lower and possibly harmful, and some of which he thinks 
are higher than others, and these higher ones are the ones properly associated with the beautiful.  
With this second point, Socrates sets us up for an eventual turn toward beneficence.  
It should be noted that the equation of “harmless” with “beneficial” is not logically 
warranted; it is the fallacy of “confusing a contradictory with a contrary.” 220   Socrates does not 
offer a justification for this move, and Hippias does not object to it. The passage hints at a notion 
of pleasure that differs from that presented in the Philebus, a notion which includes pleasures 
                                                          
220 This point is made by Robin Waterfield in his commentary on the Hippias Major found in the anthology Plato, 
Early Socratic Dialogues, Trevor J. Saunders, ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1988), 263. 
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which cause harm and some which do the opposite. It is a theory of pleasure that Socrates does 
not develop, however. Regardless, this also is not the first time in this section when Socrates 
makes a dialectical move without offering justification. He acknowledges that a definition of the 
beautiful built around the concept of pleasure would exclude certain types of beautiful beings 
which cannot be perceived, namely, customs and laws (τοὺς νόμους τε καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, 
298c-d). But he enjoins Hippias to set this objection aside, and to “stay with this account” 
(ὑπομείνωμεν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, 298d). Both of these moves suggest that Socrates is more 
interested in showing the connection between beauty, pleasure, and goodness, rather than in 
formulating a definition of the beautiful that will meet the demands of precision required by 
sound reasoning. His contention seems to be that any pleasure which is beautiful is only beautiful 
insofar as it is good. To get to the heart of Socrates’s dialectical move here, we need to 
understand just how a pleasure can be “beneficial.” 
 The erotic shift towards beneficence does not occur because Socrates believes that 
pleasures of sights and sounds are morally edifying, whereas smells, tastes, and sexual pleasure 
are not. This is a tempting conclusion to draw from the two-tier structure of pleasures that 
Socrates sets up, and it would have the added bonus of giving us an instance in which Plato 
writes words in favor of music and painting, which could be set up as a contrast to the criticism 
and vituperation that the two (ostensibly) undergo in the Republic. Instead, a more cautious 
reading of this passage indicates that Socrates is not necessarily arguing for the positive 
character-building power of pleasures associated with sights and sounds, but rather noting that 
these pleasures, if nothing else, at least provide for a distance between the person and the 
pleasurable object. Smells, tastes, and sexual congress all involve direct touching; the flesh must 
be involved for the pleasure to take place. These pleasures are of the most self-referential sort, 
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because they are direct, unmediated experiences of excitement. On the other hand, pleasurable 
sights and sounds, especially in the refined form of painting and music, require the mediation of 
distance to be fully absorbed. The pleasure of sights and sounds cannot occur without the viewer 
or listener distancing herself from the object of pleasure. This implies that the viewer or listener 
will perforce recognize the existence of this object, must accept that it is other that himself. This 
is a basic element of eros: the recognition that my desire is for something other than myself. 
Distance is also an essential element of the poverty-plenty dynamic that constitutes eros. Eros is 
always at a distance from its object of desire, and no matter what, it will always be at a distance 
from absolute satisfaction, at least within this life. The incompleteness of eros is represented by 
distance. Thus the other-oriented turn which is implied in Socrates’s redefinition of the beautiful 
as “power,” to that of “beneficial power,” is recapitulated in the turn from “pleasure of hearing 
and sight,” to “beneficial pleasure,” and this recapitulation is prepared for by Socrates’s singling 
out those types of pleasures which require mediation and distance from those that do not. Of 
course, the above account does not hold absolutely. One may lose himself in the ecstasy of 
music, and not remember the “other” at all (e.g., the Dionysian intoxication that Nietzsche 
celebrates). Also, the fact that sex is pleasurable does not (and most would say, should not) 
imply that one forgets where the pleasure comes from, i.e., the other person. In fact, care for the 
other person is an important part of sex; more than that, it is a sign of eros, which is kindled 
precisely in the desire for another person. These objections are true, and one could assume that 
Socrates would have accepted them. Nevertheless, there is a phenomenological point which is 
contained in Socrates’s remarks, and which holds up regardless of the above objections: the issue 
of distance. Even if sexual pleasure is, strictly speaking, as much of an occasion for other-turning 
and eros as contemplation of a beautiful painting, nevertheless, Socrates wants to emphasize that 
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a constitutive element in eros, the distance between self and other, is absolutely required in the 
contemplation of a painting. While one may be a bad lover, and disregard the other, one cannot 
contemplate a painting without taking a few steps back. Having carved out this distance between 
object and person, Socrates will eventually place the good before the person.  
 Another important event that happens in this first dialectical moment is the moment of 
recognition that occurs when Socrates reveals the identity of his hitherto unnamed “friend” who 
has been a pressing force in the dialogue up to this point. Socrates wonders whether the 
definition of the beautiful as the pleasant through hearing and sight might please his friend, given 
that the definition does not include (as I noted above) beautiful customs and laws (298b). In fact, 
the definition would exclude many of the things that Socrates and Hippias have already agreed to 
be beautiful, among them special skills, an honorable life, and beneficial power. Nevertheless, 
Hippias (in a statement which betrays how loose his attachment to the rigor of philosophical 
discussion truly is) believes that such inconsistencies might “slip right past the man” (298b) and 
then asks Socrates what this man’s name is. “Sophroniscus’s son” (298b) is Socrates’s response. 
Hippias would likely know that Socrates is Sophroniscus’s son. With this revelation, Socrates 
becomes more transparently himself, a philosopher. It was Socrates all along who had the 
caustic, violent criticisms of Hippias’s failed definitions of the beautiful. Socrates was more than 
the innocent, fumbling foil to these violent criticisms. He was expressing them. Now, 
philosophical eros has a face, and Hippias will have to make a final decision about where he 
stands with regard to it. Socrates reveals himself right before the conclusion of the dialogue, as if 
preparing himself for his final statement with regard the value of the philosophical dialogue he 
and Hippias have conducted. Socrates reveals himself as the first step toward his big finale.  
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 The second moment of the dialectic is another movement toward beneficence. Socrates 
believes that it is not the actual pleasure of hearing or sight that makes something be beautiful. 
Rather, it is a quality added to both. If pleasure through sight were what caused something to be 
beautiful, then pleasure through hearing would never be beautiful, and vice versa. The eidos of 
the beautiful must be one thing, and that thing must be pleasure through hearing and sight. If 
instead it was only one of the two types of pleasure, then it could not be the other. If it is both, 
then it must be a quality that both pleasurable sight and hearing share in common. “They have 
some thing that itself makes them be beautiful, that common thing [τὸ κοινὸν τοῦτο] that belongs 
to both of them in common and each privately,” Socrates says (300a-b). That is, the quality that 
makes something beautiful must inhere in both pleasurable sights and pleasurable sounds, and 
must be fully present in both equally. Hippias agrees (300b). This second moment is another 
movement toward beneficence because it involves another step away from immediate pleasure. 
Not only does Socrates imply that distance is integral to the experience of beauty, but also he 
affirms that pleasure by itself is not the beautiful itself, but rather a quality which certain types of 
pleasure (those of sight and sound) always carry. Once again, Socrates takes us a step away from 
pleasure, within the dialectic of the beautiful as pleasure. 
 The third moment of the dialectic is a digression wherein Hippias and Socrates lay out 
their philosophical cards. That is, Hippias comes out against philosophy, and effectively drops 
out of the dialogue, and Socrates reaffirms his conviction that the dialogue and philosophical 
inquiry in general are worth having. The digression begins with a disagreement over the 
existence of properties which can inhere in two objects only when considered as a pair, but not to 
each individually—properties which, for the sake of this discussion, I call “discontinuous” 
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(basing the term on Hippias’s use of διηνεκής [“continuous, unbroken,” 301b]).221 Socrates 
believes that the beautiful through hearing and sight is a property that inheres in both types of 
pleasure as well as in each individually. Hippias affirms that this is so, and indicates that a 
property which inheres in both, but not in each individually, could not exist: “Socrates, no one 
will know more beautifully than you whether I’m playing or not, if you try to say what these 
things are that are seen by you plainly. You’ll be seen to be saying nothing. Because never shall 
you find what is attributed to neither me nor you, but is attributed to both of us” (300d). 
Nevertheless, Socrates insists that such properties do exist, even though their existence is 
irrelevant to the debate over pleasure through sight and sound as constituting the eidos of the 
beautiful. Why does he believe the point to be so important? 
 The response to this question lies in the enterprise of philosophy itself. Right after 
Socrates reaffirms his belief in the existence of discontinuous properties (300e), Hippias 
launches into a comprehensive condemnation of Socrates’s philosophical method. He begins by 
questioning Socrates, thus turning the tables: “Your answers seem weird again, Socrates, more so 
than the ones you have me a little earlier. Look. If both of us were just, wouldn’t each of us be 
too? Or if each of us were unjust, wouldn’t both of us?” (301a). Socrates agrees. Then the attack 
becomes more pointed:  
But Socrates, you don’t look at the entireties of things, nor do the people you’re used to talking with. You 
people knock away at the beautiful and other things by taking each separately and cutting it up with words. 
Because of that you don’t realize how great they are—naturally continuous bodies of being. And now 
you’re so far from realizing it that you think there’s some attribute or being that is true of these both but not 
                                                          
221 I am adopting the terminology of continuous and discontinuous properties as defined by Wolfsdsorf. “Continuous 
properties” is a property such that, “if two entities … separately possess the property, then the two entities conjointly 
possess that property, and vice versa.” A discontinuous property is a property such that “if two entities separately 
possess a property, then the two entities conjointly do not possess that property, or vice versa.” See Wolfsdorf, 
“Hippias Major 301b2-c2,” 221-222. 
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of each, or of each but not of both. That’s how unreasonably and unobservantly and foolishly and 
uncomprehendingly you operate (301a-c). 
Later, Hippias will reiterate his complaint against Socrates, telling him that his speeches are 
nothing but “flakings and clippings of speeches” (304a). Hippias’s invective is an invective 
against philosophy itself. This is clear for two reasons. The first is the fact that Hippias treats 
Socrates like a common sophist, rather than an ignorant man in pursuit of knowledge: “I know 
how everybody who’s involved in speeches operates” (301d), Hippias tells Socrates after the 
latter responds to the above diatribe. The second reason is that Hippias believes that any attempt 
to analyze beings, or to describe them according to various characteristics (to cut them up with 
words, as Hippias puts it) is foolish, because beings are naturally continuous, though it is unclear 
what this might mean. Socrates’s method yields false knowledge, or in any case, a type of speech 
that is inelegant and probably useless.222 
                                                          
222 A few attempts have been made to reconstruct Hippias’s “continuity theory” of being. See Wolfsdorf, “Hippias 
Major 301b2-c2,” 221-255, which among other topics, engages those arguments in Michael L. Morgan, “The 
Continuity Theory of Reality in Plato’s Hippias Major,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (1983): 133-158. 
Both of these papers attempt to reconstruct Hippias’s theory, and one main difference between Wolfsdorf’s and 
Morgan’s respective reconstruction lies precisely on the status of the beautiful: “I disagree with Morgan that Hippias 
… conceives of τὸ καλόν as an οὐσία” (Wolfsdorf, “Hippias Major 301b2-c2,” 236). Wolfsdorf argues that the 
beautiful is never hypostasized in Hippias’s mind, but that it only refers to “that which is beautiful” (238). This 
would mean that, in the final instance, Hippias has never really followed Socrates, and never truly believed that the 
beautiful itself “is something” (287c), a claim to which Hippias explicitly assents at the beginning of the dialogue 
(287d). The “continuity theory” expresses, perhaps, what Hippias really thinks. I would agree with this claim, 
though it is also important to consider the fact that Hippias does consider the possibility that the beautiful itself “is 
something.” Beyond this, my argument here does not depend on a reconstruction of Hippias’s beliefs, but only with 
the upshot that his beliefs are anti-Socratic, and incompatible with the search for an eidos of the beautiful beyond 
appearances. Other commentators plainly state either that Hippias is a materialist, or that Hippias’s theory has the 
distinguishing feature of being a form of materialism (that is, a denial of the reality of any formal categories or 
spiritual entities). As such, they support Wolfsdorf’s side of the argument. Sweet does not attempt to reconstruct 
Hippias’s theory, but he does argue that Hippias has a “tendency to distort the arguments in the direction of objects 
of sense.” See Sweet, “Commentary,” 354. Raphaël Arteau McNeil finds Democritus’s atomist materialism to be a 
useful hermeneutical tool with which to understand Hippias’s argument with Socrates: “Qu’Hippias se fasse ici 
l’écho du matérialisme tel qu’il fut élaboré par Démocrite ou non, il n’en partage pas moins les mēmes prémisses 
fondamentales: l’Un es Multiple, et cette multiciplité d’unités premieres se fonde, en dernière analyse, sur les corps 
du réel” (446). See Raphaël Arteau McNeil, “Platon, critique du matérialisme: le cas de l’Hippias majeur,” Dialogue 
46 (2007): 435-458.  
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The reason why Socrates must defend discontinuous properties is they are part of 
philosophy, that is, because they are a part of the “cutting” that Hippias says is impossible. 
Socrates must reject what he calls Hippias’s “continuous theory of being” (διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς 
οὐσίας, 301e). Socrates defends discontinuous properties by drawing a numerical example: 
“Then if each of us is one, wouldn’t he also be odd-numbered? ... Then will both of us be odd-
numbered, being two?” (302a). That is, each individual is one, and thus odd, but put together, the 
individuals form a pair, and thus are even. Socrates’s example shows that any full understanding 
of reality requires continuous properties, and also (and this point is crucial) that these properties 
are not necessarily physical properties (as numbers are not).223 
 Still, Socrates does not believe that the beautiful is a discontinuous property: “I think it’s 
a great absurdity for both of us to be beautiful, but each not; or each beautiful, but both not, or 
anything else like that” (303c) he says later on. This means that Socrates believes the beautiful 
itself to be both something, and something that is not a number or discontinuous. This is 
important because it means that the beautiful itself is a general term that can be understood both 
when applied to a particular or to all particulars taken as a whole: beauty lies both in the eidos 
and a beautiful flower. Thus Socrates confirms that beautiful beings are part of a greater general 
eidos, and beautiful beings, particular instantiations of beauty, as they manifest themselves 
radiantly to the human observer, are able to provide noetic glimpses of this greater general 
eidos.224 Notice too that pleasure, by itself, is less likely to hint at a greater general eidos than 
beauty is. Beauty shines forth and communicates a certain eidetic structure; pleasure is inherently 
                                                          
223 Perhaps the reference to number is a nod toward Plato’s Pythagorean roots. See Gadamer’s discussion of the 
relationship between the Pythagorean and Platonic notions of eidos in Gadamer, The Idea of the Good, 14-15 and 
111-112. 
224 Cf. my discussion about appearances and deception in Chapter Three. 
203 
 
self-referential, and one can be tempted to define it in a completely self-referential way: pleasure 
simply is what pleases me. 
 Pleasure begins to point beyond itself in the fourth and fifth dialectical moments. In the 
fourth moment, the definition of pleasure through hearing and sight is dropped precisely because 
it is a continuous property. Socrates says that “ ‘Through sight and hearing’ makes both 
beautiful, but not each” (303d). He thus contradicts the previous statement to the contrary made 
by Hippias (300b). The fifth and final moment consists of reassessing the definition of the 
beautiful as pleasure of hearing and sight. “What do you say that is—the beautiful in both 
pleasures, which made you honor [τιμήσαντες] them above others and call them beautiful?” asks 
Socrates, in the voice of the imaginary third person (which, Hippias and the reader now know, is 
Socrates).225 The answer is that these pleasures are “harmless” (ἀσινέσταται). Socrates asks 
Hippias if he can think of another distinguishing factor, and Hippias says that he cannot, that 
these pleasures really are “best” (βέλτισταί εἰσιν, 303e). From there, Socrates will derive the 
definition of the beautiful as “beneficial pleasure” (ἡδονὴν ὠφέλιμον), which is then almost 
immediately dropped because, as Socrates says, this definition “comes down to the earlier 
account. The good would not be beautiful, nor the beautiful good, if each of these were different” 
(304a). With this, the final definition has been exhausted, and none other will be suggested by 
either interlocutor. 
Thus the erotic shift is complete: we have turned from a definition of the beautiful that 
begins with pleasure and ends in beneficial pleasure, that is, from a definition of the beautiful 
that is self-referential, to one that must conform itself to an ideal outside the self. As we have 
                                                          
225 I have changed Woodruff’s rendering of τιμήσαντες as “value” to “honor,” which I believe is more Greek and 
less modern. 
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seen, Socrates affirms that the eidos of the beautiful causes a being to be, and not appear to be, 
beautiful. As we saw in Chapter Four, dunamis is not an adequate definition of the beautiful 
because power is on the side of appearances. Whoever is powerful is able to change being, and is 
not compelled to conform herself to a standard outside of its power. Moreover, power is power 
for me, it is about what I can accomplish. Beneficial power is a different concept altogether, 
because it is power in harmony with the standard of goodness, which is a standard I do not 
define. The same applies for pleasure. Pleasure by itself is self-referential, and has to do with 
what I feel to be pleasurable. Pleasure is an appearance, in other words. But beneficial pleasure is 
a pleasure that must be measured against a standard of beneficence or goodness that I do not 
define. Candy is pleasurable, but Beethoven’s Ninth is a beneficial pleasure. I can easily discern 
that the former statement is true, but it requires more knowledge—about goodness—to discern 
why the latter is the case. 
With the completion of this erotic shift, the recapitulation is also complete. The dialogue 
has taken us from Hippias’s boasts about his money and influence, to his first definition of the 
beautiful (a beautiful maiden) which evokes epithumia and an attachment to bodies. Eventually, 
through many dialectical twists and turns, Socrates shepherds the discussion to the noetic 
revelation that the beautiful is good. The definition of the beautiful as pleasure also evokes 
epithumia, and in fact Socrates uses the word, in a rather odd context, during the beginning of the 
recapitulation. But like the previous part of the dialogue, this part too reveals that the beautiful 
must be associated with the good in some way, if we are to get anywhere near defining its eidos. 
Both the main part of the dialogue and the recapitulation end in the same way: in both the 
goodness of the beautiful is affirmed, but in neither is the eidos of the beautiful identified as 
being goodness. In other words, the beautiful is good, but the two are distinct things. Yet by 
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leading two dialectical trains down to the same station, Plato suggests that the goodness of the 
beautiful is truth which philosophy can uncover, and can do so in various ways. The beautiful 
always leads us to the good, and it even leads dialectic itself toward it. We can say now that the 
dialogue begins with the noetic insight that the beautiful itself is something, and that dialectic 
refines this insight (through the crafting and revising and rejection of various definitions of the 
beautiful), so that eventually we are lead to a new insight, one which holds up through two 
separate sequences of dialectical questionings: beautiful things are good, and the beautiful itself 
is good. 
The dialogue does not conclude here, however. It concludes with Socrates and Hippias 
making their final statements of allegiance. Hippias will go first, reiterating his previous 
criticism of Socrates by claiming that Socrates’s talk is “flakings and clippings of speeches … 
divided up small” (304a). Socrates, it is implied, engages in “small talking” (σμικρολογίας, 
304a) and “nonsense” (ἀνόητος, 304b). Socrates’s philosophical inquiries are pointless. More 
than that, they are useless. Hippias implicitly returns to utility as a standard by which to judge 
the beautiful: “But here’s what is beautiful and worth a lot: to be able to present a speech well 
and beautifully, in court or council or any other authority to whom you give the speech, to 
convince them and go home carrying not the smallest but the greatest of prizes, the successful 
defense of yourself, your property, and friends. One should stick to that” (304a-b). Hippias’s 
statement signals a departure from the attempt to even play along with Socrates. He defines the 
beautiful by its usefulness, even using the word beautiful in his ersatz “definition” (something 
that he did before, in his first and third definitions). Moreover, the type of usefulness that 
Hippias refers to is related to political power. Now, the pretense is gone. If you are smart, 
Socrates, you will stick to what is good for you, and leave aside this chasing after things that do 
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not exist. Hippias has made his decision: against philosophical eros, and against the pursuit of 
the eidos of the beautiful.  
On his part, Socrates reaffirms the search for the eidos of the beautiful, as well as 
philosophical eros. He coyly tells Hippias “you know which activities a man should practice, and 
you’ve practiced them too” (304b), admits that “I wander around and I’m always getting stuck” 
(304c). Socrates considers it may be the case that “I am spending my time on things that are silly 
and small and worthless.” Yet when he comes close to agreeing with Hippias on this point, that 
man—the imaginary friend, the son of Sophroniscus—begins to insult him once again. He asks 
Socrates “How dare I [Socrates] discuss beautiful activities when I’ve been so plainly routed 
about the beautiful, and it’s clear I don’t even know at all what that is itself” (304d). The son of 
Sophroniscus compels Socrates to stick with philosophy. In other words, Socrates cannot disobey 
his own desire to ask the question about the beautiful. He remains true to his philosophical eros. 
In this case, it is not the daimon of the Apology, but a version of Socrates himself, “the son of 
Sophroniscus,” who reminds Socrates that philosophy is the way of life he should lead. This 
“idealized” or “imaginary” Socrates is merely Socrates in a more confident mode. Socrates 
believes it is necessary to bear the pain of the blows and insults which “the Son of Sophroniscus” 
threatens him with. These blows are likely the suffering that is involved in any philosophical 
endeavor, the effort required to discover any truth. About this suffering, Socrates says, “It 
wouldn’t be strange if it were good for me. I actually think, Hippias, that associating with both of 
you has done me good.” Philosophy, however painful, has been a path to goodness. “What’s 
beautiful is hard,” is the final thing that Socrates affirms. With these words, Socrates reaffirms 
his philosophical eros. He does not say that it is a useful art, or that it will allow him to win a 
court case. Nor does he argue that it will make him rich or honored, as sophistry has done for 
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Hippias. He merely says that it will do him good. Moreover, the search has left him with the 
knowledge that beautiful things are “difficult,” along with all the other affirmations that he 
makes at earlier junctures in the dialogue: among them, that the beautiful itself is something, that 
it appears radiantly to the erotic seeker, and that it is good. 
Both Hippias and Socrates have now completed their respective dramatic arcs, have made 
final gestures of allegiance; in Aristotelian terms, their “action” has been completed. Now, 
therefore, we can examine the comic and tragic dimensions of their action. 
Comedy in the Hippias Major 
 Before we analyze the contrast between the comic elements of the dialogue, and the 
dialogue’s philosophical meaning, I should clarify what I mean by “comedy” as a genre. Strictly 
speaking, the comedy of the fourth and fifth centuries was a staged affair, with three to four 
actors wearing masks and costumes.226 While some have argued that it is possible for Plato’s 
dialogues to have been staged, my argument here is not contingent upon such a possibility.227 
Instead of being a comic play, the fact is that the Hippias Major has comic elements, ones which 
a Greek audience would recognize. It is important to outline and interpret these comic elements 
because they form a part of the whole of the dialogue, and their presence must be considered in 
any interpretation of the dialogue that aims to disclose the role that eros plays within it. In fact, 
the erotic dimension is part of what makes this dialogue funny. 
                                                          
226 “In the fifth century, spectators would expect to see a play with three speaking actors (or possibly four) and a 
chorus, all or almost all dressed in outlandish, padded costumes, and many bearing large leather phalluses; some of 
them, especially in the chorus, might even be dressed as animals or other strange entities, such as clouds.” Konstan, 
“Defining the genre,” 33. 
227 On the possibility of Plato’s dialogues having been performed in a very limited sense, see Blondell, The Play of 
Character in Plato’s Dialogues (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 22-25. Blondell argues that 
because silent and solitary reading were the exception, rather than the rule, in Plato’s time, “just about all ancient 
Greek texts were in some sense performed. At a minimum, this means that they were spoken aloud, for the benefit or 
entertainment of some kind of audience (23).” Nevertheless, complex, reported dialogues such as the Symposium, 
would not likely have been performed by more than one actor (24).  
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 The comedy in the Hippias Major manifests itself primarily in three comic tropes: 
Hippias is made to seem foolish and his claims to nobility are found questionable in light of the 
events of the story; both Socrates and Hippias find themselves in a laughable situation; the 
register employed by both characters has a wide range, befitting the comic genre. These comic 
elements are present in the dialogue and a Greek reader would recognize them as such.228 The 
overall philosophical significance of the comedy in the dialogue lies in the self-knowledge that 
both Socrates and Hippias acquire, when they both admit, in different ways, to having failed to 
define the beautiful itself in a definitive, discursive way. This self-knowledge also extends to 
reader of the dialogue, who is able to see in the contrasting ways that Hippias and Socrates deal 
with their admitted failure a choice between sophistry and philosophy.229 Once their ignorance is 
revealed, Hippias and Socrates deal with their failure to answer the question of the beautiful in 
different ways. Socrates is a person who admits to not knowing what the definition of the 
beautiful itself is, but who must relentlessly pursue the question. Hippias is revealed to be 
someone who claims to know what the beautiful itself is (287b), but who does not care or find it 
                                                          
228 David Konstan writes: “… an Athenian audience, whether in the fifth century or the fourth and later, would have 
had no difficulty in knowing whether the performance they were watching was a kômôidia.”  See David Konstan, 
“Defining the genre,” in The Cambridge Companion to Greek Comedy, Martin Revermann, ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 32. It follows that an Athenian reader would be able to recognize comic tropes 
when they make their appearance in a Platonic dialogue. 
229 Here I concur with Franco V. Trivigno’s thesis that the comic element of Platonic dialogues is best understood as 
a device to inspire self-knowledge in the reader. “Since self-ignorance is universally agreed to be a vice, by 
exposing the self-ignorant, he makes them more virtuous. Indeed, insofar as this person aims at the good even of his 
enemies, this person seems not really to have enemies at all. He recognizes and acknowledges a shared humanity: 
both he and the self-ignorant are ignorant with respect to wisdom and share the tendency to self-ignorance. This 
person perceives the bad, self-ignorant condition of others also as a real possibility for himself, which he attempts to 
stave off through constant examination. His examination of others is thus at the same time an opportunity for self-
scrutiny. The pleasurable feeling generated by the revelation of self-ignorance is not one of mocking self-
satisfaction. Rather, it is the pure pleasure of learning (52a). The person living the higher way of life, then, through 
his exposure of the ridiculousness of self-ignorance, attempts to occasion self-knowledge in all he meets.” Franco V. 
Trivigno, “The Philosophical Muse: On Comedy in the Platonic Dialogues” (PhD Diss., Boston University, 2008), 
242. I would quibble with Trivgno’s thesis only in adding that the Socrates of the Hippias Major does not 
necessarily prove that Hippias’s ignorance of the philosophical answer to the question of the beautiful (as opposed to 
the rhetorical or sophistical answer which he gives us [304a-b]) is morally blameworthy. In other words, Socrates 
demonstrates Hippias’s philosophical ignorance, but he leaves the reader with the option to question whether the 
philosophical path truly is preferable. This will become clearer in the third section of this chapter. 
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useful to pursue the question—and someone whose ignorance has been exposed by none other 
than the self-aware ignorant and ugly man, Socrates. Thus we have a comic situation where the 
ignorance of both characters is revealed, but the pride of only one of the two is hurt.  But 
Hippias’s pride is only hurt because he claimed to know something he did not know. If he were a 
philosopher, his pride would not have been hurt. Proceeding, I will first elaborate upon the three 
comic tropes found in the Hippias Major. Then I will articulate the philosophical significance of 
the comic element. 
 The first comic element lies in Hippias’s failure and inability to satisfactorily answer the 
question of the beautiful, and the irony that comes with this failure and inability, given the claims 
that Hippias makes for himself. In the Poetics, Aristotle argues that comedy concerns blundering 
or laughable protagonists (μίμησις φαυλοτέρων) who make some sort of mistake (ἁμάρτημα) 
which is laughable (γελοῖον), but which does not cause pain and disaster (ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ 
φθαρτικόν).230 This dynamic is found in the Hippias Major. Hippias’s mistake is his inability and 
failure to meet the standard of wisdom he has claimed of himself. As such, he cuts a common 
Platonic figure. From the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates indulges Hippias’s ego, by 
affirming his noble claims. Hippias is “beautiful and wise,” and he excels in both public and 
private affairs. Many cities—with the significant exception of Sparta—pay him to teach. Yet 
once Socrates sets for him the task of defining one of the terms—τὸ καλόν—which Hippias uses 
to describe the value of his work as a Sophist, Hippias is found to be powerless to do so. The 
failure of all three of his attempts to define the beautiful, and his loss of patience with Socrates, 
both point to a comic haplessness on the part of the man who claims to be able to teach the elite 
youth of many Greek cities. A similar charge cannot be made of Socrates. He too cannot 
                                                          
230 Poetics 1449a. 
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discover the eidos of the beautiful. But the fact that he does not claim to know the beautiful, and 
that he confesses his ignorance (286c), keeps him from becoming a ridiculous figure. Moreover, 
all of the vituperation that Socrates takes at the hands of his unnamed friend, precisely for being 
unable to answer the question, is actually transferable to Hippias himself. Once the unnamed 
friend is unmasked, and seen to be Socrates himself, more comedy ensues. The unnamed friend 
has been, all along (though perhaps not exclusively), a comic device, which Socrates uses to 
mock and ridicule Hippias, indirectly, from the very beginning of their dialogue. Hippias would 
know the identity of “Sophroniscus’s son,” and the more strident tone that Hippias adopts against 
Socrates in the final passages of the dialogue is due to the fact that Socrates has disclosed his 
own opinion of Hippias’s by disclosing the true identity of his unnamed friend.231 
 An important part of Hippias’s failure is that he does not learn from it—that is, he gains 
no self-knowledge from it. Even if Hippias’s inability to answer the question becomes readily 
apparent to him by the end of the dialogue (and is laughable, when one recalls, for example, his 
initial confidence and boastfulness about the question not being “large,” 287b), it does not 
become apparent at all that his ignorance constitutes a flaw, or something negative, in itself. 
Instead, from his point of view, Hippias fails not at obtaining knowledge, but at playing 
Socrates’s game. Once he drops Socrates’s questioning, and makes a gesture in support of 
speechmaking (“But here’s what is beautiful and worth a lot: to be able to present a speech well 
and beautifully…”, 304a-b), he no longer looks like a fool. He is only a comical figure when he 
attempts to do something he cannot do: define the beautiful under the strict standards set forth by 
                                                          
231 Less plausible is that Hippias does not know who “Sophroniscus’s son” really is. In that case, Socrates’s line, that 
“He happens to be a close relative of mine, and he lives in the same house” (304d), which he utters near the end of 
the dialogue, is comic because Socrates is teasing Hippias about the true identity of the unnamed friend. It would be 
an instance of dramatic irony: the reader knows who Sophroniscus’s son is, but not Hippias. I find this interpretation 
less plausible than the one I advance above, for the reason that Socrates was a well-known figure, historically 
speaking, to the Sophists with whom he dialogued. 
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Socrates’s dialectical questioning. But once he wholly rejects Socrates’s method, he is no longer 
an object of ridicule. Hippias learns that he cannot claim philosophical wisdom, but having 
learned this, he chooses to definitely break with the life of philosophical eros. He rejects 
Socrates’s philosophical eros in order to stop looking ridiculous, in order to end the frustrating 
conversation that Socrates has roped him into having. Yet the reader also learns something about 
Hippias: that his initial boastfulness was misguided and wrong, and that philosophy is more 
difficult—and perhaps more worthy of pursuing—than Hippias believes it to be. 
 The second comic element of the Hippias Major has to do with the general situation in 
which the protagonists find themselves. Even if Socrates is saved from looking foolish—because 
he, unlike Hippias, does not claim to be wise—nevertheless both Socrates and Hippias share in 
looking ridiculous once they have undertaken the task of discovering the eidos of the beautiful. 
The fact that neither of them can discover the eidos puts them both in a laughable situation.232 
For all of their talk about maidens and spoons, power and pleasure, neither Socrates nor Hippias 
can formulate a satisfying answer to their own question. Socrates himself understands the 
humorous side to this. He tells Hippias that the unnamed third friend would “certainly laugh 
[καταγελάσεται] at us harder than ever” (291e) for still not being able to answer the question, 
already back when the two discuss Hippias’s third definition. Later on, after the collapse of his 
own definition of the beautiful as “the beneficial,” Socrates will confess that the collapse of this 
definition is “more laughable [γελοιότερος] than the first accounts, when we thought the girl, or 
each one of those things mentioned earlier, was the beautiful” (297d). Hippias and Socrates have 
each failed, and Socrates finds both of their failures to be comical. However, Socrates reserves 
the more pejorative word, καταγελάω, for Hippias’s failure—a word that is closer to “jeer”—
                                                          
232 As Hyland notes, “those dialogues in which a number of definitions are proposed but all are refuted, thus ending 
in aporia, can be understood as comedies of errors.” See Hyland, Finitude and Transcendence, 133. 
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while applying the lighter γέλοιος (“ridiculous”, “mirth-provoking”) to his own.233 This suggests 
that Socrates does not see the two “failures” in the same light: Socrates is making a genuine 
philosophical search, his eros oriented toward the good. Hippias, on the other hand, vacillates 
between genuinely supporting Socrates’s philosophical inquiry, and buffing up his own claims to 
knowledge. The end result, as we have seen, is that Hippias ultimately rejects philosophy, and 
Socrates’s questioning. 
 The difference between laughing and jeering can be recast in terms of self-knowledge. 
Socrates knows that he does not know something worth knowing; Hippias knows that he does 
not know, but he does not think this ignorance is significant. In other words, Socrates recognizes 
the limits of his knowledge, but he maintains the interrogative stance, characteristic of 
philosophical eros, with respect to the eidos of the beautiful. At the end of the dialogue, he 
affirms that the investigation into the beautiful has been worthwhile. His situation is comic, 
viewed from a certain angle. But it is not something before which one should jeer. Socrates 
recognizes his limited capacity to pursue a worthwhile goal of knowledge. In contrast, Hippias 
sees this same limitation in himself, but does not believe that this limitation signals something 
significant about his condition as a human being. He prefers to ignore it and move on to other 
things, like the pursuit of power through sophistry. Socrates and Hippias both obtain self-
knowledge about the limits of their capacity of knowledge, but only Socrates refuses to see this 
bit of self-knowledge as a sign that he should quit philosophizing. He affirms philosophy in spite 
of it, recognizing that philosophy is still something good. 
                                                          
233 In his survey of Platonic uses of laughter, G.J. De Vries underscores the difference between καταγέλαστος, the 
adjectival form of καταγελάω, and γελοῖσς (or γέλοιος): “As to the terms used, no uncertainty can exist. Plato makes 
Aristophanes mark the difference between καταγέλαστος which is always unfavourable and γελοῖσς which often 
means ‘funny,’ ‘amusing’ (Sy. 189 b, cp. 215 a).” De Vries’s preferred rendering of γελοῖσς is “funny,” a translation 
that we adopt in this chapter: “In his translation of Republic Shorey consistently uses ‘ludicrous’ for γελοῖσς. I am 
not sure that the English word can be used as synonymous with ‘funny.’” See G.J. De Vries, “Laughter in Plato’s 
Writings,” Mnemosyne 38 (1985): 381. 
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 The third comic element in the Hippias Major lies in its register, or the range of linguistic 
variety employed by the work’s protagonists.234 Greek comedy of Plato’s time employs 
colloquial and less formal registers,235 sometimes contrasting this “vulgar” diction with the lofty 
language of the higher classes.236 We see a similar wide-ranging register in the Hippias Major. 
Hippias speaks in a lofty style, while Socrates’s imaginary friend speaks in a more vulgar 
fashion; Hippias attacks him precisely for this reason: “Who is the man, Socrates? What a boor 
he is to dare in an august proceeding to speak such vulgar speech [φαῦλα] that way!” (288d). 
Socrates says that his friend is “not refined. He’s garbage” (οὐ κομψὸς ἀλλὰ συρφετός, 288d). 
Yet this unrefined man cares for nothing but the truth (οὐδὲν ἄλλο φροντίζων ἢ τὸ ἀληθές , 
288d). By the end of the dialogue, we learn that Socrates is in fact referring to himself in these 
passages. Thus the philosophical search for truth is deemed to be a wholly separate enterprise 
from the mellifluous speechmaking that Hippias practices and prefers. Socrates, unrefined and 
desirous of discovering the truth, prefers to use as wide a range of diction as possible. He will 
speak of spoons and mares, but also of the eidos and the beneficial. But he defends the use of 
lowly diction against Hippias’s condemnations of the same. The dialogue contains many “low” 
moments and vulgar diction.  
 Socrates’s defense of low diction presents a problem, similar to his lack of beautiful 
dress. Why is it that the man who does not know the beautiful itself—Hippias—is also the one 
                                                          
234 As part of his discussion about the Hippias Major’s authenticity, Woodruff highlights the comic register in the 
dialogue: “the Hippias Major uses poetic and bombastic language playfully in parody of Hippias, possibly by 
quoting comic authors of Plato’s period.” See Woodruff, Hippias Major, 99. 
235 See Andreas Willi, “The Language(s) of Comedy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Greek Comedy, Martin 
Revermann, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 168-185, especially these observations on the 
continuities of register in throughout the history of Greek comedies: “Considering the entire range of Greek literary 
genres, comedy – both Aristophanic and Menandrean—undoubtedly gravitates towards the colloquial end” (172).  
236 Konstan argues that is was the case in the time of Old Comedy: “Beyond metre, the audience at a kômôidia in the 
time of Aristophanes would anticipate a linguistic register that was highly varied, including colloquialisms and 
vulgar language, extravagant multisyllabic coinages, occasional imitations of non-Attic dialects or ungrammatical 
and even nonsensical expressions on the part of barbarians (that is, non-Greeks), and ‘high-falutin’ phrases in the 
style of tragedy, especially useful for mocking the sister genre.” See Konstan, “Defining the genre,” 34. 
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who is beautifully clad and who speaks beautifully? And why is it that ugly Socrates, who 
earnestly desires to know the beautiful and may have learned at least something about it in the 
course of his dialogue with Hippias—why is he using vulgar words? A reason for these contrasts 
can be found in the erotic nature of Socrates’s search. Eros seeks what it lacks. The ugly 
Socrates seeks for beauty. Moreover, Socrates’s philosophical eros causes him to search for what 
is beautiful itself within appearances but somehow distinct from them (294a), and he is therefore 
against anything which would give an object the appearances of beauty without the eidos of 
beauty. The example he uses is precisely “clothes and shoes” that make someone who is in fact 
ridiculous (γελοῖος) look beautiful (294a). Finally, philosophical eros expresses itself in the 
performance of asking questions (as we argue in Chapter One). Hippias’s preference for lofty 
speech, and his disdain for the vulgar, closes him off to philosophical dialogue with Socrates’s 
unnamed friend: “I wouldn’t talk with a man who asked things like that” (291a). That man is, 
once again, Socrates himself.237 
 This identification of Socrates with the use of vulgar language suggests that we can 
understand the register of the dialogue also in terms of self-knowledge. Socrates refuses to claim 
a wisdom he does not have for himself. His language reflects his awareness of his lack of 
knowledge, and his refusal to make lofty claims for himself.  But Socrates’s ability to 
nevertheless engage Hippias, who speaks beautiful, shows that Socrates does have the ability to 
pursue knowledge from within his stance of poverty, from within the interrogative stance. The 
                                                          
237 My interpretation of the linguistic register in the Hippias Major owes much to Nancy Worman’s illuminating 
discussion. Worman calls Socrates’s engagement with his imaginary friend and Hippias an “elaborate charade,” in 
which “Socrates’s imposture makes possible a lampoon not only of the boastful, word-proud sophist but also of the 
self-abuse that reiterates the insults of his opponents and underscores his lowbrow, small-talking ways” (204). See 
her full discussion of the Hippias Major in Nancy Worman, Abusive Mouths in Classical Athens (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 201-204.  
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reader then is forced to consider whether Socrates’s vulgar speech is truly at odds with the 
pursuit of wisdom, or whether Hippias’s lofty speech is actually a mask for ignorance. 
 Having looked at the comic elements in the Hippias Major, we can now analyze their 
contrast with the philosophical significance of the dialogue’s theme (the beautiful) and the 
philosophical eros which animates the pursuit of this theme. The three comic elements in the 
Hippias Major which we have just described—the contrast between Hippias’s high claims about 
his own knowledge and his inability to answer the question of the beautiful, the laughable 
situation the characters find themselves in, and the range of linguistic variety found in the 
dialogue—can all be said to contribute to a general atmosphere of liveliness and fun in the 
dialogue. But this liveliness and fun is accompanied by a sense of limits: the comic elements 
disclose the inability and failure of both characters to define the beautiful. Precisely because 
Hippias and Socrates fail to answer the question, the dialogue is funny. The dialogue makes their 
task appear to be impossible, and for two men to spend a lot of time trying to accomplish an 
impossible task can be a comic situation. Yet the comic dimension also reveals a difference 
between the character’s respective ways of dealing with this limitation. Both acquire self-
knowledge about their ability to define the beautiful, but Socrates does not see this limitation as 
an excuse to abandon philosophy, the way Hippias does. The reader is forced then to ask herself 
which of the two stances with respect to philosophy—Hippias’s or Socrates’s—is the most 
reasonable. In other words, what should eros do after it encounters beauty? Should it pursue one 
interrogate beauty, asking for its eidos? Should one merely use it? This question cannot be fully 
answered, however, without also taking into account the tragic elements of the dialogue. 
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Tragedy in the Hippias Major 
 Looking at the comic dimension of the dialogue brings to the fore Hippias’s and 
Socrates’s limitations with regard to their ability to define the beautiful itself. It also shows us 
how these characters gain self-knowledge about their limitation. But each character also 
responds to their failure to define the beautiful, and their self-awareness about this failure, in 
different ways, and the dialogue suggests that these responses produce tragic outcomes for both 
Hippias and Socrates. Nussbaum’s observation about the tragedy and comedy of eros, as 
depicted in the Aristophanic discourse in the Symposium, finds an echo here: “If it were told 
from the inside, it would, as we have said, be tragedy. The comedy comes in the sudden turning 
round of our heads and eyes to look at human genitals and faces, our unrounded, desiring, and 
vulnerable parts.” 238  From the “outside,” the Hippias Major looks like the story of two men, one 
rich and the other poor, one powerful and the other a pauper, one beautiful and the other ugly, 
both in search of something neither can obtain. Together, they come to an awareness of the 
limitations of their knowledge. From the inside, however—from the point of view of my 
personal erotic longing for the good, and from the point of view of the beautiful—the dialogue 
takes on a tragic tone. On the one hand, the dénouement of the dialogue suggests that Hippias is 
a tragic figure. That is, Hippias, as a result of his decision to reject philosophy, encounters 
suffering. On the other hand, the dénouement also hints a tragedy for Socrates. Socrates, as a 
result of his decision to embrace philosophy, will fail to do what Hippias calls “what is beautiful 
and worth a lot,” that is, “to be able to present a speech …. in court or council or any other 
authority to whom you give the speech, to convince them and go hone carrying not the smallest 
but the greatest of prizes, the successful defense of yourself, your property, and friends” (304a-
                                                          
238 See Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 173. 
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b). A close look at each of these tragic outcomes reveals a difference between them explicable in 
terms of eros, and hints a sort of “consolation” which attenuates, or perhaps makes worthwhile, 
Socrates’s tragic suffering.  
The Tragedy of Hippias 
 The tragedy of Hippias results from his final decision to reject philosophy and return to 
his original position as a sophist (304a). He returns to viewing the beautiful as a powerful 
rhetorical tool, as something to be used, as opposed to something to be discovered for its own 
sake, something to be known. If we bring to bear a few of the conventions of Greek tragedy, we 
can see how the dialogue suggests that this decision of Hippias’s is a tragic one. My method here 
is not to make a general interpretation of Aristotelian tragedy in order to see whether and how 
Hippias and Socrates stand with relation to it. Rather, I want to demonstrate how certain aspects 
of tragedy, as identified by Aristotle, help us gain a deeper understanding of the twin fates of our 
interlocutors as they are described in the dénouement of the dialogue. 
One of the essential elements of tragedy enumerated in the Poetics of Aristotle is the 
stature of the tragic hero. Only the fall of a person from a position of “great repute and good 
fortune” (μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχίᾳ, 1453a8) to a position of bad fortune can inspire tragic 
pity and fear in an audience.  More to the point, the stature of the tragic figure is a product of 
other people’s estimation, and not necessarily a matter of fact. As Michael Davis puts it, “the 
subjects of tragedy are those who are thought to be great. Their repute (doxa) is a question of 
opinion (doxa).”239 The tragic hero’s subsequent fall forces reflection upon, and reevaluation of, 
                                                          
239 See the “Introduction” by Michael Davis in Aristotle, Poetics, Seth Benardete and Michael Davis, trans. (South 
Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2002), xxiii. 
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this opinion.240 This fall must be of a certain magnitude (μέγεθος ἐχούσης, 1449b24). Within 
Hippias’s story, we find all of these tragic elements: a certain stature furnished by public 
opinion; a missing-of-the-mark, attributable to both personal moral factors as well as political 
world beyond Hippias’s control; and tragic consequences –a fall—which come about as a 
consequence of this missing-of-the-mark, which are hinted at or implied in the dialogue.  
 Hippias’s stature is made clear from the very beginning of the dialogue. Stature need not 
mean moral rectitude, but merely a high status of power and honor in Greek society, that is, a 
position of prestige afforded by the doxa of others. Hippias is both a diplomat and a renowned 
sophist (281a-d). Moreover, a contemporary reader of the dialogue would perhaps know about 
the career of the real-life Hippias, which was full of prestige as well as notoriety. In any case, it 
was the career of a powerful man. But in a broader sense, his stature is also derived from the fact 
that he can experience beautiful beings, and has the ability—as a human being—to make a noetic 
insight into the beautiful itself. In other words, he is an erotic being, and he has the choice to 
direct his eros toward the good. He has the ability to follow Socrates. This gives him a certain 
nobility, at least in the Socratic sense of the word. The beautiful is also noble (καλόν is often 
rendered, “the noble”) and  the ability to come to know the noble, an ability which Socrates 
believes human beings have (to an imperfect but real degree), gives a certain nobility to human 
beings.  
Hippias’s hamartia, or missing-of-the-mark, is precisely his rejection of his ability to 
know the beautiful. It is his decision to abort the search, inaugurated by Socrates, for the eidos of 
the beautiful. The concept of hamartia, as it appears in Aristotle and as it manifests itself in 
                                                          
240 As Davis puts it, “The goal of tragedy is the stimulation of pity and fear because reflection is stimulated only by 
failure.” Davis, “Introduction,” xxv. 
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Greek tragedy, has been variously defined as meaning a “mistake of fact”241 or a “moral 
error,”242 or as encompassing both.243 Moreover, the external factors and unchangeable facts of 
the situation and environment which surround the tragic hero (and which he cannot control) also 
have a place in any complete account of hamartia.244 In calling Hippias’s rejection of philosophy 
a hamartia, I am arguing that Hippias’s refusal to direct his eros toward the good and toward 
knowledge about beauty brings about negative consequences, which are caused both by the 
nature of his decision as well as by external factors. Hippias’s decision constitutes a moral error, 
but it is also one made within a particular political environment.  
Hippias’s hamartia must first be understood in terms of his attitude toward eros and 
pleasure, and their respective relationship to the beautiful. We can gain a sharper view of his 
                                                          
241 A thorough defense of hamartia as referring exclusively to mistakes of fact is found in R. D. Dawe, “Some 
Reflections on Ate and Hamartia,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 72 (1968): 89-123. Dawe prefers the 
phrase, “error in judgment,” caused sometimes through divine action as ate. As he puts it, “an error in judgment is 
something which can either be entirely the responsibility of the man who makes it, or can be something induced, 
normally by the gods putting in such a position that he has little choice but to make a decision that will later recoil 
on him with disastrous, and above all disproportionate, consequences” (94-95). Leon Golden disputes Dawe’s 
association of ate and hamartia, but defends the notion that hamartia means “intellectual error of judgment, although 
it may at times include other nuances of meaning as well” (12). See Leon Golden, “Hamartia, Ate, and Oedipus,” 
The Classical World 72 (1978): 3-12. A more recent expression of this view is found in Ho Kim, “Aristotle’s 
‘Hamartia’ Reconsidered,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 105 (2010): 33-52. Kim writes that hamartia 
“can be interpreted to mean ignorance of the particulars of one’s action, especially including misidentification of 
close blood-relatives.” For a historical survey of how this passage in the Poetics has been interpreted since the 
Middle Ages, see J. M. Bremer, Hamartia: Tragic Error in the Poetics of Aristotle and in Greek Tragedy 
(Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1969). 
242 A compelling case for “moral error” as a type of hamartia included in the Poetics is made by T.C.W. Stinton, 
“Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy,” The Classical Quarterly 25 (1975): 221-254. Michael Davis shares this 
view. See Davis, “Introduction,” xxv. A useful and brief explanation of Stinton’s views is found in J.L. Moles, 
“Aristotle and Dido’s ‘Hamartia,’” Greece & Rome 31 (1984): 48-54. 
243 There are also those who argue that hamartia is not a central idea to Aristotle’s theory of tragedy nor to tragedy 
itself. See A. W. H. Adkins, “Aristotle and the Best Kind of Tragedy,” The Classical Quarterly 16 (1966): 78-102. 
Adkins argues that hamartia does not require special emphasis in Aristotle. Also Joe Sachs, who writes: “Tragedy is 
never about flaws, and it is only the silliest of mistranslations that puts that claim in Aristotle’s mouth. Tragedy is 
about central and indispensable human attributes, disclosed to us by the pity that draws us toward them and the fear 
that makes us recoil from what threatens them.” Joe Sachs, “Aristotle: Poetics,” Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-poe/. While I find the concept to be useful for looking at the dénouement 
of the Hippias Major, I would agree with Sachs that, read in light of the categories of tragic theater, the Hippias 
Major shows us a few central human attributes with regard to eros, noesis, and the beautiful.  
244 In David Roochnik’s apt description, the hero’s fall is “as much a consequence of his necessary involvement in a 
world beyond his control as it is of his own action. It is precisely this duality … that characterizes tragic 
catastrophe.” Roochnik, The Tragedy of Logos, 3. 
220 
 
attitude towards both if we compare it to that of two other Platonic characters, Alcibiades in the 
Symposium and Philebus in the dialogue of the same name. Both of these characters also chose to 
reject Socrates’s invitation to follow him in the path of philosophy, and they also both betrayed a 
weakness for the life of pleasure. Hippias stands in contrast to these two characters in a unique 
way. Unlike Philebus, he is open to following Socrates down the path of philosophy, at least for 
the length of one conversation. Unlike Alcibiades, his decision to reject Socrates is adamant, 
clear-cut, and not fraught with self-doubt or insecurity. 
The contrast with Philebus is instructive because it shows the degree to which Hippias 
attempts to embrace philosophy. Philebus only speaks three times in the dialogue which bears his 
name (11c, 12a-c, 27e); the discussion about pleasure, and its relation to the good life, is 
conducted primarily between Socrates and Protarchus, Philebus’s companion. Socrates has set 
out to determine whether pleasure is the highest good for which one should live. If one chooses 
to engage in philosophical discussion about pleasure, one has already indicated, by actions if not 
argument, that there exists a good higher than pleasure. According to Gadamer, Philebus’s 
silence is philosophically meaningful: “Resistance to the demand that justification be given is 
part and parcel of the hedonist position. Philebus is consistent when he does not oppose this 
demand with a logical argument, but, instead, dogmatically insists on the unconditional priority 
of hëdonë.”245 In other words, Philebus choses to be consistent with what he declares to be his 
deepest held belief: the life of pleasure is the best way of life. Had he chosen to engage Socrates 
in a defense of this belief, he would be affirming its contrary; he would be arguing that the life of 
philosophy is at least on par with the life of pleasure. But Philebus’s position can also be 
articulated in terms of eros. Philebus does not have the need to go beyond pleasure and to see the 
                                                          
245 Gadamer, The Idea of the Good, 106. 
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good. Pleasure is self-referential; it is a type of appearance. Philebus does not have an eros for 
the truth beyond appearances. By refusing to play Socrates’s game, he remains consistent in his 
self-satisfaction. In contrast, Hippias does entertain Socrates’s invitation to philosophize, even if 
he does so without the best attitude (for example, he thinks that the discussion is too easy for 
him: “The question is not large” 287a). Nevertheless, he implicitly affirms that philosophizing 
with Socrates is good. He also explicitly agrees with Socrates that the beautiful is good (297c). 
All of this, despite also showing a bias for defining the beautiful in self-referential ways: through 
the thrill of pleasure (his first definition, “a beautiful maiden”) or sensory perception (his second 
definition, “gold”). When Socrates proposes that the beautiful may be defined as “the pleasurable 
through hearing and sight,” Hippias entertains the idea, even to the point of concurring with 
Socrates that if the beautiful were to be associated with pleasure, then it would have to be a sort 
of beneficial pleasure (303e). What all of this indicates is that Hippias does not have a consistent 
point of view with regard to the goodness of philosophy, up until the moment that he decides to 
reject it. Before that, he is able to entertain the possibility that the definition of the beautiful itself 
ought to be sought after in dialectical argument, even though, were he to pursue this endeavor 
consistently, he would have to change his way of life.  
From the Socratic point of view, Hippias’s ultimate rejection of philosophy (304a) is a 
mistake, which can also be articulated in terms of eros. Hippias ultimately does not want to 
direct his eros toward the good. To direct one’s eros toward the good means to refuse to be 
content with apparent goods, and to not cease exploring until one reaches an actual good. The 
pursuit of the eidos of the beautiful requires a similar disposition: we cannot be content merely to 
accept the apparent beauty of objects, but must move in a direction of trying to understand the 
eidos which is the source of their beautiful appearance. Whatever the psychological origins of his 
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refusal, Hippias’s refusal is decisive. It is also pleasant. By abandoning Socrates’s path, Hippias 
returns to his self-referential, self-interested position. He can enjoy his wealth, power, and 
pleasure, without the bothersome task of following the path of philosophy.  
 In this last respect, Hippias stands in sharp contrast with the Alcibiades of the 
Symposium. In that dialogue, Alcibiades depicts himself as being torn between his attraction to 
Socrates, on the on hand, and his attraction to the life that Socrates is inviting him to live, on the 
other. He is also, broadly speaking, torn between a life of honor and power, and the more 
demanding, self-sacrificing, ascetic life of philosophy.246 His flaw has to do with weakness: for 
pleasure and honor over self-sacrifice, and for the particular (Socrates) over the ideal (the Good). 
Alcibiades is attached to what is familiar to him, and what seems more pleasant. But he has seen 
enough of the life of philosophy to be tortured by his weakness, and to regret the fact that he 
cannot follow Socrates down the path of philosophy. Hippias, in contrast, feels no such regret. 
He knows, in the end, what is truly beautiful: “to be able to present a speech well and beautifully, 
in court or council or any other authority … to convince them and go home carrying not the 
smallest but the greatest of prizes, the successful defense of yourself, your property, and your 
friends. One should stick to that” (304a-b). In other words, what is beautiful is the ability to 
defend, protect, and increase one’s own interests, those things which are good “for me,” in a 
selfish sense. This is consistent with what we know about the historical Hippias: he was known 
to regard “money and glory as the constant values of human life.”247 We do not perceive in 
                                                          
246 I quibble here with Nussbaum’s following claim: “The philosopher asks to be taken to the agathon, the 
repeatable universal Good. Alcibiades asks to be taken to Agathon, a non-very-good particular boy.” Alcibiades’s is 
surely attracted by Agathon, but he is also in love with Socrates. It is the tension between his love of Socrates, and 
the fact that Socrates’s points beyond himself toward the good, that is the source of Alcibiades’s suffering. 
Alcibiades wants the good, but he cannot sacrifice his desire to possess Socrates. See Nussbaum, The Fragility of 
Goodness, 185. 
247 S. Dušanić,”Hippias the Elean: The Revolutionary Activities and Political Attitudes of a Sophist,” Aevum 82 
(2008): 46. Dušanić goes through most of the historical records we have of Hippias in an attempt to reconstruct his 
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Hippias the same turmoil that Alcibiades is all too willing to divulge to his friends in the 
Symposium. In fact, his decision is taken out of frustration with Socrates’s apparently aimless 
and fruitless questioning. Socrates only gives us “flakings and clippings of speeches” (κνήσματά 
τοί ἐστι καὶ περιτμήματα τῶν λόγων, 304a) and his theorizing does not allow him to see 
“naturally continuous bodies of being” (διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα, 301a). In contrast 
to Alcibiades, Hippias shows himself to be more confident and decisive in rejecting philosophy 
and Socrates. 
 Alcibiades also proves to be a useful contrast when dealing with the matter of the 
“world” beyond Hippias’s control, that is, the situation within which Hippias makes his decision 
to reject philosophy. For this, we must go to the historical record. Hippias was “a prominent, but 
not sincere, diplomat.”  He was remembered in the ancient world for being “autocratic and 
harsh,”248 known for revolutionary inclinations,249 and the conviction that “nature is to be 
preferred to law, and that it is nature which is the real source of human obligations.”250 This last 
philosophical conviction supplied the philosophical justification for arguing in favor of Pan-
Hellenic unity.251 (This conviction also explains, perhaps, Hippias’s preference for “continuous 
bodies” over Socrates’s tedious questioning.)  In other words, Hippias was enmeshed in a world 
quite similar to that of Alcibiades, who was also a political leader involved in revolutionary 
intrigue. Moreover, like Alcibiades, Hippias loved money and glory. Therefore his decision to 
reject the path beyond appearances that Socrates opens up is made within a context of wealth, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
political career. Aldo Brancacci also attempts to reconstruct Hippias’s political views in “La Pensée Politique 
d’Hippias,” Methexis 26 (2013) 23-38, arguing that Plato’s Hippias held to a sort of “aristocratic cosmopolitanism.” 
248 The Roman Ammianus Marcellinus has written: “Hippiam Eleum sophistarum acerrimum.” Cited in Dušanić, 
“Hippias the Elean,” 44.  
249 On Hippias’s “political radicalism and revolutionary temperament,” see Dušanić, “Hippias the Elean,” 45. 
250 G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 148. 
251 As Brancacci writes: “Hippias y aurait soutenu la thèse selon laquelle les Grecs sont mutuellement unis, et sont 
des concitoyens d’un mëme état, selon la nature, non selon la loi … ” See Brancacci, “Le pensée politique 
d’Hippias,” 36. 
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power, and violence. When Plato has Hippias declare that the most beautiful thing is to be able to 
defend one’s self, friends, and property before a council or court, he is probably alluding to the 
historical Hippias’s involvement with the politics of Elis. Moreover, he is possibly alluding to 
the fact that Hippias died as a direct consequence of his political activities. Hippias was executed 
for attempting to launch a coup in Elis “against the oppressive, radically oligarchical and pro-
Spartan regime created in Elis in 401-400 BC.”252 To be sure, Hippias is not “fated” to reject 
philosophy for power in the same way Oedipus is fated by the gods to murder his father and 
marry his mother, but the political environment does play a role analogous to that of the gods in 
that it is a pressure upon Hippias that he cannot control completely, and that could determine his 
fate. 
 As stated above, for Hippias’s act of rejecting philosophy to be considered properly 
tragic, it must be shown to be a fall from good fortune to bad fortune—that is, it must have 
negative consequences. Hippias makes his choice explicit (304a-b), and this choice reflects his 
preference for the way of life that he has been leading to this moment: a life of wealth, glory, and 
sophistry, but also the engaged political life of a diplomat. But it is precisely this world of glory 
and power which will see his end. In becoming embroiled in revolutionary politics, Hippias will 
find his fate.  
 Another angle from which to consider whether Hippias’s fate is to be called tragic is to 
consider the content of his politics. The historical Hippias died as a consequence of his 
opposition to a pro-Spartan regime. In the Hippias Major, Sparta is depicted as being a city 
which holds teachers to the standard of virtue and, as a consequence, does not allow Hippias to 
teach to its youth (284d-285c). Socrates in the Hippias Major effectively aligns himself with the 
                                                          
252 See Dušanić, “Hippias the Elean,” 45. 
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Spartans, in the sense that he too opposes Hippias’s understanding of what education is, and 
unlike Hippias, believes that the search for the beautiful is good, and that the beautiful is good in 
itself. (To be sure, Socrates may have disagreed with the actual content of Spartan education—it 
is their intentions that he agrees with). Thus, Socrates implicitly agrees with the Spartan bias 
against foreign education and for the teaching of virtue, and Hippias ends his life in a fight 
against a pro-Spartan regime. Perhaps there is a link here between the discussion about Sparta in 
the dialogue, and Hippias’s actual end. Perhaps Plato is hinting at the political consequences of 
the rejection of philosophy. 
 Regardless of the accuracy of the foregoing historical speculation, however, on a 
philosophical plane, Hippias’s decision can be construed as tragic most certainly if we take 
Socrates’s point of view on the beautiful itself. If Socrates and Hippias have truly had a noetic 
flash, an insight that the beautiful itself is something, and something good, then Hippias’s 
rejection of the search for the beautiful itself is a rejection of this capacity (however limited) to 
make trustworthy insights into the beautiful itself. It is also a rejection of the capacity to know 
the good in one of its manifestations (i.e., as beauty). It is the tragic rejection of the discoveries 
made in the course of a philosophical dialogue. The search for the beautiful itself was born out of 
a debate between Hippias and Socrates concerning beautiful speeches, and their value for the 
citizens of a polis. As we have seen, the ensuing philosophical investigation into the beautiful 
revealed the beautiful to be “something” (287c-d), an eidos which causes beings to become 
beautiful (289d) and not merely appear to become beautiful (294a), and which has a beneficial 
power (296e-297a) and is also itself good (297c). Only the soul whose eros is focused in a 
philosophical direction toward the good, will be able to see the beautiful for what it is. Only the 
eros for the good forces one to go beyond epithumia, utilitarian interest, and appearances (an 
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apparent good is never satisfactory; one can only be content with an actual good). But now, 
Hippias has opted to forget all of this.  
If we accept Socrates’s position, then Hippias’s life must be considered tragic.253 We do 
not see the “pity and fear” depicted in the dialogue, however. In this respect, his story is not 
tragic in a more conventional sense. What is ennobling is Socrates’s life, and the suffering that 
he undergoes in the pursuit of philosophy. The dialogue leaves us with a hint that Socrates’s life 
is preferable to Hippias’s, and also with Socrates’s explicit claim that his search for the eidos is 
“good for me.” Ultimately, however, this claim must be tested, that is, enacted, by the reader 
who wishes to attempt the philosophical life. 
The Tragedy of Socrates 
 Socrates’s character also undergoes tragedy, but his hamartia is the opposite of 
Hippias’s: he chooses to continue philosophizing, and this is what will eventually lead him to 
suffering (which he acknowledges in his final speech, 304b-e) and catastrophe (though this 
catastrophe—Socrates’s execution—is known by the readers, though not depicted, but perhaps 
foreshadowed, in the text).254 This means that Socrates’s story is tragic only in the eyes of 
someone who values philosophy, who believes that eros should seek the good, and who believes 
that the beautiful itself is worth knowing. This is also because Socrates has the required tragic 
stature according to those who believe (doxa) that philosophy is a worthwhile endeavor. Thus 
                                                          
253 In his interpretation of the Laws, Richard Patterson writes the philosopher’s perception of what is tragic may 
differ from that of common opinion. See Richard Patterson, “The Platonic Art of Comedy and Tragedy,” Philosophy 
and Literature 6 (1982): 84. 
254 Christopher Bruell suggests that Socrates’s death is foreshadowed by these lines in the Hippias Major. As far as I 
can tell, he is the only commentator who has made this insight. See the Christopher Bruell, On the Socratic 
Education, 91. 
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one’s perception of the tragic element in the Hippias Major is contingent, at least in part, on the 
value that one judges philosophy to have.  
Beyond this, however, it is also the case that Socrates’s tragedy has an added dimension 
to it which Hippias’s lacks. This added dimension is a moment of partial transcendence, a partial 
fulfillment, which is proper to philosophical eros, and which makes the suffering and catastrophe 
worthwhile.255 This makes Socrates’s tragedy a tragedy of a special sort, a philosophical one. Or 
perhaps, even the word “tragedy” is inadequate here, because it emphasizes the negative aspect 
of Socrates’s philosophical enterprise: its incompleteness. Rather, Socrates, in making insights 
into the eidos of the beautiful, enjoys partial success. If tragedy reveals to a character (and to an 
audience) certain limitations about the human condition, then Socrates’s partial philosophical 
triumph, however incomplete and uncertain (in the Cartesian sense of clarity and distinctness), 
also shows a way in which finite human understanding can transcend its limitations. Here, I will 
explore both aspects of Socrates’s story.  
 The first step to understanding Socrates’s partial fulfillment is to note that eros is 
understood not only by what it lacks, but also by what it is able to attain. In the Symposium, 
Diotima defines it as the offspring of both Poverty and Plenty. In other words, eros, as it is 
experienced in human life, comes with moments of yearning, but also with moments of 
satisfaction, however partial and transitory those moments may be. Eros has a certain 
                                                          
255 Here I am following Hyland’s understanding of the “noble” nature of eros: “Human eros is not just a source of 
consolation for foolish humans; in its multiple manifestations, it is the source as well of the noblest of human 
aspirations. As I have already suggested, this makes the human situation not less but more fully tragic. Not only are 
humans fated to a condition of incompleteness that they will never fully overcome, not only are they therefore fated 
to aspire toward a goal to which they are doomed to fail, but this aspiration, notwithstanding its fated failure, 
nevertheless can, in the striving, ennoble human being. The portrayal of eros in the Symposium therefore sets out in 
full richness the potentially tragic character of the human situation.” This tragic nobility is characteristic, Hyland 
argues, of philosophy. See Hyland, Finitude and Transcendence, 122. My purpose here is to see how this tragic 
nobility manifests itself in the Socrates of the Hippias Major. 
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“paternity,” a consoling positive element to it which makes the moments of yearning bearable.256 
This dynamic between poverty and plenty, yearning and paternity, also holds with regard to 
philosophical eros as it manifests itself in Socrates in the Hippias Major. Despite the fact that 
neither Socrates nor Hippias is able to reach a conclusive definition of the beautiful itself, they 
nevertheless are able to make certain noetic insights about the beautiful itself. As stated above, 
those insights includes that the beautiful itself “is something,” something that causes particular 
beings to become beautiful (rather than appear to be so), and it is something beneficial and good. 
With these discoveries, Socrates suggests that philosophical eros experiences a partial degree of 
noetic fulfillment, however incomplete and tenuous that fulfillment might be. They are 
experiences in which Socrates looks at the beautiful as something outside of his own interests, 
outside of a network of possible uses, and outside of the interests of power. They are moments of 
contemplation of the beautiful itself. Having had these experiences, Socrates is able to consider 
all beautiful beings in a new light: he is able to see them not only as beautiful appearances but 
instances of the eidos of the beautiful beyond appearances. Socrates’s philosophical 
transcendence, however partial, has the potential to enrich all of his experiences of the beautiful. 
This is why Socrates is able to tell Hippias that the abuse he (Socrates) has taken at the hands of 
his imaginary friend is “good for me,” and that engaging with Hippias has “done me good” 
(304e). The philosophical pursuit of an answer to the question of the beautiful uncovers the 
goodness of the beautiful, but this discovery is not merely theoretical: Socrates believes that it 
enriches his life, and is worth the sacrifices which must be endured to learn. Evidently, Socrates 
                                                          
256 I borrow the term “paternity” from Hyland. He notes that the Aristophanic discourse in the Symposium never 
mentions to τὸ κάλλος, and is the only speech in that dialogue with this omission. Hyland offers that a point is being 
made with this omission: “What Aristophanes misses is eros’ paternity,” that is, the positive side of erotic desire, 
“Plenty” or “Resourcefulness.” “But one crucial feature is missing [in Aristophanes’s discourse], and that is the 
element of beauty, of nobility, that from time to time can characterize human erotic striving, even an erotic striving 
that is fated to fail.” See Hyland, “The Whole Comedy and Tragedy of Philosophy,” 17-18. I differ with Hyland 
only in qualifying his sense of the word “failure.” I think that even a limited moment of beauty counts as a kind of 
“success.” 
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feels like his time with Hippias has been well spent, and unlike Hippias, he will not reject 
philosophy in favor of speechmaking and politics.  
 It would serve us to press deeper on this point and ask just why Socrates believes that a 
philosophical investigation into the experience of the beautiful and the beautiful itself gives an 
added value to one’s experience of beauty. The key to understanding this “added value” lies in 
the fact that Socrates prizes the good above all things—in that his eros is directed toward the 
good. We have already seen Socrates argue in favor of virtue and goodness and against personal 
advantage and power in the opening sections of the dialogue (283e-284, see Chapter One). We 
have also seen him argue for the goodness of the beautiful (287c-d, see Chapter Four). It is clear 
that Socrates believes that the pursuit of the truth about the beautiful itself is good, and that the 
truth itself is good. To make a brief insight, however incomplete, into eidos of the beautiful itself 
is therefore a good thing for Socrates. It is the goal of his eros. Once again, the goodness of 
Socrates’s enterprise and of its noetic fruits can only be recognized by someone who also values 
philosophy, who chooses to follow Socrates, and whose eros desires goodness. Only a person 
who chooses to do so can fully verify that this “added value” really exists.  
A sign of this added value—of the goodness and therefore worth of the philosophical 
path—is the fact that Socrates believes that his investigation into the eidos of the beautiful is so 
worthwhile and valuable, that he will continue it even at the cost of his own life. The dialogue 
appears to foreshadow Socrates’s future trial, which will culminate in his execution at the hands 
of the state: Hippias says that a beautiful speech is one which gives one the power “to be able to 
present a speech well and beautiful, in court or council…” (304a-b).257 Hippias tells Socrates that 
the philosophical way of speaking, “flakings and clippings of speeches,” does not yield any 
                                                          
257 See Bruell, On the Socratic Education, 91. 
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practical benefit. Instead, Hippias prefers to speak beautifully, because such speech will protect 
“yourself, your property, and friends” (304b) before a council or court of law. Recall that in the 
Apology, Socrates tells the jurors that he will not speak in words spoken beautifully 
(κεκαλλιεπημένους, 17b) or carefully arranged (κεκοσμημένους, 17c). In the Apology, Socrates 
does not take Hippias’s advice. His suffering for the sake of philosophy is thus implicitly 
ennobling, but also worthwhile for the fruits that it yields of its own accord: a life of goodness.258 
The suffering and sacrifice involved in the pursuit of the beautiful itself is encapsulated in 
the proverb with which Socrates concludes the dialogue: “Beautiful things are difficult” (χαλεπὰ 
τὰ καλά, 304e). The levels of meaning in this proverb sum up many of the themes we have 
explored in this dialogue. The proverb appears in three other places in the Platonic canon: twice 
in the Republic, and once in the Cratylus. Within each context it takes on a different shade of 
meaning.259 In the Hippias Major, the proverb serves as a sort of check on Hippias’s arrogance, 
and reprimand against his initial bluster that that question of the beautiful would be easy to 
answer.260 But the phrase can evoke more than just the emotions that are aroused by 
admonishment. As I have stated above,261 the proverb underscores the “otherness” of the 
                                                          
258 McCoy’s comparison between Alcibiades’s and Socrates’s respective attitudes toward political pressure, also 
applies, I would argue, to that of Hippias and Socrates here: “However, the Symposium suggests that there are 
tremendous costs in too great a concern with political pressure. While Socrates’s death is the consequence of 
choosing philosophy, a life of enquiry and of questioning of others, as his response, Alcibiades avoids his own 
vulnerability with the resulting peril of losing a sense of his own virtue. If we contrast Socrates’s relative placidity 
and acceptance of his own death in both the Phaedo and the Apology, to the inner turmoil and confusion that we see 
in Alcibiades’ speech, as well as the outward tumult of his political actions, Socrates’s response seems to result in 
greater happiness.” We do not see inner turmoil in Hippias, but we the historical record does give evidence of 
questionable or in any case violent political action. See McCoy, Wounded Heroes, 137. 
259 For a thorough interpretation of each use in the Platonic canon, see See A.I. Mintz, “ ‘Chalepa Ta Kala,’ ‘Fine 
Things are Difficult’: Socrates’s Insights into the Psychology of Teaching and Learning,” Studies in Philosophy and 
Education 29 (2010): 287-299. 
260 This point is made by Mintz: “The proverb can be read as Socrates’s rebuke of Hippias’s general intellectual and 
moral conceit, which is perhaps also intended to remind the reader of the lengthy introduction to the dialogue.” The 
phrase has two meanings, it “describes the general type of effort or struggle necessary for learning and moral 
development,” and it “serves to chastise those who have avoided the necessary effort of struggle.” See Mintz, 
“Chalepa Ta Kala,” 292. 
261 See Chapter Three. 
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beautiful, the fact that a beautiful object is beautiful in itself, and not because of an emotion or 
valorizing projection on the part of the observer. Recognizing this “otherness” is of vital 
importance, because it is requirement for understanding: the beautiful is not merely something 
which appears before me and is appealing or useful, but something in and of itself, and I must 
stretch out of my own perspective in order to understand it. The phrase can also be read in a 
pedagogical vein, as a sort of encouragement to the reader who wishes to pursue philosophy. As 
it appears in the opening lines of the Cratylus, the proverb suggests a sort of encouragement to 
pursue a question in philosophy, however difficult it may prove to be.262 A reader mindful of the 
overarching pedagogical purpose of Plato’s dialogues may find an echo of this same 
encouragement in Socrates’s use of the proverb in the Hippias Major. This gesture of 
encouragement would be directed less at Hippias (who has given up on philosophy at this point) 
but to the reader of the dialogue (at least, a reader who is still interested in philosophy after 
concluding her reading of it).263 Moreover, beyond reprimand, “otherness,” or encouragement, 
the phrase signals that the desire for beautiful beings and the pursuit of knowledge about the 
beautiful itself, both entail suffering. But this last shade of meaning comes with an important 
implicit claim, that this suffering is somehow worthwhile, because beauty is worth pursuing. The 
suffering involved in the pursuit of beauty and knowledge about beauty is a suffering that is 
ennobling. It is a suffering that Socrates undertook, even unto death. This last implication leads 
us to one more nuance of meaning in the proverb: “Beautiful things are difficult” is a phrase that 
                                                          
262 As Mintz puts it, in the Cratylus the proverb is used “to express support and encouragement in the face of a 
difficult task.” See Mintz, “Chalepa Ta Kala,” 294. 
263 Mintz also points out that one of the two uses of the phrase in the Republic (435c-d) is connected to Socrates’s 
statement that philosophy requires a “longer and fuller road.” In a sense, this meaning is present in the Hippias 
Major, as well. The longer and fuller road is the dialogue itself, which Hippias chooses to end, but which Socrates 
continues for the rest of his life. See Mintz, “Chalepa Ta Kala,” 294. 
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implies hope. If things are difficult, they are not impossible, or ἄπορος. To obtain beautiful 
beings, and knowledge about the beautiful itself, is not impossible. 
This last point requires some unpacking. It is related to the point about Socrates’s partial 
fulfillment, or transcendence, the dialogue. The dialogue ends in an aporia with respect to the 
explicit goal that Socrates and Hippias set out to attain: a comprehensive definition of the 
beautiful itself, which would endow the knower with a sense of possession—that is, of 
possessing the essence of the beautiful itself in his or her own mind. The dialogue does not yield 
a “clear and distinct” idea of what the beautiful is, and therefore does not provide certain 
knowledge in this Cartesian sense of “certainty.” But the proverb, along with the other claims 
that Socrates has made about the beautiful—that it is something in itself, that it is good, that it 
causes a being to become, and not appear, to be beautiful, etc.—signals that, even though 
Socrates and Hippias have failed in their mission to articulate a definition of the beautiful itself 
using words, they have nevertheless discovered a few things about it. Their philosophical eros 
has borne some fruit. The proverb in essence tells us that beautiful things are difficult, but not 
impenetrable. It suggests a way through the aporia: it suggests that a modification of the 
standard of “definition” would in fact allow for some knowledge of the beautiful. If we give up 
the idea that the beautiful can be defined using words, and instead assume a posture of humility 
with regard toward the beautiful (it is “difficult”), then we may find ourselves to actually possess 
more knowledge about it than we realized. Beautiful things are “difficult,” meaning that they 
cannot be fully possessed, explained, or articulated: but certain aspects about them can be known 
by an erotic seeker who directs his eros toward the good, that is, who becomes a philosopher. By 
the end of the dialogue, Hippias no longer has the patience to endure the difficulty of beauty and 
he “will not suffer fools” who do. For him, beauty is either useful, or it is nothing. Beauty is 
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useful in speechmaking and politics: this is all Hippias has to say about the beautiful both in the 
beginning and end of the dialogue. 
 In contrast with Hippias’s return to the status quo ante at the end of the dialogue, 
Socrates embraces an ennobling suffering for the sake of philosophy and beauty at the end of the 
Hippias Major. This choice to embrace suffering, however tragic, has a positive, not negative, 
relationship to eros. Usually, in a tragedy, an event occurs that causes a human life or human 
project to become frustrated, terminated, or otherwise thwarted. Tragedy involves a limit to 
erotic fulfillment, whether eros for another, or eros for the good. A tragic hero (as well as his 
audience) becomes aware of a certain limit to human capacities through his failure to achieve 
something, or to prevent something evil from befalling him. A tragic hero’s manner of facing 
tragedy, of accepting and suffering through it, is supposed to be commendable, or at least 
instructive for an audience to witness. But what occurs at the end of the Hippias Major is 
altogether different. Socrates accepts suffering as part and parcel of his fulfillment, of the 
fulfillment, that is, of philosophical eros. This is not a tragedy in the conventional sense, because 
his eros is not thwarted, but rather left incompletely fulfilled, but fulfilled enough to make the 
suffering worth it. Therefore the dialogue cannot be called a comedy in the conventional sense 
either, because the fulfillment that Socrates comes to enjoy is incomplete, and retains a certain 
sense of danger about it, since his death at the hands of the state is also part of his future. 
Socrates is able, after all, to say a few things about the beautiful itself that he had not said before. 
These noetic insights are attempts to capture in words the elusive experience of something that 
stands apart from one’s self, always enriching one’s self in the experience of encounter: beautiful 
beings, shining forth in their beauty, particulars of the beautiful itself. Socrates does not see the 
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beautiful itself, but he says a few things about it, all of which are borne out of experience, and 
become trustworthy after a process of dialectical examination. 
 Exploring the tragic dimension of Socrates’s story in the Hippias Major brings us to the 
point where we can draw up a most fruitful comparison with Diotima’s ascent. The penultimate 
rung on Diotima’s ascent is philosophy (φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ210d). The culmination and 
fulfillment of eros must go through a phrase in which the erotic seeker becomes a philosopher. 
This is a necessary condition for the fulfillment of eros and the insight into the beautiful “itself 
by itself with itself” (ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μεθ᾽ αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς, 211b). Similarly, the Hippias 
Major, by showing us that it is Socrates, and not Hippias—that is, the philosopher who loves the 
good above all things, rather than the sophist, who prefers power and utility—that has the 
required character and disposition to make a noetic insight into the beautiful itself. But the big 
difference between the two dialogues lies in the tragic aspect, the limitation, and the 
incompleteness of Socrates’s search for the beautiful itself which characterizes the latter 
dialogue. Both dialogues suggest that the beautiful itself is a mysterious essence, distinct from its 
instantiations in the world. Both depict the different ways eros is drawn to beauty. Both suggest 
that the philosopher, because his desire for the good expands his horizons to the widest breadth 
possible, is uniquely suited for the goal of making a noetic insight into the beautiful itself. Both 
suggest that the beautiful is good, and the good beautiful. But while Diotima’s story appears to 
end in a triumph, in the Hippias Major, Socrates ends in a special sort of tragedy. Diotima’s 
story ends with the “sudden” (ἐξαίφνης, 210d) encounter with the beautiful itself, while 
Socrates’s story in the Hippias Major ends in aporia and suffering, albeit with enough of a 
consolation—enough of a noetic “flash” —to make the suffering worthwhile. Thus, the Hippias 
Major gives us a view of an ascent toward the form of beauty similar to Diotima’s, but one 
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which begins and ends within the sub-ouranian realm, within the world of appearances. It is, in a 
sense, a more “realistic” or “naturalistic” depiction of what happens when eros becomes 
philosophical eros and, inspired by beauty, makes an ascent. 
 This special nature of Socrates’s story in the Hippias Major—its not-quite-tragic 
conclusion for Socrates—helps us to make a contribution to the ongoing discussion over the 
relationship between Plato’s dialogues and the Greek tradition of tragedy. This debate also helps 
us to what exactly Socrates gains at the end of the dialogue with regard to the beautiful, that 
which makes his suffering “good for me.” It also helps us to see more clearly how arbitrary and, 
in a sense, violent is Hippias’s rejection of philosophy at the end of the dialogue. 
On one side of this debate is Martha Nussbaum, with her contention that the Platonic 
dialogues present us with an “anti-tragic theater,” a type of theater “purged and purified of 
theater’s characteristic appeal to powerful emotion, a pure crystalline theater of the intellect.” 
Plato’s dialogues aim to draw the soul away from its attention to particulars, and towards 
“general accounts,” and ultimately to pure intellectual knowledge. For Plato, “only certain 
elements are appropriate” to the search for truth: the noetic capacity, but not the passions. While 
tragedy is open to the “complexity and indeterminacy of the lived practical situation,” Platonic 
dialogues aim to overcome these in favor of noetic insight.264 Prominent (but by no means alone) 
on the other side of the debate is David Roochnik, who contends that Plato does present us with a 
tragedy, the tragedy of logos itself. “Logos has limits that it cannot surpass, and against which it 
must collide,” and this limit is self-justification.265 Logos explains reality, but it cannot explain 
why it should be the only method with which to explain reality. For this reason, Socrates most of 
                                                          
264 All quotations from Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 133-134. 
265 Roochnik, The Tragedy of Logos, 13. 
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the time fails to convince his interlocutors to change their lives in favor of philosophy. A good 
example of this failure is found in the Hippias Major.266 
 For the anti-tragic side, the Hippias Major does, at first blush, appear to follow the 
description that Nussbaum gives of a Platonic dialogue. Socrates does steer the discussion away 
from Hippias’s definitions, which center upon concrete realities or physical attributes (maidens, 
the color gold, etc.), and toward definitions of the beautiful that appeal to ideas (utility, 
goodness, etc.).  But the dialogue does not associate philosophical discussion and noetic insight 
with salvation from, or abandonment of, the “lived practical situation” which Nussbaum says 
traditional tragedy deals with. On the contrary, by hinting at a connection between Hippias’s 
rejection of philosophy and the rest of his life as he lived it, Plato suggests a link between the 
pursuit of philosophy and the goodness of one’s life. Moreover, Socrates, whose end is 
superficially similar to Hippias’s (they were both executed by their fellow citizens), is able to 
bear and find goodness in his own life, precisely because he pursues the beautiful as an eidos, 
and does not consider it to be a mere tool (as Hippias ultimately does). In the Hippias Major, 
Plato is aware of the tragic dimension of life, but associates this dimension with a rejection of the 
good. This is not to say that a person who aims for the good is protected from tragedy. Socrates 
himself was not. But Plato does suggest that the rejection of philosophy and of the erotic longing 
for the good which is philosophical eros, is itself tragic. This rejection has consequences in a 
person’s “lived practical situation,” because by rejecting philosophical eros, one is neglecting to 
direct one’s eros toward the good. On the other hand, but directing one’s eros toward the good, 
                                                          
266 Drew Hyland has also contributed to this debate in Finitude and Transcendence, 111-137, arguing that a proper 
understanding of the tragic dimension in Platonic dialogues involves framing the Socratic quest for definitions in 
terms of eros. In Wounded Heroes, Marina McCoy has articulated the role that the passions play in various Platonic 
dialogues. See also Franco V. Trivigno, “Is Good Tragedy Possible? The Argument of Gorgias 502b-503b,” Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 41 (2011): 115-38; also Patterson, “The Platonic Art of Comedy and Tragedy,” 84. 
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one is allowing for the possibility that tragedy does not have the last word in life, but a 
consolation in the form of noetic insight, the “paternal” aspect of eros. 
 To Roochnik’s argument, the Hippias Major offers a way beyond the tragic impasse 
which he articulates. While it is true that Socrates fails to convince—and convert—Hippias to 
the life of philosophy, it is not the case that Socrates does not attempt to justify the philosophical 
way up against Hippias’s sophistry. Socrates does justify his own path, the path of philosophy. 
He does so by arguing for its goodness: “It wouldn’t be strange if it were good for me” (304e) he 
says, referring to the discussion that has just taken place.267 This justification is not made with 
apodictic certainty. Nevertheless, it is a claim upon which Socrates is willing to stake his life. 
This justification also works for continuing the philosophical discussion after the action of the 
dialogue has drawn to a close. Philosophical discussion is good, and good for me. I can verify the 
goodness of philosophy, and thus justify it for myself, by living philosophically and seeing that it 
is, indeed, good for me. The key here is that “good for me” can only be determined by a 
willingness on Socrates’s part to accept that his knowledge of the beautiful and the good is 
uncertain, but that the way toward truth consists in continuing the philosophical path. As I have 
argued,268 human beings who direct their eros toward the good are never content with apparent 
goods, but only actual ones. In order for me to verify whether philosophical inquiry is good for 
me, I must direct my eros toward the good, and must continue until I get to an experience of 
authentic goodness. Hippias cannot be convinced by an argument, but he can be given a method 
                                                          
267 Here I am following Schindler, who argues that one cannot take for granted that (for Socrates), “reason’s primary 
aim is to persuade, to such an extent that, if it fails to achieve this aim, its own integrity becomes suspect.” Rather, 
reason’s aim is “simply the good.” See Schindler, Plato’s Critique of Impure Reason, 272-273. Schindler develops 
his own brand of the anti-tragic view (partially using Roochnik as a foil), which nevertheless appears to be different 
from Nussbaum’s in that Schindler attempts to defend Plato against the charge of “otherworldliness.” See especially 
pages 240-282,which include a critique of the “tragic” view, and the final chapter of that book, which includes an 
engagement with Nussbaum’s work. 
268 Following C.D.C. Reeve, in Chapter Three. 
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through which to verify the philosophical path: test it, and see whether it is good. This testing, of 
course, requires a modification of one’s eros: it has to become directed toward being, beyond 
appearances, toward the truth beyond my immediate self-interest. It demands, in other words, a 
switch from the life of a political sophist to that of an “ugly” philosopher.  
 This test or work of verification has already been modeled, and to a degree, accomplished 
in the dialogue itself. By agreeing with Socrates that the beautiful itself “is something,” and that 
this something is the object of a dialectical inquiry, Hippias implicitly agrees that true opinion is 
distinct from false opinion. He also agrees that any definition of the beautiful itself is trustworthy 
only to the extent to which it does describes the beautiful itself as it is in itself, not as it is in 
appearance. The problem lies, of course, in discerning the eidos within appearances. But the key 
point is that, in Protagorean terms, Hippias accepts that the beautiful itself, and not “man”, is the 
“measure” of what makes an object be beautiful. Now, Hippias is compelled to accept this 
because to deny that the beautiful itself is something would be to deny the practical knowledge 
that Hippias himself claims to have about the beautiful (i.e., the knowledge that he claims to 
have with regard to beautiful speech, and implicitly claims to have with regard to beautiful 
dress). Such knowledge requires the prior recognition that the beautiful is something to be 
known (for example, I have to know about meter, rhyme, assonance, etc., in order to speak well). 
Hippias’s knowledge is a techne, and the existence of a techne implies the corresponding 
existence of a part of reality which is to be manipulated (that it is something). To the degree that 
Hippias actually does know something about arranging things beautifully, he can also trust the 
claim that the beautiful itself is something, because he can distinguish between an object with 
beauty and one without beauty. Once Hippias recognizes that the beautiful itself is something, he 
accepts the whole erotic, other-oriented structure of Socratic philosophical inquiry, and the 
239 
 
development of the dialogue goes, perforce, in a Socratic direction, and toward an eventual 
recognition of beauty’s goodness. The trustworthiness of Socrates’s subsequent claims about the 
beautiful itself have their foundation in the original noetic insight that the beautiful itself is 
something distinct from beautiful objects. Once Hippias finds himself in the increasingly 
frustrating philosophical path (frustrating because it puts into question Hippias’s claims to 
knowledge), Hippias finds that the only way to end it is to break with it violently, to declare 
himself to be against philosophy and in favor of rhetoric, once again. 269 Thus it is not really 
philosophy that needs justification in the Hippias Major, but rather what needs justification is 
Hippias’s decision to ignore the truth he has already recognized: that the beautiful itself is 
something, something to be known, something not defined by me.270 
                                                          
269 One may speculate that this account, from Simon Leys, is perhaps descriptive of what Hippias chooses to do at 
the end of the Hippias Major: “Once—many years ago—a miniscule incident afforded me a deeply upsetting 
revelation. I was writing in a café; I had been sitting there for a couple of hours already, comfortably settled at a 
table with my books and papers. Like many lazy people, I enjoy a measure of hustle and bustle around me while I 
am supposed to work—it gives me an illusion of activity—and thus the surrounding din of conversations and calls 
did not disturb me in the least. The radio that had been blaring in a corner all morning could not bother me either: 
pop songs, stock market figures, muzak, horseracing reports, more pop songs, a lecture on foot-and-mouth disease in 
cows—whatever: this audio-pap kept dripping like lukewarm water from a leaky faucet and nobody was listening 
anyway. 
 Suddenly a miracle occurred. For a reason that will forever remain mysterious, this vulgar broadcasting 
routine gave way without transition (or, if there had been one, it escaped my attention) to the most sublime music: 
the first bars of Mozart’s clarinet quintet began to flow and with serene authority filled the entire space fo the café, 
turning it at once into an antechamber of Paradise. But the other patrons who had been chatting, drinking, playing 
cards or reading newspapers were not deaf after all: this magical irruption of a voice from heaven provoked a 
general state among them –all faces turned round, frowning with puzzled concern. Yet, in a matter of seconds, to the 
huge relief of all, one customer resolutely stood up, walked straight to the radio, turned the tuning knob and cut off 
this disquieting intermède, switched to another state and restored at once the more congenial noises, which everyone 
could again comfortably ignore. 
 At that moment the realization hit me—and has never left me since: true Philistines are not people who are 
incapable of recognizing beauty; they recognize it all too well; they detect its presence anywhere, immediately, and 
with a flair as infallible as that of the most sensitive aesthete—but for them, it is in order to be able better to pounce 
upon it at once and destroy it before it can gain a foothold in their universal empire of ugliness. Ignorance is not 
simply absence of knowledge, obscurantism does not result from a dearth of light, bad taste is not merely a lack of 
good taste, stupidity is not a simple want of intelligence: all these are fiercely active forces, that angrily assert 
themselves on every occasion; they tolerate no challenge to their omnipresent rule. …More than artistic beauty, 
moral beauty seems to exasperate our sorry species. They need to bring down to our own wretched level, to deface, 
to deride and debunk any splendor that is towering above us, is probably the saddest urge of human nature.” Simon 
Leys, The Hall of Uselessness: Collected Essays (New York: New York Review of Books Classics, 2013), 40-41. 
270 Schindler argues that the association between money and sophistry is founded on the latter’s preference for 
appearance over reality, and of practical wisdom over theoretical wisdom: “It is precisely because this [the ti esti 
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Conclusion 
 The Hippias Major ends with a recapitulation of the essential thrust of the journey that 
Hippias and Socrates have taken together, a journey that begins with a colloquial and 
unexamined use of kallos and to kalon, shifts to a concerted philosophical effort to understand 
the content of the word, and culminates with Socrates announcing that the beautiful is good. This 
announcement forces the discussion to turn, and threatens Hippias’s position as a sophist: to 
accept the goodness of the beautiful requires the acceptance of a standard of goodness outside of 
one’s own definition of goodness, and perhaps also against the immediate political interests that 
one may have. Perhaps in order to avoid ending the discussion already at the conclusion of the 
discussion of the beautiful as “father of the good,” Socrates begins a recapitulation: perhaps the 
beautiful is a sort of pleasure. Yet the discussion ends up in the same place: in a protreptic 
injunction. The beautiful, if it is pleasure, must be a beneficial pleasure. Hippias cannot abide by 
this conclusion; he rejects it in favor of the art of speaking beautifully, an art with more practical 
advantages. More importantly, the noetic insights into the beautiful that are gained by Socrates 
and Hippias’s dialogue—that the beautiful is something in itself, that knowing it requires a move 
beyond appearances, and that it is good—cannot be accepted by Hippias without Hippias also 
abandoning the life of sophistry.  
 The decision to philosophize about the beautiful unites a distinction between the practical 
and the theoretical, as the entirety of our soul—eros and nous—must be directed toward the good 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
question that Socrates poses] is a theoretical, rather than practical, question that it always arrives as a troublesome 
interruption of one’s projects. If one is going to pay [a sophist] … one would most immediately rather pay for the 
removal of this nuisance, which is another way of saying for the ‘power’ to be free from the claims that reality 
makes on us: the sophist, Gorgias, in Plato’s dialogue of the same name, points to just this sort of freedom as the aim 
of sophistry. Education, as a claim on one’s being, costs too much, as it were. You cannot buy an education; but you 
can buy the appearance of an education.” See D. C. Schindler, “Why Socrates Didn’t Charge: Plato and the 
Metaphysics of Money,” Communio 36 (2009): 394-426. Hippias appears to share this sentiment when he rejects 
philosophy.  
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in order to discover the beautiful. This unique state of soul rises in high relief at the end of the 
dialogue, in the figure of Socrates. By transcending both the comic and (to a limited degree) the 
tragic, Socrates comes to light as a uniquely philosophical hero: one who knows the good, at 
least in part, and is able to stake his entire life on it, even unto death. This stands in sharp 
contrast to the sublime heights that Diotima’s rhetoric reaches in the Symposium, as well as 
Socrates’s speech in the Phaedrus. The Hippias Major stands with those dialogues in presenting 
an understanding of the beautiful that responds to erotic desire and leads guides it toward the 
good; but it differs from those dialogues in presenting a much earthier, realistic version of the 
same story. In all three dialogues, it necessary for eros to become philosophical in order for it to 
make an insight into the beautiful itself. But in the Hippias Major, this insight is partial, and 
takes place within finite human existence, and is accompanied by tragic suffering. In comparison 
to the tragedies and comedies of Plato’s time, it also stands apart. The dialogue’s conclusion is 
neither comic nor tragic in the conventional sense, but philosophical. The dialogue discloses that 
the proper way of understanding the beautiful—the attitude through which one can come to 
understand the beautiful in its intelligible nature—is philosophical. But the dialogue also shows 
us that there are consequences to taking this stance—tragic consequences. Philosophy changes 
one’s life in very clear ways. The Hippias Major here suggests that beautiful beings inspire a 
philosophical question, but that this question is tied to suffering, and cannot be answered—even 
if only partially—without sacrifice. The difference between the triumphal climax of Diotima’s 
ladder, and the quiet tragic foreboding of the Hippias Major, could not be starker. 
* * * 
 So far in this dissertation, I have primarily worked on the task of describing the ways in 
which eros, and philosophical eros in particular, manifest themselves in the Hippias Major, and 
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are thus indispensable concepts for understanding it. But all the while, I have also been 
describing the philosophical claims which make up the relationship between beauty and love of 
the good, claims which the dialogue makes manifest to the careful reader. In the next chapter, I 
will attempt to bring these claims into conversation with a more general set of questions in the 
philosophy of aesthetics. In doing so, I will make another, more concise statement of what I take 
these claims to be. 
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Chapter Six 
Beauty, “Liking Devoid of Interest,” and Eros 
 
My main philosophical claim about the Hippias Major can be summed up as follows: The 
possibility of making a noetic insight into the eidos of the beautiful is contingent upon the 
attitude that one takes toward the good. In the dialogue, this attitude proper to the eidos of 
beauty is modeled by Socrates: philosophical eros, that is, the desire for the good above all other 
things, a desire which motivates the philosophical quest to understand the essence of beings. In 
this chapter, I would like to go deeper into the significance that this claim about the Hippias 
Major has for the philosophy of beauty in general. More specifically, I would like to show how 
my interpretation of the Hippias Major offers a model for understanding aesthetic judgment and 
aesthetic contemplation which is an alternative to the Kantian notion of “liking … devoid of 
interest.”271 As I state in the Introduction above, my claim in this dissertation is not only that 
eros is a key interpretive key to the Hippias Major, but also that this relationship between eros 
and beauty modelled in the Hippias Major tells us something essential about what the way 
human beings experience and judge beauty in the world. It is this essential finding which I wish 
to bring to bring into a conversation with the Kantian view. 
“Disinterestedness,” “disinterested pleasure,” or “disinterested liking,” are three different 
ways to denote one of the foundational claims of Kant’s aesthetics, namely that “The Liking That 
Determines Judgment of Taste Is Devoid of All Interest (Interesse).”272 Kant’s claim is that the 
proper understanding of both beauty and aesthetic judgment includes the idea that the observer 
                                                          
271 This phrase appears in the second section of Division I of the Critique of Judgment. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 
45. See Also the discussion of interest in the Introduction: Kant, Critique of Judgment, lix-lx. 
272 This is the title of the second section of Division I of the Critique of Judgment. See Kant, Critique of Judgment, 
45. 
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and judger of beautiful objects is “disinterested” in the beautiful object’s existence, and means 
therefore that this observer and judger does not wish to possess it in any way. In contrast, in the 
Hippias Major we are given, in the figure of Socrates, someone who is both interested in 
observing and enjoying and possessing beautiful objects, while at the same time also interested 
in gaining a proper understanding of the essence of the beautiful itself, and thereby gaining the 
requisite knowledge for making proper judgments over whether objects are beautiful. This very 
knowledge—the knowledge about the eidos of beauty, which is also the knowledge required to 
make a proper judgment about the beauty of an object—is sought and contemplated within a 
context of “interest” in beautiful beings. Thus, for the Socrates of the Hippias Major, a proper 
understanding of the beautiful itself does not preclude the desire to possess, and take interest in 
the existence of, beautiful objects. Beauty inspires eros, and eros is attracted to and aims to 
possess beautiful objects. When it becomes philosophical, eros inspires the desire to understand 
how these beautiful beings are able to be beautiful. Thus the desire to understand that which 
makes things be beautiful—their eidos—occurs within a context of interest and desire. 
Therefore, with regard to the question of the appropriate human attitude required to contemplate, 
and make an insight into the nature of, the beautiful, the Kantian view and the view depicted in 
the Hippias Major stand at loggerheads. In this chapter, I would like to further articulate the 
difference between these two views, and explain why I believe that the Socratic view is, in one 
respect, superior. I contend that the Socratic view found in the Hippias Major makes a more 
adequate description of the phenomenon of aesthetic enjoyment and its relation to aesthetic 
judgment, than does Kant’s theory. This chapter has two parts. First, I will sketch out the 
essential components of the Kantian view. Second, I will make a contrast between the Kantian 
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view and the Socratic position that I believe is modelled in the Hippias Major. In the Conclusion, 
I will argue for the superiority of the account of beauty and desire in the Hippias Major. 
“Liking Devoid of Interest”  
In order to set up the contrast with the depiction of the relationship between beauty and 
eros found in the Hippias Major, we must first outline the main facets of Kant’s notion of “liking 
devoid of interest,” as they are found in his Critique of Judgment. Kant’s position is famously 
complex, but briefly put it can be said to have the effect of sundering any link between desire 
(e.g., for possession of the beautiful object, including sexual desire, or any other type of 
involvement) and aesthetic judgment. In §2 of the Critique, Kant writes that “in order for me to 
say that an object is beautiful, and to prove that I have taste, what matters is what I do with this 
presentation within myself, and not the [respect] in which I depend on the object’s existence.” In 
§5, he writes: “A judgment of taste…is merely contemplative, i.e., it is a judgment that is 
indifferent to the existence of the object.”273 Any judgment that includes interest of any sort 
cannot be deemed a “pure” judgment of taste. Kant’s position does not necessarily exclude any 
sort of relationship between pleasure and moral interest from aesthetic contemplation. The 
aesthetic carries with it its own brand of pleasure,274 and aesthetic experience (of natural beauty, 
                                                          
273 Both passages are found in Kant, Critique of Judgment, 45-53. Many commentators have sought to clarify the 
meaning of “disinterestedness” in Kant. I have found the following to be useful. First, Gadamer: “Naturally, 
‘disinterested delight’ means that we are not interested in what appears or in what is ‘represented’ from a practical 
point of view. Disinterestedness simply signifies that characteristic feature of aesthetic behavior that forbids us to 
inquire after the purpose served by art. We cannot ask, ‘What purpose is served by enjoyment?’” See Gadamer, The 
Relevance of the Beautiful, 19. The Kant scholar Roger Scruton also is a valuable resource. As Scruton sees it, 
disinterest in an object’s existence means that my “desires, aims, and ambitions are held in abeyance in the act of 
contemplation” of the beautiful. See Roger Scruton, Kant: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 104. Instead, Scruton writes elsewhere, in a position of disinterestedness we are “entirely devoted to 
the object” as a beautiful form. See Roger Scruton, Beauty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 27. Finally, 
Martin Seel, who writes that disinterested judgment allows for a “free beholding” of the beautiful object. See Martin 
Seel, Aesthetics of Appearing (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 139. 
274 As Salim Kemal puts it, for Kant, aesthetic contemplation carries with it its own unique brand of pleasure: “By 
contrast, Kant wants to maintain, aesthetic responses are pleasurable without interest. Pleasure is only that which is 
the experience of beauty. Our liking depends only on the presentation of an object.” See Salim Kemal, Kant’s 
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in particular) can be “preparatory” to moral concern.275 What Kant does claim is that for a 
judgment to be purely aesthetic (and therefore to be possible at all, strictly speaking), “must not 
have an interest as its determining basis.”276 Moreover, the beautiful object itself must not give a 
rise to interest, be it in pleasure or of another sort.277 The upshot of Kant’s view is that it 
preserves a unique status for aesthetic contemplation, a status that cannot be reduced to any other 
type of experience—be it moral, pleasurable, or otherwise. Heidegger perhaps captures this point 
most clearly when he writes that, by claiming that beauty requires a disinterested stance, Kant 
“asks by what means our behavior, in the situation where we find something we encounter to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Aesthetic Theory (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 35-36. Malcolm Budd makes the necessary distinctions 
here: “What he means by this is that an interested pleasure in an object is pleasure that such and such is the case with 
respect to the object: it is pleasure that the world is a certain way, pleasure that something is true of this particular 
object, pleasure in a fact (or apparent fact) about the object; in particular, pleasure that a certain kind of thing, which 
the given object exemplifies, exists. Pleasure at the existence of O is pleasure that such‐and‐such is (positively) the 
case with respect to O, which is pleasure at a fact (or apparent fact) about O. Kant passes freely between the 
conception of an interest as a propositional pleasure and the conception of an interest as a desire or concern that 
something should be the case, a desire determined by a concept (e.g. CJ § 4, 209, § 10, 220). This move is easy to 
understand, for if you are pleased that p you want it to be the case that p, and if you want it to be the case that p and 
you believe that p then you are pleased that p. His claim about a pure judgement of taste is therefore that the 
pleasure it expresses is not pleasure that the represented object exists, or that it is of a certain kind or possesses 
certain properties, which implies that the pleasure is not the satisfaction of one of the subject's desires. Given Kant's 
understanding of a pure judgement of taste as a judgement about an item's form based on the pleasure experienced in 
the contemplation of that form, this is clearly correct: pleasure in the perception of an object's structure is not the 
same as pleasure that the elements of the object are structured as they are.” See Malcolm Budd, The Aesthetic 
Appreciation of Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 46. 
275 See §42 in Kant, Critique of Judgment, 167. For an account of how Kant’s argument works, see Rodolphe 
Gasché, The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 161. Kant 
claims that the judgment of beauty in nature may be “preparatory” for moral feeling by allowing us to witness a 
disinterested love of a prime object of sensible interest (nature), which is analogous to the love of a moral will 
disinterested in private gain or pleasure, but rather in acting according to the categorical imperative.  But the 
beautiful is preparatory for the moral in this way only because, and only insofar as, it is disinterested. It is the prior 
interest in the moral good which compels one to look into the disinterested contemplation of the beauty in nature for 
a “trace” of “lawful harmony” between one’s cognitive faculties and nature: “… whoever takes such an interest in 
the beautiful in nature can do so only to the extent that he has beforehand already solidly established an interest in 
the morally good” (emphasis mine). Another attempt to articulate the link between the contemplation of natural 
beauty and moral interest is found in Anne Margaret Baxley, “The Practical Significance of Taste in Kant’s Critique 
of Judgment: Love of Natural Beauty as a Mark of Moral Character,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 
(2005): 33-45. 
276 From §5 in Kant, Critique of Judgment, 163. See also the commentary by Gasché, who cites this same passage 
from Kant: “A pure judgment of taste comes into being only when all such concern with the existence of the object 
is excluded, and when that which is judged beautiful (rather than pleasant or good) pleases independently of 
‘whether anything depends or can depend on the existence of this thing, either for myself or for anyone else’ (38).” 
Gasché, The Idea of Form, 155. 
277 Both of these senses of “disinterest”—first, no interest can serve as the determining ground for a judgment, and 
second, the object itself must not inspire an interest—are identified by Baxley, “The Practical Significance of Taste 
in Kant’s Critique of Judgment,” 33. 
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beautiful, must let itself be determined in such a way that we encounter the beautiful as 
beautiful.” 278 This “behavior” which allows the beautiful to be encountered as beautiful is 
marked by detachment from practical concerns and desire for possession of the beautiful object. 
We can deepen our grasp of what disinterestedness is by contrasting aesthetic judgment, 
or a judgment of taste, with the interest that we take in sensuous pleasure and morality. Sensuous 
pleasure is like aesthetic judgment in that it makes a subjective judgment about an object: “This 
is pleasant” always means: “This is pleasant for me.” It differs from aesthetic judgment, 
however, precisely on the point of disinterestedness. Sensuous pleasure very much takes an 
interest in the existence of the object that produces pleasure. It is a judgment about a particular 
experience, and not about the form of the object itself. It therefore cannot claim universality 
grounded in disinterest. Likewise, a moral judgment is a judgment in which the will takes an 
interest, not in an object, but in reason.279 A moral judgment is purposive, it takes interest in 
practical reason, while aesthetic judgment is unconcerned with the purpose or use of a beautiful 
object.280 
The point should be emphasized, however, that despite the difference between sensuous 
pleasure and the judgment of beauty, a difference based specifically on this stance of 
disinterestedness which the latter takes as a condition for judgment, Kant does argue that the 
beautiful gives us a unique type of pleasure. Even within our disinterested stance, we feel that 
                                                          
278 See Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. 1: The Will to Power as Art, Vol. 2: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, 
Trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 113. 
279 “A pure judgment of taste must be free of partiality toward the existence of objects that cause the respective 
pleasures of the sensibly pleasant and the morally good, a partiality that is characteristic of the senses and the will.” 
Seel, Aesthetics of Appearing, 27. 
280 “Naturally, ‘disinterested delight’ means that we are not interested in what appears or in what is ‘represented’ 
from a practical point of view. Disinterestedness simply signifies that characteristic feature of aesthetic behavior that 
forbids us to inquire after the purpose served by art. We cannot ask, ‘What purpose is served by enjoyment?’” See 
Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful, 19. 
248 
 
beauty gives us pleasure, a pleasure without interest.281 This means that it is a pleasure simply in 
contemplating a beautiful form, full stop. It is not a pleasure derived from the fact that a certain 
object is beautiful (which implies an interest in the object’s existence), nor is it pleasure derived 
from possessing a beautiful object (which also clearly implies interest in existence). As 
Alexander Nehamas puts it, it is a pleasure “bereft of desire,” of beautiful objects “completely 
independent of their relations to the rest of the world.”282  
Kant also argues that the disinterestedness involved in aesthetic judgment does not 
exclude the possibility of taking an interest in making aesthetic judgments. Kant writes about 
two types of such interest. First, one may take an empirical interest in the beautiful, which is 
primarily a social interest, an interest in sharing with others one’s judgment of beauty, and in 
experiencing beauty with others. “Only in society is the beautiful of empirical interest” (§41).283 
Or one may take an intellectual interest in the beautiful in nature: one may have an interest in the 
intellectual consideration of beautiful forms which one has already judged (“the mind cannot 
meditate about the beauty of nature without at the same time finding its interest aroused” §42284). 
But both of these types of interest arise after a disinterested judgment of beauty has already been 
made. They do not alter the fundamental structure of the human experience of beauty, which is 
marked by disinterested contemplation and judgment.285 As stated above, Kant also claims that 
the judgment of beauty in nature may be “preparatory” for moral feeling by allowing us to 
                                                          
281 Kemal, Kant’s Aesthetic Theory, 35-36. 
282 Nehamas, Only a Promise of Happiness, 3. In a similar vein, Theodor Adorno writes, “For Kant, aesthetics 
becomes paradoxically a castrated hedonism, desire without desire.” See Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, Trans. 
Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1997), 14. Scruton calls this unique pleasure a type of 
pleasure “in” something, or an “intentional” pleasure, where the key factor is that the mere contemplation of, say, 
athletic glory can give pleasure without reference to an actual athletic glory that is happening before me. Scruton, 
Beauty, 28-31.  
283 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 163. 
284 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 167. As Gasché puts it, “Disinterestedness on the level of the sense—a possibility 
realized solely in the case of entirely pure judgments of taste – is the provision under which alone a relation between 
the beautiful and ethics is conceivable.” Gasché, The Idea of Form, 173. 
285 See Gasché, The Idea of Form, 170-172. 
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witness a disinterested love of a prime object of sensible interest (nature), which is analogous to 
the love of a moral will disinterested in private gain or pleasure, but rather in acting according to 
the categorical imperative.286 But the beautiful is preparatory for the moral in this way only 
because, and only insofar as, it is disinterested. It is the prior interest in the moral good which 
compels one to look into the disinterested contemplation of the beauty in nature for a “trace” of 
“lawful harmony” between one’s cognitive faculties and nature: “… whoever takes such an 
interest in the beautiful in nature can do so only to the extent that he has beforehand already 
solidly established an interest in the morally good” (emphasis mine).287 
Despite these nuanced relationships between pleasure, moral interest, and aesthetic 
judgment, however, the consequence of Kant’s position on disinterestedness is that it does not 
allow for any direct relationship between the experience of beauty and every other part of human 
life. In Kant’s theory, the link between morality and beauty is extrinsic: it is only because the 
disinterested stance, which one cultivates in contemplating the beautiful, is similar to the 
disinterested stance which belongs to moral concern that one can speak of a link between beauty 
and morality. Moreover, the pleasure that one takes in normal engagement with beautiful 
beings—the warm glow of the sun, the smell of flowers, or sexual pleasures—have nothing to do 
with the unique type of pleasure afforded by pure judgments of taste. For Kant, these realms are 
all distinct and separate: There is the world of practical concern: of moral decisions and logistical 
arrangements, the world of choices and tools. There is also the world of emotional affectivity 
(e.g., for my friends) and sensuous pleasure (e.g., for chocolate). The contemplation of beauty is 
wholly distinct from both, because it does not rely, but rather excludes, concern for, interest in, 
or desire to possess the beautiful object. 
                                                          
286 Gasché, The Idea of Form, 161. 
287 This passage is found in §42. See Kant, Critique of Judgment, 167. 
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Contrast with Socrates 
Having laid out the essential points of Kant’s notion of disinterestedness, we can proceed 
to contrast his view with what is present before us in the Hippias Major. There are precedents for 
this comparison. Many thinkers have argued that Kant’s position excludes aspects or dimensions 
of aesthetic experience which are constitutive of the human experience of beauty. Others point 
out that these are aspects or dimensions which the Greeks (and Plato in particular) did not 
exclude.288 Constraining myself here to what is found in the Hippias Major, I would like to make 
the case for three clear differences between the Kantian view, as outlined above, and the Socratic 
view found in this dialogue (drawing upon my preceding interpretation of it). The three 
differences are as follows: First, in the Hippias Major, beautiful beings always inspire “interest” 
of one sort or another. Second, for Socrates and Hippias, the ground of aesthetic judgment is 
always based on some interest. Third, the search for the eidos of the beautiful, which is also a 
search for the proper criterion of aesthetic judgment, is itself interested, and this interest is in part 
moral interest in the good. 
First, that beautiful objects always inspire an interest of some sort can be seen by the fact 
that, whenever Hippias and Socrates speak about a beautiful object, they never attempt to isolate 
                                                          
288 A famous (though not necessarily rigorous) proponent of this criticism is Nietzsche. In a passage from The 
Twilight of the Idols, an earlier work, Nietzsche summons Plato (in a rare moment of approval) in order to defend 
the notion that interest, in particular, sexual interest, is an important element in the beautiful. Here he attacks 
Schopenhauer, who Nietzsche sees as Kant’s heir in matters of aesthetics, separating the “will” from the experience 
of beauty: “No lesser authority than the divine Plato (—as Schopenhauer himself calls him) maintains a different 
proposition: that all beauty stimulates procreation—that this is precisely the proprium of its effect, from the most 
sensual right up to the most spiritual …” See Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols or, How to Philosophize with a 
Hammer, Trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 54. Elsewhere, Nietzsche attacks Kant’s 
notion of disinterestedness directly (but without reference to Plato). See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of 
Morals: A Polemic, Trans. Douglas Smith. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 83-84. Alexander Nehamas is a 
contemporary voice for this criticism. Identifying Kant’s view with the term “aesthetic,” he writes: “The aesthetic 
made it possible to isolate the beautiful from all the sensual, practical, and ethical issues that were the center of 
Plato’s concern … Kant disavowed the ancients.” See Nehamas, Only a Promise of Happiness, 3. A similar 
sentiment is expressed by Hyland, when he argues that Kant and his heirs begin their inquiry into “aesthetics” by 
looking at art, whereas “for the Greeks beauty begins, as it were, with the beauty of human bodies, and only from 
their radiates to art and elsewhere.” See Hyland, Plato and the Question of Beauty, 15. 
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(in thought) that object’s intelligible form, which would stand apart from the lived experience of 
beholding that object. For example, they never speak of the form of the spoon as being beautiful, 
but rather its active capacity to stir the soup as being what makes it beautiful. In other words, 
they never claim that the object of their contemplation is purely formal, and separated from the 
complex of interests within which these beautiful objects are discovered in the course of human 
life. The only time when Hippias and Socrates do distinguish form from particular object is when 
they pose the question of whether the beautiful itself is something (287c), which will later be 
restated as the question of what kind of form causes an object to become beautiful when added—
the point in the dialogue in which the word, eidos, appears (289d). But the discovery that the 
beautiful itself is a form which stands apart from its instantiations in the world is achieved by 
first taking an inventory of objects whose beauty is grounded in a diverse array of interests—
sexual (maidens), moral (noble lives), even utilitarian (a spoon, an Elean mare). It is in 
contemplating the beauty of these objects as they are experienced in the world that, later on, as a 
second step, the interlocutors are able to posit the existence of the eidos. The idea that an object 
can properly be called beautiful only when it is contemplated with disregard to its surrounding 
context of interests and concepts is an idea that is foreign to this dialogue. 
Two examples suffice to establish that, for Socrates and Hippias aesthetic judgment is 
always grounded in an interest of some sort. In other words, aesthetic judgments made by both 
characters in the dialogue are grounded in some one or other aspect of the beautiful object, an 
aspect which is attractive and inspires a concrete interest in that object’s existence. First, 
Socrates and Hippias agree that a noble life (or rather, the noble life of a male Greek aristocrat) 
is beautiful (291d-e). Now, a noble life is beautiful precisely because it is noble, or moral, i.e., 
precisely because it is a life in which a person has fulfilled his duties. The determining ground 
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for the judgment, “A noble life is beautiful,” is a moral interest in nobility. It is this very nobility, 
this fulfillment of one’s duties, which is beautiful. Second, Socrates and Hippias both believe 
that a maiden is beautiful (287e). As we have seen in Chapter Two, the judgment that maidens 
are beautiful is not founded on a contemplation of the human body as an abstract form, but rather 
upon a host of sexual and cultural prejudices which the Greeks associated with young, unmarried 
women. The “determining ground” of Socrates’s and Hippias’s judgment is, then, both sexual 
interest and also the interests encapsulated in certain ideas that the Greeks held to be true about 
maidens. However, although the determining basis of their judgment are these sexual and 
cultural prejudices, this does not keep Socrates and Hippias from asserting that the determining 
ground of their judgment is not also the beautiful itself. Both the cultural and sexual prejudices or 
interests, and also the eidos of the beautiful, are the determining ground of their judgment. In 
other words, the eidos inheres in the object by virtue of these interests. The problem then lies in 
finding a definition of the eidos of the beautiful that is expansive enough to encompass sexuality, 
maidenhood, as well as all of the other attributes of beauty (e.g., utility, power, etc.) which the 
interlocutors go on to discover. The task is complicated because the beautiful is both something 
distinct from beautiful beings, but it also manifests itself in each of these beings in a different 
way. 
Not only is the contemplation of beautiful beings always involved in the nexus of 
interests which inform common life, but the search for the eidos of the beautiful is itself 
“interested.” The philosophical endeavor which informs the dialogue is never sundered from 
those “interested” experiences of beautiful objects in real life which inspire the question about 
the beautiful in the first place. The drive behind the question, What is that, the beautiful? is asked 
within these experiences, and is itself motivated by the desire for the good which defines 
253 
 
philosophy. As I argue in Chapter Four, the relation between these experiences and the 
overarching drive to question is that of a mobile and motive.289 “Motives are ideas that draw to 
action. Mobiles are forces or impulses that incline us to act.”290 The eros for the good above all 
things is a motive, which fuels our desire to understand the essential nature (eidos) of those 
mobiles (beautiful beings), which attract our attention and desire. If we take into account the fact 
that proper aesthetic judgment is grounded in knowledge of the eidos of the beautiful (Socrates’s 
unnamed friend associates the practice of correct aesthetic judgment with knowledge of the 
eidos: “How do you know what sorts of things are beautiful and foul? Look, would you be able 
to say what the beautiful is?” 286d), then it follows that the desire to make correct judgments is 
also somehow associated with the desire to possess the good, or to be good, or to behave well 
and correctly. For Socrates, taste is tightly woven into the notion how a life should be lived well: 
the desire to possess the good, which is the desire proper to a philosopher, also includes the 
desire to make proper judgments about beauty, and the ability to make proper judgments about 
beauty is contingent on one’s love of the good.  
This relationship between love of the good and knowledge about the beautiful, which 
manifests itself in the actions and words of the Socrates of the Hippias Major, is most clearly 
visible in the political dimension of the dialogue.291 As seen above, the question about the 
beautiful is born within a political discussion between Hippias and Socrates, about the proper 
way to teach the youth of a polis (283d-286c).292 Since Hippias makes claims about his ability to 
                                                          
289 See Chapter Four for a discussion of these terms.  
290 Quoted from Oliva Blanchette, Maurice Blondel: A Philosophical Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 
610-611. 
291 It is interesting that Hannah Arendt found, in Kant’s aesthetic theory, the basis for a political philosophy. 
Unfortunately, neither Kant nor Arendt was able to develop such a theory extensively, though Arendt did leave us 
with the lecture notes which were to form the basis of a (never written) book on the subject. See Hannah Arendt, 
Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
292 See Chapter One. 
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teach well, and since he uses the word kallos and kalon as markers of the value of his work, 
Socrates decides to test Hippias’s knowledge about these words. They are words of praise, words 
of evaluation, and thus Socrates would like to know whether Hippias has the adequate 
knowledge to bestow proper praise and to make a sound evaluation, in particular with respect to 
education and speechmaking. The key is that, in order to have such adequate knowledge, one 
must have an insight into the very nature of beauty itself—into the eidos of the beautiful: How 
do you know what sorts of things are beautiful and ugly? Look, would you be able to say what 
the beautiful is?” (286d). Thus knowledge for proper praise is said to require an insight into the 
essence of beauty. In order to be able to make such an insight, one must abandon the self-
interested life of sophistry (as depicted by Hippias), which is primarily concerned with power, 
and become instead a lover of the good, a person who understands that the truth about being lies 
beyond appearances, and must be discovered, rather than defined by one’s self. That is, one must 
become a philosopher. Thus, when Socrates later alleges that the “most beautiful” thing is 
wisdom about politics (296a), he is saying this already within a context of believing that only 
philosophy will achieve for a person a modicum of this wisdom. The political dimension thus 
shows that the search for the eidos has practical consequences, and is directly related to the 
problem of the good life as it manifests itself politically. It is therefore founded on “interest” 
through and through. These practical consequences are also—as we have seen—tragic, for both 
Hippias and Socrates. Thus the proper attitude toward the beautiful is also one that bears certain 
existential risks, or perhaps demands certain sacrifices. 
 In these three ways, we can see that the picture of aesthetic contemplation found in the 
Hippias Major is thoroughly connected to desire and interest. The ground of judgment is always 
based on an attractive or admirable quality in an object. The contemplation of a beautiful object 
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is never disconnected from the desire inspired by its attractive or admirable qualities. And the 
desire to understand how and why these objects are beautiful, and what the beautiful itself 
consists of, is also connected to the overall interest in the good which is characteristic of 
philosophy. Compared to Kant’s theory, the Hippias Major gives us a view that beauty is born 
within, and always remains within, a web of interests and erotic desire.  
 But it should be made clear, however, that the point of comparison is between Kant’s 
view and that view modeled by Socrates, not Hippias. It is Socrates who is able to both 
appreciate the beautiful as it is in itself within the complex of interests—that is, of erotic 
longing—that constitutes the experience of beautiful beings in the world. Hippias, while feeling 
the same erotic attraction to beauty, ultimately rejects the philosophical attitude required to make 
an insight into the beautiful as it is in itself. This is why I make the argument293 that Hippias is 
more interested in the charm of beauty—in its uses and pleasures—than in the beautiful itself. 
For Kant, a judgment about a beautiful object’s charm (Reiz) is held to be distinct from a 
judgment about an object’s beauty. Charm is an object’s sensory or emotional appeal, and 
according to the Kantian understanding of the term, has nothing to do with beauty as such: “Any 
taste remains barbaric if its liking requires that charms and emotions be mingled in, let alone if it 
makes these the standard of its approval.”294  There is a sense in which the Socratic position in 
the Hippias Major could be said to echo Kant’s distinction here. Socrates is indeed “charmed” by 
beautiful beings, but his relationship to them is not ultimately defined by charm, but rather by the 
desire to make an insight into their intelligible nature. Thus, in contrast with Kant’s view, the 
beauty of objects may manifest itself through charm, and charm does not necessarily keep a 
                                                          
293 See Chapter Three. 
294 The main discussion on charm is found in §13, “A Pure Judgment of Taste is Independent of Charm and 
Emotion.” See Kant, Critique of Judgment, 69. 
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person from contemplating a beautiful being’s intelligible nature as beautiful. However, a person 
may choose to simply stay at the level of charm and not come to a deeper understanding of what 
the beautiful itself is—this is Hippias’s position.  
Conclusion 
 My argument in this chapter can be summarized as follows. The view of the beautiful 
which is presented and enacted by Socrates in the Hippias Major shows us that the desire for 
pleasure, utilitarian interest, and moral concern are all inextricable from the experience of beauty 
as it occurs in human beings.295 It also shows us that philosophical eros is required to see that 
what makes beautiful beings beautiful is the eidos of the beautiful, as opposed to their 
pleasantness, utility, or goodness. Philosophical eros means eros directed toward the good, and it 
is this direction toward the good that allows one to pose the question of the eidos of the beautiful 
and make a noetic insight into its nature. Thus we see that the Hippias Major gives us a view 
about the nature of human contemplation of the beautiful which does not exclude desires and 
interests from the experience of beauty (I may desire the object that I believe to be beautiful, in 
other words), but also preserves a unique status for the beautiful itself (if I pay attention to what 
makes a beautiful being beautiful, I will learn that it is beautiful by virtue of the eidos of the 
                                                          
295 The parallels to the Symposium are once again worth noting. As Andrew Payne writes of Diotima’s Ladder: “The 
lover’s actions in the ascent are all done for the sake of the vision of the form of beauty, a quite determinate end, but 
these actions do not betray adherence to any overarching model of practical rationality” (146). Practical rationality is 
a concern in the Hippias Major: Hippias’s definitions often evoke it (i.e., the spoon), and Socrates does not reject it 
as a constitutive part of the eidos of the beautiful. Ultimately, however, as in the Diotima’s Ladder, the end of 
Socrates’s quest in the Hippias Major cannot be characterized as a practical concern but as the desire to obtain 
noetic knowledge of the beautiful itself. See Andrew Payne, “The Teleology of Ascent in Plato’s Symposium,” 
Apeiron 41 (2008): 123-146. In contrast, the dichotomy which Nussbaum finds in the Symposium between Socrates 
and Alcibiades’s respective perceptions of the beautiful is not found in the Hippias Major: “The faculty that 
apprehends the form is preeminently stable, unwavering, and in our power to exercise regardless of the world’s 
happenings. The faculties that see and hear and respond to Alcibiades will be the feelings and sense-perceptions of 
the body, both vulnerable and inconstant.” Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, 184. The Socrates of the Hippias 
Major responds to feelings and sense perceptions and takes these as starting points in his question to discover eidetic 
knowledge of the beautiful itself.  
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beautiful, and not because of any other reason). To refer once again to Heidegger’s words cited 
above, what the Hippias Major shows us is that the proper “behavior” that a human being must 
adopt in order to allow the beautiful to manifest itself as beautiful is philosophical behavior. This 
philosophical behavior consists of an openness to allow beautiful being to be defined by the 
eidos of the beautiful, and not be defined by appearances, or utility, or by the pleasure it may 
induce. It is only by adopting a philosophical stance that I can approach the beautiful for what it 
really is. In adopting this stance, I too accept certain consequences—consequences which, for 
Socrates, include suffering, but suffering that he believes to be worthwhile.  
 Because it is able to account for a proper “behavior” before the beautiful, while at the 
same time encompassing those experiences of desire and interest which often arise when a 
human being encounters the beautiful, I believe that the Socratic view as presented in the 
Hippias Major is superior to the Kantian theory of disinterestedness. It is able to safeguard a 
unique conceptual space for beauty judgments while at the same time also allowing for the fact 
that beauty judgments are usually accompanied by desire to possess, enjoy, or somehow involve 
one’s self with that object which is being judged as beautiful. As such, the Socratic account gives 
a more accurate account of the way most human beings experience the beautiful. 
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Conclusion 
 The task which I set out to accomplish with this dissertation is to show that where beauty 
becomes an object of possible knowledge (noesis) in the Hippias Major, it does not cease to also 
be an object of love (eros), and in fact that the eidos of the beautiful itself can only be known by 
a soul who eros is directed toward the good, that is, by a philosopher. In other words, the Hippias 
Major presents us not only with an inquiry into the eidos of the beautiful, but it also gives us a 
dramatic presentation of the disposition that a soul must take in order to conduct such an inquiry 
successfully (in the limited, partial, Socratic sense that “success” means, in this context). If one 
does not direct one’s eros toward the good, one still perceives beautiful beings (they are an 
object of eros, after all), but one cannot know them except in terms of their appearance, that is, in 
terms of their relative significance for a human observer (e.g., as pleasant or useful).  When eros 
is directed toward the good, it is tasked with going beyond appearances and toward being. Only 
with such a disposition can the beautiful beings be distinguished from the eidos which makes 
them be beautiful, and make a noetic insight into its nature. I have also tried to show that in 
describing the centrality of eros to the Hippias Major, I am not only making a statement about a 
more accurate way to read this dialogue, but I am also arguing that the dialogue itself says 
something essential about the relationship between eros, beauty, and philosophy, and it does so 
through its dramatic enactment of two ways of relating to the beautiful: Hippias’s way, and 
Socrates’s way, both of which end in distinct types of tragedy. In this conclusion, I would like to 
first, recap the noetic path that Socrates takes, in order to second, show how philosophical eros 
plays a role in it.  
The Hippias Major speaks about beauty in two ways. First, it speaks of beautiful objects: 
maidens, spoons, noble lives, et al. Second is the eidos of the beautiful, which is also beautiful in 
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itself, and which causes objects to become beautiful. As the Symposium (along with the 
Charmides, as well as other dialogues) tells us, beautiful objects are the objects of love (eros). 
What the Hippias Major shows us is a case study in making beautiful objects the object of a 
noetic inquiry. Two things immediately occur when beautiful objects become the object of noetic 
inquiry. First, the objects become distinguished from the eidos of the beautiful, which is what 
gives them their beautiful nature. This eidos is “something.” The second thing that happens is 
that the investigation becomes focused on determining what this eidos consists of, what its 
attributes might be, and how (if possible) one could articulate its definition using words. What 
we are left with at the end of the dialogue is only a partial fulfilment of this task by Socrates. He 
is able to say a few things about the eidos of the beautiful but is not able to encompass the eidos 
in a definition. This is perhaps in itself another truth about the beautiful—that by its very nature 
it eludes a comprehensive discursive understanding—thus, the conclusion that “beautiful things 
are difficult.” But did all of this happen without eros playing a role? No—eros plays a major, 
principle, vital role in the noetic investigation. 
 The first way that eros plays a role is the way we have just mentioned: it is eros which 
notices beautiful beings. But beyond this commonplace observation, there are the ways in which 
philosophical eros guides the noetic investigation itself. As we saw in Chapter One, Socrates’s 
questioning, his interrogative stance, and his interest in the good, are all a function of 
philosophical eros. In Chapter Two, we saw how Socrates’s dialectical engagement with 
Hippias’s definitions of the beautiful produces a sort of “ascent” towards a view of the beautiful 
which includes different types of beings and which, to a certain degree, “scales” upward toward 
higher types of beauties, in a way reminiscent of Diotima’s latter. This “ascent” is also a product 
of philosophical eros. Socrates’s declaration that the eidos causes a being to be, and not appear to 
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be beautiful—and its attendant implication that noesis of the eidos amounts to an insight into the 
intelligible form beyond appearances—is an erotic declaration. It is erotic because the self-
transcending impetus to move beyond appearances and toward intelligible reality is part of what 
constitutes eros. The movement from appearances to being which Socrates talks about, which is 
analogous to the movement from opinion to knowledge, is likewise a movement of self-
transcendence toward an object.296 The Hippias Major also depicts the beautiful as bearing a 
“visible” intelligibility, that is, as being radiant in appearance before anyone who is seeking to 
understand it according to what it is in itself. As such, the beautiful in the Hippias Major is 
similar to the beautiful in the Phaedrus, where it is depicted as being a unique form because it 
makes the intelligible visible. In Chapter Four, we saw that the erotic movement of self-
transcendence required to know the beautiful itself must become a movement toward the good—
this is what produces the shift we see in the dialogue. This shift is important because it orders the 
direction of the discussion with Hippias definitively in the direction of knowing the beautiful as 
it is in itself, and not as it appears to me. The goodness of the beautiful grounds the distinction 
between, and the possibility of an erotic movement from appearances and toward being. 
Goodness is a concept that admits of a relative and intrinsic dimension. It is both good for me (it 
appears good to me), and it is good in itself (it is intrinsically good). Anyone who truly loves the 
good (whose eros is directed toward the good), will want to go from the relative good, to the 
good in itself. Since beautiful beings, as beautiful, are also good, they also inspire and cooperate 
with this transit from appearances to being. Thus we see that the love of the good (eros for the 
good, philosophy) is a necessary condition for any noetic insight into the beautiful itself.  
                                                          
296 To further clarify this point, Schindler’s discussion of Platonic eros is instructive. “Love is self-transcending of 
its very nature, because it aims at what lies beyond mere relativity to self.” This transcending aspect of love mirrors 
the movement from opinion to knowledge because such a movement “involves a renunciation of the Protagorean 
measure, because it is a consent to be measured by what is other than the self. Knowledge means taking something, 
not merely as it is for me, but … as it is in itself.” Schindler, Plato’s Critique of Impure Reason, 129-135. 
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 The result of this noetic-erotic inquiry into the eidos of the beautiful can be gleaned in 
part by examining the dramatic conclusion of the dialogue according to the canons of comedy 
and tragedy. It is my contention that Socrates and Hippias both come to trustworthy noetic 
insights into the beautiful, derived from both their experience of beautiful beings (which they 
discuss throughout the dialogue) and dialectical inquiry into that experience (as when every 
definition is expanded and refined to include different nuances of meaning). But these insights 
are also incomplete. Moreover, Socrates and Hippias finish the dialogue agreeing on one thing: 
that a definition of the beautiful has not been reached. Socrates continues to quest for knowledge 
of the beautiful itself, but it is not clear—and I would argue, it is not the case—that his quest 
remains a quest for a comprehensive definition of the beautiful itself. Rather, he is seeking for a 
knowledge which will always remain incomplete. To use the terms adopted in Chapter Three, 
Socrates’s telic noesis is never an absolute noesis. This is also a sign of the erotic nature of the 
noetic inquiry of the beautiful: it is a venture which encompasses both poverty and plenty, partial 
knowledge and a mystery always beyond complete grasp. The tragic dénouement of the dialogue 
also suggests that, while the proper attitude required to make an insight into the beautiful itself is 
philosophy, or love of the good, it is not the case that this attitude yields the triumph of making it 
to the top of Diotima’s ladder, or of reaching the supernatural realm that Socrates speaks about in 
the Phaedrus. Rather, the philosophical ascent toward the beautiful itself, as it plays out in this 
world, actually requires sacrifice, suffering, and—Socrates perhaps suggests—may end in 
tragedy. Thus the notion that philosophical eros is required to know the eidos of the beautiful 
amounts to much more than the simple idea that an intelligible nature is something only a 
philosopher can see, because only a philosopher is interested in knowing it. Instead, the Hippias 
Major suggests that the attractiveness of beauty invites us to philosophize, and to make a 
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commitment to an ever-deeper insight into its intelligible nature, and that doing so risks suffering 
and maybe tragedy. Philosophy, for Socrates, involves intense and dangerous living.  
 This description of the cooperation between noesis and philosophical eros in the Hippias 
Major gives us a new approach to the more general question in philosophical aesthetics 
concerning the relationship between the contemplation of beauty, and the various desires and 
interests (in pleasure, usefulness, etc.) which comprise human experience. The view of the 
experience of beautiful beings, and of the search for the principle which makes beings beautiful, 
which is presented in the Hippias Major, shows us that the beautiful is part and parcel of the 
whole web of experiences and desires which constitute human life, and that it is not a unique 
mode of contemplation which isolates the self from human desire. In other words, I can call a 
being beautiful while at the same time be charmed by it or desire to possess it (for pleasure or 
utility). But the Hippias Major also shows us that noesis of the eidos of the beautiful requires a 
knowledge that transcends experience, that goes beyond appearances, and that is therefore a 
unique form of contemplation distinct from the desire for pleasure or interest in utility. It is, once 
again, the eros for the good—the necessary disposition for knowing the beautiful. 
 The interpretation of the Hippias Major advanced by this dissertation is that while the 
dialogue deals with the noesis of the beautiful itself, it also models the search for this noesis, and 
this model is philosophical eros. The Hippias Major is not, then, a dialogue which makes a 
theme of eros—as does the Symposium and to a certain extent, the Phaedrus. It is, instead, a 
dialogue which in presenting the philosophical search for the eidos in dramatic fashion allows us 
to see the erotic structure of that search, and also to see why the erotic structure is indispensable 
specifically for the search for the beautiful itself. In showing the intricate relationship between 
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noesis and eros, the Hippias Major can serve as a starting point for further reflection on the deep 
relationship between these two themes in other dialogues in the Platonic corpus. 
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